Appraising glances: evaluating Martin's model of APPRAISAL

Geoff Thompson

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Appraising glances: evaluating Martin's model of APPRAISAL

Abstract. The development of APPRAISAL theory has opened up areas of interpersonal meanings that had been relatively neglected within Systemic Functional Linguistics and other approaches to the analysis of discourse. The model is comprehensive and discourse-based, and in many respects it works well in practice. However, text analysis using the model has thrown up a number of problematic aspects; and in this paper I explore some of the problems in the attitudinal systems. In particular, I question whether all representations of feeling (through mental processes or agnate attributes) should be categorized as AFFECT, and I propose a more restricted definition of AFFECT. I also examine critically the criteria for distinguishing between JUDGEMENT and APPRECIATION, particularly in the area of behavior. Finally, I discuss what I call the 'Chinese box' issue: the possibility of seeing APPRAISAL choices as layered, with a choice in one system functioning as a token of a choice in a different system. This appears to be necessary in order to capture how APPRAISAL works in discourse, but it can become dangerously impressionistic. I argue for an approach to analysis which, while taking such layering into account, consistently stays as close to the wording of the text as possible.

1. Introduction. It has for some time been recognized that evaluation is a central kind of meaning-making. Winter (1982), for example, starts from the assumption that any clause gives two kinds of fundamental information—what is known and what is felt about this—highlighting the fact that we constantly express evaluations of what we talk about. In different ways, evaluation is seen as being at the heart of discourse organization in narrative structure (e.g. Labov 1972), in textual patterns such as Problem-Solution (Hoey 1983, 2001), and in tri-partite models of text (e.g. Sinclair 1988; Bolivar 2001). However, until recently the concept has been only patchily explored in terms of how it is expressed and recognized. Traditional studies in the field of lexis, through the concept of connotation (e.g. Cruse 1986), mainly work with the most basic categories of positive and negative values. Labov provides a list of linguistic features associated with evaluation in narrative, and studies of clause relations (e.g. Hoey 2001; Jordan 2001) have identified certain patterns of connection which involve evaluation, and have explored the
ways in which it is signalled. The focus in these studies is on how evaluation is recognized: for Labov, the kind of evaluation is largely irrelevant, while for Hoey and Jordan the question is simply whether the evaluation is positive or negative. What has rarely been investigated, at least in linguistics, is the question of what values are drawn on. This gap seems odd, given the extent to which categories of evaluation are crucial (and increasingly explicit and sophisticated) in a wide range of areas of activity where judgments are made—be it assessment of student work, of performance in jobs, of efficiency of equipment, of legality of actions, et cetera.

There have been a few studies which categorize the values at stake in particular registers. Hunston (1993) and Thetela (1997), for example, both provide different, though compatible, accounts of values by which concepts and activities are judged in formal academic discourse. Research into pattern grammar in the Cobuild project (Francis and Manning 1997; Hunston and Francis 2000) has—almost despite itself, given its principled concentration on syntagmatic rather than paradigmatic choices—begun to throw up particular semantic groupings which fit into patterns associated with evaluation (see also Hunston and Sinclair 2000). However, it is within Systemic Functional Linguistics that the investigation of the systems of evaluative choices available to language users and of their function in discourse has been carried farthest. In a key paper, Lemke (1998) identifies seven broad categories of ‘evaluative attributes of propositions and proposals’ and discusses various related features of text semantics such as ‘evaluative metaphor’ (in which a wording which expresses one kind of evaluative attribute is used in context to realize a different kind). Lemke’s model was being developed at the same time as Martin’s (see below), and despite differences—for example, Lemke is explicitly interested only in the evaluation of propositions and proposals, whereas Martin does not specify that restriction and in fact focuses more on the evaluation of entities—they share many concerns and insights.

The most fully developed model of evaluation is that of APPRAISAL, which has been elaborated by Martin (2000; Christie and Martin 1997; Martin and Rose 2003; Martin and White 2005) and his associates, especially White (e.g. 2000) who maintains an extensive website (www.grammatics.com/appraisal) dedicated to the model which has served both as an introduction to the theory for many scholars and as a testbed for a number of recent refinements and extensions. Macken-Horarik and Martin (2003) provide a usefully representative sample of recent work on APPRAISAL. The approach is lexically-based but text-oriented and designed to link in with grammatical systems. However, de-
spite its undoubted strengths, there are certain aspects of the model which seem to me to raise problematic issues. and in this paper I wish to explore these issues and to suggest possible responses to the problems.

