

**With respect to consent:
The language of sex education**

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Declaration

I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged.

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Abstract

Comprehensive sex education contributes to positive health and social outcomes, including decreasing rates of sexually transmitted infections and increasing acceptance of gender and sexuality diversity (UNESCO 2018a). While there is extensive evidence that sex education accomplishes these outcomes, little is known about how they are achieved. This thesis seeks to describe what actually goes on inside sex education classrooms. The data for this study are 30 hours of video recordings of Year 9 Personal Development, Health and Physical Education (PDHPE) lessons on sex education delivered at an all-girls school in Sydney.

In particular, this thesis describes the pedagogy of consent and respect. It shows that consent is taught through a process called technicalisation. Evaluative meanings such as *wanting sex* or feeling *afraid* are discharged, instead foregrounding the legal definition of consent. In the assessment task, students must demonstrate their understanding of both the legal definition of consent and the evaluative meanings that underpin it. By contrast, respect is taught through a process called iconisation. Respect hypercharges evaluative meanings, functioning as something you do (*you respect the other person*), something you are (*we are respectful to each other*) and an abstract concept (*respect is really important*). The process of iconisation discharges ideational meaning and neutralises the field, making respect something that applies to all people and situations.

This thesis draws on a range of Systemic Functional Linguistic tools including APPRAISAL (Martin & White 2005), field (Doran & Martin 2021) and genre (Martin & Rose 2008). It builds on existing work on technicality (Wignell et al. 1993; Martin 2017a) and bonding icons (Stenglin 2004), describing the complementary processes of technicalising and iconising attitudinal meanings through what will be called distilling and instilling. It consolidates this into a typology of highly condensed meanings that ‘do the heavy lifting’ of building fields and communities.

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Who all lead lives dedicated to sex and education

Contents

Chapter 1 – Laws and Values: Sex Education in School.....	1
1.1 Motivation for this study.....	3
1.1.1 The Australian context of consent	3
1.1.2 My interest in sex education	4
1.2 Organisation of the thesis.....	7
Chapter 2 – Foundations: Theory, Description and Practice	10
2.1 Sex education	10
2.1.1 What is sex education?.....	11
2.1.2 The evidence for school-based sex education.....	12
2.1.3 What does sex education look like in Australia?	14
2.1.3.1 The sex education curriculum.....	14
2.1.3.2 Variation between schools	16
2.1.3.3 Variation within schools	16
2.1.3.3.1 Teachers’ experiences of sex education.....	17
2.1.3.3.2 Students’ experiences of sex education	18
2.1.4 What do we know about teaching practices in sex education?	20
2.1.5 The need to look more closely at sex education	22
2.2 Systemic Functional Linguistics	23
2.2.1 Hierarchies	25
2.2.1.1 Realisation (a hierarchy of abstraction)	25
2.2.1.2 Instantiation (a cline of generalisation).....	28
2.2.1.2.1 Semogenesis.....	29
2.2.1.3 Individuation (a scale of belonging)	30
2.2.2 Complementarities	32
2.2.2.1 Axis	32
2.2.2.2 Metafunction	32
2.3 SFL and ideational meaning	33
2.3.1 Field	34
2.3.1.1 Field relations.....	34
2.3.1.2 Field interrelations	40

2.3.2	Technicality.....	43
2.3.2.1	Axi-technicality.....	44
2.4	SFL and interpersonal meaning	45
2.4.1	APPRAISAL.....	47
2.4.1.1	Inscribed and invoked attitude	50
2.4.1.2	Distinguishing affect, judgement and appreciation	50
2.4.1.3	Double coding attitude	54
2.4.2	Coupling.....	55
2.4.2.1	Ideation-attitude coupling	56
2.4.3	Bonding and affiliation	58
2.4.4	Icons and iconisation.....	60
2.5	Bringing metafunctions together: Mass and presence	63
2.6	Data for this study	68
 Chapter 3 – Technicalising Consent.....		72
3.1	Recontextualising legal discourse.....	72
3.1.1	NSW consent laws	72
3.1.2	LawStuff	73
3.2	Technicalising consent in sex education.....	76
3.2.1	Technicalising what?	78
3.2.1.1	Field relations and consent.....	79
3.2.1.2	Field interrelations and consent	82
3.2.2	Changes to consent law.....	90
3.3	Revisiting technicalisation	92
3.3.1	Distilling interpersonal meaning.....	92
3.3.2	Technicalising (axi)technicality	94
3.4	Accruing ATTITUDE	97
3.4.1	Accruing AFFECT.....	100
3.4.2	Accruing JUDGEMENT.....	101
3.4.2.1	Tenacity and propriety	102
3.4.3	Feelings and behaviours affecting consent	104
3.4.4	Conditions which do not impact consent	106
3.4.4.1	APPRECIATION and consent	108

3.4.5	Attitude bingo as a resource for teaching	108
3.5	Insights from Chapter 3	116
Chapter 4 – Learning Consent.....		118
4.1	Unpacking and repacking technicality	118
4.1.1	Unpacking consent	120
4.1.2	Repacking consent	125
4.1.3	Mass and presence as resources for unpacking and repacking	133
4.2	Learning consent in the assessment	134
4.2.1	Assessment task scenario	137
4.2.2	Students’ understanding of consent	139
4.2.2.1	Exemplar response	139
4.2.2.2	Referring to the law on consent	140
4.2.2.3	Referring to the scenario	142
4.2.2.4	Explaining why the scenario is (not) consensual	144
4.2.2.5	Succeeding at consent in the assessment task	147
4.3	Recommendations for teaching consent	149
4.3.1	Language resources for the principles which underlie consent	150
4.3.2	Language resources for expressing cause and effect	155
4.3.3	Potential impact of these recommendations	158
4.4	Insights from Chapters 3 & 4.....	159
4.4.1	Consent beyond the classroom.....	160
4.4.2	Consent beyond legal discourse.....	162
Chapter 5 – Iconising Respect		165
5.1	Realising respect	165
5.1.1	‘Respect’ as mental Process.....	168
5.1.2	‘Respect’ as Attribute	171
5.1.3	‘Respect’ as Classifier.....	175
5.1.4	‘Respect’ as Thing	179
5.1.5	Comparing the realisations of ‘respect’	183
5.2	Instilling respect.....	186
5.2.1	Amassing triggers and targets	191

5.2.2	Charging a consistent valency	193
5.2.3	An interpersonal perspective on condensing meanings	195
5.3	Revisiting iconisation.....	196
5.3.1	Iconised ideation and iconised attitude	196
5.3.2	Bringing together technicality and iconisation	200
5.4	Insights from Chapter 5	205
Chapter 6 – Learning Respect		208
6.1	Rallying around respect	209
6.1.1	Text 6.1: Different beliefs, same behaviour.....	209
6.1.2	Text 6.2: Different topic, same strategies	214
6.2	Brokering respect	229
6.3	Rhetorics of re-aligning	235
6.3.1	Identifying successful rhetorical strategies	236
6.3.2	The key to succeeding with rhetorical strategies	239
6.3.2.1	Re-writing respect.....	241
6.3.3	Situating rhetorical strategies.....	242
6.3.4	Rhetorical strategies as a resource for teaching.....	246
6.4	Insights from Chapters 5 & 6.....	249
Chapter 7 – Interpersonal Education: Beyond Ideation		251
7.1	Theoretical and descriptive implications	251
7.1.1	Technicality and technicalisation.....	251
7.1.2	Icons and iconisation.....	252
7.1.3	Topological and typological perspectives on technicalisation and iconisation	253
7.2	Pedagogic implications	257
7.3	Looking forward	262
7.3.1	Future directions for SFL research	262
7.3.2	Future directions for sex education research	264
7.3.3	Towards the iconisation of consent.....	266
7.4	Better sex education, better outcomes	268

References	270
Appendix A – Transcription Conventions.....	292
Appendix B – Transcripts	294
Appendix C – Other materials.....	319
Appendix D – Analyses.....	333

List of Figures

Figure 2.1 SFL strata organised into expression and content planes	26
Figure 2.2 SFL’s stratified model of language and context	27
Figure 2.3 Hierarchy of instantiation (Martin 2008a: 35).....	28
Figure 2.4 Timescales and semogenesis (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 18)	30
Figure 2.5 Hierarchy of individuation (Martin 2009: 565).....	31
Figure 2.6 Basic parameters of field (Doran & Martin 2021: 117)	35
Figure 2.7 Perspectives on field (adapted from Doran & Martin 2021: 115).....	37
Figure 2.8 Types of properties (adapted from Doran & Martin 2021: 122)	39
Figure 2.9 Extension (+) relations for the seasons.....	42
Figure 2.10 Enhancement (x) relations for the seasons	42
Figure 2.11 Elaboration (=) relations for the seasons	42
Figure 2.12 Three tiers of interrelations for the seasons.....	43
Figure 2.13 Basic parameters of APPRAISAL (adapted from Martin & White 2005: 38)	47
Figure 2.14 More delicate parameters of APPRAISAL	49
Figure 2.15 Sub-systems of ATTITUDE (Martin & White 2005)	53
Figure 2.16 Ideation-attitude coupling in <i>tricky situation</i>	57
Figure 2.17 Ideation-attitude coupling in <i>vibrant Brazilian agricultural industry</i>	57
Figure 2.18 Recoupling in <i>the vibrant Brazilian agricultural industry represents a considerable opportunity</i>	58
Figure 2.19 Revised model of iconography (adapted from Zappavigna & Martin 2018: 279)	63
Figure 2.20 Variables of mass	65
Figure 2.21 Variables of presence	67
Figure 3.1 Slide introducing LawStuff (R4_slide8)	74
Figure 3.2 ‘What does consent mean?’ excerpt from LawStuff website/handout.....	76
Figure 3.3 Basic extension (+) relations for consent	83
Figure 3.4 Basic enhancement (x) relations for consent.....	83
Figure 3.5 Basic elaboration (=) relations for consent.....	83
Figure 3.6 Enhancement and elaboration relations for consent.....	84
Figure 3.7 Enhancing relation between ASLEEP and NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT .	84

Figure 3.8 Individual enhancing relations between WANT TO STOP, UNCONSCIOUS, AFRAID, FORCED and NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT	85
Figure 3.9 Combined enhancing relations between WANT TO STOP, ASLEEP, UNCONSCIOUS, AFRAID, FORCED and NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT	85
Figure 3.10 Three tiers of interrelation for NO CONSENT	86
Figure 3.11 Combined enhancing relations between conditions of consent and NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT.....	87
Figure 3.12 Extension (+) relations for FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT.....	87
Figure 3.13 Field interrelations for CONSENT.....	88
Figure 3.14 Field interrelations for CONSENT.....	89
Figure 3.15 Field interrelations for NO CONSENT	89
Figure 3.16 Slide showing consent scenarios (R5_slide6)	98
Figure 3.17 Consent checklist.....	109
Figure 4.1 Excerpt from assessment instructions showing hypothetical scenario.....	135
Figure 5.1 Mind map for respect (J2@23m).....	189
Figure 5.2 System network of inscribing and invoking attitudes (Martin 2020a: 21)	201
Figure 5.3 Inscribing and invoking attitude as a cline	202
Figure 5.4 Technicalised attitude and iconised attitude as extremes of dis/charging interpersonal meaning	202
Figure 6.1 Coupling in <i>feel comfortable... about it</i> (R9_20m).....	219
Figure 6.2 Coupling in <i>feel...not quite sure about it</i> (R9_20m)	220
Figure 6.3 Recoupling in <i>it's OK to feel comfortable... about it</i> (R9_20m)	220
Figure 6.4 Recoupling in <i>it's OK to not be quite sure about it</i> (R9_20m)	221
Figure 6.5 RE-SEE it: Rhetorical strategies as a teaching resource	246
Figure 7.1 Topological perspective on technicalised attitude and iconised attitude.....	254

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Summary of lesson topics in dataset.....	69
Table 3.1 Field relations for conditions of consent.....	81
Table 3.2 Elements of (NO) CONSENT and their attitudinal meanings.....	93
Table 3.3 Accruing attitude summary.....	105
Table 3.4 Elaborated consent checklist for veracity.....	111
Table 3.5 Elaborated consent checklist for veracity with space for additional examples.....	113
Table 3.6 Elaborated consent checklist for all sub-types of affect and judgement.....	114
Table 4.1 Genre staging analysis for exemplum in R4_54m.....	123
Table 4.2 Genre staging analysis for anecdote in R4_56m.....	127
Table 4.3 Problem phases in Remarkable Event stage of anecdote in R4_56m.....	129
Table 4.4 Student answers to question 2 as high, mid or low scoring.....	136
Table 4.5 Genre staging and phasing analysis for exemplum in assessment task.....	138
Table 4.6 Analysis summary for student responses to question 2.....	148
Table 4.7 Consent checklist excerpt showing capacity.....	150
Table 4.8 Elaborated consent checklist for capacity, with ‘Example’ and ‘Reason why’.....	152
Table 4.9 Elaborated consent checklist for veracity, with ‘Example’ and ‘Reason why’.....	154
Table 5.1 Summary of ATTITUDE realisations for ‘respect’ as mental Process.....	170
Table 5.2 Summary of ATTITUDE realisations for ‘respect’ as Attribute.....	174
Table 5.3 Summary of ATTITUDE realisations for ‘respect’ as Classifier.....	177
Table 5.4 Summary of ATTITUDE realisations for ‘respect’ as mental Process, Attribute and Classifier.....	178
Table 5.5 Summary of ATTITUDE realisations for ‘respect’ as Thing ^ Qualifier and Thing only.....	182
Table 5.6 Different lexicogrammatical realisations of ‘respect’ in sex education.....	184
Table 5.7 A typology of highly condensed meanings.....	204
Table 6.1 Staging of Side 1 and Side 2 in discussion in J3_13m Ground rules.....	212
Table 6.2 Staging of Side 1 and Side 2 in discussion in R9_20m Same-sex attraction.....	218
Table 6.3 Genre staging of exemplum in Rhianon lesson 9 (R9_20m).....	223
Table 6.4 Comment and reflection phases in the exemplum (R9_20m).....	224
Table 6.5 Staging of Issue, Side 1 and Side 2 in discussion in R3_7m Dating an ex.....	231
Table 6.6 Linguistic resources for each rhetorical strategy.....	238

Table 6.7 Re-written version of Text 6.3 Dating an ex (R3_7m)	241
Table 6.8 Rhetorical strategies realised by discussion stages in J3_13m Ground rules	243
Table 6.9 RE-SEE it: Language resources	247
Table 7.1 Typological perspective on technicalisation and iconisation	255

Chapter 1 – Laws and Values: Sex Education in School

All the scenarios in these lessons describe young people having casual sex and sex with multiple partners.

[The program] encourages ‘sexting’... [for] children as young as 11.

[Programs like Safe Schools] exploit young people’s emotional vulnerability and confusion regarding relationships and forces them to commit to ‘coming out’ too early. If left alone they will most likely resolve their confusion in a different direction.

Concerned parents on the website
‘You’re teaching our children what?’

Based on these quotes, you would be forgiven for thinking that sex education in Australian schools is creating a generation of students who have been indoctrinated into a queer, free-sex agenda without warning or parental permission. Before long, we would expect to find that every school has gender neutral toilets, school formals with same-sex partners and rainbow striped pedestrian crossings by the front gate. ‘Reverse discrimination’ and the breakdown of ‘traditional marriage’ are surely just around the corner, supported by a carnival of gays, feminists, atheists, pro-abortionists and communists (Goldman 2008). But the authors of these quotes, like many academic researchers, know relatively little about what actually goes on in sex education classrooms.

Many researchers have studied sex education, including not only those from public health and education but also those from sociology, psychology, media studies, gender and cultural studies, and linguistics. The majority of research has come from public health and medicine, with a typical study considering sex education as an ‘intervention’ with quantifiable results before and after. Researchers might investigate whether providing a series of lessons on sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and contraception to a particular population can increase the use of condoms and thereby lower the rates of Chlamydia. Overall such studies demonstrate strong evidence for health outcomes, such as reducing the incidence of disease. But they also note positive social outcomes. For example, sex education can improve confidence and self-identity, increase knowledge and acceptance of diverse sexualities, and reduce gender-based

and intimate partner violence (UNESCO 2018a). These interventions are shown to be particularly effective if they take place in schools (ibid., Pound et al. 2017, Fisher et al. 2019, Opie et al. 2018). So all in all there is plenty of evidence for the effectiveness of sex education, but much less is known about how these outcomes are achieved. Outcomes are measured as a series of inputs and outputs (i.e. what happens before and after an intervention), and sex education itself remains a black box.

To find out more, we can of course ask students and teachers about their experience of sex education. Many researchers have done just this, sometimes in large-scale studies which survey thousands of people (e.g. Hill et al. 2021, Waling et al. 2020). And students and teachers have plenty to say, both in terms of what they would like more of (more time, more training, more information on healthy relationships) and what they would like less of (less awkwardness, less embarrassment, less fear of saying the wrong thing). There is plenty of information to be gleaned from these surveys, both quantitative (e.g. 84% of Australian students receive sex education at school, Fisher et al. 2019) and qualitative (e.g. *It was very welcoming and I learnt a lot*; ibid.: 79). But asking people to recount their experience of sex education can only tell us so much. Surveys, interviews and focus groups, whether conducted with dozens, hundreds or thousands of people, require students and teachers to recall their experiences. They remain one step removed from classroom interaction – asking questions about what goes on in classrooms but not studying data from within classrooms. None of this research can tell us what sex education really looks like up close.

What actually does go on in a sex education classroom? What sorts of questions do students ask? How do teachers accommodate different beliefs in their classrooms, both religious and secular? How do students learn about more values-based topics, such as consent, respectful relationships, and gender and sexuality diversity? What does teaching look like over the course of a whole unit? What does the assessment look like, and what makes a ‘successful’ student? In short – how is sex education actually taught? This is the question that this thesis seeks to answer.

This study goes into real sex education classrooms, following two teachers and approximately 50 students over 30 hours of lessons. This dataset captures a range of interactions you might expect – questions designed to embarrass the teacher (*What’s the point of a butt plug?*) or to get a laugh (*Do you think Harry Styles will marry me?*). But there are also questions that capture the full adolescent spectrum of emotions about sex, from curiosity (*How long does oral sex last?*) to fear (*Can you die of too much sex?*) to excitement (*What does sex feel like? Does it feel nicer than eating like a good cake?*). Students’ nascent understandings

about relationships and sexuality are captured in these interactions, both the ones they are just learning about (*Can women go to gay clubs?; If your boyfriend calls someone else hot, is that cheating?*), and the ones they are starting to challenge (*Why are women's nipples so sexualised? My nips aren't a McDonalds meal!*).

1.1 MOTIVATION FOR THIS STUDY

1.1.1 The Australian context of consent

In the past few years, consent and consent education have been catapulted into the Australian consciousness. In early 2021, several high-profile news stories put consent in the national spotlight. In January, Grace Tame was named the 2021 Australian of the Year for her advocacy following a two-year battle to self-identify as a rape survivor. In February, a Liberal party staffer, Brittany Higgins, alleged she had been raped at Parliament House in 2019. Also in February, a young woman named Chanel Contos started an online petition for better consent education which went viral, attracting thousands of testimonies of sexual assault, especially at Australian private schools. And later that month, historical rape allegations were made against a federal cabinet minister, later revealed to be Attorney General Christian Porter. These stories drew national attention to consent, and especially the failings of Australia's parliamentary and educational institutions. In light of this, a campaign for compulsory consent education quickly gained momentum, and in February 2022 state and federal education ministers agreed to make consent education mandatory in Australian schools (ABC News 2022). The new Australian curriculum makes consent education mandatory from foundation to year 10 (ages 5-16), and includes "content that addresses the role of gender, power, coercion and disrespect in abusive or violent relationships" (ACARA 2022a). The new curriculum was approved by state and federal education ministers in April 2022, and is expected to begin in schools in 2023.

At the same time, changes to consent legislation were underway in New South Wales (NSW), where the data for this study was collected and where this thesis was written. In November 2021, state parliament amended the NSW *Crimes Act 1900* to adopt affirmative consent laws, which specify that consent is the presence of a 'yes' rather than the absence of a 'no'. For example, you cannot assume that someone who is silent or "does not offer physical or verbal resistance" has consented (NSW Parliamentary Counsel 2022). Rather, people must "freely and voluntarily agree" and there must be "ongoing and mutual communication" (ibid.). These changes came into effect on 1 June 2022, and similar laws have passed in a number of Australian and overseas jurisdictions. They have generally been welcomed by legal advocates,

human rights organisations and mainstream public discourse (Burgin 2019, Amnesty International 2018, Dowds 2021). Campaigning for this change had begun several years earlier, following the legal case of Saxon Mullins, who reported her rape to police in 2013 and went on to face a traumatic five-year criminal legal battle (RASARA n.d., Milligan 2018). While her identity was initially protected, she gave up her anonymity in 2018 to highlight the need for consent law reform, drawing national attention to her case (Milligan 2018). Changes to consent legislation were thus set in motion years ago, but their passing in parliament in 2022 was undoubtedly also linked to the consent context in the Australian mainstream.

In some ways, it is serendipitous that consent has received renewed attention at the same time that the research in this thesis was taking place. In another sense, the timing is no coincidence. Young people's concerns about sex education, including consent education, are not new: they have been well documented in Australia for more than 20 years (e.g. Hillier et al. 1998, Mitchell et al. 2014, Ezer et al. 2019, Hill et al. 2021). They may have only become a major talking point in Australian media just recently, but this is in fact the result of a steady campaign by researchers and young people which has been growing for decades. This call for change is finally being heard, and the renewed urgency around consent in the Australian mainstream is certainly welcome.

1.1.2 My interest in sex education

My initial research in sex education began with magazines (see Carr & Bednarek 2019, Carr 2020). Magazines are an important source of sex education, especially for young women. Reading a magazine is easier and less embarrassing than asking a teacher or parent a question about sex, and magazines can cover topics which young people might not learn about in school sex education (Bragg 2006; Kehily 199a, 1999b). In particular, I studied advice columns in *Dolly*, an Australian fashion, beauty, lifestyle and celebrity magazine aimed at teenage girls. These advice columns contain young people's burning questions about relationships and sexuality which are then answered by a doctor, other health professional, a journalist or a celebrity. They also showcase a wide range of concerns, including bodies (*My left breast is smaller than my right*), relationships (*we broke up and I can't stop thinking about him*), mental health (*every now and then I experience symptoms of depression*), sexual experiences (*I'm a 15-year-old girl who has never been kissed*) and sexuality (*I still like guys, I just don't know if I'm into girls as well*). While similar concerns can appear both in the sex education classroom and on the glossy pages of magazines, the anonymity of advice columns seems to encourage

particularly intimate and confidential disclosures. I analysed these advice columns using corpus linguistics, looking at how sex education advice for young women has changed in the last 25 years. Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses, I found that questions about sexual health were more frequent in the 1990s while mental health questions were more frequent in the 2010s (Carr & Bednarek 2019). But despite these differences, young people have had one concern in common across this time period – namely, being normal (Carr 2020). This research offered a fascinating insight into the lives of young women and the ways that their concerns have both changed and stayed the same over time.

While magazines are an important source of sex education, the most significant setting of sex education is the school. School sex education programs are not only the most common source of sex education, they are also the most effective (UNESCO 2018a, Pound et al. 2017). They are consistently rated as a trustworthy source of information, and they provide the ideal environment for teaching and learning which is age-appropriate, confidential and which provides enough information (Mitchell et al. 2014, UNESCO 2018a). Research in schools was thus an inviting next step for my research, but it also posed problems. Getting access to sex education classrooms required navigating a complicated ethics process as well as finding teachers and students who were willing to be observed during potentially awkward, embarrassing or controversial interactions. And this difficulty was of course magnified by bringing a video camera into the room.

As well as my linguistic research on sex education, I have also been involved in more health-based research. In 2018, I co-authored a position paper on comprehensive sex education for the Australian Association of Adolescent Health (Opie et al. 2018). The health literature in this area is extensive: thousands of studies, hundreds of randomised control trials, and dozens of systematic reviews. One of the aims of the position paper was to distil this wealth of information into a series of recommendations, turning the enormous body of research evidence into a series of action items. This followed a similar set of recommendations which had been put forward nationally (e.g. Collier-Harris & Goldman 2017) and internationally (e.g. Pound et al. 2017, UNESCO 2018a). But writing these recommendations and knowing how to implement them remained a huge gap to bridge. How should a teacher interpret the recommendation to be ‘enthusiastic’, ‘frank’ and ‘non-judgemental’? How can those who design curricula and teaching resources ensure they are creating something ‘engaging’, ‘adaptable’ and which ‘meet[s] the diverse range of needs of all students’? For all this research and all these recommendations for best practice, what did the literature have to say about how this is actually achieved in classrooms?

