But me some buts: A multidimensional view of conjunction

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Abstract

Although the distinction between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ conjunction introduced by Halliday and Hasan (1976) is well established, mainstream studies have, with certain notable exceptions, tended to focus on ‘external’ types as the core categories and to present ‘internal’ conjunction as a relatively unmotivated set of pragmatic extensions of the core. The present paper, working within the broad framework of systemic functional linguistics (see, e.g., Halliday and Matthiessen 2004), makes the case for recognizing a more central role for ‘internal’ conjunction. Current accounts of ‘internal’ conjunction are reviewed and it is argued that the phenomenon can be defined with more precision than is done at present, even in those models that give it full weight. A more discriminating model of analysis is proposed and related to broader features of the language system. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of assigning greater importance to textual and interpersonal dimensions in descriptions of conjunction.

Keywords: conjunction; discourse connectivity; pragmatics.

1. Introduction

It has frequently been noted in studies of conjunction that instances like (2) are in some sense ‘anomalous’ in relation to (1) (both examples taken from the Web—see Appendix for list of sources):1

(1) The application has failed to start because cygfreetype-6.dll was not found.

(2) I think I must have been his first date because he had no idea how to kiss.
The relationship between the two clauses in (1) is what is generally taken as ‘normal’ for because: it is one of ‘real-world’ causation, in which the because clause expresses the reason why the event or state in the other clause comes about. The relationship in (2), on the other hand, is clearly different: the fact that the writer was his first date does not depend causally on the boyfriend having no idea how to kiss—indeed, if anything the logical causal relationship is the reverse (he had no idea how to kiss because she was his first date). Instead, the because clause gives what Davies (1979: 174) terms the speaker’s ‘reason for knowing’—it can be glossed as: ‘the reason why I deduce I was his first date is that he had no idea how to kiss’.

While this and other similar cases of ‘anomalous’ uses of conjunctions are recognized, there have been relatively few attempts to fit them into a general model of connectivity in text or to explore the implications for the concept of conjunction as a whole. They have often been overlooked or at least relegated to being treated as pragmatic extensions of the ‘literal’ or ‘core’ meaning of the conjunction. However, in recent years there has been a shift toward greater focus on what is often called ‘internal’ conjunction (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 239; and see especially Martin 1992: 207; Martin and Rose 2003: 120). This concept represents an explicit recognition that conjunction involves more than the encoding of ‘external’ relations between ‘real-world’ states of affairs as illustrated in (1) above. In Halliday and Hasan’s view:

internal relations may be regarded as an extension of the underlying patterns of conjunction into the communication situation itself, treating it, and thereby also the text—the linguistic component of the communication process—as having by analogy the same structure as ‘reality’. (1976: 267)

Thus ‘internal’ relations are seen as internal to the text, conjunctive relationships between steps or moves in the discourse rather than between the external events and states represented in the text. For example, the use of because illustrated in (2) above signals the relationship between a claim and the justification for that claim.

The exact scope of ‘internal’ conjunction, however, is sometimes ill-defined, and it covers a number of phenomena that appear somewhat disparate—not only the kind of ‘internal causal’ relation in (2) but also text organization relations as signaled by markers such as firstly. What I wish to do in this paper is to explore the ‘internal–external’ distinction in greater detail, and to set out what I see as a more fully rounded model of conjunction: this involves in particular arguing for a principled division between two different types of conjunction that are normally both subsumed under ‘internal’.
2. **Contrasting perspectives on conjunction**

Studies of the semantic phenomenon of conjunction typically start either from the forms or from the relations. Focus on forms is centered on the study of the word class of conjunctions: those conjunctive relationships that are explicitly signaled by conjunctions are taken as primary. The main aim is to arrive at a categorization of all members of the grammatical class of conjunctions according to semantic criteria (e.g., ‘time sequence’), but also to structural criteria (e.g., ‘subordinating’ vs. ‘coordinating’). Potential conjunctive relations that are not signaled by conjunctions are normally left unexplored, although it may be noted that certain relations, such as ‘conditional’, can hold without the overt presence of a conjunction (see, e.g., Quirk et al. 1985: 1094). This approach tends to be associated with the assumption of a major distinction between structural and nonstructural connectivity (clause complexing vs. cohesion); the similarities between these two aspects of conjunction may be recognized but they may also be downplayed, or even ignored.

Focus on relations, on the other hand, aims to identify a set of semantic relations that potentially includes all the possible ways in which two stretches of text may be connected, and thus tends to elide the distinction between structural and nonstructural connectivity. There may be overt signals of the relations, including not only conjunctions such as *whereas* but also conjuncts such as *on the other hand*, lexical signals such as *comparison*, structural signals such as parallelism, and so on. Alternatively, the relation may not be explicitly signaled. Approaches of this kind include clause-relational analyses (e.g., Hoey 1983; Winter 1994) and rhetorical structure theory (RST: e.g., Mann and Thompson 1988; Mann et al. 1992). These start from the assumption that each clause in a stretch of discourse that is perceived as coherent stands in some kind of relation to at least one other adjacent or nearby clause, and that these relationships affect the way the clause is interpreted (or, to express it the other way round: discourse will be perceived as coherent if it is possible to see plausible relations between the clauses). The present study works within this tradition, and, in particular, I will adopt from these approaches the principle of exhaustiveness—that every ranking clause should, except in special circumstances, be in a relation with at least one other clause in its neighborhood, whether or not that relation is made explicit by a conjunctive signal.

As noted above, a broad division between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ conjunction is generally accepted. The latter is usually seen as in some sense an extension of, or parasitic on, the former. Van Dijk (1977), for example, uses the terms ‘semantic’ and ‘pragmatic’, with the clear implication...
that the pragmatic uses are secondary developments from the basic semantic uses. Whether or not this division is included in a particular model of conjunction is largely independent of the decision to focus on form or on function. For example, within relation-oriented approaches, analysts working with clause relations have not found it necessary to highlight such differences, whereas RST has established two major types of relations, subject-matter and presentational. Subject-matter relations correspond roughly to ‘external’ conjunction: they express the way the elements of the topic of the text connect with each other (e.g., how one situation causes another). Presentational relations, on the other hand, are similar to ‘internal’ conjunction: they are concerned with the way the information is presented in the text (e.g., what grounds the author has for making a particular claim).