2. ATTITUDE in the APPRAISAL model. What follows is deliberately a sketchy outline of the approach, intended to serve merely as grounding for the subsequent discussion. The basic framework of the model combines an appealing simplicity with a potential for scales of delicacy in analysis. APPRAISAL is seen as drawing on three sets of resources (Martin and White 2005: 35): ENGAGEMENT ("the play of voices around opinions in discourse"), GRADUATION (the ways in which "feelings are amplified and categories blurred"), and the core systems of evaluative choices captured in ATTITUDE. The focus here is on the latter.

The central system is AFFECT: the set of choices to do with 'emotional responses'—expressing reactions to, and feelings about, things, such as liking or fearing. This is 'institutionalized', in Martin's (2000: 147) term, in two other systems, JUDGEMENT and APPRECIATION. JUDGEMENT is the realm of ethical and moral assessments of human behavior, drawing on and constructing "norms about how people should and shouldn't behave" (Martin 2000: 155). APPRECIATION, on the other hand, is the realm of aesthetic assessments of "products, performances and naturally occurring phenomena" (2000: 159). Thus, in the very simplest terms, AFFECT consists of variations on 'I like/dislike it/her'; JUDGEMENT consists of variations on 'She is good/bad'; and APPRECIATION consists of variations on 'It is nice/nasty'. All acts of appraisal are in essence expressions of the appraiser's positive or negative feelings about something, and the institutionalization that Martin refers to can be seen as the evolution of a different form of construal of these feelings. Instead of the act of appraisal being represented in its most 'natural' form, as the appraiser's process of reaction directed towards, or stimulated by, some entity or state of affairs as in AFFECT, it is represented as a quality ascribed to or inhering in the entity or state. Whereas AFFECT therefore normally involves explicit reference to the source of the appraisal, in JUDGEMENT and APPRECIATION the source is not an inherent part of the figure: the reaction is, in a sense, transferred to the thing appraised.

As noted above, each of the three systems allows more delicate categorization of types of appraisal. For example, AFFECT includes amongst other distinctions the difference between realis and irrealis, depending on whether the feelings are directed towards existing entities and states or towards future states as yet unrealized. This covers the dif-
ference between ‘I like it’ and ‘I want it’. JUDGEMENT divides into social esteem (‘she is clever’) and social sanction (‘she is honest’), while APPRECIATION includes the sub-categories of Valuation (‘it is innovative’), Reaction (‘it is exciting’) and Composition (‘it is harmonious’). All these categories have further sub-divisions based on evidence from the analysis of a range of texts and registers, and, as mentioned above, the positive-negative distinction applies across all the systems. Overall, the categories are claimed to reflect not only the conventional means of expressing appraisal in a given language, but more fundamentally the feelings and values of a culture, the attitudes which it is ‘normal’ for members of that culture to have and the parameters within which they ‘place’ their experiences.

An important feature of the model, which has shown itself to be vital in dealing with the analysis of naturally-occurring texts, is the assumption that appraisal can be expressed in a range of ways. It is not only that evaluative lexical resources are much more varied than the consciously simple examples used so far might suggest. Although mental processes and attributes frequently realize the appraisal in AFFECT and JUDGEMENT/APPRECIATION respectively, there are many other ways of introducing evaluation into one’s messages. A more far-reaching insight is that not all appraising is explicit or ‘inscribed’: an utterance without evaluative lexis such as ‘that child tears the wings off butterflies’ is clearly intended (in British culture, at least!) to express a negative judgment of the child. Martin (2000: 154) terms this ‘evoked appraisal’, and the expression ‘tears the wings off butterflies’ is a ‘token’ of evoked JUDGEMENT. [In later publications (e.g. Martin and White 2005), the term ‘invoked’ is used instead of ‘evoked’.] This is similar to the claim in Hunston (1993) that, in order to understand evaluation in research articles, it is necessary to invoke the concept of goals: whatever is represented in the text as contributing to the goals of the research is to be taken as positively evaluated even if no explicitly evaluative terms are used.