This question persisted in the small role I have had in delivering sex education. For several years, I volunteered with fEMPOWER, a registered charity which runs workshops on gender equality in Victorian and New South Wales high schools. This organisation was founded in 2015 by the Women’s Collective at the University of Sydney when a group of undergraduate students who were starting to learn more about feminism and gender (in)equality bemoaned the fact that they had not been exposed to this sort of education earlier. They decided to fill this gap themselves and created fEMPOWER. While not explicitly advertised as ‘sex education’, the content of fEMPOWER’s workshops can be considered under this broad umbrella: workshops included information on gender stereotypes, gendered violence and challenging everyday sexism. Facilitating these workshops was rewarding, and they were mostly well received by students and teachers. But I learnt the feeling of standing in front of a room of teenagers, telling them about the importance of consent, or how to respond to a friend who discloses a sexual assault, or why it is not OK to send an unsolicited picture of your genitals, and thinking “*is this actually working?*” Understanding what sex education looks like is crucial for answering this question – for myself, and for any other sex educator who finds this a familiar experience.

To this end, this project followed two sex education teachers over the course of an entire unit of sex education (10 weeks/15 lessons each). Of course, there is only so much which can be extrapolated about sex education from two teachers alone, but this research should not be dismissed on this basis for several reasons. First, a smaller number of participants allows for a greater depth of analysis, and even with just two teachers only a small amount of the 30-hour dataset has been analysed. Second, these teachers self-selected to be in a study where they would be not only observed but filmed during their teaching, and this alone speaks to their confidence and competence as educators. And third, this project captures moments where the pedagogy truly seemed to ‘work’. In some instances, this is easy to point to – in the assessment task, for example, many of the students can accurately cite the NSW law on consent. At other times, the success of sex education is less tangible and harder to grasp. One notable moment is a lesson on gender and sexuality diversity where students are discussing how they would feel if someone of the same sex asked them out. In the middle of this discussion, and with a video camera in the corner, one student comes out in front of the class: “I would [be flattered if someone of the same sex asked me out], because I’m actually bisexual”. Moments like this might be captured in other studies of sex education, whether quantitative (e.g. 70% of LGBTQA+ students have disclosed their sexuality or gender identity to a classmate, Hill et al. 2021: 15) or qualitative (e.g. *I would never have come out openly at school*, Hillier et al. 2010:

90). But the moment itself, and all the moments leading up to it – in which the teacher creates a classroom environment which is tolerant, respectful and perhaps even welcoming of different sexualities – could only ever be captured in a study of this kind. So while I cannot presume that this thesis contains the ‘best’ kind of sex education, there is undoubtedly evidence of teachers working hard and getting it right. Wherever possible, I aim to highlight what teachers ought to do rather than what not to do, with the intention that this description could have an impact well beyond this one setting.

The motivation for this thesis is thus three-fold. First, a desire to move from researching sex education in magazines to schools, and to shift from a more quantitative analysis to a more qualitative one. Second, a desire to move from more general recommendations about how sex education should be to actual descriptions of how it is. And third, a desire to provide teachers with tools and resources which get specific about how to deliver sex education. In other words, the aim of this thesis is to describe sex education pedagogy in detail. Rather than being one-step removed, the aim of this research is to ‘get close’ to sex education, to see it in action, to witness its joys, embarrassments and humour, as well as its moments of impact, respect and deep understanding.

1.2 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS

This thesis is organised into seven chapters. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical and methodological foundations for the study. Chapters 3-6 consist of two pairs of chapters with a symmetrical structure. The first pair (Chapters 3 & 4) describe how consent is taught in sex education, and more specifically how it is technicalised. The second pair (Chapters 5 & 6) describe how respect is taught, and more specifically how it is iconised. In each pair, the first chapter is more theoretical, and the second chapter is more applied. The applied chapters offer a particularly close reading of the data, analysing a smaller number of texts in greater detail; this is intended to offer a description of how learning actually happens. I include applications of my description throughout this thesis, rather than reserving these for the final chapter. For example, in Chapters 3, 4 and 6 I propose teaching resources which directly build off and incorporate my analysis. Chapter 7 reviews the work of the entire thesis and highlights its implications for theory, description and practice.

Chapter 2 – Foundations: Theory, Description and Practice outlines the theoretical and methodological foundations which underpin this thesis. I begin by describing research on sex education, particularly the rich body of literature from the fields of medicine and public

health (§2.1). I then introduce Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) and the basic cartography of this theory (§2.2), before outlining the theoretical tools which will principally inform this research. These include tools related to ideational meaning, including technicality and field relations (§2.3), tools relating to interpersonal meaning, including APPRAISAL and iconisation (§2.4), and tools relating to instantiation, including mass and presence (§2.5).

Chapter 3 – Technicalising Consent describes how consent is technicalised in sex education. I start by summarising consent laws in NSW and show how the legal definition of consent is recontextualised in the classroom (§3.1). I then describe how attitudinal meanings are distilled into the technical term ‘consent’ (§3.2) and use this analysis to revisit the existing SFL description of technicality (§3.3). I then show how consent continues to accrue attitudinal meaning over the course of sex education, and I propose a way of turning the description of this chapter into a teaching resource (§3.4).

Chapter 4 – Learning Consent describes how students acquire the technicality of consent and learn how to put the law into practice. First, I describe how the technical term ‘consent’ is unpacked and repacked using shifts in mass and presence (§4.1). Second, I analyse the assessment task where students are given a hypothetical scenario and must say whether or not it is consensual (§4.2). This requires students to use the same unpacking and repacking that the teacher has modelled previously, but also requires them to go beyond saying whether consent is present or absent and also explain why there is (no) consent. I then bring together the analyses from Chapters 3 and 4 and discuss the implications of this analysis for teaching consent (§4.3).

Chapter 5 – Iconising Respect describes how respect is iconised in sex education. I begin by describing the different attitudinal meanings that respect has in sex education by providing an account of its realisations in lexicogrammar and discourse semantics (§5.1). I then show how respect is ‘instilled’, that is, how it condenses meaning in the service of iconisation. (§5.2). I use this analysis to revisit the existing SFL description of iconisation and bring this together with the description of technicality from Chapter 3 (§5.3).

Chapter 6 – Learning Respect describes how respect is learnt and how the class navigates competing perspectives on what respect means. The aim of this chapter is to understand whether the knowledge and attitudes that are instilled into respect are taken up (or not) by students, and whether teachers successfully rally the class around respect as a values system. I conduct a close reading of three excerpts in the data where the teacher attempts to (re)align students around a particular meaning of respect, sometimes successfully (§6.1) and other times relatively less successfully (§6.2). I then review the common linguistic patterns that

teachers use when these attempts to re-align are successful and propose a way of turning this into a teaching resource for navigating sensitive topics in sex education (§6.3).

Chapter 7 – Interpersonal Education: Beyond Ideation brings together all of the insights from this thesis, outlining the implications of this work for SFL and sex education. I review the implications for theory and description (§7.1) as well as for pedagogic practice (§7.2). I also consider future directions for research for SFL theory and description, and for mobilising the description in teaching/learning practice. (§7.3).

In some ways, the goals of sex education are incredibly lofty. It is one thing to lower rates of Chlamydia and unintended pregnancy, it is quite another to build a world in which sex is always consensual and pleasurable, in which there is no gendered violence, and in which everyone embraces the full spectrum of gender and sexuality diversity. Yet this is precisely the world which comprehensive sex education makes possible. This thesis aims to contribute to this effort in some way.

Chapter 2 – Foundations: Theory, Description and Practice

This chapter provides the theoretical foundations relevant for analysing sex education pedagogy. It is organised into five sections. Section 2.1 introduces the field of sex education, including defining sex education, describing sex education in Australia and reviewing research in this area – especially from the fields of medicine and public health. Sections 2.2-2.5 review relevant theoretical principles from Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). Section 2.2 provides an overview of key concepts in SFL and the general SFL architecture. Section 2.3 focuses on ideational meaning and associated theoretical work on field and technicality. Section 2.4 focuses on interpersonal meaning and associated theoretical work on APPRAISAL, coupling, bonding and affiliation, and icons and iconisation. Section 2.5 brings together ideational and interpersonal meaning using the concepts of mass and presence. Section 2.6 describes the data for this study, which will be used to extend the research and theory reviewed in this chapter.

2.1 SEX EDUCATION

Sex education is a substantial field of research, with studies of sex education from disciplines as diverse as medicine, public health, education, psychology, media studies and gender and cultural studies. As well as occupying researchers, it has captured the attention of schools, covering a large and growing range of content and taking on an increasing importance in curricula. Yet it remains hard to pin down because of significant variation between schools and even within schools. And while there have been recent calls for more consent education in Australia, sex education remains a controversial topic for parents and the wider community. In this section, I survey the primary research strands in sex education. The major focus of research in this area is on the effectiveness of sex education – typically quantitative research from the fields of medicine and public health. But this has been extended to more qualitative research, especially surveys and interviews which seek to understand the experience of sex education for teachers and students. While this body of work provides excellent evidence that sex education can have a positive impact on students' health and wellbeing, we still know relatively little about how this impact is achieved. The field of research on sex education is substantial and I limit my coverage to the most relevant work – for example, I focus on comprehensive school-based sex education unless stated otherwise. I exclude research from adjacent fields such as healthcare communication and language and gender/sexuality. While there is some relevant

research in these fields, reviewing it is beyond the scope of this chapter. These fields undoubtedly have insights to offer, for example descriptions of language and gender (e.g. Cameron 2005) could certainly inform the ways that students negotiate their conceptualisations of masculinity and femininity in their discussions of sex and sexuality. But the research reviewed here is limited to that which best serves to primary purpose of this thesis – to describe sex education pedagogy.

2.1.1 What is sex education?

Sex education has an increasingly comprehensive definition – for researchers, teachers and students alike. A stereotypical view of sex education is a high school health class where students learn about human reproduction (‘the birds and the bees’) and sexual anatomy (‘the plumbing’). Typical lessons might include labelling diagrams with *testes* and *fallopian tubes* or putting a condom on a banana. Student sexual activity is likely discouraged, either by advocating for abstinence or by focussing on the risks of sex such as pregnancy, disease and heartbreak. Students are unlikely to learn about pleasure, consent or healthy relationships, especially if those relationships are not heterosexual. This sort of classroom certainly exists, but it is an incomplete picture of sex education. In reality, sex education encompasses much more than this stereotype – it includes a longer list of topics; it is taught to young children, teenagers and adults alike; and it is provided by teachers, health professionals, police officers, chaplains and others. Note that ‘sex education’ is also referred to in the literature as ‘sexuality education’, ‘sexuality and relationships education’ and ‘respectful relationships education’. I use the term ‘sex education’ throughout this thesis.

For one thing, sex education covers much more than the birds and the bees. A more comprehensive definition of sex education is the “teaching and learning about the cognitive, emotional, physical and social aspects of sexuality” (UNESCO 2018a: 16). Topics that fall under this broad umbrella include those listed above – human anatomy, STIs and contraception – but they also include information about sexuality and gender diversity; consent, coercion and violence; pornography, online safety and sexting; and intimacy, pleasure and love. This more comprehensive view is adopted by international guidelines on sex education (e.g. UNESCO 2018a), Australian state and federal school programs (e.g. NESA 2018, ACARA 2018) and students themselves (e.g. Fisher et al. 2019).

Second, sex education is taught to people of all ages – who may seek sexual health information and advice from health practitioners, peers, family and the internet, as well as from

media such as film, television and magazines. A child who asks where babies come from, a teenager who Googles “when will I get my period?” and an adult who asks their doctor for advice on falling pregnant are all instances of sex education. Even if we narrow our focus to formal sex education in schools, we find examples throughout primary, secondary and tertiary education. Primary school students might learn names for parts of the body in younger years and the changes of puberty in later years. Secondary students might learn about contraception, STIs and healthy relationships. And tertiary students might learn about consent or how to access medical services on a university campus. Even before entering formal schooling, children can learn key concepts without an explicit discussion of sex or sexuality. For example, a pre-school class might learn about who can touch their bodies or how to ask a friend if you can share their toys in an age-appropriate lesson on bodily autonomy and consent.

And third, school sex education can be provided by people other than health teachers. It can be taught by other schoolteachers, for example in a biology lesson on human reproduction or a school assembly on sexting and cyberbullying. Or it can be taught by someone from outside the school who is recruited for their professional expertise. For example, a police officer may educate students on how to file a report for sexual assault, or a nurse may advise students on how to access STI testing. Alternatively, sex education may be provided by peer (or near-to-peer) educators, such as high school or university students. Unlike other external providers, peer educators do not necessarily have additional training or expertise. However, students may find peer educators easier to talk to, with their age making them more relatable and less awkward than teachers or other adult educators.

Sex education thus has a much broader scope than high school health classes on the birds and the bees. This definition is also only going to grow, especially to encompass ways that modern technology mediates sex and sexuality. Consider, for example, that sexting and online pornography have only been folded into the comprehensive definition of sex education in recent years. The stereotype does, of course, exist for a reason. School health classes remain the most common kind of sex education, both in Australia and internationally (Fisher et al. 2019, UNESCO 2018a). But crucially, school sex education – when done well – also has the greatest capacity to affect change.

2.1.2 The evidence for school-based sex education

Comprehensive sex education in schools has an ever-increasing list of positive effects. Earlier research in this area was particularly concerned with disproving the effects of abstinence-only

sex education (i.e. programs which taught students not to have sex until marriage). This research has consistently found that abstinence-only education worsens health outcomes; for example it is correlated with higher rates of unintended pregnancy (Stranger-Hall & Hall 2011). Conversely, comprehensive sex education programs can reduce rates of unintended pregnancy and STIs and can increase the use of condoms and contraception (UNESCO 2018a, Pound et al. 2017, Kirby 2011). Abstinence-only education programs are generally motivated by a fear that teaching students about sex will harm their innocence or make them more promiscuous (Goldman 2008), but in fact the opposite is true. Providing students with accurate and detailed information about sex does not increase sexual activity, sexual risk-taking behaviour or STI infection rates, and can in fact decrease the number of sexual partners someone has and the frequency with which they have sex; it can also encourage young people to wait longer to have sex for the first time (UNESCO 2018a: 28, Pound et al. 2017, Kirby 2011).

As well as proving that comprehensive sex education can improve health outcomes, researchers have also turned their attention to its wide range of positive social outcomes. This work has demonstrated that comprehensive sex education can improve students' confidence and self-identity, their knowledge and acceptance of diverse sexualities, and their gender equity attitudes (UNESCO 2018a). A 2021 systematic review of school-based sex education found a range of other positive outcomes, including appreciation of sexual diversity, dating and intimate partner violence prevention, development of healthy relationships, prevention of child sex abuse, improved social/emotional learning and increased media literacy (Goldfarb & Lieberman 2021).

The evidence in support of sex education is substantial and robust. The above findings have been replicated in dozens of studies in a broad range of countries and contexts, as well as in numerous systematic reviews. This work has consistently found that comprehensive sex education has positive outcomes, whether in high income countries (e.g. Shepherd et al. 2010, Picot et al. 2012) or low- and middle-income countries (e.g. Fonner et al. 2014, Hindin et al. 2016), and whether or not it primarily assesses health outcomes (e.g. Michielsen et al. 2010, Goesling et al. 2014) or social outcomes (e.g. Goldfarb & Lieberman 2021, Burton et al. 2021; see also UNESCO 2009, 2018a, 2018b).

However, these outcomes cannot be achieved equally in all contexts; research indicates that the best setting for effective sex education is in schools. School programs are one of the most used and, crucially, most trusted sources of sexual health information. In Australia, school is consistently rated as a more trustworthy source of information than doctors, friends and siblings; the only other contender for first place as far as trust is concerned is 'mum' (Mitchell

et al. 2014). While young people do increasingly turn to sources like the internet, they generally have a low level of trust in the accuracy of this information and approach it infrequently and with a degree of caution (Fisher et al 2019, Fisher & Kauer 2019). Several other factors also contribute to effective sex education, including that it is taught from ages 5-18 in an age-appropriate way, that it takes place in a safe and confidential environment, and that it is of sufficient duration and intensity (UNESCO 2018a). Schools are ideally placed to provide this, and unsurprisingly school programs have the greatest capacity to improve sexual health outcomes (Pound et al. 2017). We might ask, then, what sex education looks like in schools.

2.1.3 What does sex education look like in Australia?

Sex education has a significant and growing place in Australian schools and has received substantial research attention for several decades. Yet what sex education looks like in Australia does not have a straightforward answer. We can begin by looking at curriculum documents, which set the agenda for sex education at the state and federal level. But what the curriculum specifies may not be what actually takes place, since there is substantial variation between and even within schools. Even with a significant body of research, sex education in Australia remains difficult to pin down.

2.1.3.1 The sex education curriculum

In the 1980s and 1990s, the primary goal of sex education was to respond to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Research and public policy were urgently concerned with HIV transmission, and sex education programs reflected this with a focus on STIs and contraception (Harvey 2013). Since then, sex education has expanded to include a much broader range of topics, including consent, healthy relationships, and harassment and violence (ACARA 2018). More recently, sex education has been consolidated in the Australian national curriculum, and most Australian students (84%) receive sex education at school (Fisher et al. 2019: 5). More specifically, sex education is part of the Health and Physical Education curriculum under the focus area ‘Relationships and Sexuality’ (ACARA 2018). The national curriculum sets a broad agenda for content, and this is then adapted and implemented by each of the states and territories. While it does not mandate an age where sex education should be taught, the suggested progression includes some form of sex education from the earliest years of schooling. For example, students might learn about parts of the body at age 5-6, puberty at age 10-12 and sexual/intimate relationships at age 14-16 (ACARA 2015). Within NSW, sex education is usually taught at age

12-16 as part of the Personal Development, Health and Physical Education (PHDPE) syllabus (NESA 2018).

The sex education curriculum, or more specifically the consent curriculum, has also received renewed attention just in the last two years. A series of high-profile news stories thrust consent into the Australia mainstream, and public pressure has now pushed consent into the mandatory curriculum through all years of compulsory schooling (age 5-16). As such, the curriculum which was in use at the time the data in this study was collected (July-November 2020) is different to the current curriculum (version 8.4 vs. version 9.0, ACARA 2022b). It remains to be seen what the outcome of these changes will be on consent pedagogy. Curriculum changes come and go, often without major changes to classroom implementation; but the surrounding public attention and social change suggest that consent education may transform significantly in coming years. The analysis of consent in this thesis (Chapters 3 & 4) thus serves as a baseline description and will be a crucial reference point in any future research.

The curriculum is the key agenda setting document of any subject area, and researchers have unsurprisingly been interested in analysing these texts. One particular strand of research in this area is critical discourse analysis (CDA), which has generally identified positive discourses in Australian curricula. For example, in curriculum discourses students are viewed as agents who are able to make decisions about their own health, wellbeing and relationships; attraction has a broad definition which includes physical, sexual, emotional and/or spiritual attraction; and schools are encouraged to think about racial, sexual and gender diversity and to challenge homophobia and transphobia (Ezer et al. 2018, Shannon & Smith 2015). There are also criticisms of the curricula – for example minimal or missing mention of pleasure (Allen, Rasmussen & Quinlivan 2013) and the exclusion of non-Western and Indigenous voices (Fitzpatrick 2018, MacDonald 2013). Similar discourses have also been identified in the UK (see e.g. Sauntson 2013, 2018; Sundaram & Sauntson 2016) and internationally (see e.g. Jones 2011). Research on curricula is a logical object of study given the status of these documents and the ease of accessing them – syllabuses and curricula are publicly available on government websites. But an analysis of sex education curricula (what to teach) can only tell us so much about sex education pedagogy (how to teach). The curriculum and syllabus documents prescribe a certain program, but this may not reflect what sex education actually looks like. In the following section, I describe how sex education varies across Australia, both between and within schools.

2.1.3.2 Variation between schools

At the broadest level, sex education varies between the states and territories which adapt and implement the national curriculum in their own way. But within any given state there is variation based on whether the school is single-sex or co-educational, and whether the school is government, independent or Catholic.

In terms of gender, sex education in single-sex classrooms presents some advantages. For example, female students report that they feel more comfortable and less vulnerable in single-sex classes (Pound et al. 2017). However, sex segregation can also pose problems. Single-sex classes with only boys can be more disruptive and even hostile (Measor, Tiffin & Miller 2000), and dividing students by gender implies that they should receive different messages about sex, for example, that girls should be learning about periods while boys learn about wet dreams. While students do express some differences in what they wish to learn, in general they have overlapping content interests (Allen 2011). Dividing students by gender can also be alienating for trans and non-binary students, who may find these lessons inappropriate or irrelevant (Haley et al. 2019, Jones et al. 2016). There is significant debate about whether sex education should be taught in single-sex or mixed-sex classes, but sex educators and researchers generally argue that sex education should take place in mixed-sex classes at least some of the time (Measor, Tiffin & Miller 2000; Allen 2011; Pound et al. 2017).

In terms of school type, sex education can vary based on whether the school is government, independent or Catholic. Some religious schools may choose not to teach sex education; but most do provide it in a form which is in line with the school's beliefs (Mitchell et al. 2014). However, young people at these schools are more likely to receive a more conservative form of sex education and are more likely to experience homophobic language and social exclusion at school (ibid., Hillier et al. 2010). There is also likely to be variation between metropolitan, regional and rural schools, though this remains an under-researched area (Hulme Chambers et al. 2017, see also Senior et al. 2014; Heslop, Burns & Lobo 2019).

2.1.3.3 Variation within schools

As well as varying between schools, sex education can vary within schools. To understand this fluctuation, we can speak to teachers and students about their experiences of sex education, and many researchers have done just this. Research in this area tends to be more qualitative, typically involving surveys (e.g. Ollis & Harrison 2016, Burns & Hendriks 2018, Hillier et al. 2010, Mitchell et al. 2014, Fisher et al. 2019, Smith et al. 2011) or interviews and focus groups

(e.g. Ollis 2017, Jones et al. 2016). This is again a substantial field of research, including work in primary schools (e.g. Smith et al. 2013; Johnson, Sendall & McCuaig 2014) and secondary schools (e.g. Ollis & Dyson 2018, Joyce et al. 2018), and research which has also zoomed in on particular settings, such as regional and rural schools (e.g. Heslop, Burns & Lobo 2019; Duffy et al. 2013; Smith et al. 2013) and particular populations, such as Muslim students (e.g. Sanjakdar 2009) and migrant and refugee young people (e.g. Botfield et al. 2018). And it has also gone beyond schools altogether, for example sex education for at-risk, out-of-school young people (e.g. Brown, Sorenson & Hildebrand 2012) and older Australians (e.g. Fileborn et al. 2017).

2.1.3.3.1 *Teachers' experiences of sex education*

Despite recognising the importance of sex education, many teachers report that they feel underprepared to teach it, either from lack of time, lack of resources or lack of training (Pound et al. 2017; Goldman 2008, 2011; Carman et al. 2011). Teachers of all kinds operate in an increasingly busy environment and must juggle competing agendas and priorities in a crowded curriculum (Johnson, Sendall & McCuaig 2014: 370). Sex education is no exception, and teachers identify lack of time as the main barrier to their delivery of sex education (Smith et al. 2011). This is especially the case where sex education is not in the core (i.e. assessable) curriculum. In addition to lacking time, sex education teachers may lack training. In Australia, only 9% of teacher training courses have a substantial inclusion of training on sexuality education, and more than half (51%) of courses have no inclusion (Carman et al. 2011: 269). Even courses which do include sexuality education training only dedicate a few hours to the topic (ibid.).

While a crowded curriculum and lack of resources are a common experience for all kinds of teachers, there are other barriers which are unique to sex education and its perceived 'controversial' nature. Teachers may lack confidence when teaching sex education and express a fear of saying the wrong thing (Smith et al. 2011, Donovan 1998). They may feel uncomfortable or embarrassed when teaching particularly sensitive topics such as intimacy, pleasure, masturbation and pornography (Fisher et al. 2019; Smith et al. 2011; Ollis 2016a, b). This is exacerbated by a fear of backlash from parents or the community, who may believe that sex education encourages sexual activity, or that it pushes a left-leaning 'woke' political agenda (Smith et al. 2011, Opie et al. 2018, Law 2017). Even if only a few parents object, some schools will simply choose to opt out of sex education altogether (Goldman 2011: 156).