Most studies of ‘internal’ conjunction may be further divided into those that focus on the type exemplified by the because example in (2), and those that focus on a type that relates more to ‘discourse-organizing’ functions. Within the first group, Schiffrin (1987) and Sweetser (1990), for example, take as their starting point the ways in which linguistic forms are deployed for pragmatic purposes (which relate essentially to the interaction between speaker and hearer). They therefore highlight the uses of conjunctions or discourse markers as signals of how the speaker wishes the hearer to fit the current utterance into the developing interaction. Schiffrin distinguishes between fact-based, knowledge-based, and action-based uses of because and so; these correspond fairly closely to Sweetser’s content, epistemic, and speech-act domains, respectively. The first of these refers to ‘external’ causation, as in (1) above and (3) (the example is from Schiffrin 1987: 204, slightly simplified):

(3) Well we were going up to see our son tonight, but we’re not cause
   the younger one’s gonna come for dinner

Knowledge-based or epistemic conjunction establishes a relationship between a claim and the warrant for the claim, as in (2) above and (4) (again from Schiffrin 1987: 206, simplified and with an explanatory gloss in brackets added):

(4) Sometimes it works. [My reason for knowing this is] Because there’s
   this guy Louie Gelman, he went to a big specialist.

Action-based or speech-act conjunction is seen as operating in terms of motive and action, or on the level of speech act performance. In (5) (Schiffrin 1987: 208), for example, the second clause explains to the hearer the speaker’s motivation for asking the question in the first clause.
D’you mean ‘did’ or ‘do’. [My reason for asking this is] Cause we don’t go out with anybody much anymore.

The other area that has been included under ‘internal’ conjunction, particularly within systemic functional linguistics, concerns the organization of discourse. In their account of ‘internal’ conjunction, Halliday and Hasan (1976) focus on the relationships between ‘the steps in an argument’ (Halliday 1994: 338) signaled by forms such as firstly, next, finally (see also Martin 1992: 207). In (6), for example, the ordering signaled by first of all and secondly is primarily the ‘discourse-internal’ order of telling (‘the first part of my answer is . . . ’):

(6) Periodically, I’ll get a question like ‘how do I get started?’ First of all, it depends on a variety of factors but secondly and most important is how do you really know you want or should get started in the first place?

This can be compared with (7), where the ordering is ‘external’ in the sense that it construes the ‘real-world’ order in which the emotions came:

(7) Since the 18th of October I have been the prey to many emotions. First of all came surprise at having been selected for this high honour. Then came elation as the truth of it sank in. Then bewilderment at the Niagara of publicity that engulfed me.

A similar distinction can be seen between (8), in which the ‘internal’ addition can be glossed as ‘something more I want to say’, and (9) (from the longer Extract [12] below), in which the ‘external’ addition is ‘another aspect of my situation’:

(8) The only thing I want to point out right now is that there’s no reason you can’t pay for a support contract for any protocol/server, including FTP, NNTP, or whatever. And besides, it shouldn’t have to be an either/or proposition—look at free WAIS (CNIDR) and WAIS Inc.

(9) the trouble is I can’t bend forward and I can’t like turn sideways

At this point, it may be useful to summarize the wide range of terms that have been introduced relating to each of the two main types of conjunction: see Table 1. The terms in each row are contrasted within a particular model; but, as indicated above, those in each column are not necessarily fully equivalent to each other.

Few of the studies of conjunction that include reference to ‘internal’ conjunction attempt to place all the variants within an overall model. Verstraete (1998), for example, outlines a convincing method of
incorporating epistemic and speech-act because in a cognitively based grammar. He draws on Langacker’s (1985) representation of the clause as consisting of ‘an instantiated type expressing the propositional content, which is “tied down” to the speech event by grounding resources’ (Verstraete 1998: 188), and argues that, whereas ‘external’ because relates to the instantiated type, ‘internal’ because relates to the ground. In a response to this paper, McGregor (1999) demonstrates how the phenomenon can be handled equally economically within his semiotic grammar. However, this debate restricts itself to because clauses; and it is not clear how a conjunction that serves to construe textual organization might be handled by either approach.

Probably the most comprehensive and systematic account to date of ‘internal’ relations is given in Martin (1992) and developed in Martin and Rose (2003). Although Martin (1992) starts from a focus on textual organization, he does in fact include a discussion of ‘internal consequential relations’ (pp. 222–224), which include concession (see 3.3 below); and he briefly mentions epistemic because (p. 226). However, he treats these as the same in kind as text-organizing conjunction, illustrated in (6) and (8) above. The model proposed in the present paper is closest in its concerns to that elaborated by Martin and Rose, in that it aims to be exhaustive (in the sense outlined above) and to give due weight to non-‘external’ conjunction; but it aims to take the approach further by exploring in more depth the nature and scope of ‘internal’ conjunction.

### Table 1. An overview of terminology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘External’</th>
<th>‘Internal’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>real-world text-organizational</td>
<td>text-organizational, discourse-internal pragmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>semantic discourse-internal</td>
<td>pragmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fact-based knowledge-based</td>
<td>knowledge-based / action-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>content epistemic / speech-act</td>
<td>epistemic / speech-act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subject-matter presentation</td>
<td>presentation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Conjunction in text

3.1. ‘External’ conjunction

In order to highlight the ways in which a complementary account of ‘internal’ conjunction is necessary to capture how discourse proceeds, I will present some analyses of extracts from different registers. Isolated pairs of clauses clearly give only part of the picture, and it is more revealing to examine relations in a reasonably extended stretch of text.
In the sample analyses below, I have as far as possible used the categorization of relations from Martin and Rose (2003: 133 and 134), in order to make it easier to compare my approach with others. (Table 9 in Section 3.4, which summarizes the most relevant relations, also indicates how the labels relate to those used by Martin and Rose.) However, some of the labels are different (see below), and some of the relations are not included in their classification. Signals of conjunctive relations are in italics; and, following Martin and Rose, I add a conjunction in brackets as a gloss to show what relation is assumed in cases where no explicit conjunctive signal is used. Arrows in the labeling are normally in pairs, one pointing downwards, the other upwards. These signal the two parts of a relation, such as cause and effect. The arrows are placed by the main clauses taking part in the relation and may therefore not be immediately adjacent to each other.

(10) she realised
    \[effect\] that this was the end
    \[because\] She couldn’t switch on the light. \[cause\]

As Example (10) shows, I adopt from the clause-relational approach an emphasis on the essentially binary nature of relations; and therefore in most cases, rather than single labels such as ‘cause’ (as in Martin and Rose 2003: 119), I use paired labels such as ‘cause–effect’. This reflects the fact that many relationships between clauses involve semantic reciprocity (for example, one clause realizes ‘cause’ only in relation to the other clause that realizes ‘effect’, and vice versa). However, there are certain exceptions. Some relations, such as time sequence, time location, and addition, are essentially one-way. A clause that is succeeded, located in time, added to, etc., by another clause is not inherently affected by that increment. In these cases the arrows simply point back or forward to the adjacent stretch of text.