With evoked appraisal, we are told something about an entity or state which is intended to elicit a particular kind of evaluative reaction, without any of the lexical items being identifiable as unambiguously evaluative. One way of viewing this is to borrow terminology from Jordan (2001). He notes that Assessments of all kinds in discourse are frequently accompanied by Basis—a reason for the assessment. In its simplest form, evoked appraisal involves giving an experiential, ‘observable’ Basis and leaving the addressees to reconstitute the Assessment for themselves. This strategy clearly depends on shared values, or at least on the addressees perceiving and accepting, however provision-
ally, the values which are required in order to make the statement relevant. It is therefore a powerful resource for maintaining values within a culture which gain strength from being so taken for granted that they do not need to be spelt out; and it can, of course, also be deployed manipulatively, since it may be harder for readers and hearers to resist values which are assumed but not overtly expressed. It can also be used to construct group membership: if you understand the value that is intended to be evoked by the experiential Basis and accept the connection, you thereby display your in-group status (for example, 'he wears sandals with socks' might seem an innocent statement to some people, but many British readers would recognize it as a token of scornfully negative JUDGEMENT of the sandal-wearer's sartorial taste and, as an exten-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>inscribed</th>
<th>is awful</th>
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<tr>
<td>↓</td>
<td>is tasteless</td>
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<tr>
<td>provoked</td>
<td>This dish is a bit too Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
<td>is high in fat content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evoked</td>
<td>has 2000 calories</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1 From inscribed to evoked ATTITUDE
sion, of the political and social beliefs that are assumed to be reflected in his dress).

There is in fact a cline between evoked and inscribed appraisal, and Peter White suggests that in the intermediate area we have 'provoked' appraisal. This covers cases where there are lexico-grammatical signals that appraisal is happening even though it is not being fully inscribed. The difference, and the cline, can be illustrated with the invented examples of APPRECIATION shown in Figure 1.

The nature of evoked appraisal highlights the last point that I want to bring out in this sketch of the theory. As mentioned above, tokens of appraisal rely on the assumption that the addressee will recognize and accept that the experiential meanings expressed lead 'naturally' to a particular evaluation. More generally, Martin (2000: 165) points out that "appraisal resources play an important role in negotiating solidarity": any expression of appraisal represents an invitation to the addressee to react to the evaluation, with the normal expectation that the reaction will be one of agreement. Contrary to the traditional view, Appraisal, like modality, is not just a personal form of meaning making ('saying what you think about something') but a profoundly interpersonal one ('setting out to induce a reaction (by saying what you think about something').

So much for the main features of the theory as I see them. Although there is no space to illustrate the theory in action, it has been demonstrated in numerous studies that APPRAISAL analysis can provide an economical handle on central aspects of meaning in text which other forms of analysis would not be able to capture. In the rest of the paper, I will be adopting a more critical perspective, but this should be seen not as an assault on the model but as an attempt to iron out certain wrinkles that have emerged in trying to apply it to a range of texts.

3.1. Issue 1: the scope of AFFECT. There are three interrelated points that I want to explore, each of which I see as increasingly more problematic. The first is the scope of AFFECT. This has two aspects: source and directedness.

In the simple examples that I have given so far, the source of AFFECT has been either the speaker or addressee. In such cases, the solidarity-inducing effect which was mentioned above as one of the central functions of the act of appraising is generally very clear. In the following extract from an article about a duchess who has designed a grand garden, the writer supports her 'liking' by deploying JUDGEMENT resources in the second sentence to detail the reasons why she liked her, thus encouraging the reader to accept the evaluation (the signal of AFFECT is underlined).
(1) But actually as soon as I met her, I liked her. She is completely un-duchessy, rather alarmingly naïve, and girlish in her enthusiasm.

However, it is of course also possible to report a third person’s reactions and feelings. This may be in the form of an explicitly signaled report of an utterance:

(2) She talked to a few English garden designers, but she says she was not impressed.

But it may also take the form of a description by the writer/speaker:

(3) The National Gallery is furious with the Duke. The Duke, in turn, is furious with the National Gallery.

The issue that arises is the status of such third-person emotings in the model. They clearly do not construe the negotiation between the writer and reader directly. Should they then be included as expressions of APPRAISAL or not? The outline of AFFECT categories in Martin (2000: 149) certainly indicates that they should: the illustrative clauses are consistently third-person (though the texts that are analysed have only interactant-sourced AFFECT). There is a parallel with JUDGEMENT and APPRECIATION being ascribed to a third person, as in:

(4) They argued successfully that it would be bad for him to have so much money so young.