Alternatively, schools may opt to use an external provider (i.e. sex educators from outside the school). External providers typically have other relevant expertise – for example training in adolescent sexual health, domestic and intimate partner violence or LGBTQIA+¹ issues (see e.g. Fox et al. 2014, Douglas et al. 2001, Lamb & Randazzo 2016). As well as offering additional expertise, external providers can cover topics which teachers find uncomfortable, and they give teachers a way to ‘pass the blame’ if they experience parental pushback (Johnson, Sendall & McCuaig 2014: 372; Fisher et al. 2019; Fox et al. 2014). In some cases, external providers are better placed to build rapport with students, as they are considered impartial adults who can be trusted (Pound et al. 2017). Some schools may even opt to use peer educators (i.e. young people teaching other young people), since they remove the skewed power relationship between students and adult educators (Pound et al. 2017). However, regular schoolteachers can in other cases be more effective at building rapport, since they typically having greater knowledge of their students’ personal circumstances (Fox et al. 2014, Goldman 2011). Using an external provider is an increasingly popular option for schools, with around one third of Australian secondary students receiving sex education from an external provider – though usually in addition to a schoolteacher (Mitchell et al. 2014: 71). However, the evidence in support of peer education is not as robust, since most research in this area is done on an individual basis (i.e. assessing a specific provider or specific program; Fox et al. 2014, Goldman 2011, Morgan et al. 2004). The problem of who should teach sex education remains an open question, but the current recommendation is a collaboration between schoolteachers and external providers (Pound et al. 2017, Opie et al. 2018).

2.1.3.3.2 *Students’ experiences of sex education*

Given the variation in teachers’ experiences, it is unsurprising that students also have varied experiences of sex education. While a majority of Australian students receive sex education, only a minority of them report that they find it useful (38% found it ‘very relevant’ or ‘extremely relevant’, Fisher et al. 2019: 78). Students take issue both with the content of sex education, and with its delivery (Waling et al. 2020).

First, students frequently complain that sex education is too scientific or medical, and that it focuses too much on the risks of sex (Mitchell et al. 2014, Fisher et al. 2019). While

¹ LGBTQIA+ stands for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersex, Asexual and Other sexuality or gender diverse people and is used throughout this thesis.

students are likely to learn about puberty, human reproduction and STIs, they want a more comprehensive sex education which includes information about consent, pleasure and healthy relationships, as well as violence in relationships, pornography, intimacy and love (Giordano & Ross 2012, Johnson et al. 2016, Fisher et al. 2019). There is also a lack of relevant information for queer students, such as education which addresses homophobia or discussions of sex other than male-female penetrative intercourse. Sexuality and gender diverse students are the most likely to find their sex education inadequate or irrelevant (Mitchell et al. 2014: 73). Similar issues arise for students from disadvantaged backgrounds. For example, young people with physical disabilities report feeling alienated and seen as non-sexual (Campbell, Löfgren-Mårtenson & Santinele Martino 2020, see also Family Planning NSW 2013) and young people with intellectual disabilities report that their sex education left them with more questions than answers (Frawley and Wilson 2016). And yet students from disadvantaged backgrounds may have the greatest need for school sex education. For example, young people from migrant or refugee backgrounds report an increased need for comprehensive sex education as they may be unable to access this in the family home (Botfield et al. 2018).

Second, students take issue with the delivery of sex education. This includes the timing of sex education, with some students feeling it occurs too late (e.g. only learning about contraception and STIs after students are sexually active, Waling et al. 2020). Alternatively they may feel it occurs too early, learning about the more explicit aspects of sex when an exploration of relationships and puberty would have been more appropriate (ibid.). Students also frequently take issue with who is teaching sex education. They might find their regular schoolteachers unsuitable because they are (perceived as) inadequately trained, or because they are embarrassed, judgemental and unable to discuss sex frankly (Pound et al. 2017). In addition, students may find their teachers 'awkward' or may worry that they compromise confidentiality, making it difficult to discuss sensitive topics (ibid.). Some students may find the power imbalance of a teacher-student relationship inherently problematic, and so express a preference for external providers.

Many of the concerns raised by students are not new but have been documented in Australia for over 20 years (e.g. Hillier et al. 1998, Mitchell et al. 2014, Ezer et al. 2019, Hill et al. 2021). Of course, the past 20 years have not been without progress. For example, there have been efforts to make sex education more inclusive of gender and sexuality diversity, as well as broader social and cultural shifts such as the legalisation of same-sex marriage in Australia in 2017. It is presumably thanks to these changes that more young people report non-heterosexual attraction now than 30 years ago (6% in 1997 vs. 39% in 2018, Fisher & Kauer

2019: 2). And importantly, some students do note positive experiences of sex education. For example, some students found their sex education informative, comprehensive in the topics it covered, and inclusive of different sexualities (Waling et al. 2020). Positive comments were more likely to be provided by students who attended government schools, were heterosexual, had not had penetrative sex and were younger (year 9 compared to year 12, Waling et al. 2020: 541).

So far, I have reviewed the evidence base for sex education, drawing on both quantitative research which tends to come from medicine and public health, as well as more qualitative research which seeks to understand teachers' and students' experiences of sex education. This evidence base is not only significant; it is robust, and there is consensus from national and international bodies on what constitutes best practice sex education (see e.g. Pound et al. 2017, UNESCO 2018a, Opie et al. 2018). This knowledge has been implemented in a range of settings, including international technical guidance on sex education (e.g. UNESCO 2018a) and frameworks for domestic violence prevention (e.g. Our Watch 2015, 2021). And it has been used to enrich pedagogy, underpinning a more comprehensive definition of sex education in the Australian curriculum (e.g. ACARA 2022a) and the NSW state syllabus (e.g. NSW Department of Education 2015, 2017). However, if this evidence base is to have the most impact, we need to also understand what these recommendations and guidelines look like in practice. For example, how can a sex educator ensure that they are being 'non-judgemental and approachable'? How can someone designing content and resources for the classroom ensure that they are 'frank and informative'? We have an enormous body of research on what teachers, students and researchers think is happening in sex education, but to actually find out what is happening we need to look at real teaching practices.

2.1.4 What do we know about teaching practices in sex education?

The rich body of work described so far still tells us relatively little about what goes on inside sex education classrooms. We need to now turn to consider research which takes place in sex education classrooms, rather than simply about classrooms.

The first strand of research in classrooms comprises studies which evaluate whether a program is being taught as it is designed, known as 'implementation fidelity' (e.g. Berglas et al. 2016, Cushman et al. 2014, Meiksin et al. 2020, Jarpe-Ratner 2020). These studies can be quite extensive, involving observation at multiple schools and over multiple lessons. However, this kind of classroom observation does not aim to analyse teaching practices in detail; rather

it might assess whether certain topics are taught or highlight barriers to implementing the program as intended.

This larger scale research has also given way to smaller scale studies which get closer to sex education. This includes two research methodologies in particular: ethnography and critical discourse analysis. Ethnographic research on sex education has been conducted in a range of different countries, from Norway (Røthing 2008), to Ethiopia (Browes 2015), to the USA (Sperling 2021), to Australia and New Zealand (Brömdal et al. 2017). It is difficult to summarise this work neatly, since ethnographies are necessarily unique to their context. But one common trend in this research is to highlight the issues that researchers observe. For example, it might be noted that homosexuality was marginalised and stigmatised (Røthing 2008), that there was a lack of representation of intersex people (Sperling 2021) or that teachers and students found it difficult to discuss sexuality due to the cultural context (Browes 2015).

Similarly, research from the field of critical discourse analysis (CDA) has tended to highlight the negative aspects of sex education. For example, Sauntson's (2018) study of sex education classrooms in the UK found that teachers used heteronormative discourses of sexuality – that is, discourses which prioritise heterosexual relations, particularly ones which are monogamous, reproductive and based on traditional gender roles. Jackson and Weatherall (2010) similarly noted traditional discourses of sexuality in their research in New Zealand sex education classrooms. CDA research can also highlight positive aspects of sex education discourses, for example discussions of non-heterosexual attraction (Sauntson 2018) and of pleasure (Jackson & Weatherall 2010). Kehily's (1999a, b; 2002) research in the UK similarly found that students discussed pleasure and homosexuality, referring to magazines to explore themes which were otherwise underdeveloped in classroom sex education. These kinds of interactions do suggest new and encouraging ways of thinking about sexuality; but they are also salient for their scarcity.

While there is research which includes classroom observation and which analyses teaching practices, this work also highlights the difficulty of accessing sex education classrooms. The research cited here has often been the result of significant ethnographies conducted over several years (e.g. Kehily 1999a, b), by researchers who have a pre-existing rapport with a school or with specific teachers (e.g. Ollis 2016a) and/or by researchers who are also the sex educators in the study (e.g. Lamb & Randazzo 2016). Understandably, some researchers will take the alternate route of looking at classroom materials, such as lesson plans (e.g. Ollis 2016b) and student work samples (e.g. Ollis 2017). For those who are able to get access to classrooms, this will typically be for a fairly short period, with observations and

recordings usually ranging from a few lessons to a few weeks. The exception is Kehily's (1999a, b; 2002) work, which observed a sex education class over 10 weeks. However, this research was part of a three-year ethnographic study – an extremely high bar for entry.

As well as the logistical barriers to observing sex education, there are significant ethical barriers. Any research in classrooms must seek consent from teachers, students and parents/carers. Compared to, say, biology or history classes, sex education classes present a unique challenge because of their sensitive nature. Students may struggle to feel comfortable in sex education classrooms at the best of times, let alone with a stranger sitting in the corner, and even more so if they are accompanied by a tape recorder or a video camera. And yet, if we are to understand the teaching practices of sex education, especially in detail, this is precisely what is required.

The other notable absence in this research is a more positive description of sex education pedagogy. While there can undoubtedly be issues with sex education and these are worth raising, this research can offer little insight into how to do sex education, rather than how not to do it. A different type of research is needed to connect the goals of sex education (e.g. increasing acceptance of LGBTQIA+ people), the abstract recommendations for pedagogy (e.g. be non-judgemental) and the way this actually looks in the classroom.

2.1.5 The need to look more closely at sex education

Above I have presented an overview of the substantial field of research on sex education. The dominant strand of research in this area is concerned with the effectiveness of sex education, especially in quantitative studies from medicine and public health. This research has repeatedly shown the ability of comprehensive, school-based sex education to improve health outcomes, such as reducing rates of STIs, but also to improve social outcomes, such as increasing acceptance of diverse sexualities. These outcomes are best achieved in schools, which have also been the subject of substantial research attention. Despite this, there is no straightforward answer to what school sex education looks like in Australia. Curriculum documents set the agenda for sex education, but this may not be what actually takes place, with significant variation between and even within schools. Researchers have sought to understand this through more qualitative studies, namely surveys and interviews which seek to understand teachers' and students' experiences of sex education. This substantial quantitative and qualitative evidence base has been implemented in a range of settings and has also been distilled into a concise set of recommendations for best practice sex education. However, in order for this

research evidence to have the most impact, we need to understand what these recommendations and guidelines look like by studying real teaching practices.

There is a smaller body of research which opens up this black box, which we might think of as research in classrooms rather than merely about classrooms. Research which involves classroom observation might be fairly broad, such as studies which assess whether certain topics have been covered in sex education lessons as part of implementation fidelity (e.g. Berglas et al. 2016, Meiksin et al. 2020). Or classroom observation might be more detailed, including ethnographies (e.g. Røthing 2008, Browes 2015, Sperling 2021) and research from Critical Discourse Analysis which records sex education classrooms so that their language can be analysed in detail (e.g. Kehily 1999a, b; Jackson & Weatherall 2010; Sauntson 2018). This research in general highlights the significant barriers to analysing sex education pedagogy, both logistical (e.g. finding teachers who are willing to participate, especially in a study which runs for several weeks) and ethical (e.g. getting student and parental consent to film teenagers talking about sex). None of this research has described teaching practices in detail, nor has it offered a guide of what to do (rather than what not to do) in sex education pedagogy.

In short, none of the above research can tell us what sex education pedagogy really looks like. What does teaching look like over the course of a whole unit? How do teachers accommodate different beliefs in their classrooms, both religious and secular? How do students learn about more values-based topics, such as consent, respectful relationships, and gender and sexuality diversity? What does assessment look like in sex education, and what makes a ‘successful’ student? In short – how is sex education actually taught? To analyse this, we need a linguistic theory capable of capturing the detail of pedagogic discourse. Below I introduce one such theory, Systemic Functional Linguistics, beginning with the basic parameters and then introducing the theoretical concepts most relevant to this thesis.

2.2 SYSTEMIC FUNCTIONAL LINGUISTICS

The theoretical framework which underpins this thesis is Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL; Halliday 1978, 1985 [1994]; Halliday & Matthiessen 2014). In SFL, language is conceived as a resource for making meaning (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 3). Where many theories of linguistics are concerned with a cognitive approach to language (e.g. Universal Grammar; Chomsky 1957, 1965), SFL adopts a social perspective on language – as something

people use to live. SFL provides the theoretical principals and analytical tools which will be used to analyse the language of sex education.

One of the guiding principles of SFL is to be an ‘applied linguistics’ (Halliday 2008). That is, to be “a comprehensive and theoretically powerful model of language” which is “capable of being applied to the... practical problems” of modern society (ibid.: 7). As such, the goal of much SFL work – including this thesis – is action research (see Caldwell, Knox & Martin 2022 for recent work in this area). This requires a dialectic between theory, description and practice, as making change (practice) often demands new description, and this may in turn demand new theory (Martin, Knox & Caldwell 2022: 10). This is also underscored by the view of SFL as Marxist linguistics; a desire to think politically about language but needing to go deeply into the nature of language to do so (see Martin 2013a).

A particularly productive strand of SFL action research is the so-called ‘Sydney School’ of educational linguistics (Martin 2000a, Rose & Martin 2012). This began with work on primary school and then secondary school writing in the 1980s, where the notion of genre and genre-based literacy emerged (see Martin & Rose 2008 for a consolidation of this work). This work grew to encompass a wider variety of school subjects across primary, secondary and tertiary education, with particular interest in evaluative language and APPRAISAL in the 1990s (see Martin 1992a, Martin & White 2005) and multimodality in the 2000s (see e.g. Royce & Bowcher 2006, Unsworth 2008). The rich cannon of SFL research in education now comprises studies of science (Lemke 1990; Halliday & Martin 1993a; Martin & Veel 1998; Halliday 2004; Maton, Martin & Doran 2021), mathematics (O’Halloran 2005), history (Martin & Wodak 2003, Coffin 2006, Hao & Martin in prep), social science (Wignell 2007) business studies (Szenes 2017, 2021) and education for bilingual students (Harman 2018), among others. This thesis aims to contribute to this rich body of SFL research by analysing the language of sex education. Like other work in this cannon, the ultimate goal of this thesis is action research. That is, it aims to move beyond a description of what can be found in sex education and instead take a step towards finding out what works in education and the language resources we need to get there. I return to this point in the final chapter, asking what action research in sex education would look like.

Below I introduce some key concepts in SFL which are relevant to this thesis. I begin with an explanation of three hierarchies (realisation, instantiation and individuation) and two complementarities (axis and metafunction). These concepts will be relevant to an analysis of language – both spoken and written – in sex education. However, it is worth noting that these concepts are also relevant to other modalities of communication and have been used in SFL to

study images (e.g. Kress & van Leeuwen 2006), artefacts (e.g. Stenglin 2008, 2022), space (e.g. Stenglin 2004, Martin & Stenglin 2007), mathematics (Doran 2018), body language (Ngo et al. 2022), movement and music (Han 2021) and emoji (Logi & Zappavigna 2021), among others.

2.2.1 Hierarchies

SFL has three hierarchies for language: realisation, instantiation and individuation. The first of these hierarchies – realisation – has received the most attention in SFL to date (Martin 2008a). However all three hierarchies are valuable in an analysis of sex education pedagogy, offering complementary perspectives on language and meaning making. In particular, this thesis will use the instantiation hierarchy to understand how meaning unfolds at different timescales – for example, to analyse how consent is taught in a single lesson and over the course of 10 weeks. I also draw on the individuation hierarchy in my analysis of iconisation, a crucial aspect of respect pedagogy. Below I introduce each of the three hierarchies and highlight why they are relevant to an analysis of sex education.

2.2.1.1 Realisation (a hierarchy of abstraction)

Realisation can be characterised as a hierarchy of abstraction. In SFL, language is generally modelled as three strata – phonology/graphology, lexicogrammar and (discourse) semantics. These can be organised into an expression plane (phonology/graphology) and a stratified content plane (lexicogrammar and discourse semantics), following Martin (2014). This is often represented imaginatively with co-tangential circles, as in Figure 2.1 (originally in Martin & Matthiessen 1991, following a suggestion of Halliday's).




Figure 2.1 SFL strata organised into expression and content planes

The relation of one stratum to other strata is known as realisation (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999). In this stratified model, each level of meaning is recoded as another – discourse semantics (meaning) is realised by lexicogrammar (wording), which is realised by phonology (sounds) in the case of spoken language or graphology (letters) in the case of written language (Martin 2008a). This is described by Lemke (1984) as a relationship of metaredundancy, whereby discourse semantics is a pattern of lexicogrammatical patterns, which are in turn a pattern of phonological or graphological patterns (see also Martin 2008a: 33).

In this thesis, I adopt a stratified model of both language (phonology, lexicogrammar and discourse semantics) and context (register and genre), following Martin (1992a, 2014). This is represented in Figure 2.2.




Figure 2.2 SFL’s stratified model of language and context

The first stratum of context is register, which comprises the variables of field, tenor and mode. Field refers to the activities that participants engage in (see also Section 2.3.1), tenor refers to the relationships between participants, and mode deals with the role that language is playing. These three variables correlate with the three metafunctions of language, introduced below (see Section 2.2.2.2). The second stratum of context is genre. For practical purposes a genre is generally treated as a “staged, goal-oriented social process” (Martin & Rose 2008: 6), meaning genres have a particular social purpose and it takes a few steps to get there. The notion of metaredundancy holds for context strata, with genre a pattern of register patterns, which is in turn a pattern of discourse semantic patterns, which are in turn a pattern of lexicogrammatical patterns, which are in turn a pattern of phonological/graphological patterns (Martin 2008a: 33). This thesis adopts Martin’s stratified model of social context because it allows us to analyse significant concepts in sex education; for example field relations (from register) will be used to analyse the technical term consent, and genre will be used to analyse spoken classroom discourse and a written assessment task.

2.2.1.2 Instantiation (a cline of generalisation)

Whereas realisation is characterised as a hierarchy of abstraction, instantiation can be characterised as a cline of generalisation (Martin 2008a: 33). Halliday and Matthiessen (1999, 2014) introduce this hierarchy through the metaphor of climate and weather:

“Climate and weather are not two different phenomena; rather, they are the same phenomenon seen from different standpoints of the observer. What we call ‘climate’ is weather seen from a greater depth of time — it is what is instantiated in the form of weather. The weather is the text: it is what goes on around us all the time, impacting on, and sometimes disturbing, our daily lives. The climate is the system, the potential that underlies these variable effects.”

(Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 27)

At the ‘climate’ end of the scale, instantiation is concerned with system; the underlying potential of a language as a meaning making resource. At the ‘weather’ end of the scale, instantiation is concerned with an individual text (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014). The relationship between system and text is a cline, as represented in Figure 2.3.




Figure 2.3 Hierarchy of instantiation (Martin 2008a: 35)

System and text are the two poles of the cline, and between these poles there are intermediate patterns. For example, we can begin with a single *text* and then look for other texts which are similar according to certain criteria. By highlighting patterns they all share, we can identify a *text type* (e.g. recipes, weather forecasts, service encounters), moving up the instantiation cline (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 29). We can then further generalise to *diatypes* (Gregory 1967)

i.e. the ways we use language in different contexts, and eventually to the full *system* of meaning potential in a language. It is also possible to extend the hierarchy of instantiation further downwards to ‘reading’, following Martin (e.g. 2006, 2008a). In this conceptualisation, *reading* is a subjectified meaning afforded by the broader potential at the level of *text*. This is useful for a context such as education, where the teacher might intend one reading of their text but students may understand quite another. Importantly, the realisation and instantiation hierarchies should not be conflated as they are complementary perspectives on language. All strata instantiate, since they are all designed to “model comprehensively the meaning potential of a culture” (Martin 2010: 18). A similar perspective is offered by work on hybridity (e.g. Miller & Bayley 2016), which seeks to understand how linguistic categories can be both regular (e.g. when considered for language description) and original (e.g. when considered as agents of social change). Since this can be considered independently of strata (e.g. grammatical hybridity, registerial hybridity), this also offers a way to distinguish between the realisation hierarchy (i.e. the choices available in language) and the ways those choices come together in text.

When we are dealing with an instance of something, we are necessarily concerned with how something unfolds in time. Indeed, the analogy with the climate and weather makes this explicit: “What we call ‘climate’ is weather seen *from a greater depth of time*” (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 27, emphasis added). For this reason, is it useful here to introduce the notion of semogenesis and its associated timescales.

2.2.1.2.1 *Semogenesis*

Semogenesis refers to “the processes by which meaning, and particular meanings, are created” (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 17). Semogenesis can be considered from the perspective of three different timescales: logogenesis, ontogenesis and phylogenesis. Logogenesis is the unfolding of a text, using *logo(s)* in the original sense of ‘discourse’. Ontogenesis is the development of the individual speaker, over, say, their lifetime. Phylogenesis is the evolution or emergence of human language, including the development of specific languages. Where logogenesis is concerned with unfolding over seconds, minutes and hours, ontogenesis is concerned with development in days, months and years, and phylogenesis is concerned with evolution over decades, centuries and millennia (Martin 1997: 9; see also Lemke 2000: 277 for a more detailed discussion of timescales). These timescales are interrelated, as Martin (1997: 9) explains: “Phylogenesis provides the environment for ontogenesis which in turn provides

the environment for logogenesis... Conversely, logogenesis provides the material (i.e. semiotic goods) for ontogenesis, which in turn provides the material for phylogenesis” (based on Halliday & Matthiessen 1999). These processes can be visualised, as in Figure 2.4.




Figure 2.4 Timescales and semogenesis (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 18)

2.2.1.3 Individuation (a scale of belonging)

Alongside the hierarchies of realisation and instantiation is a third, complementary hierarchy: individuation (Matthiessen 2003 as cited in Martin 2008a; Martin 2009, 2010). Individuation can be characterised as a scale of belonging. It is concerned with identity and describes the relationship between individuals and their culture. A useful metaphor here, drawing from Bernstein (1996, 1999), is of reservoir and repertoire:

“I shall use the term ‘repertoire’ to refer to the set of strategies and their analogic potential possessed by any one individual, and the term ‘reservoir’ to refer to the total of sets and its potential of the community as a whole. Thus, the repertoire of each member of the community will have a common nucleus but there will be differences between the repertoires. There will be differences between the repertoires because of

differences between the members arising out of differences in member contexts and activities, and their associated issues.”

(Bernstein 1999: 159-160)

Reservoir and repertoire are the starting points for two complementary ways of thinking about individuation. If we take *reservoir* as our starting point, we begin with all the resources of identity that are available in a culture and consider how these are distributed to individual users of language. This ‘top-down’ perspective deals with *allocation* and has been principally explored in SFL by Hasan and her colleagues (e.g. Hasan 1996, 2005, 2009; Williams 2005), following Hasan’s work on semantic variation in relation to gender and social class. Alternatively, if we take *repertoire* as our starting point, we begin with the individual and consider how they mobilise resources to bond with one another. This ‘bottom-up’ perspective deals with *affiliation*, principally advanced by Knight’s (2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2013) work on conversational humour and extended in particular by Zappavigna and her colleagues (e.g. Zappavigna 2011, 2018; Martin et al. 2013; Zappavigna & Ross 2021, Logi & Zappavigna 2022). I expand on the affiliation perspective in more detail in Section 2.4.3. These two perspectives on individuation are visualised in Figure 2.5.




Figure 2.5 Hierarchy of individuation (Martin 2009: 565)

Figure 2.5 visualises the complementary perspectives on individuation, in essence asking whether we are distributing identities (allocation) or negotiating them (affiliation; Martin 2010). From the perspective of allocation, we begin with the culture as a whole and consider how we can divide it into smaller communities, including master identities such as gender, class and ethnicity, through to sub-cultures and then personae. From the perspective of affiliation, we can conceive of personae aligning themselves into sub-cultures which configure

master identities, and which in turn constitute a culture (ibid.: 24). Again, individuation offers a complementary perspective to the other hierarchies: just as all strata instantiate, all strata individuate (Martin 2009).