Another point where I depart from Martin and Rose is in the area of what they call ‘unexpected consequences’ (2003: 130–132): whereas they treat the signaling of counter-expectancy as a feature that may be added to relations without affecting their basic classification, I see it as a more fundamental aspect of discourse connectivity involving relations that are better kept separate—see for example the discussion of the situation–cancellation relation in relation to Extracts (11) and (12) below. Although this separation, together with the use of paired labels, inevitably makes the analyses appear more complex because it multiplies the terminology, I find it more transparent and theoretically better motivated.

As a starting point in the presentation of the model being proposed here, I will first take a text sample that relies more or less exclusively on
‘external’ conjunction. This is a stretch of narrative from P. D. James’s 1975 novel *The Black Tower*.

(11) The door presented no problem. But when she had sidled through, she realised that this was the end. She couldn’t switch on the light. The low bulb in the corridor gave a faint diffused glow but, even with the door of the clinical room ajar, it was inadequate to show her the position of the light. And if she were to succeed in switching it on with the dressing-gown cord, she had to know accurately at what spot to aim. She stretched out her hand and felt along the wall. Nothing. She held the cord in a loop and flung it softly and repeatedly where she thought the switch might be. But it fell away uselessly. She began to cry again, defeated, desperately cold, suddenly realising that she had the whole painful journey to do again in reverse, and that dragging herself back into bed would be the most difficult and painful of all.

Table 2 shows the analysis of conjunctive relations (following Martin and Rose 2003 again, ‘external’ and ‘internal’ conjunction are shown on each side of the text). As noted above, the aim is to be exhaustive: each ranking clause is assumed to stand in a conjunctive relation to at least one of the clauses around it. Many independent clauses in fact take part in two relations, one with a clause in the preceding stretch of text and the other with a clause in the following stretch; a dependent clause, on the other hand, typically takes part in only one relation, with the clause on which it depends (though in more complex sentences there may, of course, also be relations between dependent clauses). ‘External’ projected (reported) clauses are labeled in square brackets, since they normally do not enter into relations separately but are within the frame of the relations entered into by the projecting clause (see further discussion in Section 3.3 below).

As the distribution of labels in the two analysis columns shows clearly, a view of conjunction as involving ‘external’ or ‘real-world’ relations copes with such a stretch of text very adequately. Of the relations shown in the right-hand column, only one perhaps needs a comment. Situation–cancellation refers to what is traditionally called a concessive relation, where the situation presented in one clause is shown not to hold for that in the next clause despite expectations that it might. However, for reasons that will be discussed in Section 3.3 below, I prefer to keep the term ‘concession’ for cases that are similar in certain respects but in which the interactive implications of ‘conceding’ are highlighted.

There is only one pair of terms in the left-hand column: assessment–basis (see Jordan 2001). The relation between the clauses at this point is
The double labeling reflects the possible reading of the stretch as free indirect discourse, with *she couldn’t switch on the light* continuing her thought (hence the quote marks in the labels). Whereas the ‘external’ reading represents her realization (that it was the end) as the effect of her being unable to switch on the light, the ‘internal’ reading projects her as realizing ‘this is the end; my basis for arriving at that assessment is that I can’t switch on the light’. This is therefore an example of the epistemic relation illustrated in (2) above. But this is clearly a marginal case and could be omitted without seriously affecting the way the relations that hold the text together are captured.

### Table 2. ‘External’ conjunction in a narrative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Internal’</th>
<th>‘External’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The door presented no problem.</td>
<td><em>situation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>But when</em> she had sidled through, she realised <em>that</em> this was the end.</td>
<td><em>situation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>because</em> she couldn’t switch on the light.</td>
<td><em>cause / effect</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>because</em> The low bulb in the corridor gave a faint diffused glow.</td>
<td><em>situation 1</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>but, even with</em> the door of the clinical room ajar,</td>
<td><em>situation 2</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>it was inadequate to show her the position of the light.</td>
<td><em>cancellation / cause</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>And if</em> she were to succeed in switching it on with the dressing-gown cord, she had to know accurately at what spot to aim.</td>
<td><em>addition / means</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>then</em> She stretched out her hand and felt along the wall.</td>
<td><em>succession / situation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>but (there was)</em> Nothing.</td>
<td><em>cancellation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>then</em> She held the cord in a loop and flung it softly and repeatedly where she thought the switch might be.</td>
<td><em>succession / situation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>But</em> it fell away uselessly.</td>
<td><em>cancellation</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>then</em> She began to cry again, defeated, desperately cold,</td>
<td><em>succession / effect</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>because</em> suddenly realising <em>that</em> she had the whole painful journey to do again in reverse, and that dragging herself back into bed would be the most difficult and painful of all.</td>
<td><em>projection</em></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td><em>addition</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in fact already partly indicated in the right-hand column as effect–cause; the double labeling reflects the possible reading of the stretch as free indirect discourse, with *she couldn’t switch on the light* continuing her thought (hence the quote marks in the labels). Whereas the ‘external’ reading represents her realization (that it was the end) as the effect of her being unable to switch on the light, the ‘internal’ reading projects her as realizing ‘this is the end; my basis for arriving at that assessment is that I can’t switch on the light’. This is therefore an example of the epistemic relation illustrated in (2) above. But this is clearly a marginal case and could be omitted without seriously affecting the way the relations that hold the text together are captured.
3.2. ‘Internal’ conjunction

As a contrast with the ‘external’ conjunction in (11), we can turn to Martin and Rose (2003: 139), who present an extract from Desmond Tutu’s *No Future without Forgiveness* as an example of an argumentative text in which all the main conjunctive relations are ‘internal’ in their terms: That is, they are to do with ‘connecting steps in arguments . . . organizing discourse’ (p. 120). The extract with their analysis is given in Table 3 (their conventions for displaying conjunctive relations have been amended to match those used in the present paper). Martin and Rose point out that, in ‘internal’ relations, succession is to do with the ordering of ‘the steps in the text’s internal logic’ (2003: 125; compare [6] above); addition signals the adding of arguments (compare [8] above); and, with consequence, ‘the conclusion is construed as a logical consequence of the argument that has been presented’ (2003: 126).