However, the parallel would not cover cases like (3) above where the source is not indicated in a separate clause (‘they argued that’) or other form of source tag (e.g. ‘according to them’) but is typically the Senser of a mental process of affection (‘people hate it’); this is specific to AFFECT. The technical difficulty I have with this is that it means that AFFECT resources incorporate completely the transitivity categories of mental processes of affection and desideration (for the transitivity categories, see Halliday and Matthiessen 2004). Admittedly, AFFECT covers a wider area, including the cognate expressions of feelings in the form of relational processes with ‘emotion’ attributes (compare ‘I hate them’: mental process of affection, and ‘I am furious with them’: relational process with attribute). Nevertheless, it would seem odd to have two very different orders of linguistic categories, one interpersonal, the other experiential, which map exclusively onto each other (at least in one direction). Clearly any representation of human emotion is likely to
be engaging, since this aspect of experience has a special status for us, and one important function of the representation of third-person reactions is to dramatise the narrative and 'round out' the person to whom the emotions are ascribed. The description above of the Duke and the National Gallery at loggerheads is no doubt intended to amuse and titillate readers, but it does not appear, at first sight, to invite agreement or a responding reaction from the reader.

I added ‘at first sight’ because there are numerous cases where the construal of third-person emotions does serve to elicit a reaction. However, this is done indirectly: the appraisal is evoked, and it is typically JUDGEMENT that is at stake rather than AFFECT. It could be argued, for example, that even the description of the Duke and the National Gallery in (3) functions in the text to evoke a negative assessment of both parties engaged in a petty squabble. A clearer example comes at the end of the article, where the writer sums up her impression of the Duchess:

(5) I am inclined to agree with Mary Keen that vanity comes into it. She wants to make her name, obviously, and she is not unhappy with media attention. She also seems to have a bee in her bonnet about the gardening establishment, or English gardening snobbery.

Here we are told about the Duchess's wishes and feelings, as a way of supporting the judgment of her 'vanity'. It would be feasible to describe this as AFFECT being used to evoke—or, rather, provoke—JUDGEMENT, which would fit in with a very frequent pattern in appraisal (see 3.3 below). However, I would argue that that would blur the functional boundaries of AFFECT unhelpfully, and that it would be theoretically more secure to regard these simply as experiential representations of emotion which often serve as provoking tokens of JUDGEMENT. This could turn out to be one of their main, perhaps even overriding, functions in many genres such as narration: other people's feelings are described as a way of depicting what kind of person they are and therefore how the addressee is intended to judge them. In interactant-sourced AFFECT, on the other hand, the direct appeal for validation from the addressee is primary, and the 'persona-construing' function, though it will often be in play, is generally secondary. It is worth mentioning that one beneficial by-product of this limitation of the scope of AFFECT would be a slight simplification of the 'Chinese box' problem addressed in 3.3.

The second aspect of the scope of AFFECT concerns the directedness of the emotion. Although it has not been highlighted, in all the ex-
amples discussed so far there has been what we can call an ‘Appraised Entity’ or AE (this term is based on Thetela’s 1997 concept of the Evaluated Entity, or EE). However, emotional states may be generalized and undirected, and Martin (2000:151) includes as realizations of AFFECT words like ‘cheerful’ and ‘confident’, which are often used to describe more or less permanent character traits that are not a response to a specific stimulus. In some cases, a focus of the emotion can be identified. In the following, the state of happiness could be said to be directed towards ‘living in a cottage’:

(6) My husband and I would be just as happy living in a cottage as a castle.

With ‘cheerful’ (applied to people), one of the commonest phrases thrown up by a concordance search is ‘reasons to be cheerful’, which suggests that cheerfulness is often the result of a stimulus, and ‘cheerful about’ also occurs frequently. These are straightforwardly AFFECT. In a number of cases, however, no AE is recoverable, and including these under AFFECT seems again to blur the boundaries of the concept. It is immediately noticeable that a concordance search on ‘cheerful person’ tends to throw up cases where that term is paired with terms that clearly express JUDGEMENT. The following is a brief sample from Google:

(7) She is an independent and cheerful person looking for an understanding and interesting partner.

(8) Being an extremely sociable and cheerful person, I have always enjoyed interacting with people.