In this section I have outlined three hierarchies in SFL. Realisation is a hierarchy of abstraction, instantiation is a cline generalisation, and individuation is a scale of belonging (i.e. allocation/affiliation). These hierarchies offer complementary ways of looking at language and other forms of semiosis, asking what choices there are (realisation), how we coordinate those choices as they unfold in discourse (instantiation) and why we make choices to commune (individuation).

2.2.2 Complementarities

Alongside the three hierarchies, SFL has two major complementarities: axis and metafunction. Below I briefly introduce each of these, before turning to consider work on ideational and interpersonal meaning in more detail in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.

2.2.2.1 Axis

SFL distinguishes between two axes: syntagmatic, for relations of sequencing, and paradigmatic, for relations of choice. The syntagmatic axis is concerned with structure (i.e. how parts of language are chained together). For example, in a declarative clause such as *respect is important*, the Subject (*respect*) comes before the Finite (*is*). The paradigmatic axis is concerned with system (i.e. what resource is used and what could have been used instead). For example, the declarative clause *respect is important* is an alternative MOOD choice to the interrogative clause *is respect important?* While SFL is concerned with both system and structure, it prioritises the paradigmatic axis, seeing language as fundamentally concerned with choices between different resources for meaning making. SFL represents these choices in system networks, which I introduce below (see Section 2.3.1.1).

2.2.2.2 Metafunction

The systems introduced above to model paradigmatic relations are organised according to the three generalised functions that language serves. These are known as metafunctions (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 31). The three metafunctions are the ideational, referring to the subject matter or social activity; the interpersonal, referring to the social relationships between

interlocutors; and the textual, referring to the role that language is playing. Each metafunction relates to a different kind of ‘reality’ – ideational meanings construe external and internal reality; interpersonal meanings enact social reality; and textual meanings compose semiotic reality (Martin 1991: 104, Martin & Rose 2007: 11). The three metafunctions organise these three different kinds of meaning simultaneously. The metafunctions also operate across strata, with clusters of systems reflecting metafunctions found at the level of phonology, lexicogrammar and discourse semantics. At the level of register, each metafunction corresponds to a different register variable – patterns in ideational metafunction construe field, patterns in interpersonal metafunction enact tenor, and patterns in textual metafunction compose mode.

There is significant work in SFL associated with each metafunction. In particular, this thesis is concerned with technicality (which has been predominantly studied in relation to ideational meaning) and iconisation (which has been predominantly studied in relation to interpersonal meaning). Since both of these areas provide significant theoretical foundations for this thesis, in the following two sections I expand on SFL research on ideational meaning and interpersonal meaning in more detail.

2.3 SFL AND IDEATIONAL MEANING

As described above (Section 2.1.2), sex education is a broad umbrella, and students need to acquire both knowledge (e.g. the reproductive anatomy) and values (e.g. maintaining respectful relationships). To explore both of these, we need to consider both the ideational and interpersonal meanings at stake in sex education. I begin by reviewing SFL work on ideational meaning in this section, before turning to interpersonal meaning in Section 2.4.

The need to look more closely at ideational meaning in education arose in the Sydney School in the 1990s. After genre-based literacy was initially explored in primary school writing, by the late 1980s these programs were being trialled in secondary schools and it was clear that genre was not enough (Martin & Unsworth in prep). The different subject areas in secondary school, from history to maths to English to visual arts, had significantly different content knowledge; and this had to be untangled for SFL to continue to be productive in analysing students’ literacy needs. In particular, SFL needed to deal with the many subject specific technical terms (e.g. *nucleus*, *imperialism*, *simile*) and abstract nominalisations (e.g. *condensation*, *production*, *personification*) that students encounter in secondary schooling. This work was developed through the 1990s and 2000s, building up an understanding of how

uncommonsense knowledge is developed in the sciences, social sciences and humanities (Martin & Unsworth in prep, Christie & Martin 1997, Coffin 2006, Halliday & Martin 1993a, Martin & Veel 1998, Martin & Wodak 2003, Veel 2006, Wignell 2007). This led to significant new understandings of ideational meaning, including theorisation of field and technicality. Note there was also significant research on textual meaning, including descriptions of abstraction and mode. While I will not review this work in detail here, see Martin (2007a, b) for overviews; in addition see the discussion of ‘presence’ below (Section 2.5).

2.3.1 Field

Field is a variable of register, alongside tenor and mode, and is by and large construed through ideational meaning. Martin (1992a) treats field as a set of activity sequences which are oriented to some global institutional purpose, as well as taxonomies of the entities (people, places and things) involved in those activities. This model was useful for understanding how everyday sequences and taxonomies (e.g. getting dressed; heads, shoulders, knees and toes) differ from academic ones (e.g. photosynthesis, mammals), and has been productively used to study the sciences in particular (e.g. Halliday & Martin 1993a, Martin & Veel 1998, Halliday 2004). Field has recently been revisited and extended in Doran and Martin (2021). As well as relating activity and entities (activities and items, in their terms), they add property as a basic parameter of field. Their model is an important foundation for understanding sex education, specifically consent pedagogy, and so is outlined in more detail below.

2.3.1.1 Field relations

The basic parameters of field are presented as a system network in Figure 2.6. In system networks such as this, square brackets [represent contrasting options, while enclosing brackets { indicate that options are selected simultaneously. For example, choices about FIELD PERSPECTIVE and PROPERTY are selected at the same time, but the field perspective cannot simultaneously be dynamic and static. (Square and enclosing brackets together {[indicate an and/or relation, where you can select one or the other, or both; see force/focus in Figure 2.14 below.)




Figure 2.6 Basic parameters of field (Doran & Martin 2021: 117)

Beginning with the FIELD PERSPECTIVE system, we can first distinguish between construing phenomena statically as items or dynamically as activities. A static perspective on field views phenomena as items that can (optionally) be organised into specific taxonomies. These taxonomies can relate items in terms of composition – for example *the female reproductive system includes the vagina, uterus, fallopian tubes and ovaries*; or they can relate items in terms of classification – for example *there are two types of condom: male condoms and female condoms*. Alternatively, a dynamic perspective on field views phenomena as activities that can (optionally) be momented. For example *ovulation* can be momented as *oestrogen levels increase, ovarian follicles rupture, egg is released from the ovary into the fallopian tube*. This momenting can relate activities through implication, where one activity necessarily entails the other, for example *the rupture of the ovarian follicles causes the egg to be released from the ovary*. Or momenting can relate activities through expectancy, where activities occur together in temporal sequence but one does not necessarily entail the other – for example when *putting on a condom* is momented as *removing condom wrapper, squeezing the tip of the condom and rolling the condom down to the base of the penis*. In sequences of this kind something can go wrong as moments are probabilistically expectant not categorically dependent. Static and dynamic perspectives offer alternative but complementary perspectives on phenomena, and in principle all phenomena can be viewed either way. For example, the female reproductive system can be viewed statically as a composition taxonomy of items vagina, uterus, ovaries, fallopian tubes and so on; or it can be viewed dynamically as involving processes of

menstruation, ovulation, gestation and so on. These considerations are summarised in Figure 2.7.




Figure 2.7 Perspectives on field (adapted from Doran & Martin 2021: 115)

In addition to activities and items, fields may be construed in terms of properties. Properties organise potentially gradable qualities or positions in time and space, enabling rich descriptions of phenomena. For example, properties can characterise items in terms of their quality (e.g. *small T-shaped device*) or spatio-temporal location (e.g. *a hormone called levonorgestrel in their stem*). Alternatively, properties can characterise activities in terms of their quality (e.g. *the contraceptive implant releases progestogen slowly*) or spatio-temporal location (e.g. *an egg travels from the ovary*). Properties can also be graded (e.g. *very small device, releases progestogen very slowly*). And these gradations can be arrayed, establishing the degree of a property (e.g. *Chlamydia is the most common STI*), or they can be gauged, specifying the amount of a property more precisely (e.g. *standard condoms are 54mm wide*). These distinctions are summarised in Figure 2.8.




Figure 2.8 Types of properties (adapted from Doran & Martin 2021: 122)

Activity, item and property systems are the basic resources for construing field; but each variable can also be reconstructed. For example, a property can be reconstructed as an item (*wide* → *width*), resulting in an itemised property. Most relevant to this thesis are itemised activities, when an activity (e.g. *menstruate*) is reconstructed as an item (e.g. *menstruation*). Itemised activities are particularly common when technicality is being distilled (Doran & Martin 2021). It is also possible to reconstrue properties as activities (activated properties) and items as activities (activated items); however these are not relevant to the analysis in this thesis. When something is reconstructed, it has the features of both the ‘original’ resource and the reconstructed resource (e.g. itemised properties have features of both items and properties). For example, the itemised property *width* can be graded like other properties (e.g. *narrow width*) and can be classified like other items (e.g. *nominal width* vs. *actual width*).² Similarly, the itemised activity *menstruation* can be momented like other activities (e.g. *progesterone levels fall, uterine lining sheds, mucosal tissue is expelled through the vagina*), and can be classified like other items (e.g. *abnormal menstruation*).

2.3.1.2 Field interrelations

Interrelating is concerned with how different elements of field are associated with each other. Where taxonomies allow us to organise items and sequences allow us to organise activities, interrelating allows us to organise items, activities, properties and any reconstructions (e.g. itemised activities, itemised properties). To explain field interrelations, consider the following explanation of the seasons:

² These terms distinguish how wide a condom is when it is laid flat (*nominal width*) compared to its circumference when inflated (*actual width*, also known as *girth*).

What Causes Seasons on Earth?

Seasons happen because Earth's axis is tilted at an angle of about 23.4 degrees and different parts of Earth receive more solar energy than others.

Because of Earth's axial tilt (obliquity), our planet orbits the Sun on a slant which means different areas of Earth point toward or away from the Sun at different times of the year.

Around the June solstice, the North Pole is tilted toward the Sun and the Northern Hemisphere gets more of the Sun's direct rays. This is why June, July and August are summer months in the Northern Hemisphere.

Opposite Seasons

At the same time, the Southern Hemisphere points away from the Sun, creating winter during the months of June, July and August. Summer in the Southern Hemisphere is in December, January, and February, when the South Pole is tilted toward the Sun and the Northern Hemisphere is tilted away.

(Time and Date n.d. as cited in Doran & Martin 2021: 105)

According to this explanation, there are multiple factors which cause seasons. There is the tilt of the Earth (*Earth's axis is titled at... 23.4 degrees*), the division of Earth into different hemispheres (*Northern Hemisphere, Southern Hemisphere*), Earth's orbit of the sun (*our planet orbits the sun*), the fact that the Earth receives solar energy and this varies in *different parts of Earth* and according to the time of year (*June, July, August vs. December, January, February*), and the distinct seasons of *summer* and *winter*.

Understanding what causes the seasons is not only a matter of identifying each of these factors, but also of understanding how the factors are related to each other. If we were exclusively dealing with items, we could relate the factors through taxonomy, or if we were dealing exclusively with activities, we could relate the factors through sequencing. However, here we are dealing with both activities (e.g. *Earth receives solar energy*) and items (e.g. *northern and southern hemispheres*), as well as reconstruals such as itemised activities (e.g. *Earth's orbit of the sun*). In order to show how these factors are related to each other, we can describe their interrelations.

There are three ways for field elements to be interrelated: extension, enhancement and elaboration. (These terms are borrowed from Halliday and Matthiessen's (2014) logico-semantic relations for English clause complexing.) Extension, signified by +, is for elements

which are relatively independent of one another. The elements are coordinated, but they are not ordered in any way. In the seasons explanation, the fact that the Earth is *tilted at... 23.4 degrees* is not related to the fact that it has two *hemisphere[s]*, that it *orbits the sun* or that it *receives... solar energy*. They are thus related through extension, and can be laid out in parallel, as in Figure 2.9.




Figure 2.9 Extension (+) relations for the seasons

(Following Doran & Martin (2021), I use SMALL CAPS when referring to elements of field which are interrelated.)

Enhancement, signified by x, is where elements of field are dependent on others. In the seasons explanation, the VARIATION IN SOLAR ENERGY is caused by the earth's TILT, HEMISPHERES, ORBIT and RECEIPT OF SOLAR ENERGY. In other words, without each of these factors, the precise variation in solar energy would not occur. We can lay these out vertically, with enhancing elements below the element they depend on, as in Figure 2.10.




Figure 2.10 Enhancement (x) relations for the seasons

Elaboration, signified by =, is where an element is named and distilled as another element, especially when named as a technical term. In the seasons explanation, the variation in solar energy is renamed as the technical term SEASONS. We can represent this vertically, as in Figure 2.11.




Figure 2.11 Elaboration (=) relations for the seasons

And we can relate all these elements together across multiple ‘tiers’, as in Figure 2.12.




Figure 2.12 Three tiers of interrelations for the seasons

One way to ‘read’ the visualisation in Figure 2.12 is “the Earth’s TILT, HEMISPHERES, ORBIT and RECEIPT OF SOLAR ENERGY cause VARIATION IN SOLAR ENERGY. This is called the SEASONS.”

This type of analysis shows the complexity underpinning the explanation of the seasons and brings together elements with different field relations (e.g. items, activities, itemised activities). This is useful for the analysis of sex education, where technical terms such as *consent* bring together a range of different elements at the level of field. Field interrelations are particularly useful for complex relations which are distilled as technicality, a concept which I expand on below.

2.3.2 Technicality

Another major focus of SFL research on ideational meaning is technicality. Like field, technicality was crucial to understanding the literacy demands of secondary schooling and the ways that uncommonsense knowledge is taught across a range of subject areas. Indeed, when dealing with field relations in and beyond secondary schooling, many activities, items and properties (e.g. *photosynthesis*, *nucleus*, *soluble*) are also technical terms. By technicality I mean “terms or expressions (but mostly nominal group constituents) with a specialized field-specific meaning” (Wignell, Martin & Eggins 1993: 160). For example, to a layperson, a *desert* is a large, dry area covered with sand. However, when used as a technical term, for instance in geography, *desert* has a field-specific meaning: “an almost barren tract of land in which the precipitation is so scanty or spasmodic that it will not adequately support vegetation” (Moore 1949: 53–4 as cited in Wignell, Martin & Eggins 1993: 160). For the geographer, then, *desert* is a technical term. Other examples of technicality include *strata*, *nucleus* and *oestrogen*, from the fields of linguistics, chemistry and biology respectively.

Technical terms tend to be nominal groups, for several reasons. First, the nominal group has extensive resources for organising things. For example, the different types of *oestrogen* can be named with Classifier ^ Thing structures, as in *endogenous oestrogen* and *premenopausal oestrogen*. Second, nominal groups fit neatly into elaborating structures, both relational and classifying. This makes it easy to give technical terms a definition (e.g. *oestrogen is/means/is defined as ...*). It also means that many meanings can be consolidated into a technical term. For example, *oestrogen* can be defined as *a female sex hormone*, or as *any of several steroid hormones, that are secreted chiefly by the ovaries and placenta, that induce oestrus, stimulate changes in the female reproductive organs during the oestrous cycle, and promote development of female secondary sexual characteristics* (Dictionary.com 2022).

Importantly, technicality allows more meaning to be packed into a single term. For example, the technical term *oestrogen* captures information about what it is (*hormone*), where it comes from (*secreted chiefly by the ovaries and placenta*) and what its effects are (*induce oestrus, stimulate changes in the female reproductive organs, promote development of female secondary sexual characteristics*). This makes it possible to order and classify the experiential world (Wignell, Martin & Eggins 1993: 160), both by clearly defining what *oestrogen* is, and by contrasting it with other technical terms such as *progesterone* or *testosterone*. We can also consider how this condensation of meaning unfolds in time, approaching technicality from a logogenetic perspective. The process of technicalisation, also referred to as a distillation, is the process whereby meaning is “both condensed and reconstituted in lexis construing uncommonsense knowledge of the world” (Martin 2017a: 113).

2.3.2.1 Axi-technicality

While technicality was originally motivated by research on ideational meaning, recently interest has grown in how more interpersonal meanings can be technicalised. Martin and Zappavigna (2016, Zappavigna & Martin 2018) refer to this as ‘axiologically-charged technicality’, or ‘axi-tech’, in their work on youth justice conferencing. Consider the following excerpt from a youth justice conference:

Convenor: *The Young Offenders Act 1997 requires that the Young Person has admitted the offence and agreed to the conference. Nathan, do you confirm your admission to the offence of stealing?*

YP [Young Person]: *Yes.*

(Martin & Zappavigna 2016: 110)

As Martin and Zappavigna explain, admitting to an offence, as the young person does here, does not involve any inscribed feelings (e.g. *sorry*, *remorseful*). Rather, *stealing* is a technical activity in legal discourse – involving the process of *pleading guilty* as distinct from *feeling guilty*. The legal system is of course designed to punish those who have behaved ‘badly’ – as deceitful, deceptive, manipulative, unfair, mean, cruel, rude, greedy, selfish etc. But the technical legal terms that refer to such offences (e.g. murder, manslaughter rape, assault, battery, burglary, arson, vandalism, embezzlement, forgery, libel etc.) are not themselves direct expressions of feeling. Rather, they invoke negative judgements as ‘axiologically charged technicality’ or ‘axi-tech’ (ibid.). Indeed, the function of legal discourse is “to ideationalize the arbitration of behaviour that might otherwise explode as feeling driven contestation” (ibid.). While legal discourse is a particularly useful site for axi-tech, it has also been analysed in engineering (Szenes 2017, Simpson-Smith 2021), medicine (Stosic 2021a, b) and administrative discourse (Martin 2021). Despite axi-tech being identified in these fields (e.g. *mitigation* in engineering, *depression* in medicine), there is not yet an agreed upon definition, nor is there an explanation of how axi-tech emerges (i.e. how it is distilled logogenetically/ontogenetically). Further, none of this work has grappled with the question of how axi-tech can simultaneously straddle both ideational and attitudinal meanings. One of the functions of technicality is to ‘empty out’ attitudinal meanings (e.g. how *feeling guilty* becomes *pleading guilty*), and the question of how this happens remains to be explored.

2.4 SFL AND INTERPERSONAL MEANING

Alongside the rich body of work on ideational meaning, SFL has had a concurrent interest in understanding interpersonal meaning. At the same time that SFL was grappling with the technical meanings that students had to produce in secondary schools, linguists were also noting the importance of interpersonal meaning (Martin & White 2005: xi). Work on story genres, beginning in the 1980s, highlighted the importance of evaluation. For example, anecdotes hinge on sharing an affectual reaction to remarkable experience (e.g. *I was so afraid*

and unhappy), while exemplums involve moral judgements of people and their behaviour (e.g. *It was a kindly action from the natives*; Martin & Rose 2008: 52-62).

The 1980s and 1990s saw pioneering work on interpersonal meaning by Poynton (e.g. 1985, 1990). Her work on language and gender, including affect, naming practices and amplification, identified two key variables of tenor: status and contact (often referred to in related studies as power and solidarity; Martin & White 2005, Martin 1992a). Status is concerned with reciprocity, that is, whether social subjects have access to and take up the same kind of choices. When interlocutors do not share the same status (e.g. doctor and patient, lawyer and client, teacher and student), they will have different patterns of turn-taking, lexical choice, pronunciation and more (Poynton 1990: 37, 73). A canonical example is naming practices, where a teacher might address a student by their first name, but the student will refer to their teacher with a title and surname. On the other hand, contact is concerned with proliferation and contraction. Proliferation refers to how many meanings you have available to exchange. For example, strangers may be limited to commenting on the weather and current events, while close friends and partners can discuss more sensitive and intimate topics including sex, politics and religion. Contraction refers to the amount of work it takes to exchange meanings, with more explicitness required for more distant relationships. Again, naming practices are a useful example, with titles and surnames more likely to be used between people who do not know each other well (e.g. *Ms Georgia Carr*), and short names and nicknames for people who are close to one another (e.g. *Georgie, G*).

Poynton's work significantly advanced SFL's understandings of interpersonal meaning, identifying key variables (status and contact) and principles (reciprocity, proliferation, contraction) at the level of tenor. In this section I explore ways that this foundational work has been developed. Most notable is the development of the APPRAISAL framework (Martin & White 2005), which has in turn inspired work on couplings, bonding and affiliation (e.g. Knight 2010a, Zappavigna 2018, Logi & Zappavigna 2022), and icons and iconisation (e.g. Stenglin 2004, Martin 2010, Tann 2010a, Zappavigna & Martin 2018). This work has shunted between different areas of SFL architecture, with APPRAISAL situated in the realisation hierarchy, coupling situated on the cline of instantiation, and affiliation explored in relation to individuation. I outline each of these areas in turn, before turning to work on icons and iconisation, which have been viewed from both instantiation and individuation.

2.4.1 APPRAISAL

Research on evaluative language throughout the 1990s gave rise to the APPRAISAL framework (Martin & White 2005), which has since spawned a wave of studies of evaluation both within and without SFL. While this framework built on Poynton's model of interpersonal meaning, it also included two key renovations. First, it moved beyond expressions of feelings (i.e. affect) to also consider how we judge behaviour and appreciate the value of things (Martin & White 2005: xi). Second, while Poynton's model situates affect in tenor, APPRAISAL treats attitude (including affect) as a resource in discourse semantics (see Martin & White 2005: 35 for a comparison of these models).

APPRAISAL, then, is a discourse semantic system for enacting interpersonal meaning. Alongside INVOLVEMENT and NEGOTIATION, it realises tenor relations at the level of register (Martin & White 2005: 35). The basic parameters of APPRAISAL are presented as a system network in Figure 2.13.




Figure 2.13 Basic parameters of APPRAISAL (adapted from Martin & White 2005: 38)

The APPRAISAL system considers evaluation according to three interacting domains: ATTITUDE, GRADUATION, and ENGAGEMENT. The first system, ATTITUDE is the system for feelings we often think of in commonsense terms as emotion, ethics and aesthetics (ibid.: 42). (Throughout this thesis, I use small caps to refer to the ATTITUDE system and lowercase to refer to specific instances of attitude.) ATTITUDE is divided into three categories: affect, judgement and appreciation – which can be either positive or negative (examples of each are given in brackets).

Affect deals with resources for enacting emotional reactions (e.g. *interested, afraid*), judgement concerns resources assessing people and behaviour (e.g. *kind, disrespectful*) and appreciation covers evaluations of semiotic and natural phenomena (e.g. *fantastic, difficult*). The second system, GRADUATION refers to the resources for grading evaluations, either by adjusting intensity (force) or prototypicality (focus). Force can be raised (e.g. *I feel **really** bad about it*) or lowered (e.g. *It's ok to be **a little** bit unsure*); focus is sharpened (e.g. *We need to know **exactly** what consent means*) or softened (e.g. *They were **kind of** forced into that decision*). The third system, ENGAGEMENT, is concerned with resources which allow a speaker/writer to position themselves in relation to alternative voices at play in the communicative context. This allows for bare assertions (monoglossic, e.g. *You wanna have some things in common*) or explicit acknowledgement of external voices (heteroglossic). Heteroglossia can either expand the dialogic space, meaning it opens up space for alternative voices (e.g. *Tell us a ground rule you **might** set up in your relationship*); or it can contract the dialogic space, meaning it challenges, fends off or restricts the scope of other voices (e.g. *They've **obviously** got a lot of guts*). These options are outlined in Figure 2.14.




Figure 2.14 More delicate parameters of APPRAISAL

In this thesis, I analyse evaluative language according to all three of these systems; but I am principally concerned with ATTITUDE. Below I outline additional elements of the ATTITUDE system which are relevant to this thesis, and I spell out my parameters for identifying and analysing attitudes in text to establish comparability of analysis in an area of language which can be hard to pin down.

2.4.1.1 Inscribed and invoked attitude

Attitudes can be either explicitly inscribed or they can be implicitly invoked. Invoked attitudes are marked with t-notation, indicating it is a ‘token’ of attitude. For example (attitude underlined):

(2.1) *Hossein asked Kit to stop* [negative **t-inclination**] (Student G_Q2)

(2.2) *What if one person is really drunk?* [negative **t-capacity**] (R5_27m)

Invoked attitudes can also be specified more delicately as provoking, flagging or affording (Martin & White 2005: 67, see also Martin 2020a: 21). While I generally do not code attitude at this level of delicacy, it is worth mentioning here some common resources for each. Attitudes can be provoked using lexical metaphors, for example:

(2.3) *They’ve obviously **got a lot of guts** to come and ask you.* (R9_20m)

They can also be flagged with swearing, for example:

(2.4) *It wasn’t until their youngest child died of an HIV/AIDS related illness they went, “**what the hell’s** going on?”* (R5_27m)

Grading also flags attitude, for example:

(2.5) *It can lead to **many** consequences.* (Student L_Q5)

2.4.1.2 Distinguishing affect, judgement and appreciation

There are several strategies which help determine whether an attitude is affect, judgement or appreciation. First, we can identify the type of attitude based on which grammatical frame it fits. Martin and White (2005: 58-9) propose the following grammatical frames, which reflect the fact that affect is triggered whereas judgement and appreciation are targeted:

{person feels **affect** about something }

{it makes person feel **affect** that... }

{it was **judgement** for/of person to do that }

{(for person) to do that was **judgement** }

{person consider something **appreciation** }

{person see something as **appreciation** }

This is particularly useful for distinguishing affect from the other two types. Consider Examples 2.6 and 2.7:

(2.6) *If you were **interested** [in dating them], that's great.* (R9_20m)

(2.7) *Alcohol and hormones is an **interesting** combination.* (R5_27m)

In Example 2.6, *interested* fits the grammatical frame for affect: {you feel **interested** about dating them}. In Example 2.7, *interesting* fits the grammatical frame for appreciation: {I consider the combination of alcohol and hormones **interesting**}.