Since Martin and Rose explicitly focus in their analysis only on the relations between textual stages and phases, they do not attempt to be exhaustive and deliberately omit a few of the conjunctive relations in the passage. However, the relations that are omitted are in fact central to the model proposed here, precisely because they do not fit easily within an

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Table 3. ‘Internal’ conjunction in an argumentative text

| ‘Internal’ | | |
| --- | --- | |
| ![succession / argument] | So is amnesty being given at the cost of justice being done? | |
| ![succession / argument] | *The Act required that the application should be dealt with in a public hearing.* | |
| ![consequence] | *Thus* there is the penalty of public exposure and humiliation for the perpetrator. | |
| ![addition / argument] | It is also not true that the granting of amnesty encourages impunity in the sense that perpetrators can escape completely the consequence because amnesty is only give to those who plead guilty, who accept responsibility for what they have done. | |
| ![consequence] | *Thus* the process in fact encourages accountability rather than the opposite. | |
| ![addition / argument] | *Further* retributive justice—in which an impersonal state hands down punishment . . . is not the only form of justice. | |
| ![addition / argument] | I contend that there is another kind of justice, restorative justice, which is characteristic of traditional African jurisprudence. | |
| ![consequence] | *Thus* we would claim that justice, restorative justice, is being served. | |

= The connection jumps back over the immediately preceding relation to an earlier clause.
approach that sees ‘internal’ conjunction as predominantly or exclusively to do with the textual organization of discourse. Table 4 shows a full analysis of the ‘internal’ relations, with the additions in a separate column (there is a case of projection in the second sentence, but, since this is the only ‘external’ relation, it has been omitted from the analysis).

In the fourth sentence of the extract, the writer advances an assessment of the proposition granting amnesty encourages impunity as not true, and provides an epistemic basis for this assessment, signaled by because. In the sixth sentence the negation signals that the proposition retributive justice
... is the only form of justice is being construed as plausibly representing what the reader might—mistakenly—expect and as therefore needing to be negated (on negation in discourse see, e.g., Tottie 1982; Jordan 1998); and this is then countered by the proposition in the seventh sentence that the writer construes as more valid (there is another kind of justice). There are also two cases of what I have labeled ‘speech-act marking’, which form part of a larger phenomenon within conjunction, interpersonal projection. This phenomenon will be discussed in greater detail in Section 3.3 below; here I will simply note that both of the markers serve to reinforce the sense of dialogue with the reader by highlighting the writer’s awareness of the contentious nature of his claims.

It is clear that the labels that have been added in Table 4 are not concerned with ‘organizing discourse’: They are, rather, concerned with the interpersonal negotiation of claims. They are therefore different not in degree but in kind, which suggests that the ‘internal’ category needs to be divided into two.

3.3. Dividing up ‘internal’ conjunction

The glosses used for the two ‘internal’ categories in Table 4 are deliberately chosen in order to prepare for the final main step in the model of conjunction being proposed. This involves mapping the three types of conjunction onto Halliday’s three metafunctions: experiential, interpersonal, and textual. Table 5 (adapted from Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 61) summarizes the systemic functional linguistic view of the metafunctions.

Although the third column in Table 5 highlights the way in which the metafunctions are realized at clause level, within systemic functional linguistics the metafunctions are seen as holding across all aspects of the lexico-grammar. It therefore seems plausible that the ways in which clause connectivity operates should reflect this general design feature of language (for theoretical arguments in favor of taking this sort of step, see Taylor Torsello 1996). From this perspective, ‘external’ conjunction can be more precisely described as experiential (representing experience). The ‘internal’ relations identified by Martin and Rose

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metafunction</th>
<th>Definition (kind of meaning)</th>
<th>Corresponding status in clause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>experiential</td>
<td>construing a model of experience</td>
<td>clause as representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interpersonal</td>
<td>enacting social relationships</td>
<td>clause as exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>textual</td>
<td>creating relevance to context</td>
<td>clause as message</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
perform a primarily textual (discourse-organizing) function, whereas the relations that I have brought out in Table 4 are interpersonal (dialogic, negotiating relationships).

Thus what is being proposed here is a three-dimensional view of conjunction, which can be broadly characterized as shown in Table 6. The fundamental nature of the division introduced by Halliday (see, e.g., 1994: 219) between expansion and projection is reflected in the fact that the three dimensions are manifested differently in each of these two domains (indeed, as the table shows, there appears to be a ‘gap’ in that projection does not have a specifically textual function). The choice from the three major types of conjunction reflects whether the speaker at that point in the communicative event is operating with a model of potential connection between stretches of the discourse that is primarily oriented toward language as representation (experiential), as exchange (interpersonal), or as message (textual). That is, at any moment the speaker may be more concerned to foreground ‘real-world’ connections, or to enact awareness of, and/or guide, the hearer’s reactions to what is being said, or to make explicit the organization of what is being said.

The use of the description ‘unfolding’ for interpersonal and textual expansion but not for experiential expansion in Table 6 is deliberate. All three types do, of course, realize meanings that develop as the speaker produces the successive utterances; but interpersonal and textual expansion share a kind of discourse-reflexivity that is less fundamental with experiential expansion. Both of the former relate directly to the dynamic progression of the discourse, the interpersonal by enacting it and the textual by making it textually explicit in the discourse itself. Experiential expansion, on the other hand, concerns the essentially synoptic relationships between the states and events represented in the text; the fact that these relations are not represented simultaneously is to do with the linear nature of language production.

To illustrate and clarify the proposed categorization, I will present an analysis of an extract from a doctor–patient consultation, in which all

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6. Three-dimensional conjunction</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experiential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projection</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
three kinds of conjunction are involved (slashes are added where syntactically appropriate in order to make the transcript easier to read).

\[(12) \quad P: \text{I thought I'd better come to the doctor because with me working with residents I thought well I don't want to put my back out} \\
D: \text{er no you can't work like this at the moment / you find that any movement catches it so lifting people is just out at the moment / I'm sure this is a muscle tear because it's typical of them that er the time you do it you don't feel much it's often overnight that the pain steadily develops} \\
P: \text{I was coming home from work and I only seemed to feel it when I got in last night / when I got into the warmth it was all right at the time / I've been in agony all night /10 secs/} \\
D: \text{so the first thing is rest / secondly I'll give you some painkillers / they don't speed up the healing it's just to make life comfortable for you while it's healing} \\
P: \text{what is it / is it like a thing I've got with my spine or} \\
D: \text{it's a torn muscle in your back yeh it should recover} \\
P: \text{you wouldn't think it was so painful would you} \\
D: \text{oh no it is but it's all right as long as you don't move / as soon as you move it'll try and go into spasm to stop you using those muscles you've injured}

The analysis is shown in Table 7. This is perhaps an appropriate point to stress that all the analyses inevitably reflect my reading of the extracts. This caveat in fact applies to any analysis of conjunction: even where explicit signals such as conjunctions occur, the precise nature of the connection may well be a matter of interpretation (both for the analyst and for the addressee—although the addressee is normally in the happier position of being untroubled by vagueness of meaning and multifunctionality). This appears to be particularly true of the distinctions that I am focusing on: although the categories are shown as distinct for the sake of economy, it would be more accurate to represent them as clines, with a number of cases falling in the area between two core points on the cline.