(9) I am a very open-minded and cheerful person.

It is significant that the phrase seems closely associated with descriptions of people looking for partners; this is a prime site for JUDGEMENT of oneself. The writers do also talk about their likes and dislikes, but, interestingly, ‘cheerful’ tends not to occur in that part of the personal ad. Being of a particular disposition, even where that involves being normally in a particular emotional state, would then appear to be construed as an ethical quality rather than an emotional response. Thus I would place undirected feeling outside AFFECT (though still within APPRAISAL, as part of JUDGEMENT resources).
Putting the two points above together, I would argue that AFFECT should be limited to interactant-sourced directed feeling. Other types of construal of feeling should be treated as sharing with AFFECT the general characteristic of providing a particular kind of what we might call ‘textual relief’—adding emotional light and shade to the discourse—for a range of purposes, but they enter into the system of APPRAISAL resources only as JUDGEMENT, either inscribed or indirectly as tokens, with the human source of the feeling as the AE giving evidence of their ethical character by the emotions that they display. This therefore contrasts markedly with AFFECT, where the feeling is construed as directed from the human source towards the AE.

3.2. Issue 2: appraising behavior. The concept of the AE leads to the second issue: the basis for establishing JUDGEMENT and APPRECIATION as separate categories. The distinction has been glossed in a range of ways, which can be summarised as in Figure 2 (mainly drawing on Martin 2000).

In many cases, the distinction is relatively easy to apply, but (as one would predict) there are a number of areas where the boundaries are blurred. In particular, human behavior can be seen as either action/state or product, as illustrated in the following invented set:

(10) He was catching the ball brilliantly.

(11) His catches were brilliant.

(12) His catching was brilliant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>feelings in the context of:</th>
<th>JUDGEMENT</th>
<th>APPRECIATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>proposals (“norms of how people should and shouldn’t behave”)</td>
<td>propositions (“norms about how products . . . are valued”)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>areas of values:</td>
<td>morality, ethics</td>
<td>aesthetics, worth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appraised Entity:</td>
<td>human behavior and character</td>
<td>products of behavior, natural phenomena</td>
</tr>
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Figure 2 Criteria for distinguishing JUDGEMENT and APPRECIATION
Here, (10) is fairly unproblematically JUDGEMENT: capacity, while (11) appears to be worded as APPRECIATION: reaction. The assignment of a category here depends most strongly on what view is taken of the AE: whether or not it is human behavior (the process of 'catching') which is being evaluated or a 'thing' which is a product of that behavior ('a catch'). Example (12), however, could be seen as closer to either of the first two, depending on how much the verbal, process, meaning of 'catching' is felt to be present.

The main complicating factor here is the intersection of APPRAISAL with nominalization. When behavior is nominalized it moves into a grey area between action and product, and, although the grammatical structure takes it towards product and therefore APPRECIATION, the evaluative terms chosen can sometimes be associated with JUDGEMENT, as in (13), or appear to evoke/provoke JUDGEMENT as in (14) (the AEs are underlined):

(13) He said that he deeply regretted his actions and conceded his behavior was "unacceptable and irresponsible".

(14) This type of corporate exploitation of children has to stop.

A further step in this grey area takes us to the results of behavior, which can also be evaluated in ethical terms that belong most typically to JUDGEMENT: the attributes of the human behaver are transferred to the product. In descriptions like 'a kind word' and 'a vicious rumor', the evaluative items actually indicate the moral qualities of the person who utters the word and spreads the rumor; and yet the wording attributes these qualities to the results, in a form of transfer which occurs so frequently that it can be argued that any sense of a metaphorical 'disjunction' has all but disappeared. This would suggest that even (11) above should perhaps be categorized as JUDGEMENT.

In principle, it is possible to treat this intermediate area in either of two ways. The first is to group together all appraisals of behavior as involving JUDGEMENT, irrespective of the formal characteristics of the wording. The rationale that can be advanced in favor of a more semantically-based labelling is that it makes intuitive sense to separate any appraisal directed towards an AE with [+human] as an inherent feature. The homogeneity of such a grouping is reflected in the fact that, as noted above, the values are often those associated with JUDGEMENT, and closely agnate forms can make clearer the intended focus and type of evaluation. Thus (13) can be paraphrased as 'he behaved "unaccept-
ably and irresponsibly””, which could be used to justify a JUDGEMENT reading.