Second, we can identify attitudes in terms of the nature of appraisers, triggers and targets. If the appraised is a phenomenon which is responsible for an emotional reaction, it is coded as affect. If the appraised is a person or behaviour, it is coded as judgement. And if the appraised is a thing, whether concrete, abstract, material or semiotic, it is coded as appreciation (Martin & White 2005: 59-61). This is particularly useful for distinguishing judgement from appreciation. Consider Examples 2.8 and 2.9:

(2.8) *You are two **unique** different people.* (J2_5m)

(2.9) *There are some very **unique** circumstances where that might not be the case.* (J11_2m)

In Example 2.8, *unique* appraises the target *people*, and so is coded as judgement. In Example 2.9, *unique* appraises the target *circumstances*, and so is coded as appreciation. There are borderline cases which may be hard to distinguish, especially where there is also nominalisation and/or grammatical metaphor. Consider Example 2.10:

(2.10) *That would be a great sign of a **respectful** relationship.* (J6_24m)

In Example 2.10, *respectful* appraises the target *relationship*. This is a thing, and so we could code this example as appreciation. However, relationships occur between people, and there is

a strongly implied judgement that the people in the relationship are *respectful*. Instances such as this are analysed on a case-by-case basis in my data.

Third, we can identify the type of attitude based on whether it fits the sub-types within affect, judgement and appreciation, which I introduce here. There are four sub-types of AFFECT: dis/inclination, un/happiness, in/security and dis/satisfaction (Martin & White 2005: 49). Inclination covers a desire for something (e.g. *Do you **wanna** have sex?*). Happiness covers ‘affairs of the heart’, such as sadness, hate, happiness and love (e.g. *You’re not very **happy** about it*). Security covers ecosocial wellbeing, such as anxiety, fear, confidence and trust (e.g. *There’s lots of people who don’t feel **comfortable** with who they are*). Satisfaction covers emotions concerned with the pursuit of goals, such as ennui, displeasure and curiosity (e.g. *Kit was really **enjoying** it*). Martin (2017b, 2020b) comments in detail on this classification with reference to revisions proposed in Bednarek (2008).

There are five sub-types of JUDGEMENT: normality, capacity, tenacity, veracity and propriety (Martin & White 2005: 52). The first three sub-types deal with ‘social esteem’: normality is concerned with how un/usual someone is (e.g. *It was **normal** to feel embarrassed*), capacity is concerned with how capable someone is (e.g. *She isn’t **mature** enough*), and tenacity is concerned with how resolute someone is (e.g. *Them giving consent would not be **reliable***). The final two sub-types deal with ‘social sanction’: veracity is concerned with how truthful someone is (e.g. *you must be **truthful** with your partner*), and propriety is concerned with how ethical someone is (e.g. *I would let them down **kindly***).

There are five sub-types of APPRECIATION: impact, quality, balance, complexity and valuation (Martin & White 2005: 56). Impact and quality are concerned with our reactions to things: impact is for things which catch our attention (e.g. *Alcohol and hormones is an **interesting** combination*) and quality is things which dis/please us (e.g. *that’s a **good** example*). Balance and complexity are concerned with the composition of things: balance captures whether or not something hangs together (e.g. *It’s a **tricky** situation*) and complexity captures whether something is hard or easy to follow (e.g. *it needs to be **clear** enough*). Finally, valuation is concerned with the value of things and whether or not something is worthwhile (e.g. *There are some very **unique** circumstances*). These more delicate categories are outlined in Figure 2.15.




Figure 2.15 Sub-systems of ATTITUDE (Martin & White 2005)

Attitude can thus be identified as either affect, judgement or appreciation based on which sub-type it best fits. The key test here is agnation patterns – i.e. what alternative evaluative lexis could have been used. Consider Examples 2.11-2.13:

(2.11) *It would ensure that my friend has **respected** the other person's opinion.* (Student H_Q5)

(2.12) *As long as we are **respectful** and kind to each other.* (R9_20m)

(2.13) *Things like porn have then altered the way people see positive or **respectful** relationships.* (R5_13m)

In Example 2.11, *respected* is synonymous with *valued*, *admired*, *regarded* and *thought highly of*. These are all examples of affect, specifically positive satisfaction. In Example 2.12, *respectful* is synonymous with *polite*, *considerate* and *civil*. These are all examples of judgement, specifically positive propriety. And in Example 2.13, *respectful* is synonymous with *healthy* and *positive*. These are all examples of appreciation, specifically balance.

2.4.1.3 Double coding attitude

Martin and White (2005: 60) identify one class of attitudinal lexis which is double coded for attitude. Specifically, they identify lexis which construes an emotional reaction (affect) to people and things we approve or disapprove of (judgement/appreciation). For example, *proud* in *I felt **proud** that they'd won* both inscribes positive satisfaction in *I felt proud* and invokes positive judgement of the behaviour *that they'd won* (Martin & White 2005: 60-61). Other items in this set include *guilty*, *embarrassed*, *envious* and *disgusted* (ibid.). Martin and Zappavigna extend this list based on their work on youth justice conferencing to include *sorry*, *disappointed*, *regretful*, *remorseful*, *disappointed* and others (2016: 109). Examples of these terms appear in the sex education data, for example:

(2.14) *They [Kit and Hossein] should not feel **embarrassed**.* (Student G_Q1)

In Example 2.14, *embarrassed* is double coded as inscribed affect and invoked judgement. It principally describes the feelings of Kit and Hossein, and we can specify this more delicately as negative security (similar to feeling *uncomfortable* or *uneasy*). But it also invokes a judgement: that they feel negatively about something they have done (similar to feeling *ashamed* or *humiliated*). Note that we cannot specify the sub-type more delicately (e.g. tenacity, capacity); we can only say that it is negative judgement. Following Martin and White, I classify examples such as this as inscribing one attitude (usually affect) and invoking another

(usually judgement or appreciation). However, there are also instances which I double code as two inscribed attitudes. Consider Example 2.15:

(2.15) *You've been... coerced into that situation.* (R4_54m)

In Example 2.15, *coerced* is double coded for affect and judgement. Like the term *embarrassed* in Example 2.14, *coerced* inscribes affect. We can specify this more delicately as disinclination (i.e. someone who feels *coerced* does not want to do something). *Coerced* is also coded for judgement, evaluating the person who has done the coercing. But unlike the judgement for *embarrassed*, we can specify the sub-type of judgement more delicately. Someone who has *coerced* you is evaluated as behaving immorally, so we can specify the sub-type of judgement as negative propriety. Since we can specify the sub-type of affect (as inclination) and the sub-type of judgement (as propriety), I code both of these as inscribed attitudes.

Having introduced the APPRAISAL system in more detail, I now turn to related SFL work on interpersonal meaning which takes APPRAISAL as its foundation. While APPRAISAL is situated in the realisation hierarchy at the level of discourse semantics, it has also inspired work within instantiation and individuation. I first outline the concept of coupling, and then summarise two strands of research this has inspired: i) bonding and affiliation, and ii) icons and iconisation.

2.4.2 Coupling

One key aspect of expressing attitude is that our evaluations are generally about something. Whether we are expressing affect (e.g. *Do you **wanna** have sex?*), judgement (e.g. *you **must be truthful** with your partner*) or appreciation (e.g. *it's a **tricky** situation*), we are always appraising something or someone, be it *hav[ing] sex*, the way *you* are *with your partner*, or the *situation*. This combination of attitude (e.g. *tricky*) and its ideational target (e.g. *situation*) has been described in terms of coupling.

In general terms, coupling refers to the combination of meanings “as pairs, triplets, quadruplets or any number of coordinated choices” (Martin 2008b: 39). Coupling captures a ‘with’ relation: variable *x* comes with variable *y* (Zhao 2011: 144), and can refer to co-selection across ranks, metafunctions, strata or modalities (Zappavigna 2018). Early SFL work on coupling approached this co-selection in terms of probability. One aim of this work was to generate corpus-based systemic profiles (Zappavigna 2018: 106) – for example, a particular register (e.g. service encounter) could be described in terms of which language features it

tended to include. This work offered a synoptic perspective on a text but could not specify how features patterned as a text unfolds, nor which features do not co-occur (Zappavigna, Dwyer & Martin 2008; Zappavigna 2018).

Coupling also emerged as a useful perspective on instantiation in SFL. At the text level, we can describe a specific instance of co-selection (e.g. *tricky* + *situation* in a specific lesson). But we can also describe the co-selection of meanings at the level of the text type or at the level of diatype. For example, an analysis of co-selection across the 10 weeks of sex education lessons might highlight that positive appreciation tends to occur with raised force (e.g. *really fantastic*, *very important*). Couplings, then, can be used to describe how we bring together features that realisation positions as possible co-selections but does not prescribe how or when they are combined. Martin (2010) in fact refers to instantiation as a “hierarchy of couplings” (2010: 26). A related notion here is that of ‘syndromes’ of meaning (Zappavigna, Dwyer & Martin 2008). This refers to the repeated patterning of couplings in a text or corpus, analogising from the medical concept of a cluster of associated symptoms.

2.4.2.1 Ideation-attitude coupling

While coupling can in theory refer to the co-selection of features across ranks, metafunctions, strata or modalities, by far the most studied is the combination of ideation and attitude in an evaluative coupling. Ideation-attitude coupling has been studied in a range of contexts, including casual conversation (Knight 2010a, b; 2013), academic discourse (Hao & Humphrey 2009, Hood 2010), business writing (Szenes 2017, 2021), Youth Justice Conferencing (Martin et al. 2013; Zappavigna, Dwyer & Martin 2008) and social media (Zappavigna 2018; 2019; 2021a, b). Since ideation-attitude coupling has received the most attention in SFL, I will use the term ‘coupling’ to refer to this specific type from here on in the thesis.

Ideation-attitude couplings can be represented with a yin yang symbol, with the attitudinal inscription above and its target below. For example, the coupling *tricky situation* could be visualised as in Figure 2.16. Note that the yin yang symbol was first used to represent couplings in Hood (2010: 143-4), with target above and attitude below. My representation follows Szenes (2017), with attitude above and target below.




Figure 2.16 Ideation-attitude coupling in *tricky situation*

Szenes (2017) extended this representation with her analysis of recoupling in undergraduate business writing. Consider Example 2.16:

(2.16) *The vibrant Brazilian agricultural industry represents a considerable opportunity.*
 (Szenes 2017: 219)

Example 2.16 contains an ideation-attitude coupling where the *Brazilian agricultural industry* is positively appreciated as *vibrant*. This can be represented as in Figure 2.17.




Figure 2.17 Ideation-attitude coupling in *vibrant Brazilian agricultural industry*

However, this coupling is then itself evaluated as *a considerable opportunity*, a positive appreciation of valuation. This sets up a higher order coupling, known as a ‘recoupling’, and can be represented with a two-layered yin yang symbol, as in Figure 2.18.




Figure 2.18 Recoupling in *the vibrant Brazilian agricultural industry* represents a *considerable opportunity*

In this example, the evaluation in the lower order and higher order couplings match in polarity (i.e. *vibrant* and *opportunity* are both positive attitudes). This is known as a ‘reinforcing recoupling’. The alternative, where recoupling combines a positive and a negative evaluation, is known as an ‘inverting recoupling’. Recoupling is relevant to sex education because of the ways that different feelings and experiences are validated for students. For example, students might feel *comfortable* or *uncomfortable* about a given *situation*, and both of these options are themselves evaluated as *OK*.

Work on ideation-attitude coupling has inspired two strands of research in SFL. The first of these relates to bonding and affiliation and is principally oriented to the individuation hierarchy. The second of these relates to icons and iconisation and is oriented to both the individuation and instantiation hierarchies. Below I outline each of these in turn.

2.4.3 Bonding and affiliation

Bonds and bonding have been explored by numerous SFL scholars, but most relevant here is Knight’s (2010a, b) conception of the relationship between couplings and bonds (see also Section 2.4.4 for Stenglin’s conceptualisation of bonding on which Knight’s work is partly based; see also Stenglin 2004, 2008; Martin 2004a, 2010; Martin and Stenglin 2007). Knight explains that when couplings are shared by interlocutors, they create a bond. This moves us

from the instantiation hierarchy (the co-selection of meanings) to the individuation hierarchy, where bonds form “the basic building blocks of the individuation hierarchy, clustering into the sub-cultures and master identities to which community members subscribe” (Martin 2010: 26). Put another way, couplings are the “linguistic evidence for the social semiotic unit of bonds” (Logi & Zappavigna 2022: 327).

Since we are now dealing with individuation, we are in part concerned with affiliation – the forging of social connections (Zappavigna 2019: 58). Knight’s work on conversational humour (2010a, b) identifies three kinds of affiliation: communing, laughing and condemning. In communing affiliation, interactants share a bond or rally around a bonding icon. In condemning affiliation, interactants must reject a bond which violates other bonds shared between interactants in order to continue the affiliation process. This is the typical affiliation strategy at play in the discourse of gossip. In laughing affiliation, a speaker presents a coupling which ‘wrinkles’ with other bonds shared between interactants. Both condemning and laughing affiliation involve tension between bonds; but where condemning affiliation involves a major tension (‘violation’), laughing affiliation creates only a minor tension (‘wrinkle’). This wrinkle is seen as non-threatening and humorous and is thus ‘laughed off’. The relationship between couplings, bonds and affiliation is usefully summed up by Logi and Zappavigna: “The *affiliation* model provides an applicable rubric for identifying the linguistic resources (*couplings* construed in discourse) that serve to table the social semiotic *bonds* which can then be negotiated among interactants” (2022: 327, emphasis added).

Knight’s work dealt with affiliation in conversational humour between friends, where bonds are negotiated directly between interlocutors. A rich body of literature has since developed affiliation further to account for the ways that people can affiliate online (e.g. Zappavigna 2011, 2014a, b; Zappavigna & Ross 2021; Logi & Zappavigna 2022). As Zappavigna (2021a: 25) explains, in digital and social media environments, users “commune around bonds even where there is no direct interaction”, known as ‘ambient affiliation’. For example, Twitter users may call together a community using hashtags (Zappavigna 2019), or YouTube comments may commune around a shared bond even where the comments are not directly replying to each other (Zappavigna 2021a). We can distinguish, then, between dialogic affiliation, where people interact directly, and ambient affiliation, where people commune around something but do not interact directly (Zappavigna 2019: 58). Note that Zappavigna uses both *ambient* affiliation and *communings* affiliation to describe how users commune without direct interaction (see e.g. Zappavigna & Martin 2018; Zappavigna 2019, 2021a). In her use, *communings/ambient* affiliation is distinguished from *dialogic* affiliation, where people

interact directly. However, Knight's use of communing affiliation refers to "sharing a bond or rallying around a bonding icon" (2010a: 217) and is distinguished from *laughing* affiliation and *condemning* affiliation. In order to avoid (similar but) conflicting definitions, I use communing affiliation in Knight's sense, and prefer ambient affiliation to describe Zappavigna's analysis of affiliation on social media.

2.4.4 Icons and iconisation

A second strand of research emerging from work on coupling relates to icons and iconisation. For Stenglin (e.g. 2004, 2008, 2022), APPRAISAL was a tool for exploring interpersonal meaning in 3D space. Her research was centred on museums and was focused on understanding what brings people to museums, and how to entice visitors back again and again. She identified two key social semiotic tools: binding and bonding. Binding is concerned with how the organisation of space can help people feel secure or insecure. For example, being in a space which is too unbound (e.g. the upper storeys of a high-rise skyscraper) can make people feel vulnerable and exposed; being in a too bound space on the other hand (e.g. an elevator or tunnel) can make people feel smothered and restricted (Stenglin 2004). Bonding is concerned with ways of aligning users into communities of belonging. In the context of museums, bonding is concerned with making visitors feel welcome – positioning them interpersonally to create solidarity (ibid.). These two semiotic tools work together, as Stenglin (2022: 309) explains: "feeling safe in a space (Binding) makes possible related feelings – such as developing a sense of emotional engagement with the institution and feeling secure enough to explore ideas that may be exciting and challenging with like-minded others (Bonding)". Note that bonding in Stenglin's sense is related to but distinct from Knight's conceptualisation. For Stenglin, bonding is about the coming together of persons in the social sphere, while for Knight a bond is an ideation-attitude coupling which is tabled for the sake of communing, condemning or laughing (see Knight 2010a: 205).

Another focus of Stenglin's work was the Olympic Torch Relay for the Sydney 2000 Olympics. She found that the relay had immense rallying power, bringing together "young and old, elite athletes and non-athletes, urban and rural dwellers" and "transcend[ing] political, social, economic and cultural divisions" (Stenglin 2022: 314-5). This was crucial to her research on museums which sought to understand how to transcend divisive boundaries and reach new audiences. She identified the Olympic flame as a bonding icon (see also Ravelli 2000 on values in the Olympic store). Bonding icons are "emblems or powerfully evocative

symbols of social belonging which have a strong potential for rallying” (Stenglin 2004: 406). They “crystallis[e] strong interpersonal attitudes to ideational meanings”, allowing items to “become axiologically super-charged and radiate specific values for communities to rally around” (Stenglin 2022: 6; see also Stenglin 2004, 2008; Martin & Stenglin 2007). Bonding icons, or ‘bondicons’ (Martin 2008c: 130) evoke positive attitudes, while ‘anticons’ (Stenglin 2022: 315) evoke negative attitudes. Note that SFL’s notion of ‘icon’ is distinct from the Peircean notion of icon as a type of sign (alongside ‘index’ and ‘symbol’, Peirce 1955: 102-3). While the Peircean concept of icon is defined in terms of formal semblance to its object, the concept of iconicity within SFL literature is concerned with the sign’s function in facilitating bonding and affiliation among language users (Tann 2013: 389, see also Stenglin 2004).

APPRAISAL was important for illuminating how bonding icons become axiologically super-charged and come to rally communities. Stenglin explains that bonding icons such as the Olympic torch are able to “mov[e] people through all three attitudinal systems” – i.e. AFFECT, JUDGEMENT and APPRECIATION (2022: 4). She exemplifies this for the Olympic torch using a letter to a newspaper about the Sydney 2000 Olympic torch relay, in which the author moves through affect (in **blue**), judgement (in **green**) and appreciation (in **red**):

(2.17) *What a **wonderful** night!* [positive valuation]

*For all the **corruption**, **elitism** and **excesses** [negative propriety] of the IOC, you have to **appreciate** [positive valuation] an event that **draws the community on to the streets** [positive t-valuation], that engenders **a carnival atmosphere** [positive t-quality] and fills people with **joy**. [positive happiness] (Stenglin 2022: 4-5, markup edited from original)*

Other examples of bonding icons that have been identified include the white dove for peace, flags for national identity, team colours for sports fans, iconic buildings such as the Sydney Opera House, and leaders such as Nelson Mandela (Stenglin 2004, Zappavigna & Martin 2018).

Bonding icons are a tool for exploring affiliation, and so can be considered from the perspective of individuation. However, we can also take a view from instantiation, where we are interested in the process of iconisation as it unfolds in time, whether it emerges logogenetically (i.e. in text), ontogenetically (i.e. within the individual over a lifetime) or phylogenetically (i.e. within a culture; Stenglin 2004: 418). Viewed as a process, iconisation is “the process of instantiation whereby ideational meaning is discharged and interpersonal

meaning charged” (Martin 2010: 21). For example, Stenglin comments on the American flag as follows:

“The thirteen stripes for example, represent the beginnings of the nation in thirteen different colonies, while the 50 stars represent the unity of the 50 states. Together, these elements simultaneously *compress and evoke the shared history of American people*. Ideationally, the flag also functions to compress and evoke abstractions that are part of the collective associations of nationhood *that have evolved over time*. Phylogenetically then, these include the ideals that North American people have grown to associate with their nation; ideals such as freedom, liberty, equality, justice and democracy.”

(Stenglin 2004: 410, emphasis added)

Stenglin also describes the process of iconisation for the Olympic torch (2004, 2022), where an ideational meaning (a flame) is charged with abstract interpersonal meanings (e.g. friendship, fair play, solidarity), and for the ‘Croata’ tie (2012), where a literal meaning (a tie) is charged with values such as prestige, luxury and national pride.

Stenglin’s work on bonding icons has also been developed by Tann (2010a, b; 2013) in his research on Japanese national identity and discourse iconography. Most relevant here is Tann’s notion of ‘Oracle’ for celebrated people (Heroes) and things (Heritage). Tann’s model was developed further by Zappavigna and Martin in their work on youth justice conferencing – a form of restorative justice which aims to divert adolescents away from the court system (2018, see also Martin & Zappavigna 2016, Martin et al. 2013). Zappavigna and Martin found that iconisation played a significant role in ‘ceremonial redress’ in these conferences, with a “unique power... to motivate social realignment” and to “invite, enact and hopefully enable reintegration of the [young person] into the appropriate ‘communities of concern’” (Zappavigna & Martin 2018: 294-296). Recognising the significance of these ceremonies, they extended Tann’s notion of Oracle to not only include celebrated people and things, but also scripture, parable and ritual (2018: 272). They also acknowledged the significant overlap between Tann’s and Stenglin’s conceptualisations, and indeed renamed Tann’s ‘Oracle’ to ‘bonding icon’ in a revised model for iconography. The other dimensions are ‘Doxa’ for shared values and ‘Communitas’ for sense of community (the latter is renamed from Tann’s ‘Gemeinschaft’). Their revised model for iconography is shown in Figure 2.19.




Figure 2.19 Revised model of iconography (adapted from Zappavigna & Martin 2018: 279)

Work on icons and iconisation has thus highlighted its significance in museums, in national identity texts, and in youth justice conferencing. However, it remains to be seen how icons and iconisation are used in educational contexts. For example, what kinds of icons are found in schools? Can iconisation be used in classrooms as a pedagogical tool? What is their application in a subject such as sex education, which is concerned with both knowledge and attitudes? Can icons be used to apprentice students into certain values systems, for example being accepting of gender and sexuality diversity? While there is related work on values in education from sociology (see e.g. ‘axiological relations’ in Maton 2014), there is little understanding of the linguistic features which contribute to iconisation in educational contexts.

2.5 BRINGING METAFUNCTIONS TOGETHER: MASS & PRESENCE

Above I have reviewed ideational meaning and interpersonal meaning and their distinct bodies of work in SFL. Of particular relevance to this thesis is technicality, typically considered with respect to ideational meaning, and icons, typically considered with respect to interpersonal meaning. However, for the purpose of this thesis, and from the perspective of instantiation, these need to be brought together using a final set of analytical tools: mass and presence. Mass and presence were inspired through dialogue with Legitimation Code Theory (in particular the concepts of semantic gravity and semantic density; Maton 2013; Martin & Maton 2013). These concepts are crossfunctional – they bring together the ideational, interpersonal and textual by considering meaning from the perspective of instantiation rather than realisation.

Mass refers to the degree to which meaning is condensed (Martin 2017a; see also ‘semantic density’, Maton 2013). Consider Example 2.18:

(2.18) *The follicles in the ovaries break and release ovarian cells. This is known as ovulation.*

In Example 2.18, the first sentence describes the process of ovulating, momented into two activities: *the follicles in the ovaries break* and *they release ovarian cells*. In the second sentence, these two activities are packaged up, both with text reference (*this*) and with a single nominalised term referring to the whole first sentence (*ovulation*). In terms of mass, we can say that the first sentence has less meaning condensed and therefore weaker mass, while the second sentence has more meanings condensed and therefore stronger mass.