The relations shown in the experiential column are familiar from traditional accounts of conjunction and need no commentary. Those in the textual column have already been illustrated in Table 3 above, apart from similarity. In Martin and Rose's model this includes reformulation, where one clause provides an alternative wording of a concept in a preceding clause, and clarification, where one clause restates a preceding clause in more precise terms. It is also worth noting that the doctor's use
Table 7. Conjunctive relations in a medical consultation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual</th>
<th>Interpersonal</th>
<th>Experiential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I thought</td>
<td>cause</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’d better come to the doctor because with me working with residents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I thought</td>
<td>effect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>well I don’t want to put my back out</td>
<td>projection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>er no you can’t work like this at the moment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[because] you find that any movement catches it</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>so lifting people is just out at the moment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m sure</td>
<td>contrast</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>this is a muscle tear because it’s typical of them that er the time you do it you don’t feel much whereas it’s often overnight that the pain steadily develops //</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was coming home from work and I only seemed to feel it when I got in last night when I got into the warmth</td>
<td>addition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[that is] it was all right at the time</td>
<td>simultaneity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[but] I’ve been in agony all night //</td>
<td>situation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>so the first thing is rest</td>
<td>cancellation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secondly I’ll give you some painkillers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>they don’t speed up the healing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[instead] it’s just to make life comfortable for you while it’s healing //</td>
<td>simultaneity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>what is it</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[more precisely] is it like a thing I’ve got with my spine or // it’s a torn muscle in your back yeh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[and] it should recover //</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>you wouldn’t think</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of so in so the first thing is rest construes this as a conclusion, even though there is no obvious preceding stretch of talk from which the conclusion is being drawn.

Of the interpersonal relations in the extract, there is one clear case of the epistemic because: I’m sure this is a muscle tear because it’s typical of them that . . . As noted above, I categorize such cases as assessment–basis. At a more delicate level this could be labeled conclusion–basis; but in order to highlight the similarities between the different subtypes of interpersonal because clauses (and similar conjunctive relations signaled by other connectors such as with as in with me working with residents), I have kept to the more general term here: the basis expresses the grounds for the assessment—which may be a conclusion, an instruction, an undertaking, etc. (Jordan 2001). The other cases of assessment–basis, which are closer to the speech-act because and could be labeled act–basis, are less clear-cut. For example, the doctor’s utterance you can’t work like this at the moment you find that any movement catches it so lifting people is just out at the moment could be read simply as an experientially connected complex ‘any movement catches it; this causes you to be unable to work, and to lift people’. In the context, however, it is more plausible to read the first and the third clause as instructions, with the second clause as justification: ‘my grounds for telling you not to work or to lift people are that any movement catches it’.

A comparison of the example of situation–cancellation in the patient’s account it was all right at the time [but] I’ve been in agony all night (see also examples in Table 2 above) with the concession–assertion pair in the doctor’s final utterance brings out the interactive nature of the latter. The doctor explicitly concedes the validity of the patient’s view of the pain oh no it is, but then contrasts that with his own ‘truer’ assertion that the pain can be managed. Thompson (2001) argues that concession can be
performed ‘logically’ (situation–cancellation in the terms used here) or ‘interpersonally’ (concession–assertion). He notes that one important feature of the interpersonal construal of concession is explicit signaling that what is being conceded (and subsequently countered) is the view, at least potentially, of the addressee(s). In dialogue, as here, this may be particularly overt.

The interactive nature of concession–assertion is closely connected to a wider dialogic phenomenon, that of the speaker/writer’s attention to addressee expectations. Winter (in Huddleston et al. 1968: 593) suggests that ‘the function of but is primarily to explicate the clause-relation of “conflict with what is expected”’ (cf. Segal and Duchan 1997 on but from a processing perspective). This can be seen clearly in examples like the first line of a traditional song:

(13) She was poor but she was honest

where the use of but construes the views of the speaker and, by implication, of the addressee of the relationship between poverty and honesty (see also Martin and Rose 2003: 128 on countering expectations). Winter further argues that and primarily signals that expectations are about to be met. Expectations may be positive or negative; and if, following Thompson and Zhou (2000), we take the conjunctive function of disjuncts such as (un)fortunately into account, we can see that speakers/writers can signal any of the four possible combinations shown in Table 8.

Examples of each of the options, from various sources, are given below.

(14) a. DK: There is no doubt that you have a sound that is unique to you.
    PL: Well thanks . . . that was one of our main things from the start. That was a goal and fortunately it happened naturally—as opposed to trying to force it.

b. These tours fill very fast and, unfortunately, we usually cannot accommodate all schools that apply.

### Table 8. Categories of expectancy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expectancy</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fulfilled</td>
<td>a. ‘and’ ‘fortunately’</td>
<td>b. ‘and’ ‘unfortunately’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>denied</td>
<td>c. ‘but’ ‘unfortunately’</td>
<td>d. ‘but’ ‘fortunately’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But me some buts 779
c. With people motivated to look at the source code for any number of reasons, it’s easy to assume that open source software is likely to have been carefully scrutinized, and that it’s secure as a result. Unfortunately, that’s not necessarily true.

d. If you want to escape the overly hip and huddled masses, the Frank Gehry-designed Walt Disney Concert Hall, home to the L.A. Philharmonic Association, opened its doors last year. Tickets are hard to get, but fortunately, the Hollywood Bowl is still doing its classical and jazz concert series each summer.