However, this does not solve all the problems. It is not, for example, easy to decide exactly when paraphrasing should be applied, or how far to take it. In many cases, paraphrasing does not help, even with fairly straightforward nominalizations of behavior. If we compare:

(15) His resignation was in the public interest

with the most obvious paraphrase ‘he resigned in the public interest’, the appraisal is different: the paraphrase indicates his reason for resigning (and thus appraises him positively), whereas the original does not (the action is positively appraised, whether or not he did it for good reasons). More fundamentally, it is not clear where the boundary should be drawn. If the results of behavior are included, potentially any human artifact should be subject to JUDGEMENT, which starts to dissolve any meaningful distinction. If only nominalizations of behavior are included, the scope is more limited, but still fuzzy. In (15), it is the action rather than the person that is being appraised, and labelling this as JUDGEMENT would obscure that difference. Yet it would be difficult to devise tests which would reliably separate cases like (15) from those like (13), where the JUDGEMENT reading seems in principle more defensible.

An alternative way of dealing with the difficulties outlined above is, to appropriate John Sinclair’s phrase, to ‘trust the text’ (Sinclair & Carter 2004). Wherever possible, I would argue that the wording should be taken as the basis for the initial assignment of categories. This frequently comes down to taking the AE at face value, as it were. In (12) above, for example, I feel that most weight should be given to the fact that ‘catching’ is a nominal form, indicating that the speaker is treating the behavior as a product; similarly, in ‘a kind word’, the value is ascribed to a product. Both would therefore be categorized as APPRECIATION. One advantage of relying on the formal nature of the AE is that it links APPRAISAL in with a major motif in the crypto-grammar of English (and probably most, if not all, languages): the distinction between conscious and non-conscious entities (reflected not only in the ‘he/she’ vs. ‘it’ distinction, but in less obvious ways such as the special grammar of mental process clauses which can normally only have a human Senser). This kind of constraint on at least the initial categorization seems essential if an examination of APPRAISAL in a text is to retain as much of a footing in replicable linguistic analysis as possible, rather than being a
subjective commentary on one person’s reading of the text. There is also the fundamental point that the speaker/writer could, in principle, have chosen the wording of the paraphrase but did not. No paraphrase is synonymous with the original wording. Although they have obvious aspects of meaning in common, the differences are precisely what make the relationship one of paraphrase. The analysis should therefore start from what was said rather than what might have been meant.

The concept of ‘trusting the text’ takes us directly on to the third issue, which is the most difficult facing anyone exploring APPRAISAL in text (Macken-Horarik 2003 also identifies it as the main ‘intractable’ issue).

3.3. Issue 3: the ‘Chinese box’ syndrome. It is probably best to start the discussion of what I am terming the ‘Chinese box’ problem with an illustration. The following extract is from an introduction to a collection of short stories by Henry James. An initial analysis of the ATTITUDE choices has been added.

[Appraised Entity is in italics. Inscribed appraisal is in bold. Tokens evoking appraisal are underlined.]

(16) Henry James is a greater novelist than short-story writer [+/- JUDGEMENT: capacity] because he always needed space. As he grew older he needed more space and the late manner was right and necessary for the late novels [+APPRECIATION: composition]. But for the short stories it was fatal [-APPRECIATION: composition]: they became long stories, losing on the swings and gaining nothing on the roundabouts [-APPRECIATION: valuation].

When he came to revise his early stories for the Definitive Edition of his works published in 1908-9, he sacrificed directness for unnecessary refinements [-JUDGEMENT: capacity [-APPRECIATION: composition]]. I have therefore printed the stories from the text of the first editions, though I have sometimes preferred the punctuation of a second edition [+AFFECT: satisfaction] where he had improved it [+APPRECIATION: composition].

This collection was planned to be a volume of the short stories which I like the most [+AFFECT: satisfaction] and believe to be the best introduction to reading James at all [+APPRECIATION: composition]. After I had made my choice, I was shown a copy of The Short Stories of Henry James, selected and edited by
Clifton Fadiman, New York, 1945. Mr. Fadiman’s selection confirmed my judgement with regard to six stories [+APPRECIATION: valuation], but I confess I found his notes antipathetic [-APPRECIATION: reaction].