The condensation of meaning has typically been considered in SFL as part of field, and therefore associated with ideational meaning (Martin 2017a). However, mass offers a crossfunctional perspective, with condensations possible for ideational, interpersonal and textual meaning. As such, mass has three variables which correspond to the three metafunctions: technicality (ideational), iconisation (interpersonal) and aggregation (textual). Technicality is the degree to which knowledge is distilled as technical terms arranged in field specific arrays, taxonomies, sequences and complexes. Iconisation is the degree to which a knowledge structure charges meaning with values legitimising participation in a community of practice. And aggregation is the degree to which a text consolidates meaning as it unfolds, both prospectively and retrospectively. A summary of these terms and a series of examples are presented in Figure 2.20.




Figure 2.20 Variables of mass

Technicality and iconisation as variables of mass are compatible with the work on technicality and icons presented above (see Sections 2.3.2 and 2.4.4). However, it is useful to also situate these concepts within mass, as I do here. Viewing technicality and iconisation from the perspective of instantiation allows us to consider these as processes which unfold in time (i.e. technicalising, iconising), and allows us to see these as gradable (i.e. as more or less condensed meaning) rather than absolute. This perspective is particularly valuable for an analysis of sex education pedagogy, where I view the processes of technicalising consent and iconising respect as gradual processes which unfold in text, and over the course of the school term. This thesis is particularly concerned with strong mass (i.e. items with highly condensed meanings). Examples of items with strong mass include technicality from the sciences (e.g. *nucleus*, *photosynthesis*) and the law (e.g. *consent*), as well as iconised meanings which we might associate more with the humanities and public life (e.g. the Olympic flame, the white dove symbolising peace).

Alongside mass, we can also consider presence, which refers to the degree to which meaning is dependent on its context (Martin & Matruglio 2013; see also ‘semantic gravity’, Maton 2013). Compare Examples 2.19 and 2.20:

(2.19) *So, last lesson we started looking at this video, and I wanna come back and watch this.*
(R5_21m)

(2.20) *In NSW, there are special laws that apply to filming, photographing or sharing sexual images online or by phone.* (R4_handout)

In Example 2.19, in order to understand what is going on we need to know what *we*, *I* and *this video* refer to. This information is recoverable from the context as this utterance is said by a sex education teacher to her students, and a YouTube video titled ‘Tea and Consent’ is projected on the screen at the front of the room. Example 2.19 is thus more dependent on context and has relatively strong presence. By contrast, in Example 2.20 we can decipher the meaning without additional context as we know what is going on as long as we know the meaning of each of the terms (e.g. *NSW [New South Wales], laws, filming, phone*). Example 2.20 is thus less dependent on context and has relatively weak presence. Examples 2.19 and 2.20 are designed to show the more ‘extreme’ ends of presence, but as with mass these principles are graded: presence is not on or off, present or absent, but relatively stronger or weaker.

Context dependency has typically been considered in SFL as associated with mode, and therefore with textual meaning (Martin & Matruglio 2013). However, like mass, presence is a crossfunctional concept with three variables corresponding to the three metafunctions: implicitness (textual), negotiability (interpersonal) and iconicity (ideational). Implicitness deals with the extent to which a text depends on exophoric reference, substitution or ellipsis, as well as scaffolding using higher-order periodicity. Negotiability is concerned with the extent to which propositions or proposals are arguable and depend on the moment of speaking, as well as the nature of the attitude involved (with affect more context dependent than judgement or appreciation). Iconicity is the extent to which semantic relations are realised lexicogrammatically by congruent or metaphorical configurations of entities and occurrences. A summary of these terms and a series of examples are presented in Figure 2.21.




Figure 2.21 Variables of presence

Importantly, while mass and presence are independent of one another, they often pattern together in an inverse relation to one another. That is, stronger presence tends to occur with weaker mass and vice versa (see also ‘semantic profiles’ in Legitimation Code Theory; Maton 2013, 2020).

This final set of theoretical concepts is useful for this thesis for two reasons: they allow us to bring together ideational and interpersonal meaning, and they offer a more dynamic perspective on meaning. For one thing, mass and presence are useful because they allow us to bring together the ideational and the interpersonal when these are otherwise largely kept independent of each other (a separation Martin (e.g. 2017a, 2008d) has referred to as the ‘tyranny’ of metafunctions). There are many aspects of SFL description where the need to bring together interpersonal and ideational meaning has become clear – for example APPRAISAL highlights the need to bring together attitudes with their ideational trigger/target and appraiser (e.g. *tricky + situation + someone*). Mass and presence generalise this perspective, focusing attention on how we bring together resources from across all three metafunctions and at different ranks and strata. This cross-metafunctional perspective is supported by work on coupling (both intramodal and intermodal), focusing as it does on the co-selection of many

different resources in the process of instantiation. These concepts are particularly useful for an analysis of sex education pedagogy for describing in detail how meanings are co-selected across the three metafunctions, revealing recurring ‘syndromes’ of meaning instantiated in text (Martin 2017a; Zappavigna, Dwyer & Martin 2008).

In addition to bringing together the metafunctions, mass and presence are useful for offering a more dynamic view than that which is offered by realisation. The realisation hierarchy offers a fairly synoptic view of meaning: it captures the full range of choices which are available in language, mapping meaning potential as system and structure across strata, ranks and metafunctions (see Martin 1985 for the complementarity of synoptic/dynamic as ‘process and text’). But we need to also understand how these choices come together in a text, and how they unfold dynamically. A focus on co-patterning of meaning is of course anticipated by work on genre, which is given responsibility for coordinating choices across metafunctions in a realisation hierarchy assuming a stratified model of context (as genre and register). But to date there has been very little effective prescription of the choices coordinated by genre. Shifting to a dynamic instantiation perspective forces the issue, drawing attention to the need to understand how meanings couple along the cline. This is useful for an analysis of sex education, for instance to explain how the same choices are repeatedly co-selected across multiple strata and multiple metafunctions, even though they are not predictable as genre stages or phases. Approaching language from the perspective of instantiation and mass and presence allows us to see how meaning unfolds dynamically, and to take logogenesis seriously. This is crucial to the work of this thesis, which seeks to understand what is going on in the classroom, but also what the repercussions of this pedagogy are for both ontogenetic and phylogenetic change.

2.6 DATA FOR THIS STUDY

The data for this study are video recordings of Year 9 Personal Development, Health and Physical Education (PDHPE) lessons over a 10-week unit on sex education. The unit comprised 15 one-hour lessons, taught from July-September 2020. I followed two teachers at the same school, Rhianon and Josh, who gave their consent to be identified. They taught separate Year 9 classes, so the total dataset includes 30 hours of video recordings (15 lessons x 1 hour x 2 teachers). The dataset also includes teaching materials (e.g. handouts, PowerPoint slides), a written assessment task and interviews with the teachers conducted before and after the unit. The students are approximately 15-16 years old.

The lessons cover a range of sex and relationships content within Stage 5 of the NSW syllabus (NESA 2018), including consent, healthy relationships, pregnancy and contraception, sexually transmitted infections (STIs), sexuality and gender diversity, and sexual harassment and assault, as summarised in Table 2.1.

#	Teacher 1 (Rhianon)	Teacher 2 (Josh)
1	What makes a healthy relationship	What makes a healthy relationship
2	Qualities in a partner	Qualities in a partner
3	How do I know I'm ready	Boundaries in relationships
4	Consent	Ovulation and fertilisation
5	Consent	Contraception and pregnancy
6	Contraceptives	Consent and contraception
7	Contraceptives	Contraceptives
8	STIs	STIs
9	Sexuality	STIs
		<i>Written assessment task</i>
10	<i>Written assessment task</i>	Sexuality
11	Sexual harassment and sexual assault	Safe sex (consent)
12	Cybersafety	Cybersafety
13	Cybersafety	Sexual harassment and sexual assault
14	Summary	Summary
15	Learning gallery and unit evaluation	Learning gallery and unit evaluation

Table 2.1 Summary of lesson topics in dataset

The first 6 lessons were recorded by myself or a research assistant. From lesson 7, the school stopped allowing non-essential personnel due to Covid restrictions. These lessons were recorded by the teacher, who set up a camera in the back of the room each lesson with a fixed camera angle. Josh taught an additional lesson (between lessons 9 and 10) so that both classes could hold the assessment task on the same day. This replaced what would normally have been a practical PDHPE lesson (i.e. where students play sport), which were not recorded during this term. Throughout this thesis, the teacher and lesson number are specified when providing examples (e.g. R9 = Rhianon lesson 9), and approximate timestamps are marked with the @

symbol. Extracts for close reading will be introduced as needed, with file IDs specifying the teacher, lesson number and timestamp for the beginning of the excerpt.

Initially, this study planned to incorporate a comparison of the two teachers, especially for possible differences in gender – i.e. how sex education pedagogy might differ for a man versus a woman teacher. However, the teachers' lessons had more similarities than differences; they both used the same base set of slides which had been developed collectively by the PDHPE staff, as evidenced by the similarity in their lesson topics (see Table 2.1). I highlight points of difference between the classes where relevant, but do not compare them comprehensively.

The lessons took place at an all-girls high school in Sydney which is partially academically selective (where some students need to pass an entrance exam to attend), has a high proportion of students from a language background other than English, and a significant refugee population. Students come from a range of socioeconomic backgrounds, but the school is overall of median Socio-Economic Status (ICSEA³ value of 1021, where a value of 1000 is the mean of all schools in the country; ACARA 2020). Ethics permission was obtained from the Sydney University Human Research Ethics Committee (Project no. 2019/820) and the NSW State Education Research Applications Process (SERAP2019354). Consent was sought from the teachers as well as students and their parents/carers. Students are anonymised throughout this thesis and will be identified generically when providing examples (e.g. S1 = Student 1, see Appendix A for full transcription conventions).

This chapter has situated this thesis in the field of sex education research and has provided theoretical foundations from SFL which will underpin my analysis in the following chapters. Chapters 3 and 4 use SFL to explore ideational meaning and technicality in analysing the way consent is taught in sex education. While existing analytical tools such as field serve as a useful starting point, this analysis will also highlight how this theory needs to be extended further. Specifically, it will need to account for the ways that attitudinal meanings can be technicalised. In Chapters 5 and 6 I turn towards interpersonal meaning and iconisation to analyse the way respect is taught in sex education. Specifically, it will show how iconisation unfolds logogenetically and ontogenetically, and how this can be marshalled for pedagogical purposes. Existing analytical tools such as bonding icons will serve as a useful starting point

³ ICSEA stands for Index of Community Socio-Educational Advantage. This index was created by the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority to allow comparison of educational (dis)advantage between schools (ACARA 2015).

but will similarly require renovation to account for sex education pedagogy. In Chapter 7, I return to consider the practical and theoretical implications of this analysis.

Chapter 3 – Technicalising Consent

In this chapter, I describe how consent is taught, and in particular how it is technicalised, in sex education. More specifically, I will show that it is technicalised in a way that distils a range of attitudinal meanings. Since consent is primarily taught in relation to the law, in Section 3.1 I begin by summarising consent laws in NSW and show how this legal discourse is recontextualised for the classroom. In Section 3.2, I show how consent is technicalised in sex education, and draw on Doran and Martin’s (2021) model of field to describe the ways meanings are distilled into this term. In Section 3.3, I discuss the implications this has for SFL’s current descriptions of technicality and propose the terms technicalised attitude and technicalised ideation. In Section 3.4, I turn to a different classroom excerpt and show how consent continues to accrue attitudinal meanings beyond those in the legal definition.

3.1 RECONTEXTUALISING LEGAL DISCOURSE

Consent in sex education is not simply a synonym of *agreement*, *permission* or *saying yes*. Rather, consent is taught in relation to the law and its technical legal definition. Given this, it is important to begin with a brief overview of NSW consent laws and an explanation of how these are recontextualised in the classroom.

3.1.1 NSW consent laws

The relevant legislation on consent is section 61HE of the NSW *Crimes Act 1900 Number 40* (see Appendix C for the applicable version at the time of data collection). In lay terms, this legislation says that:

- People must agree to sex freely (‘consent’)
- Certain circumstances mean that someone cannot consent, including if they are asleep or unconscious
- Certain circumstances might mean that someone cannot consent, including if they are very intoxicated or if their partner is in a position of authority (e.g. teacher, boss, coach)
- People must be 16 years old to have sex (‘age of consent’)

- The exception to the above is that people who are 14 or 15 years old can have sex if their partner is less than 2 years older (close-in-age exemption, colloquially known as ‘Romeo and Juliet laws’)

While these were the relevant laws at the time of data collection, they have since been updated and in some cases repealed and replaced. More specifically, affirmative consent laws were passed in NSW parliament on 23 November 2021 and came into effect on 1 June 2022 (see Appendix C for relevant sections of the NSW Crimes Act). I return to consider these changes and their relevance to my analysis below (see Section 3.2.2) and again at the end of Chapter 4.

3.1.2 LawStuff

In the data for this study, legal discourse makes its way into the classroom via the website LawStuff (www.lawstuff.org.au). LawStuff has general information about Australian laws and legal definitions written by a staff of lawyers and law students (Mamac 2019: 12). It is aimed at 14-year-olds with an average education and receives over 2 million page views a year (ibid., Youth Law Australia 2021). The website is run by Youth Law Australia, a community legal service which provides information and legal services for children and young people in Australia.

LawStuff is used by one of the teachers – Rhianon – as a teaching resource in lessons 4 and 5, which focus on consent. She introduces the LawStuff website as a particularly useful resource for finding out about laws:

(3.1) *So if we want to find out some of the laws or different terms to do with sex, one of the best websites that I can give you is LawStuff.org.au. So [name], LawStuff.org.au has a whole bunch of different information to do with all areas, but it's a website managed by the New South Wales Law Council, so it's law students and lawyers who manage this page, so it's actual factual information, it's not somebody who's just made it up and put it on a page. (R4@50m)*

The teacher presents LawStuff to students as *one of the best websites that I can give you if we want to find out some of the laws or different terms to do with sex*. She specifies that *it's law students and lawyers who manage this page* rather than *somebody who's just made it up*, so it has *actual factual information*. She also provides information about LawStuff on her slides, as shown in Figure 3.1.

WHERE TO FIND OUT LAWS/RULES ABOUT SEX

▪ www.lawstuff.org.au

Navigate this page

[What does age of consent mean?](#)

[What does consent mean?](#)

[What do we mean by sex?](#)

[Sex with a carer or supervisor](#)

[What happens if someone breaks these laws?](#)

[Talking about safe sex](#)

[Important contacts](#)



Figure 3.1 Slide introducing LawStuff (R4_slide8)

The slide in Figure 3.1 includes the URL for the LawStuff website and a partial screenshot of the webpage for the topic ‘consent’, which includes information about consent laws in NSW. The first three sections of this webpage – What does age of consent mean? What does consent mean? What do we mean by sex? – are copied into a word document, which the teacher prints out and provides to students as a handout (see Appendix C). The teacher also projects this handout as a ‘slide’ on the screen at the front of the classroom. Since the text of the LawStuff website, the handout and the slides are identical, I refer to this interchangeably as the website//handout/slide throughout this chapter.

The text of the LawStuff website is a direct recontextualisation of consent legislation. Compare Example 3.2 from the NSW Crimes Act, and Example 3.3 from the LawStuff website:

(3.2) *A person who consents to a sexual activity with or from another person under any of the following mistaken beliefs does not consent to the sexual activity (a) a mistaken belief as to the identity of the other person...*

(3.3) *A person does not give their consent if they are tricked or mistaken about... who the other person is.*

Examples 3.2 and 3.3 both state that someone does not consent to sex if they are mistaken about who they are having sex with. There are a number of differences between these two examples, reflecting the different functions and audiences they serve. First, the Crimes Act is longer and

more specific while the LawStuff webpage is shorter and less specific; compare *a person who consents to a sexual activity with or from another person* (Example 3.2) and *a person* (Example 3.3). Second, the Crimes Act uses more nominalisations than the LawStuff webpage; compare *the identity of the other person* and *mistaken beliefs* (Example 3.2) with *who the other person is* and *they are... mistaken* (Example 3.3). Third, the Crimes Act has more formatting which structures the different sections and subsections of the legislation (e.g. *under any of the following mistaken beliefs... (a) a mistaken belief as to...*). While the LawStuff webpage does use dot points, it does not have the same complexity of formatting as the legislation.

While Examples 3.2 and 3.3 convey the same general meaning, they are different in noticeable ways. The Crimes Act uses language which is typical of legislation, for example being precise (e.g. specifying *consent to a sexual activity*, as opposed to any *activity*) and exhaustive (e.g. *a sexual activity with or from another person*, as opposed to simply *with another person*). These language features fit the purpose of legislation which “prizes certainty above all” (Maley 1987: 35). Another goal of legislation is to create a set of “perpetual rules of action” which “regulate the conduct of classes of individuals” (ibid.: 30, 40). A key resource for this is generalisation, for instance using indefinite reference (e.g. *a person*, as opposed to *the person* or *you*) and general classifying words (e.g. *person*, *sexual activity*).

The LawStuff website replicates some of the linguistic features of the legislation, but it also makes changes in line with its purpose to be more accessible to laypeople, and specifically young people. For example, like the Crimes Act it uses indefinite reference (e.g. *a person*) and general classifying words (e.g. *person*). But unlike the Crimes Act, it has fewer nominalisations (e.g. *who the other person is*, as opposed to *identity*) and less embedding (e.g. *a person*, as opposed to *a person who consents to a sexual activity with or from another person*). This follows guidelines for how to communicate legal language to laypeople (e.g. Charrow & Charrow 1979, see also Mamac 2019).

By using LawStuff as a teaching resource, the teacher thus brings legislation directly into the classroom. As well as this direct recontextualisation, there are also other obvious references to the law. For example, throughout the lesson the teacher refers to what *the law says*, what you *can/not legally agree to* and *[breaking] the law*, and she names the specific jurisdiction: *in New South Wales*. As I show in the following section, the LawStuff website is used to introduce and define consent, and this recontextualisation of legal discourse thus forms the foundation of consent pedagogy in sex education.

3.2 TECHNICALISING CONSENT IN SEX EDUCATION

By technicality I mean “terms or expressions (but mostly nominal group constituents) with a specialized field-specific meaning” (Wignell, Martin & Eggins 1993: 160). *Strata*, *nucleus* and *oestrogen* are all examples of technicality; they are all nominals with field-specific meanings (from the fields of linguistics, chemistry and biology respectively). From a logogenetic perspective, technicality can also be thought of as a process of distillation, whereby meaning is “both condensed and reconstituted in lexis construing uncommonsense knowledge of the world” (Martin 2017a: 113). To show how consent is technicalised, I analyse a section from the LawStuff website/handout titled ‘What does consent mean?’. The text of the handout is shown in Figure 3.2.

What does consent mean?

“Consent” means giving your free and voluntary agreement to sex. It is never ok for someone to assume you have given consent or to force you to keep going if you want to stop.

A person does not give their consent if they:

- do not have the capacity to consent due to age, or a mental or physical impairment;
- are asleep or unconscious;
- are threatened, forced or afraid;
- are restrained against their wishes;
- are tricked or mistaken about the nature of the act, or who the other person is; or
- are tricked into thinking the other person is married to them.

Figure 3.2 ‘What does consent mean?’ excerpt from LawStuff website/handout

The handout begins with a definition of consent:

(3.4) *What does consent mean? “Consent” means giving your free and voluntary agreement to sex. It is never ok for someone to assume you have given consent or to force you to keep going if you want to stop.*

The teacher also provides a definition verbally, mostly reading verbatim off the slides, indicated by text in ALL CAPS:

(3.5) *But we need to know exactly WHAT CONSENT MEANS, to say, to agree to having sex. So it MEANS you GIVE YOUR FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT TO SEX. So you have, IT'S NEVER OK FOR SOMEONE TO ASSUME YOU HAVE GIVEN CONSENT OR TO FORCE YOU. So this means without coercion.* (R4_54m)

Examples 3.4 and 3.5 demonstrate the three steps needed to technicalise something: 1) giving the phenomenon a name, 2) making the term salient, and 3) giving the term a field-specific meaning (here these steps happen in this order, but this is not a requirement when technicalising; see Wignell, Martin & Eggins 1993). First, the teacher gives the phenomenon a name: *consent*. The name is realised by a nominal group, the most common realisation for technical terms. The nominal group has extensive resources for organising things, including Classifier ^ Thing structures (e.g. *enthusiastic consent, male condom*) and Focus ^ Thing structures (e.g. *the age of consent, the neck of the uterus*; see Halliday & Matthiessen 2014; Martin, Matthiessen & Painter 2010 for these grammatical terms). Nominal groups also fit neatly into elaborating structures. They can realise a Carrier and/or Attribute in attributive clauses, which is useful for elaborating composition (e.g. *The female reproductive system includes the vagina, uterus, fallopian tubes and ovaries*) and classification (e.g. *Long Acting Reversible Contraceptives include intrauterine devices and contraceptive implants*). Nominal groups can also realise Token and/or Value in identifying clauses; these can be used to relate a technical term to the meanings it distils, whether with a relatively short Value (e.g. *Consent means your free and voluntary agreement*), or with a much longer Value (e.g. *sexual intercourse is any penetration of a person's genitalia or anus by any part of the body of another person or any object, or any kind of oral sex*).

Second, the teacher draws attention to the term *consent* in both spoken and written language. In spoken language, the teacher makes the term *consent* salient by using it in the HyperTheme: *we need to know exactly what **consent** means*. In written language, *consent* is made salient on the slides and in the handout with the heading *What does consent mean?* in larger font and bolded (see Figure 3.2). The main function of making a term salient is to signal that it is about to be given a field-specific meaning (Wignell, Martin & Eggins 1993: 164); this is exactly what the teacher then does.

After naming the phenomenon *consent* and drawing attention to the term, the teacher then defines it i.e. gives it a field-specific meaning: *it means you give your free and voluntary*

agreement to sex. She defines *consent* through elaboration with an identifying relational clause (*it means...*), the most common way to define technical terms (Halliday 1985a as cited in Wignell, Martin & Eggins 1993: 166). This definition allows the teacher to relate relatively commonsense terms (*free and voluntary agreement*) to new, technical ones (*consent*; Martin 1993: 229-230). Notably, *free* and *voluntary* have fairly similar meanings, and are an example of a binomial expression; this is a common feature of legal statutes where two words with similar meaning are combined (e.g. *will and testament*, *break and enter*). While similar in meaning, one term will tend to have an Anglo-Saxon origin (e.g. *free*) while the other will tend to have a Latin origin (e.g. *voluntary*). Historically, this has arguably functioned to accommodate a linguistically diverse population; Bhatia (2014 as cited in Mamac 2019) suggests that now it is used in legal discourse in order to be precise and exhaustive.

3.2.1 Technicalising what?

Now that we have established that consent is a technical term, we need to understand what sort of meanings are being distilled. An important feature of technicality is that it allows an indefinite amount of meaning to be packed into a single term. For example, technicality can distil information about classification (e.g. *Testosterone is a steroid from the androstane class*), composition (e.g. *semen contains spermatozoa, proteolytic enzymes and fructose*) and activity sequences (e.g. *menstrual cycle* unfolds as the lining of the uterus thickens, an egg travels to the uterus from the ovaries and, if the egg is unfertilised, the uterine lining is shed as a period). If a term is used without comparable oppositions, it does not have the same meaning. For example, the linguist and non-linguist do not use the same meaning for the words *subject*, *sign* and *genre* because the terms do not enter into the same set of relations in different fields. For the (systemic functional) linguist, *genre* relations include *narrative*, *exposition* and *report*, while for the non-linguist (film buff for example) *genre* relations might include *action*, *comedy* and *science fiction*. To understand the kind of meanings being distilled for consent, I turn now to field relations.

As described in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.3.1), field can construe phenomena statically as items (e.g. *ovary*, *condom*) or dynamically as activities (e.g. *ovulation*, *putting on a condom*). These can optionally be propertyed, specifying their quality (e.g. *small T-shaped device*) and/or spatio-temporal location (e.g. *an egg travels from the ovary*). And these properties can in turn be further specified, either by arraying (e.g. *Chlamydia is the most common STI*) or by gauging (e.g. *standard condoms are 54mm wide*). Activity, item and property systems are the basic

resources for construing field; but as reviewed in Chapter 2, each variable can also be reconstrued. For example, an itemised property is a property which has been reconstrued as an item (e.g. *wide* → *width*) and an itemised activity is an activity which has been reconstrued as an item (e.g. *menstruate* → *menstruation*). Itemised activities are particularly common when technicality is being distilled (Doran & Martin 2021). Indeed, this is precisely what we see as consent is technicalised in sex education.