The concession–assertion relation comprises types (14c) and (14d) (although there may not be an explicit indication of whether the expectation is assumed to be positive or negative). With situation–cancellation, expectancy is also in play, but it is very much backgrounded. The interpersonal construal of concession can be highlighted by a number of means, singly or in combination: these include the use of an evaluative disjunct (either in the admittedly $X$, but $Y$ pattern, or in the $X$, (but) (un)fortunately $Y$ pattern illustrated above); explicit signaling of the fact that a concession is attributable to others, usually at least potentially including the addressee (it could be argued that $X$, (but) in fact $Y$); and certain uses of probability modality, as in the following example:

(15) Indiscreet he may be, but we’ve seen worse behaviour

The denial of expectation–counter relation, already seen in Table 4 above, and here exemplified in the doctor’s they don’t speed up the healing, it’s just to make life comfortable for you while it’s healing, is, in a sense, the reverse of concession–assertion. As noted above, negatives frequently reflect the speaker’s awareness of the addressee’s beliefs and expectations; but, whereas in concession–assertion the speaker signals partial acceptance of the validity of the addressee’s expectations, in denial–counter (or denial–correction, to use the term introduced by Winter; e.g., 1994: 54) the expectations are dismissed at the same time as being mentioned.

In addition to the interpersonal types of expansion discussed above, another important area of conjunction is interpersonal projection—exemplified by the utterances that I have labeled in Table 7 as ‘validity marking’. It has been noted (e.g., by Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 626) that projection can be seen, as it were, from two different ends. The view from the experiential, ‘external’, end highlights the fact that a second-order linguistic phenomenon (the report of what was said or thought) is being projected through a first-order representation of a speech or thought event (the reporting clause). From this perspective, the projecting clause is both structurally the main clause and semantically
the main proposition. The view from the interpersonal end, on the other hand, sees the projecting clause as a ‘tag’ attached to the main proposition in the projected clause. This is the grammar of validation, negotiation, and attribution: the tag serves to frame the experiential proposition in interpersonal terms of how far the speaker is committed to it (modality), and/or the function of the utterance in the interaction, and/or the ‘evidence for the main clause’ (Biber et al. 1999: 855).

The validation and negotiation functions typically come into play when there is an interactant subject (*I* or *you*) and simple present tense in the projecting clause, as in:

(16) I'm sure this is a muscle tear

These two functions of interpersonal projection show an interesting parallelism with the different subcategories of ‘internal’ *because*: just as there is a distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘speech-act’ *because*, so projection may be used to express epistemic modality, as in the example above, or to signal explicitly the speech act that is being performed, as in the example from Table 4 above:

(17) I contend that there is another kind of justice

Both types of markers are in fact metaphorical realizations of interpersonal meanings (see Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 613, 627). There is thus a close functional affinity between the two subcategories, which is reflected in the fact that very often the verbs that occur in speech act markers simultaneously signal the epistemic status of the proposition (see Hunston 2000: 184 on the concept of status on the interactive plane). For example, as noted earlier, *contend* in (17) indicates that the speaker himself avers the proposition as true but recognizes that its validity may be questioned by at least some of his readers.

Apart from the interactant subject and present tense, another criterion for identifying interpersonal projection in the approach used here is that it is typically the projected clause that enters into conjunctive relations. For example, as indicated in Table 4 the speech-act marker in (17) appears in the context of a denial–counter relation, but does not itself directly enter into that relation:

(18) Further retributive justice . . . is not the only form of justice.

I contend that
there is another kind of justice, restorative justice . . .

But me some buts
This contrasts with experiential projection, where the relations involve the projecting clause (or, more precisely, the complex of projecting + projected clause, but with the projecting clause as the dominant element). One reflex of this is that, as Halliday (1994: 354) points out, with grammatical metaphors of modality such as ‘I think’ a tag question picks up on the projected proposition rather than the projecting clause. For example, in the case of I’m sure this is a muscle tear, the most likely tag is isn’t it? rather than aren’t I?8

The third area of interpersonal projection, attribution, concerns the signaling of the source of the information in the other clause. As this formulation indicates, this is a realization of evidentiality and thus close to ‘epistemic’ because (in fact, Biber et al. 1999: 855 put these in the same category: ‘source of knowledge’ under ‘epistemic stance’). There are no examples in the extracts analyzed above, but attribution comes into play in cases where the reporting clause is structurally subordinate, such as the clause I used in the paragraph above: as Halliday (1994: 354) points out; or where it interrupts or follows the reported clause, as in the following example:

(19) Competitive sport should be available to children of all ages, Tony Blair said yesterday. ↑source marking

In neither of these cases can the concept of experiential projection be applied straightforwardly. Experiential projection involves one clause being projected ‘through’ another; but it is hard to see the relationship in these terms when the projecting clause is structurally subordinate, or is structurally detached (the two clauses in the example above appear to be neither paratactically nor hypotactically related, but simply juxtaposed).9 The reported clause is structurally indistinguishable from a clause that is averred by the speaker. This reflects the fact that the function of the attribution tag is different from an ‘external’ projecting clause: the speaker presents a proposition as if it were his/her own but signals that it comes from another source (Thetela’s 1997 term ‘delegated averral’ captures this neatly; and see also Vandelanotte 2004 on what he calls ‘scopal DIST’).

The basic principle is that all projection nexuses can be viewed from either the experiential or the interpersonal perspective but that, if the experiential reading is more dominant, the interpersonal reading is correspondingly weaker, and vice versa. This means that there are numerous intermediate cases, and it can be difficult to decide which reading is stronger in particular instances. The first utterance in extract (12) above illustrates this:
I thought I'd better come to the doctor because with me working with residents I thought well I don’t want to put my back out

I have analyzed the two cases here of I thought differently (and this affects the assignment of the two causal relations to experiential cause–effect or interpersonal basis–assessment). However, I have some hesitation about the analyses in both cases. The first seems more like a report of modal assessment in the past, whereas the second appears to introduce a quote of the thought that went through the speaker’s mind (the grounds for identifying this as a quote are the switch to present tense, and the presence of well, which is often used in speech to mark the beginning of quotes). In keeping with this analysis I have taken the first I thought as not involved in the relations, whereas ‘me thinking “X”’ is both the basis for the assessment of ‘better come to doctor’ and the effect of ‘me working with residents’. Nevertheless, the use of the past tense form I thought pushes the reading toward experiential projection for both, while the presence of I as subject and the tag question test (the most likely tag questions are hadn’t I? and do I?) push the reading toward interpersonal projection. Although the constraints of analysis mean that it is simpler to show only one reading, both are present at the same time. However, as, e.g., Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 548–549) note, this kind of indeterminacy, or more precisely multifunctionality, is inherent in conjunction, but it does not undermine the basic validity of the categorization (cf. Schiffrin 1987: 212 on multifunctional uses of because).