To remark of Brooksmith that “the scaffolding of this tale rests upon the existence of a class-stratified society” is silly [-JUDGEMENT: capacity], as all civilised human societies are, and always have been, class-stratified. If American critics admire James, they do so with a bad grace [-JUDGEMENT: propriety]
From David Garnett’s Introduction to Fourteen Stories by Henry James, Rupert Hart-Davis (1945)

In the labeling I have kept as close as possible to the wording, but, even in a relatively simple text like this, I have had to exercise my discretion in a few cases. For example, I have, in line with my arguments in 3.1 above, taken the expression of the American critics’ feelings of ‘bad grace’ not as third-person AFFECT but simply as a provoking token of JUDGEMENT. Slightly more hesitantly, I have coded ‘antipathetic’ as APPRECIATION: reaction rather than the possible alternative, AFFECT: dissatisfaction—the ‘reaction’ categories are very close to AFFECT, as the topological perspective on APPRAISAL in Martin (2000: 165) makes clear. The analysis of ‘To remark ... is silly’ illustrates the problem discussed in relation to examples (13)–(15) above. I have opted for JUDGEMENT, on the grounds that Fadiman is the understood ‘re­marker’ (‘it was silly of Fadiman to remark ...’), but it would be possible to take the embedded ‘to’-infinitive clause as equivalent to a nominal group, which would move it towards APPRECIATION.

These are fairly self-contained problems. However, a broader issue begins to emerge in the second paragraph, where I have coded the in­scribed APPRECIATION ‘unnecessary’ as embedded within the token of provoked JUDGEMENT. The negative assessment of the ‘refine­ments’ clearly makes explicit the balance of values involved in the ‘sac­rifice’: ‘directness’: good; ‘refinements’: bad (because ‘unnecessary’). Less overtly, I have not tried to capture the conflict of values presented in the last paragraph (where, for example, the quote indicates that for Fadiman ‘class-stratified’ expresses negative APPRECIATION, while Garnett counters by using it as a neutral term); instead, I have taken this as the Basis for the Assessment expressed in ‘silly’ and therefore dis­coursally subordinate—embedded in the negotiation around the main evaluation. Going back to ‘bad grace’, even if this were interactant-oriented and therefore counted as AFFECT, the expression would nor-
mally function as a token of JUDGEMENT: it does not mean just ‘unwilling’ but ‘reprehensibly unwilling’ (compare ‘have a bee in her bonnet’ in (5) above, which means ‘be reprehensibly obsessed’). It is very common to find such cases, where one kind of appraisal is nested inside another kind for which it functions primarily in that context—or even typically in most contexts—as a token or basis (cf. Lemke’s 1998 concept of ‘evaluative metaphor’). The analytical decisions that I have made seem relatively uncontroversial, and indeed essential to capture the meanings being constructed, but, to mix metaphors, they in fact open up a Chinese box of worms.

All the examples are within single sentences, which constrains the scope of the re-assignment and makes it appear manageable. But it can be argued that the same considerations should apply to longer stretches. For instance, the main point of the first paragraph could be taken as the comparison between Henry James as novelist and as short-story writer; in which case, the APPRECIATION of his works would count as tokens of the JUDGEMENT made explicit in the first sentence. In a rather similar way, the evaluation of Fadiman’s notes as ‘antipathetic’ could be subsumed within the JUDGEMENT of American critics in the following sentences, since this could be seen as the point towards which the argument is heading. Or it could possibly be the other way round: the JUDGEMENT could be seen as the basis for the APPRECIATION, indicating to the reader why the notes are antipathetic, and therefore subordinate in the hierarchy of appraisal at this point in the text.

I have deliberately chosen an extract in which such potential shifts in the appraising categories are relatively clear and small-scale, to avoid getting too bogged down in the details; but many texts present far more complex cases, where, for example, an expression of AFFECT serves as a token of JUDGEMENT in the clause as a whole, which serves as a token of APPRECIATION in the unfolding text (and so on). It seems indisputable that readers and hearers recognize such shifts and accommodate to them without much difficulty (though it would be worthwhile to devise studies to test empirically addressees’ perceptions of patterns of evaluation in particular kinds of discourse). However, an acceptance of this fact can lead to an understandable temptation for analysts to downplay the importance of the wordings and to focus instead on fitting each clause inside an overall pattern of evaluation across the text. It is at this point that the concept of tokens of evoked APPRAISAL becomes somewhat dangerous: if any kind of appraisal in a text can stand as a token of another kind (which can then itself stand as a token of yet another kind), it is difficult to find a principled way of establishing an analysis which,
while avoiding any unrealistically constraining desire to be ‘provable’, is at least generally plausible. How does the analyst know when to stop? Should the aim be to arrive at a characterization of a text as, say, a macro-judgment, and then to re-assign all appraisals within that overall appraisal?