3.2.1.1 Field relations and consent

The initial definition of consent is: *consent means giving your free and voluntary agreement to sex* (see Example 3.4). As is typical of technical terms, *consent* is an itemised activity, where the activity *consent* (e.g. *I consent to sex*) is reconstrued as the item *consent* (e.g. *consent means your free and voluntary agreement*). This definition is itself an itemised activity, though this time with properties: the propertied activity *freely and voluntarily agree* is reconstrued as the item *free and voluntary agreement*. This initial definition is simple enough; but to see the range of meanings distilled into the term *consent* let us now turn to the more elaborated explanation provided in the handout. For reasons of space I focus on the written text, but this is closely mirrored in the spoken verbiage.

The handout outlines a series of conditions in which someone does not consent, reproduced as Example 3.6:

(3.6) *A person does not give their consent if they:*

- *do not have the capacity to consent due to age, or a mental or physical impairment;*
- *are asleep or unconscious;*
- *are threatened, forced or afraid;*
- *are restrained against their wishes;*
- *are tricked or mistaken about the nature of the act, or who the other person is;*
or
- *are tricked into thinking the other person is married to them.*

Example 3.6 outlines a list of circumstances where someone does not give their consent – for example if they are *asleep, unconscious, threatened* or *afraid*. In some cases, a dot point on the handout equates to a single condition (e.g. *a person does not consent if they **are restrained***

against their wishes), and in other cases a dot point contains multiple conditions (e.g. *if they are threatened (or) forced or afraid*).

There is one final condition of consent which is not listed in these dot points, but which is included in the original definition, repeated in Example 3.7:

(3.7) “Consent” means giving your free and voluntary agreement to sex. It is never ok for someone to assume you have given consent or to force you to keep going if you want to stop.

In Example 3.7, there is another condition introduced with the condition conjunction *if: it is never ok for someone... to force you... if you want to stop*. In other words, *wanting to stop* is also a condition which negates consent. Notably, this condition is not worded as *not want to start sex*, or even simply *not want sex*. Rather, consent seems to be implied unless and until it is revoked (i.e. *you want to stop*). I return to consider this in Section 3.2.2 where I discuss the implications of the new affirmative consent laws in NSW.

In terms of field relations, the conditions mostly construe properties (e.g. if a person is *asleep, unconscious or afraid*). Some of the conditions construe itemised properties, specifically the property *capable* is reconstrued as the item *capacity* in conditions such as *do not have the capacity due to age*. And some of the conditions can be analysed as construing either properties or activities. For example *if they are threatened* can be viewed as a property (e.g. *they feel threatened*), or they can be analysed as an activity where the agent has been elided (e.g. *they are threatened (by someone)*). This dual analysis also applies to four other conditions: if someone is *forced, restrained against their wishes, tricked or mistaken about the nature of the act* and *tricked or mistaken about who the other person is*. I label these here as properties; but below I consider the alternative analysis of *forced* and *threatened* and the implications this has for analysing attitude (see Section 3.3.1). Finally, one of the conditions construes an activity: *if you want to stop*. The field relations for each of the conditions of consent is summarised in Table 3.1.

Condition of consent	Field relation
<i>do not have the capacity to consent due to age</i>	itemised property
<i>do not have the capacity due to a mental impairment</i>	itemised property
<i>do not have the capacity due to a physical impairment</i>	itemised property
<i>are asleep</i>	property
<i>are unconscious</i>	property
<i>are threatened</i>	property
<i>are forced</i>	property
<i>are afraid</i>	property
<i>are restrained against their wishes</i>	property
<i>are tricked or mistaken about the nature of the act</i>	property
<i>are tricked or mistaken about who the other person is</i>	property
<i>are tricked into thinking the other person is married to them</i>	property
<i>want to stop</i>	activity

Table 3.1 Field relations for conditions of consent

In total there are thirteen conditions which negate consent, each of which is related to *consent* with the condition conjunction *if*. Most of these (12/13) are listed in a single clause complex, as presented in Example 3.8:

- (3.8) α *A person does not give their consent*
- $\mathbf{x\beta}$ 1 *if they do not have the capacity to consent due to age*
- +2 *or... a mental impairment*
- +3 *or... a physical impairment*
- +4 *(or) are asleep*
- +5 *or unconscious;*
- +6 *(or) are threatened*
- +7 *(or) forced*
- +8 *or afraid*
- +9 *(or) are restrained against their wishes;*
- +10 *(or) are tricked or mistaken about the nature of the act*
- +11 *or... who the other person is*
- +12 *or are tricked into thinking the other person is married to them.*

In Example 3.8, the condition conjunction *if* sets up a first level of clause complexing with an enhancing beta (*a person does not give their consent **if** they do not have the capacity due to age*). This is followed by 12 paratactic extensions, each listing a different condition of consent: *if they do not have the capacity due to a mental impairment... if they are asleep... if they are afraid* and so on. These conditions are linked with the conjunction *or*, sometimes explicitly (e.g. *if they are asleep **or** unconscious*), and sometimes implicitly (e.g. *if they are threatened (**or**) forced or afraid*). The final condition is also introduced with the condition conjunction *if*, but in a separate clause complex (*it is never OK for someone... to force you to keep going **if** you want to stop*, see Example 3.7). Notably, the conditions are independent of each other (e.g. *if someone is forced **OR** afraid, they have not given consent*) and so not additive (e.g. *if someone is forced ***AND** afraid, they have not given consent*). That is, if any single condition is not met, someone has not given their consent. The use of ‘or’ relations rather than ‘and’ relations will be relevant to the analysis of interrelations in the following section.

There are thus 13 conditions of consent, and these mostly construe properties at the level of field. They are related to consent with the condition conjunction *if*, with each condition independent of the others. Notably, *if* conjunctions are typically used at the level of field to relate two activities. For example, *if a person is restrained against their wishes, (then) they do not give their consent*. However, in this case we are not only relating activities but also properties and itemised properties. Further, while this *if/then* relation describes how each condition relates to consent (e.g. *if restrained, then no consent*), it does not explain how the conditions are related to each other. Indeed, the conditions are independent of one another, and cannot be related through either implication or expectancy. That is, being *asleep* or *unconscious* has no bearing on being *threatened* and vice versa. In order to understand how these elements relate to each other, and more importantly how they collectively relate to consent, we need to turn to field interrelations.

3.2.1.2 Field interrelations and consent

Interrelating is concerned with how different elements of field are associated with each other. Where taxonomies allow us to organise items and sequences allow us to organise activities, interrelating allows us to organise items, activities, properties and any reconstructions (e.g. itemised activities, itemised properties). Interrelating is thus a useful tool for explaining how the conditions of consent (which include properties, activities and itemised properties) are related to each other, and in turn how they are related to itemised activities such as *free and*

voluntary agreement and *consent*. Following Doran and Martin (2021), I use small caps to label each element (e.g. ASLEEP, CONSENT) when describing interrelations.

There are three ways for field elements to be interrelated: extension, enhancement and elaboration. Extension, signified by +, is where multiple elements are coordinated but are not ordered in any way. We can use this to describe how the conditions are related to each other, and can lay them out in parallel, as in Figure 3.3.



Figure 3.3 Basic extension (+) relations for consent

Enhancement, signified by x, is where elements of field are dependent on others. For example, if someone is ASLEEP, then there is NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT: one is a direct result of the other. We can lay these out vertically, with enhancing elements below the element they depend on, as in Figure 3.4.




Figure 3.4 Basic enhancement (x) relations for consent

Elaboration, signified by =, is where an element is named and distilled as another element, especially when named as a technical term. Returning to our initial definition, *consent means your free and voluntary agreement*, these elements are related by elaboration with *free and voluntary agreement* a more commonsense description and *consent* the technical, legal term. We can represent this as in Figure 3.5.




Figure 3.5 Basic elaboration (=) relations for consent

We can also relate elements together across multiple ‘tiers’, as in Figure 3.6.




Figure 3.6 Enhancement and elaboration relations for consent

One way to ‘read’ this visualisation is “being ASLEEP causes NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT which is called NO CONSENT”.

Having established the three kinds of interrelation, let us take a closer look at how all the elements of consent are interrelated. Note that I am describing the underlying relations established by the text as a whole, and not necessarily how these relations unfold logogenetically. These two things may or may not map onto each other; field relations can be made explicit in language, or they can be left implicit and so need to be abduced by students (Maton & Doran 2021), a point I return to below.

Above, I described the enhancing relationship between the element being ASLEEP and NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT, visualised as Figure 3.7 (reproduced from Figure 3.4 above).




Figure 3.7 Enhancing relation between ASLEEP and NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT

But of course, being ASLEEP is not the only relevant element here. All the conditions of consent, including WANTING TO STOP or being UNCONSCIOUS, AFRAID, FORCED and so on have the same enhancing relationship with NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT. We could visualise each of these individually, as in Figure 3.8.

WANT TO STOP	UNCONSCIOUS	AFRAID	FORCED
X	X	X	X
NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT	NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT	NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT	NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT

Figure 3.8 Individual enhancing relations between WANT TO STOP, UNCONSCIOUS, AFRAID, FORCED and NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT

Or we could combine them, as in Figure 3.9.




Figure 3.9 Combined enhancing relations between WANT TO STOP, ASLEEP, UNCONSCIOUS, AFRAID, FORCED and NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT

The ‘+’ between the elements in the top tier represents a relation of extension, meaning that each element is independent of the others (e.g. being ASLEEP is unrelated to being AFRAID). But collectively, they all have the same relation to NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT, and these relations are distilled in this definition. For reasons of space I only include as many conditions as fit legibly across the page, with elided conditions indicated by ellipses (for the full visualisation, see Appendix D).

Finally, these interrelated meanings are named and distilled as the technical term NO CONSENT. We can visualise this as a third ‘tier’, marking the technical naming relation with =, as in Figure 3.10.




Figure 3.10 Three tiers of interrelation for NO CONSENT

One way to ‘read’ this visualisation is “WANTING TO STOP or being ASLEEP or UNCONSCIOUS or AFRAID... causes NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT which is called NO CONSENT”.

Above I have shown that the field interrelations for NO CONSENT are a complex of many different elements, and especially of many properties (e.g. ASLEEP, UNCONSCIOUS, AFRAID). So far, we have analysed the conditions which negate consent, for example, if you are ASLEEP then there is NO CONSENT. But what happens if we switch from a negative definition of consent (e.g. *a person does not give their consent if...*) to a positive one (e.g. *a person does give their consent if...*)? That is, how are relations distilled into CONSENT when it is present rather than absent?

We can begin by flipping the valency of each of the conditions. For example, we can replace *want to stop* with *want to continue*, *asleep* with *awake*, *unconscious* with *conscious* and so on. The field relation for each condition is the same (e.g. *asleep* and *awake* are both properties). Just like the negative conditions, the positive conditions are related to FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT through enhancement (i.e. a dependent relation of cause). However, the nature of this enhancement is different. When distilling consent in the negative, any single condition (e.g. *want to stop*, *asleep*, *unconscious*, *tricked*, *forced*) was enough to result in NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT. A visualisation is provided in Figure 3.11 (repeated from Figure 3.9).




Figure 3.11 Combined enhancing relations between conditions of consent and NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT

But for the positive distillation of consent, all the conditions must be met simultaneously to result in FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT. Put another way, the negative distillation of consent deals with OR relations (e.g. *if wanting to stop OR asleep OR unconscious, then no consent*), while the positive distillation deals with AND relations (e.g. *if wanting to continue AND awake AND conscious AND..., then consent*). We can visualise this as in Figure 3.12.




Figure 3.12 Extension (+) relations for FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT

In both the positive and negative distillation of consent we are dealing with relations of extension, where elements are coordinated but independent of each other. This is indicated with ‘+’ between elements in the top tier. In the negative distillation of consent, each condition is individually related to NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT, indicated with ‘x’ underneath each condition and lines connecting to NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT in the second tier. Conversely, in the positive distillation of consent, all conditions collectively and simultaneously relate to FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT, indicated with an enclosing bracket and a single ‘x’ for the enhancing relation to the second tier. Note that Doran and Martin (2021) do not use an enclosing bracket to indicate this same set of simultaneous interrelations (i.e. AND relations) in their explanation of the seasons. I include it here to clearly differentiate between the positive and negative distillation of consent.

Finally, all of these elements are then distilled into the technical term CONSENT using elaboration, marked by =, as in Figure 3.13.




Figure 3.13 Field interrelations for CONSENT

Above I have analysed the field interrelations for NO CONSENT and CONSENT. While the terms *consent* and *no consent* are ‘opposite’ in lay terms, this analysis reveals that their field relations are not merely mirror images of each other. For the elements themselves, we can simply flip the valency (e.g. ASLEEP → AWAKE, CONSENT → NO CONSENT). But when describing how those elements are related to each other, we are doing more than this. To highlight this, consider the field interrelations for CONSENT and NO CONSENT side by side, as presented in Figure 3.14 and Figure 3.15 respectively, with key differences in **green** and **red**:




Figure 3.14 Field interrelations for CONSENT




Figure 3.15 Field interrelations for NO CONSENT

Figures 3.14 and 3.15 highlight the difference between the positive and negative distillation of consent. When distilling consent in the negative, each element is individually related to NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT. That is, any single condition is enough to result in NO FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT. When distilling consent in the positive, all elements are collectively related to FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT. That is, all the conditions must be met simultaneously to result in FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT. In both cases the conditions are related to each other by extension, but the negative distillation deals with OR relations (e.g. *if wanting to stop OR asleep OR unconscious, then no consent*), while the positive distillation deals with AND relations (e.g. *if wanting to continue AND awake AND conscious AND..., then consent*).

Notably, the positive distillation of consent is largely implicit. When distilled in the negative, the field relations are stated explicitly in language (e.g. *a person does **not** give their consent if...*), with a tidy distillation of meaning laid out in the written language (e.g. *asleep **or***

unconscious) and helpfully scaffolded by the formatting in dot points. But the same is not true when distilling in the positive. Students are given an initial definition (*consent means giving your free and voluntary agreement to sex*), but they are left to abduce all other field relations that are distilled into this term. This is not merely a matter of flipping the valency of each element (e.g. ASLEEP to AWAKE), it also requires inferring a complex and different set of interrelations between those elements. This makes it potentially more difficult for students to learn, and one of the benefits of this analysis is to highlight precisely this issue. Making these ‘scattered’ relations more explicit in language has the potential to improve pedagogy if we want students to understand what does constitute consent, rather than what does not.

3.2.2 Changes to consent law

Above I have analysed the field interrelations being distilled for CONSENT and NO CONSENT in a sex education lesson. This analysis was based off a handout with text from the LawStuff website, which is itself a recontextualisation of the NSW Crimes Act. However, this Act has been updated since the time of data collection, and it is useful to reflect here on the significance of this change.

On 1 June 2022, affirmative consent laws came into effect in NSW (see Appendix C for the amended Crimes Act). Affirmative consent laws specify that consent is the presence of a ‘yes’ rather than the absence of a ‘no’. For example, you cannot assume that someone who is silent or “does not offer physical or verbal resistance” has consented (NSW Parliamentary Counsel 2022). This contrasts with a ‘no means no’ model of consent, which assumes that someone has consented until they give evidence to the contrary:

“The “no means no” model is problematic as it implies the existence of consent by default, in every situation where there is no express refusal to engage in a sexual act, as opposed to interpreting consent as active participation and/or affirmative expression. According to this model, [people] consent to sex perpetually, unless they state otherwise.”

(Amnesty International 2018: 10)

As Amnesty International (2018) explains, the “*no means no*” model of consent assumes that consent is the *default in every situation*, and that people *consent to sex perpetually, unless they state otherwise*. This understanding of consent is evident in the analysis of field interrelations

above. Recall that one of the conditions which negates consent is *if you want to stop*. Notably, this condition is not worded as *not want to start sex*, or even simply *not want sex*. Rather, consent seems to be implied unless and until it is revoked (i.e. *you want to stop*). Changing this assumption is precisely the motivation behind affirmative consent laws.

While a detailed analysis of the new consent laws is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth noting briefly how this would impact the distillation of consent. A portion of the new consent legislation is provided in Example 3.9:

(3.9) *Every person has the right to choose whether or not to participate in a sexual activity... Consensual sexual activity involves ongoing and mutual communication, decision-making and free and voluntary agreement between the persons.*

Affirmative consent laws, as the name suggests, are much more explicit about what consent is, and include a range of ‘positive’ elements. For example, every person *has the right to choose... to participate*, and consensual sexual activity involves *ongoing and mutual communication, decision-making and free and voluntary agreement between the persons*. This contrasts with the earlier definition of consent, analysed in this chapter, where consent was primarily defined in the negative (e.g. *a person does not consent if they are asleep*). In order to understand what does constitute consent, students are required to infer opposite meanings (e.g. *asleep* → *awake*), but also a new set of interrelations. The negative distillation of consent deals with OR relations, where any single condition (e.g. *asleep, unconscious, tricked, forced*) could negate consent. By contrast, the positive distillation of consent deals with AND relations, where all conditions must be met simultaneously.

Affirmative consent laws thus make (more) explicit what was previously implicit. While it remains to be seen what effect this will have on consent pedagogy, we might note the updated definition of consent on the LawStuff website (Youth Law Australia 2022), which has the potential to be used as a teaching resource:

(3.10) *“Consent” means free and voluntary agreement. It is useful to think of consent as an enthusiastic yes!*

In Example 3.10, *consent* still has the same initial definition: *free and voluntary agreement*. But it also includes an additional elaboration: consent is *an enthusiastic yes!* This achieves several things. First, the nominalisation *agreement* is ‘unpacked’ as *yes*. We can describe this from the perspective of NEGOTIATION, an interpersonal discourse semantic system (alongside APPRAISAL), where agreement is an A1 move in an action exchange (e.g. *Would you like to*

have sex? Yes). And second, this agreement is *enthusiastic*, a term which inscribes satisfaction (i.e. being pleased, excited). This small change thus provides a positive definition of consent without nominalisation and highlights the importance of positive affect as a central tenet of consent. Neither of these points were evident in the earlier LawStuff definition, and it is not hard to imagine the significant impact this could have had on students' understanding of this complex technical term. Affirmative consent laws have been welcomed in the field of law, but the brief analysis presented here suggests it is also significant for consent pedagogy. That said, pedagogising consent in relation to any law – affirmative or otherwise – presents challenges, a point I return to at the end of Chapter 4.

3.3 REVISITING TECHNICALISATION

Above I have shown that consent is a technical term in sex education, with a definition which is recontextualised from legal discourse. I have also described what kinds of meanings are distilled into this technical term, and how these meanings are related to each other at the level of field. I now consider the implications of this for existing understandings of technicality in SFL.

3.3.1 Distilling interpersonal meaning

Now that we have established the meanings being distilled into the term *consent*, let us take a closer look at these elements. Despite the fact that field is the ideational variable of register, the meanings being distilled into (NOT) CONSENT are very interpersonal. For example, being (NOT) AFRAID is an inscribed affect of inclination, having (NO) PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT is an inscribed judgement of capacity, and being (NOT) TRICKED ABOUT ACT is an inscribed judgement of veracity. In fact, every element of consent, whether distilled positively or negatively, has some kind of interpersonal meaning. A summary of each element and its corresponding attitude is provided in Table 3.2.

	Element of (NO) CONSENT	ATTITUDE
Tier 1	WANT TO CONTINUE/STOP	inclination
	OF AGE/UNDERAGE	t-capacity
	(NO) MENTAL IMPAIRMENT	capacity
	(NO) PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT	capacity
	AWAKE/ASLEEP	t-capacity
	CONSCIOUS/UNCONSCIOUS	t-capacity
	(NOT) THREATENED	inclination, propriety
	(NOT) FORCED	inclination, propriety
	(NOT) AFRAID	inclination
	(NOT) RESTRAINED AGAINST WISHES	capacity, inclination
	(NOT) TRICKED ABOUT ACT	veracity
	(NOT) TRICKED ABOUT WHO	veracity
	(NOT) TRICKED ABOUT MARRIAGE	veracity
Tier 2	(NO) FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT	inclination

Table 3.2 Elements of (NO) CONSENT and their attitudinal meanings

The elements of (NO) CONSENT thus all enact some kind of attitude, whether inscribed or invoked. They mostly enact judgement, including capacity (e.g. (NO) MENTAL IMPAIRMENT, CONSCIOUS/UNCONSCIOUS), propriety (e.g. (NOT) THREATENED, FORCED) and veracity (e.g. (NOT) TRICKED ABOUT WHO). A number of elements also enact affect, specifically inclination (e.g. WANT TO CONTINUE/STOP, (NOT) AFRAID). In some cases, an element enacts multiple kinds of attitude. The element (NOT) RESTRAINED AGAINST WISHES inscribes inclination (*against your wishes*), but also invokes capacity (*restrained*). The elements (NOT) FORCED and (NOT) THREATENED inscribe both inclination and propriety. As described above (see Section 3.2.1.1), these can be interpreted either as properties (e.g. feeling *forced/threatened*) or as activities where the agent has been elided (e.g. being *forced/threatened (by someone)*). This dual interpretation also reflects the double coding of attitude for these elements. If we interpret *forced* as a property of an item (e.g. *you feel forced*), then it inscribes affect, specifically negative inclination. If we interpret *forced* as an activity with an elided agent (e.g. *you are forced (by someone)*), then it inscribes judgement, specifically negative propriety. I recognise that this analysis combines ATTITUDE, a system at the stratum of discourse semantics, and field,

at the stratum of register. It would perhaps be more appropriate to describe meanings within the same stratum, for example describing field in relation to tenor. While tenor does provide some variables to analyse interpersonal meaning (see Section 2.4), discourse semantic systems such as APPRAISAL are a much more developed area of SFL theory. I thus use the ATTITUDE system here but acknowledge the necessarily awkward writing across strata.

The elements which are distilled in the technical term (NO) CONSENT all contain some attitudinal meaning, but importantly, this is not something we expect with technicality. Indeed, the function of technicality is to enable “the ordering and classification of the *experiential* world” (Wignell, Martin and Eggins 1993: 160, emphasis added). How then might we explain the numerous interpersonal meanings being distilled into the technical term *consent*? It is useful here to draw on the notion of axiologically charged technicality, i.e. ‘axi-tech’. As described in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.3.2.1), axi-tech was first used to describe technical activities in legal discourse, for example to distinguish *pleading guilty* from *feeling guilty* (Martin & Zappavigna 2016, Zappavigna & Martin 2018). While the legal system is of course designed to punish those who have behaved ‘badly’, legal discourse is designed to “ideationalize” this behaviour, for example by replacing inscribed attitudes (e.g. violent, deceptive, cruel) with ‘axiologically charged technicality’ (e.g. assault, forgery, manslaughter; Martin & Zappavigna 2016: 110). Since *consent* is also a technical term in legal discourse, axi-tech is useful for understanding how technicality and interpersonal meaning can overlap.

As well as legal discourse, axi-tech has also been documented in the language of engineering (e.g. *opportunity, mitigation*; Szenes 2017, Simpson-Smith 2021), medicine (e.g. *depression, disorder, impairment*; Stosic 2021a, b) and administrative discourse (e.g. *measures, requirements, restrictions*; Martin 2021). Despite several SFL scholars using this term, there does not yet appear to be an agreed upon definition of axi-tech, nor an explanation of how axi-tech emerges (i.e. how it is distilled logogenetically/ontogenetically). In the following section, I seek to fill this gap, ‘distilling’ the above analysis of consent into a more rigorous description of (axi)technicality.

3.3.2 Technicalising (axi)technicality

Our earlier definition of technicality described technicality as the process of distillation, “whereby meaning is both condensed and reconstituted in lexis construing uncommonsense knowledge of the world” (Martin 2017a: 113). However, we need to distinguish between technicality as it has typically been described in the sciences (e.g. *nucleus, oestrogen*) which

distils purely ideational meanings, and technicality as it has been described for *consent* which also distils attitudinal meanings. I propose naming these **technicalised ideation** and **technicalised attitude**, respectively. I propose these names for four reasons. First, I use *technicalised* rather than *technicality* as it would be oxymoronic to refer to *attitudinal technicality*, since one of the functions of technicality is to ‘empty out’ attitudinal meanings. Second, using *technicalised* rather than *technicality* highlights that technicalisation is a process that unfolds over time, whether logogenetic, ontogenetic or phylogenetic. Third, I use *attitude* rather than *axiology/axiological* (from ‘axi-tech’) to avoid conflation with the same term in Legitimation Code Theory (Maton 2014). And finally, this pair of names makes explicit the similarities and differences between these phenomena: they both involve technicalisation (i.e. condensing and reconstituting meaning), but one condenses ideational meanings and the other condenses attitudinal ones. Adapting Martin’s (2017a: 113) definition, then, technicalised ideation is the result of condensing and reconstituting ideational meanings, while technicalised attitude is the result of condensing and reconstituting attitudinal meanings. Of course, it should be noted that attitudinal meanings are usually attached to an ideational target. For example, when the element CONSCIOUS is distilled into the technical term CONSENT, this is judgement of capacity, and specifically the capacity of the people having sex. In saying that technicalised attitude is concerned with condensing and reconstituting attitudinal meanings, I do not mean to suggest that we can set ideational triggers and targets aside entirely, only that this does not appear to affect how we distinguish technicalised attitude from technicalised ideation.