3.4. An overview of interpersonal conjunction

The sample extracts above have the advantage of showing conjunctive relations in a reasonably extensive context; but it is obviously difficult to find extracts that provide comprehensive coverage of all the types of interpersonal relations proposed in this paper. Table 9 therefore brings together the main types that have been identified, showing where they fit with the ‘internal’ (i.e., textual) categories set out in Martin and Rose (2003: 134).

As Table 9 shows, each of the main types already discussed above has a paired type, which will be illustrated with examples from the Web. Denial of expectation–counter has a positive counterpart, expectation–
affirmation, in which the proposition construed as likely to be believed by the addressee is confirmed as valid (this is the ‘expectancy fulfilled’ relation illustrated in [14a] and [14b] above):

(21) You may fear the judgments and reactions of others when you tell them the news of your child’s special needs, and indeed you may not get the response you hope for from everyone you love.

Whereas denial–counter is based on difference (between the addressee’s expectations and the ‘facts’ as asserted by the speaker/writer), expectation–affirmation is based on similarity between expectations and the ‘facts’. There is a somewhat similar parallel between concession–assertion and situation–evaluation (Winter 1994). The former involves a discounting of the potential expectations raised by the conceded proposition in favor of the asserted one, whereas the latter involves an acceptance of what has gone before and provides a kind of summing-up:

(22) In their minds, however, the customer sits at the top of the food chain. They must remain focused on who they are serving, i.e., the customer, not you. And that’s the catch!

It would be possible—as is suggested by the use of and as the conjunction in (22)—to take the connection here simply as some kind of all-purpose
addition. However, even that would involve textual conjunction (‘here is another thing I want to say’) rather than ideational (‘here is another aspect of the event’). However, although this serves as a kind of concluding comment for that stretch of the discourse, it does not fit Martin and Rose’s category of textual ‘consequence’: Rather than presenting a conclusion to a line of argument, it enacts a switch to the interactive plane (Sinclair 1981/2004), standing aside from the information in order to signal what the speaker thinks about the information.

The final sets of interpersonal relations in Table 9 do not have comparable types in textual conjunction, although they fall broadly under the category of consequence, and can be seen as related to the experiential types of cause–effect and condition–consequence. As Davies (1979: 146) noted, a phenomenon that is similar to the epistemic and speech-act causal relations (i.e., conclusion–basis and act–basis in the terminology used here) can be seen in the closely allied case of conditional relations:

(23) If It’s 2005, It Must Be Time For Another War
    ↓condition

(24) If you want to find your life purpose the easy way, there is an excellent program that does the work for you and takes as little as 30 minutes.
    ↓condition

In (23), with ‘epistemic’ if, the main clause expresses a claim, and the conditional clause expresses the basis on which that claim is made. In (24), with ‘speech-act’ if, the existence of the excellent program does not depend on the condition in the if clause holding; rather, the if clause expresses the reason why the existence of the program might be relevant to the reader. Both of these can be compared with paraphrases using interpersonal because: ‘it must be time for another war, because it’s 2005’; ‘do you want to find your life purpose, because there is an excellent program that does the work for you’.

What all the proposed categories of interpersonal conjunction share is, as argued above, the function of realizing interpersonal meanings. Three of the relations—expectation–affirmation, denial–counter, and concession–assertion—are oriented toward the ‘you’ of the exchange, in that they signal the speaker or writer’s awareness of the addressee’s potential beliefs and expectations. They are related to speech roles (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 107), typically enacting both parts of an exchange within one turn. The other three—situation–evaluation, assessment–basis, and condition–assessment—are more oriented toward the ‘I’, in that they express aspects of the speaker or writer’s stance toward the information...
being exchanged, in terms of appraisal (Martin 2000), modal validation, or speech-act justification.

4. Conclusion

Many, or even most, of the interpersonal and textual relations outlined above would be picked up by a traditional analysis based on categorizing the semantic functions of the word class of conjunctions, provided it was sufficiently primed to search for them. Interpersonal *because* and *if* are often given at least a passing reference, and are sometimes more fully treated (e.g., Quirk et al. 1985: 616, 1072); and textual connectives have been comprehensively described in terms of nonstructural conjuncts, although the link with other types of conjunction is typically not made explicit. On the other hand, an approach based on a view of conjunction as a phenomenon on the semantic plane makes these ‘nonstandard’ relations more salient, since it is not restricted to clause complexification but looks more generally at rhetorical moves in the unfolding discourse: these often map onto clauses in a complex, but need not. Thus the ‘semantic’ approach is, if anything, biased toward interpersonal and textual connectivity; and, given the relative scarcity of work on these dimensions, this may be seen as a case of positive discrimination.

There is a further possible reason why traditional approaches have, on the whole, undervalued interpersonal (and, to a lesser extent, textual) conjunction. Halliday (1994: 338) notes that ‘different registers vary both in their overall use of conjunction and in their orientation towards that of an internal or external kind’; and various studies provide evidence that interpersonal types of conjunction tend to be more extensively drawn on in informal, especially spoken, registers than in formal ones. For example, Biber et al. (1999: 862) found that what they call ‘comment clauses’, a category that is more or less equivalent to interpersonal projection, are particularly frequent in conversation. Similarly, Schiffrin’s (1987) study of knowledge-based (epistemic) and action-based (speech-act) *because* is based on informal spoken data. I deliberately used the Web for many of the examples in this paper because it allows access to texts that are written in an informal ‘spoken’ style (see Note 1). The tendency is far from absolute: for example, formal written persuasive texts such as Tutu’s, which set out to involve the reader in a developing argument, often draw on interpersonal conjunction in places (see Table 4), and narratives in informal speech are typically as heavily dependent on experiential conjunction as the written narrative in (11) above.11 Nevertheless, a grammatical description that relies largely on formal written
data supplemented by intuition, as was mostly the norm until fairly recently, is less likely to have to confront the phenomenon of interpersonal conjunction than one that draws explicitly on informal language data. It is significant that Biber et al. (1999), which uses a corpus of conversation as one of the four main registers examined, is the first major reference grammar of English to devote considerable space to issues such as ‘The grammatical marking of stance’ (chapter 12).