Macken-Horarik (2003: 318) rightly stresses the need for a dynamic model of APPRAISAL which takes full account of the context of individual choices, but she also notes the problems inherent in this approach. If not cautiously handled, it runs the risk of losing sight of the trees for the wood. Picking up on the principle of ‘trusting the text’ as outlined in 3.2, it would seem important at least not to elide the steps by which an analysis is arrived at. An expression of, say, JUDGEMENT, which is realized by a token drawing on AFFECT resources is different, in ways which are in principle definable, from an inscribed expression of JUDGEMENT. Similarly, moving up in scale, a text in which the main realizations of JUDGEMENT are tokens drawing on AFFECT is different, in definable ways, from a text where JUDGEMENT is mainly inscribed. By tracking the layers of appraisal ‘outward’, it can at least be made explicit that each step represents a further move into interpretation.

In addition to tracking appraisals as suggested above, it may be that another way of reducing the problems of the Chinese box syndrome is to introduce the kind of differentiations found in certain other approaches to evaluation. One feature of the APPRAISAL model is that it is relatively ‘flat’: although nested evaluations are fully accepted, they are generally seen in terms of looping back to re-enter the same systems. Hunston (2000:205), in contrast, argues for a distinction between evaluation on the autonomous plane (“what the world is seen as made up of”) and evaluation on the interactive plane (“what counts as knowledge or as a valid argument”). Thetela (1997) makes a distinction that is similar in some respects between Topic-Oriented Evaluation (TOE) and Research-Oriented Evaluation (ROE) in research articles: TOE relates to evaluation of the world being observed, whereas ROE relates to evaluation of the research being carried out by means of those observations. TOE is therefore inherently nested within ROE; ROE is the evaluation which is being negotiated between writer and reader, while TOE primarily serves as a basis for the ROE. We can see this in the following extract from a history book:

(18) The futility of the Yorkist attempts to engineer revolution should not lead us to underestimate their seriousness as a problem. The
government of Henry VII was but poorly equipped to meet the challenge of arms.

In the second sentence of (1), ‘poorly’ expresses explicit JUDGEMENT of the ‘government’, but the primary evaluation to be negotiated is the APPRECIATION of the ‘attempts to engineer revolution’ in the first sentence (as is reflected in the presence of the modal ‘should’ and the explicit inclusion of the readership in ‘us’) — the second sentence illustrates and justifies the ‘seriousness of the problem’. In this approach, the JUDGEMENT in sentence 2 is not re-assigned to APPRECIATION; it is simply seen as working on a different level.

With appropriate changes of terminology, I would argue that a similar distinction could serve as a refinement of the APPRAISAL model. The restriction to ‘research’ in ROE is clearly too narrow for general use. The main point is that this is the evaluation which is at stake between the writer/speaker and reader/hearer, and thus the term Interaction-Oriented Appraisal is more suitable. Some appraisals would be seen as ‘internal’ to the topic, part of the establishment of the basis on which the main appraisal, which the addressee is being invited to accept, is grounded. This step would not, by any means, get round all the problems, but, if it is combined with the general principle that analysis should start with the form of wording and, where necessary, be tracked ‘outwards’, the fuzziness and reliance on individual intuition that can bedevil appraisal analysis may perhaps start to be tamed.

4. Conclusion. APPRAISAL resources draw on a very wide range of structures, and, as Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) and others have pointed out, interpersonal meanings are inherently prosodic, running through the clause and the text in a cumulative fashion. A rigidly constituent-based analysis is therefore not appropriate, and overlaps, nesting, and ambiguity of evaluation are all to be expected. Nevertheless, I would argue strongly in favor of a recognition that it is important, as far as is practical, to sharpen the definition of the categories, and to tether analyses of evaluation firmly to the wording selected by the writer or speaker. Only by doing that can we avoid the charge that we are merely providing an idiosyncratic and impressionistic commentary on discourse rather than a replicable linguistic analysis.
REFERENCES