The traditional bias toward relatively formal written models may also be a factor in the general assumption that the interpersonal uses of conjunction are a development from the experiential uses. However, although the evidence from language acquisition is far from unambiguous, studies such as those of Torr (1998) and Painter (2000, 2002) do suggest the possibility that interpersonal conjunction develops in tandem with, or is even ontogenetically prior to, experiential conjunction (see also Caron 1997: 60 on the acquisition by French children of ‘pragmatic’ before ‘content’ uses of parce que—‘because’). This raises the intriguing question of whether experiential conjunction should rather be seen as an ontogenetically and therefore most probably philogenetically sophisticated elaboration of the interpersonal. An investigation of this possibility would need hypothesis-driven studies in language acquisition and language history, which are beyond the scope of the present paper.

A more general factor in the relative neglect of interpersonal conjunction is, I would argue, the overall orientation of linguistics toward the experiential. For many linguists, ‘meaning’ essentially equates to experiential meaning, and interpersonal meaning, if recognized, is often seen as something of an embarrassment: like the first Mrs. Rochester in the attic, it is pushed away for someone else to deal with. The corner into which it is pushed is typically marked ‘pragmatics’; and it is only a partial distortion to characterize pragmatics, from this perspective, as the study of the odd things that happen to language once people start using it. However, the view is increasingly being advocated that the distinction between ‘literal’ meaning (which usually refers to experiential meaning) and ‘pragmatic’ meaning as an extension (often interpersonal) of the former in use is at best misleading and at worst mistaken (e.g., see, from rather different approaches, Toolan 1996 and Stubbs 2001). One of the aims of the present paper is to contribute to the fundamental shift of linguistics toward the placing of interpersonal meaning-making at the core of language rather than on the periphery. This shift is already taking place within our views of conjunction (as accounts such as Biber et al. 1999; Martin 1992; and Martin and Rose 2003 testify), and much of the necessary analysis has been done; but it still remains to draw the different threads together into a coherent overall account along the lines sketched in this
paper, and to use this account as a basis for continuing the exploration of the deployment of the conjunctive resources in different registers.

Appendix: Sources for examples from the Web (all accessed December 2004)

(2) http://www.avert.org/sfeel3.htm
(6) http://www.all-vending-machines.com/
(7) http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1984/stone-speech.html
(14a) http://musicmoz.org/Bands_and_Artists/T/Tragically_Hip,_The/Articles/
(14b) http://www.floridastatefair.com/cracker_tours.asp
(14c) http://www.developer.com/tech/article.php/626641
(15) http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-1398604,00.html
(19) http://www.sport.telegraph.co.uk/education/
(21) http://specialchildren.about.com/od/gettingadiagnosis/a/diagnosis.htm
(22) http://www.mdpme.com/authority.htm
(23) http://www.rense.com/general60/2005.htm
(24) http://lifematch.tripod.com/

Notes

1. Despite a number of well-recognized problems with using Google™ as a search engine for examples (uncertainty over authorship, the unwieldiness compared with regular concordance programs, etc.), this remains an unrivalled linguistic resource. It is particularly valuable because it provides access to potentially unlimited amounts of text that is in machine-readable form but has not been edited or ‘corrected’. To oversimplify, it can be seen as a way of accessing registers that are often much closer to informal speech than most publicly available written text, without the effort of transcription.

2. Rhetorical structure theory makes the further assumption that this kind of relationship is inherently a hierarchical matter—that is, two units connected by a relation form a more complex unit, which then itself stands in a relation to another unit, and so on ‘upwards’ until the whole text is exhausted. Although this has been shown to work convincingly especially with short written texts, it seems less useful for some of the discourse with which I am working—particularly informal conversation, where the
organization is hierarchical only in patches. I therefore keep as far as possible to the
more basic level of ‘chaining’ from one clause to the next. To the extent that a hierar-
chical organization can be identified in a discourse, the working hypothesis is that the
relations at all levels of a hierarchy will be essentially the same as for chaining on a sin-
gle level (cf. Matthiessen and Thompson 1988: 299, who make a similar point but from
the opposite angle: ‘clause combining is a grammaticalization of the rhetorical organi-
zation of discourse’).

3. Schiffrin explicitly relates her findings to Halliday and Hasan’s approach: she sees
knowledge-based and action-based causation as ‘two variants of internal meaning’

4. Martin and Rose (2003) do not include this relation, and I have therefore adopted
Jordan’s labels. Martin (1992: 226) discusses an example of the relation, but without
indicating how he would categorize it.

5. I am grateful to Sultan Al-Sharief for providing the data from which this extract is
taken.

6. In order to ensure to a reasonable degree that the analyses proposed in the paper are
not simply idiosyncratic, they were compared with those of another analyst, who coded
the extracts and examples separately after a discussion of Table 6 above. There was
agreement in 89% of cases as to the categorization. None of the disagreements involved
cases that I had categorized as experiential; 7% involved textual conjunction (all to do
with whether cases of addition were textual or experiential—see [8] and [9] above for
examples of this distinction), and 4% involved interpersonal conjunction (all to do
with whether causal relations were interpersonal or experiential—see [3], [4], and [5]
above). While the categorization of individual cases may be contentious, the main aim
of this paper is to argue for the validity of the model rather than of specific analyses;
and almost all the categories included here in interpersonal conjunction have been
established by previous research.

7. When the conjunction that is used in interpersonal projection, I include it with the
projecting clause ‘tag’. This is not a theoretical claim about where the division should
come, but a purely practical decision: it makes it possible to bring out more clearly the
relations into which the tagged clause enters.

8. This test only works when the subject is I. Where the subject is you or inclusive we, the
tag typically picks up the validity marking clause. There is an example of this in the
extract: you wouldn’t think it was so painful would you? However, it is significant that
the doctor’s response picks up on the main proposition rather than the validity marker:
oh no it is (not oh no I would).

9. It seems plausible that the concept of juxtaposition is more appropriate than parataxis
or hypotaxis for many, if not all, kinds of interpersonal conjunction. Certainly the
same issue of categorization in taxis has arisen for epistemic because (see, e.g., Schlep-

10. Where the examples include other relations as well, these have been ignored in order to
highlight the relevant relations.

11. However, evaluation in oral narratives (see Labov 1972) may be associated with inter-
personal conjunction, since it involves a shift of orientation from the narrative chron-
ology to interactive concerns.

12. On the other hand, it would seem most likely that textual conjunction is a later devel-
opment, since it relies on the speaker’s understanding of language as ‘text’; and, as
Martin and Rose (2003: 120) point out, it is particularly associated with written text.
This is a further justification for separating textual from interpersonal conjunction as
in the model proposed here.
References


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