As a way of turning this concept to purpose, some of the ‘features’ that can be used to identify technicalised attitude include that it:

- Distils attitudes, whether inscribed or invoked, at the level of field, as highlighted by an analysis of field (inter)relations
- Is usually realised by a nominal group, including nominalisations (e.g. *consent n.*) and Classifier ^ Thing (e.g. *enthusiastic consent*)
- Is textually prominent; it tends to occur in MacroTheme/New and HyperTheme/New (e.g. *We need to know exactly what **consent** means*)
- Appears in the opening stage of genres, such as Classification (for report) and Phenomenon (for explanation)

Note that the first of these criteria relates to technicalised attitude specifically, while the rest apply to technicalised ideation as well. These criteria relate to different strata – some relate to lexicogrammar (e.g. realisation by nominal group), some relate to discourse semantics (e.g.

textual prominence relates to PERIODICITY), and some relate to genre (e.g. appears in opening stages of reports and explanations). These criteria thus reason from above, from around and from below, following SFL's 'trinocular perspective' (Halliday 1978: 130-131, Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 48). Note, however, that dealing with technicalisation as a process also means that our examination needs to factor in how this unfolds in time, whether in text (logogenesis), in a lifetime (ontogenetic) or across generations (phylogenetic). As such, we should not look too synoptically for cut and dried recognition criteria for technicalised attitude but should also consider how technicalised ideation and technicalised attitude emerge and unfold over time.

Importantly, technicalised attitude is not itself attitudinal. Indeed, one of the functions of technicalising is to 'empty out' attitudinal meaning. However, these attitudinal meanings can be recovered when technicalised attitude is elaborated. When we unpack technical terms, such as when defining them or (especially) when pedagogising them, the attitudinal meanings that have been distilled return to the surface. Indeed, a lay definition of axi-tech is: a technical term which, while not itself attitudinal, will involve inscribed attitudes when defined. This lay definition has been formalised here: axi-tech/technicalised attitude distils attitudes, whether inscribed or invoked, at the level of field. The technical term itself (e.g. *consent*) is empty of attitudinal meaning, but the underlying relations can be revealed when the technicality is unpacked. Note that Doran and Martin (2021) also acknowledge some "overlap" and "indeterminacy" in distinguishing ideational and interpersonal meanings in their model of field (2021: 120-121). For example, the arraying (e.g. *most common*) and gauging (e.g. *54mm wide*) of properties suggests an ideational perspective on gradable meanings which have typically been explored from an interpersonal perspective (through the system of GRADUATION within APPRAISAL, see Section 2.4.1). Similarly, Martin's (2020a) analysis of lexical metaphor notes that these ideational metaphors also 'provoke' an attitudinal response. Despite acknowledging that "strictly speaking, we should not be including interpersonal meaning in an ideational network" (Martin 2020a: 19), it seems we cannot avoid bringing attitudinal properties in to field, descriptively if not theoretically.

In this section I have revisited the existing SFL description of technicality and proposed two kinds of technicality: technicalised ideation and technicalised attitude. I have elaborated definitions and criteria for each and have tried to clarify previous descriptions of 'axi-tech'. This brings rigour to a concept which has interested SFL scholars, but which has until now remained less well defined. It would be a fruitful area of future research to revisit other uses of

‘axi-tech’, such as those in engineering and medicine, to consider if the definition and criteria for technicalised attitude outlined above also fit those contexts.

So far in this chapter I have dealt with just one excerpt from the dataset: the written handout where consent is first defined and some of the corresponding spoken language in lesson 4. I now turn to a second excerpt which occurs in the following lesson (lesson 5). Whereas the previous excerpt deals with the definition of consent, and particularly how the legal definition distils a range of meanings into consent as a technical term, below we see how the students begin to apply this label to a range of hypothetical scenarios. While consent has already been loaded with a range of attitudinal meanings (e.g. inclination, capacity), below I show how the range of attitudes are expanded even further.

3.4 ACCRUING ATTITUDE

Above I have described the pedagogy in lesson 4, where the teacher introduces and defines consent. I turn now to lesson 5, where the class discusses a series of scenarios and determines whether or not they are consensual. This excerpt is valuable for highlighting how students begin to make use of the term ‘consent’ themselves, taking the technical knowledge provided by the teacher in the previous lesson and starting to apply it in a range of situations. As we will see, these situations deal with a range of attitudinal meanings, including capacity (e.g. *one person is really drunk*), inclination (e.g. *I didn’t want it*) and veracity (e.g. *without telling the girl, he takes off the condom*). This is unsurprising given that these are the very same attitudinal meanings which were distilled in the previous lesson (e.g. *unconscious* for capacity, *want to stop* for inclination and *tricked about act* for veracity). However, these situations also go beyond the types of attitude distilled in the technical definition of consent; for example they also include satisfaction, security and normality. Consent, then, is not only conditional on those attitudes which are specified in the legal definition, it is conditional on all feelings (i.e. affect) and all behaviours (i.e. judgement) being positive. Consent continues to accrue attitude, extending its attitudinal reach beyond that of the technical legal term.

To show this, I step through a 10-minute excerpt from lesson 5 (file ID R5_27m Is that consent, for full transcript see Appendix B). In this excerpt, the class discusses a series of ‘what if’ scenarios and then assesses where they are consensual or not. The first scenarios that the class discusses are presented in the slides, as shown in Figure 3.16.

CONSENT

- What if one person is drunk and the other person isn't? Can there be consent?
- What if both people are drunk? Can there be consent?
- What if they asked you over and over and over and over and you eventually gave in and said yes? Is that consent?
- What if...?



Figure 3.16 Slide showing consent scenarios (R5_slide6)

As shown in Figure 3.16, scenarios are typically presented in the format of a ‘what if’ question, followed by an event description. For example:

(3.11) *What if one person is really drunk and the other person isn't?*

The teacher begins with the scenarios shown in the slides, but then creates additional ones which become increasingly elaborate. For example:

(3.12) *What if, while having sex, so two people are having sex and the guy was wearing a condom, and then part way during sex, without telling the girl, he takes off the condom and kept going.*

The scenarios are mostly hypothetical; but there are two instances where the teacher uses real legal cases as examples.

Each ‘what if’ scenario is then followed by the question *is that consent?* or a similar yes/no question, where students are invited to label the scenario as ‘consent’ or ‘no consent’. For example:

(3.13) *What if the guy's the one who's really drunk and the girl's the one like, “yeah yeah let's have sex” and she's perfectly sober. **Is that consent?***

This question uses text reference (*is **that** consent?*) to package up the entire scenario, which the students can then assess as ‘consent’ or ‘no consent’.

While there are a range of ‘what if’ scenarios, two patterns of attitude recur throughout this excerpt (see Appendix D for full ATTITUDE analysis). First, the people in the scenario express a negative feeling about sex, i.e. negative affect with *sex/having sex* as trigger. For example (affect in **bold**, target underlined):

(3.14) “**Oh my god**, [negative security] I had sex and I was so drunk and I didn’t want it [negative inclination] **and I feel really bad** [negative happiness]⁴ about it”.

Second, the people in the scenario exhibit negative behaviour, i.e. they are the target of negative judgement. For example (judgement in **bold**, target underlined):

(3.15) *So what if one person is really **drunk** [negative t-capacity] and the other person isn’t. Can there be consent?*

Every scenario includes at least one instance of a character expressing a negative feeling about sex (e.g. *I feel really **bad***) or a judgement of a character’s negative behaviour (e.g. *one person is really **drunk***). As a result, every scenario is then labelled by the class as ‘no consent’, continuing the pattern from the previous lesson of defining and describing consent in the negative.

It is unsurprising that we see negative attitudes in these scenarios, given that these are precisely the meanings which have been distilled in the previous lesson. For example, the LawStuff handout distils negative veracity in *a person does not give their consent if they are **tricked** or mistaken about the nature of the act*. Similarly, one of the hypothetical scenarios invokes negative veracity and is then labelled as not consensual: *what if... part way during sex, **without telling the girl**, [the guy] takes off the condom and kept going*. The students are learning, then, to recognise the attitudes which were distilled in the previous lesson in a practical example. However, what is notable about these scenarios is that they also go beyond the types of attitude distilled in the technical definition of consent. Whereas the legal definition distils inclination, capacity, veracity and propriety, in this lesson consent continues to accrue even more attitudes. In fact, it accrues all sub-types of AFFECT, and most sub-types of JUDGEMENT – in a kind of ‘attitude bingo’. Consent, then, is not only conditional on those

⁴ *Bad* in *I felt really **bad*** could be analysed as negative happiness (agnate: *unhappy, sad, down*) or negative security (agnate: *uneasy, freaked out*). The former is presented here.

attitudes which are specified in the legal definition, it is conditional on all feelings (i.e. affect) and all behaviours (i.e. judgement) being positive. I begin by showing how the scenarios move through the subtypes of AFFECT, and then show this same process for JUDGEMENT. Note that I analyse the most relevant instances of attitude in each example, for instance if the focus is on affect, I may not mark instances of judgement.

3.4.1 Accruing AFFECT

All four subtypes of AFFECT can be found in these scenarios, specifically for feelings about having sex. Inclination, satisfaction, security and happiness are all used with the target ‘having sex’ or an equivalent phrase (e.g. *that decision [to have sex]*). Inclination is the most common, occurring either implicitly or explicitly in many of the hypothetical scenarios. Example 3.16 below contains inclination, as well as satisfaction and security (affect in **bold**):

(3.16) *T: Um what if someone asks you over and over and over and over again and eventually you gave in and said, “oh fine yes”. Um and it might not even be that “ugh” [negative t-satisfaction]⁵ kind of, it might be the “oh well, OK then”, the **uncomfortable** [negative security] “well I don’t really **want** [negative inclination]⁶ to but you’ve kind of asked many times now and I kind of feel **obliged** [negative t-inclination] that maybe I should”. Is that consent?*

In Example 3.16, there are several instances of affect with the person in the scenario as appraiser and ‘having sex’ as the target. They express negative satisfaction (“ugh”), negative security (*uncomfortable*) and negative inclination (*I don’t really **want** to but I kind of feel **obliged***). This scenario is labelled ‘no consent’, indicating that positive satisfaction, security and inclination are all conditions of consensual sex.

Example 3.17 similarly shows a scenario with multiple instances of affect, this time with happiness as well (affect in **bold**):

⁵ The term *ugh* on its own is negative affect, and interpreting the specific sub-type depends on co-text and voice quality. It is not said in disgust, but rather in a tone which suggests someone is fed up or sick of being asked about having sex. I therefore classify it as invoked negative satisfaction.

⁶ For ease of analysis, polarity is determined based on the evaluation as a whole. For example, *I don’t really want to* would technically be positive inclination (*want*) which is then negated within the system of ENGAGEMENT, specifically disclaim: deny (*I **don’t** want it*). Since ENGAGEMENT is not analysed in detail here, the analysis has been simplified to negative inclination.

(3.17) “*Oh my god*, [negative security] *I had sex and I was so drunk and I didn’t want it* [negative inclination] *and I feel really bad* [negative happiness] *about it*”.

In Example 3.17, the teacher uses quoted speech to show the feelings of the imagined young person in this scenario. They express negative security (*oh my god*), as well as negative inclination (*I didn’t want it*) and negative happiness (*I feel really bad about it*). Once again, this scenario is labelled by the class as ‘no consent’, indicating that positive security, inclination and happiness are all conditions of consensual sex.

The scenarios in this excerpt thus touch on all four subtypes of AFFECT: inclination, satisfaction, security and happiness. These all have the characters in the hypothetical scenario as their appraiser, and ‘having sex’ as their target. The conclusion is that if you feel disinclined, unhappy, insecure or dissatisfied about sex, it is not consensual.

3.4.2 Accruing JUDGEMENT

While not as exhaustive as AFFECT, many subtypes of JUDGEMENT can be found in these scenarios, including capacity, veracity and normality. Where affect is used to show the feelings of people having sex in these hypothetical scenarios, judgement is used to evaluate those people and their behaviours. The most common subtype is capacity, for example:

(3.18) *What if both people are really drunk* [negative t-capacity], *can there be consent?*

In Example 3.18, *drunk* invokes negative capacity. While invoked attitude is more implicit, this is graduated up by raising force as *really drunk*. The class labels this scenario as ‘no consent’, indicating that positive capacity is a condition of consensual sex.

The people in the scenario may also be judged as dishonest (i.e. negative veracity), for example:

(3.19) *What if, while having sex, so two people are having sex and the guy was wearing a condom, and then part way during sex, without telling the girl, [negative t-veracity] he takes off the condom and kept going. Is that consent?*

In Example 3.19, the act of removing a condom *without telling the girl* is an invoked judgement of veracity. The person in the scenario is behaving dishonestly by keeping this information from his sexual partner, and the scenario is labelled by the class as ‘no consent’, indicating that positive veracity is also a condition of consensual sex.

Finally, there is one scenario which could be interpreted as a judgement of normality. The teacher is explaining that someone can consent to some sexual acts (e.g. vaginal sex) but not others (e.g. anal sex):

(3.20) *They're having you know 'normal' [positive normality] sex, the guy's penis in her vagina and everything's happy and then he decides to go a bit more adventurous, and he decides he wants to try anal sex and she's not happy with it. If she says, "no I don't want that" and he does it anyway, it's not consent.*

In Example 3.20, the teacher refers to vaginal sex as 'normal' and anal sex as *more adventurous*, an inscribed judgement of tenacity but also, by contrast with vaginal sex, as something abnormal (i.e. negative normality). The implication here is that consent does not apply to sex beyond the ordinary or 'standard' forms of sex that you might have already agreed to. Notably, the teacher does gesture air quotes when describing vaginal sex as 'normal', an indication of heteroglossic expansion. I return to this example in more detail below.

In summary, while not as exhaustive as AFFECT, there are many subtypes of JUDGEMENT used in these scenarios, specifically to target the characters and their behaviour. If the people having sex are evaluated with negative judgement, whether capacity, veracity or normality, the scenario is deemed as having 'no consent'. The conclusion is that if the people having sex are not being capable, honest and normal, it is not consensual.

3.4.2.1 Tenacity and propriety

Since all sub-types of AFFECT can impact on consent, we might ask if the same is true for all types of JUDGEMENT. So far, we have seen examples of capacity, veracity and normality, but we might ask if there are also instances of the remaining two types of judgement: tenacity and propriety.

Beginning with tenacity, the subsystem which deals with how resolute someone is (Martin & White 2005: 52), we can find examples if we look to other 'what if' scenarios in other lessons. Consider Example 3.21, from lesson 13 of Josh's class (negative tenacity in **bold**):

(3.21) *Let's say... [your partner is] trying to convince you [to have sex]. Where does trying to convince you cross a line? ... If they ask you once a week? Is that crossing a personal boundary? ... Once a month? ... They're not forcing you to do anything but they're keen*

and so *they keep asking* [**negative t-tenacity**]. Where is that appropriate or not appropriate? (J13_36m)

In Example 3.21, the teacher describes a hypothetical scenario where a *partner* is *trying to convince you* to have sex. While some amount of asking just indicates that *they're keen*, at some point this *cross[es] a line* and is *not appropriate*. He invites students to think about how often is too often (*once a week? once a month?*), and at what point repeated questioning becomes impatient, hasty or stubborn. The focus of this example is not explicitly consent, but we can imagine that *cross[ing a line]*, *cross[ing] a personal boundary* and *not appropriate* (all negative judgements of propriety) are analogous ways of describing behaviour which is coercive and not conducive to consent. We could therefore argue that tenacity is another condition of consensual sex, and while not present in the main text for analysis, instances of it can be found in other parts of the dataset.

In terms of propriety, we can in fact return to the previous lesson of Rhianon's class, where consent is first defined (lesson 4). Again, this follows the same 'what if' scenario structure:

(3.22) *If they've said, "give me a blowjob or we're breaking up and I'm gonna tell everyone and I'm gonna share those [nude] pictures that you gave me". That's not voluntarily, you've been forced and coerced into that situation.* (R4_54m)

In Example 3.22, the teacher describes a scenario where someone says "*give me a blowjob or... I'm gonna share those [nude] pictures that you gave me*". In this example, the person is making a direct threat – to share nude photos – unless the person 'agrees' to have sex. Since this is taken from a different lesson, the teacher does not follow up with the question *is that consent?*, but she does provide the answer herself: *that's not voluntarily*. Recall that the initial definition of consent, which is being taught in this excerpt, is *free and voluntary agreement*. In other words, if something is not done *voluntarily*, there is no consent. Positive propriety (e.g. not threatening someone) is thus also a condition of consent.

Returning to our main excerpt for analysis in lesson 5, we can see that propriety has an important second function. So far, we have seen how negative polarity in any subsystem of AFFECT or JUDGEMENT leads to a scenario being labelled 'no consent'. Propriety, on the other hand, can be used after a scenario has been labelled as not consent, specifically in teacher elaborations. Consider the scenario of someone removing a condom during sex (Example 3.19 above), reproduced as Example 3.23 with additional co-text (negative propriety in **bold**):

(3.23) T: *What if, while having sex, so two people are having sex and the guy was wearing a condom, and then part way during sex, without telling the girl, he takes off the condom and kept going. Is that consent?*

S: *No.*

T: *No... Good. She didn't agree to that change in circumstance, and so it's not consent. So in that case there he would get himself in very big **trouble** [negative propriety], and it actually has been tested in courts more recently, to say yes, he would get in big **trouble** [negative propriety].*

As described above, the scenario itself has invoked negative veracity (*without telling the girl, he takes off the condom*). Once the scenario has been labelled 'no consent', then the teacher elaborates using negative propriety, which is graduated by raising force: *in that case there he would get himself in very big trouble*. Propriety is not the reason the scenario is non-consensual, but rather the outcome of non-consensual sex and how we judge the scenario as a whole.

Tenacity and propriety are thus both also conditions of consensual sex, with propriety having a dual role as both a condition of consent (e.g. *I'm gonna share those pictures that you gave me...*) and an outcome of non-consensual sex (e.g. *he would get in big trouble*). This means that all sub-types of JUDGEMENT (capacity, veracity, normality, tenacity and propriety) are a condition of consensual sex. That is, if the people having sex are not being capable, honest, normal, dependable and ethical, it is not consensual.

3.4.3 Feelings and behaviours affecting consent

Above I have analysed an excerpt where the class discusses a range of scenarios and labels them as 'consent' or 'no consent', and in a few cases I have drawn on additional 'what if' scenarios from other points in the dataset. Each of these scenarios includes at least one instance of someone expressing a negative feeling about having sex (e.g. *I feel really bad*) or exhibiting negative behaviour (e.g. *one person is really drunk*). That is, they all contain negative affect with 'sex'/'having sex' as trigger, or negative judgement with the person in the scenario as target. More specifically, these attitudes cycle through all the sub-types of AFFECT and all the sub-types of JUDGEMENT. The conclusion is that consensual sex is conditional on everyone feeling good about having sex (i.e. positive inclination, security, satisfaction, happiness) and behaving well while having sex (i.e. positive capacity, tenacity, normality, veracity, propriety). Table 3.3 provides a summary of the above analysis.

ATTITUDE		Example
AFFECT	inclination	<i>I don't really want to</i>
	happiness	<i>I feel really bad about it</i>
	satisfaction	<i>Someone asks you over and over again and eventually you [say]... "ugh"</i>
	security	<i>The uncomfortable ... "oh well, OK then"</i>
JUDGEMENT	capacity	<i>One person is really drunk</i>
	tenacity	<i>[Your partner is] trying to convince you [to have sex] and they keep asking</i>
	normality	<i>They're having 'normal' sex... and he decides he wants to try anal sex</i>
	veracity	<i>Without telling the girl, he takes off the condom</i>
	propriety	<i>"Give me a blowjob or... I'm gonna share those pictures that you gave me" (condition) <i>He would get himself in very big trouble (outcome)</i></i>

Table 3.3 Accruing attitude summary

In this lesson, students are learning to apply the technical definition of consent that they learnt in the previous lesson by assessing a range of scenarios as consensual or not consensual. It is unsurprising that we see negative attitudes in these scenarios: these are precisely the meanings which were distilled in the previous lesson, and evidently students are learning to identify them in a new set of examples. But what this analysis reveals is that these scenarios also go beyond the types of attitude distilled in the technical definition of consent. Whereas the legal definition included inclination, capacity, veracity and propriety, in this lesson consent continues to accrue even more attitudes. In fact, it accrues all sub-types of AFFECT and all sub-types of JUDGEMENT, such that consent is conditional on everyone feeling good about having sex and behaving well while they do it. Consent thus continues to accrue attitude in sex education, extending the attitudinal reach beyond that which is specified by the law.

So far, I have highlighted all the conditions which impact on consent, and specifically conditions which negate consent (e.g. feeling *uncomfortable*, being *drunk*). Despite the significant 'checklist' of conditions which must be met, there are also some conditions which do not impact consent. I consider these in the following section.

3.4.4 Conditions which do not impact consent

There is a significant list of conditions which must be met for a sexual scenario to be considered consensual, but there are also conditions which do not impact consent. We can see this when the teacher talks about the effect (or lack thereof) of gender and sexuality when determining whether sex is consensual. In Example 3.24, a student proposes a ‘what if’ scenario where a girl is pressuring a boy into sex (attitude in **bold**):

(3.24) S: *What if it's a girl though? Like what if she **wants** [positive inclination] it. What if he's like not **sure** [negative security] but like, you know what I mean?...*

T: *Oh, so. In this case here [points to slides], notice how we didn't use gender at all. Coz it wasn't whether the guy **pressured** [negative inclination] the girl, or the girl **pressured** [negative inclination] the guy, coz this can go either way. You know, what if the guy's the one who's really **drunk** [negative t-capacity] and the girl's the one like, “yeah yeah let's have sex” and she's perfectly **sober** [positive t-capacity]. Is that consent?*

In Example 3.24, a student asks what the outcome is if a girl wants to have sex but her male partner does not: *What if it's a girl though? Like what if she wants it but he's like not sure?* The teacher responds that gender is not relevant: *notice how we didn't use gender at all [in the previous scenario]. It wasn't whether the guy pressured the girl, or the girl pressured the guy, coz this can go either way.* Crucially, there are still negative attitudes in this scenario, including negative security (*he's like **not sure***), negative inclination (*the guy **pressured** the girl, or the girl **pressured** the guy*) and negative capacity (*he's... really **drunk***). The important factor is not the gender of the people involved, but that there are negative feelings (e.g. *not sure*) and negative behaviours (e.g. *really drunk*).

Immediately after this example, the teacher repeats the same scenario with a same-sex couple:

(3.25) T: *What if this was a same-sex relationship?*

S1: *Um.*

S2: *No.*

T: *Yeah, still no, good.*

S3: *You still have to have consent.*

T: *Good, you still have to have consent, it doesn't matter what gender the other person is, if they're not even entirely sure which gender they are, um, or they're gender fluid, they're male, female or somewhere in between, um, it literally does not matter the gender. It's about whether one person gives consent to the other person for the sexual contact in which they are both agreeing to make.*

In Example 3.25, the teacher uses the same scenario (*what if **this** [scenario]...*) but with a *same-sex relationship*. After the students label this as 'no consent' (*no; you still have to have consent*), the teacher again explains that gender, and by extension sexuality, is irrelevant: *it doesn't matter what gender the other person is, if... they're male, female or somewhere in between, um, it literally does not matter the gender*. What is relevant instead is *whether one person gives consent to the other person*, and we understand from the previous scenario (see Example 3.24) that the conditions of security, inclination and capacity have not been met. Again, it is this breach of conditions, rather than the gender and sexuality of the people, which means the scenario is not consensual.

It is worth briefly returning to the normality example above (Example 3.20), repeated here as Example 3.26:

(3.26) *They're having you know 'normal' [positive normality] sex, the guy's penis in her vagina and everything's happy and then he decides to go a bit more adventurous, and he decides he wants to try anal sex and she's not happy with it. If she says, "no I don't want that" and he does it anyway, it's not consent.*

Above I argued that this was a case of normality being a condition for consensual sex: vaginal sex is evaluated as *normal*, while anal sex is positioned as *more adventurous* and, by contrast with vaginal sex, abnormal. However, the teacher uses scare quotes when describing vaginal sex as 'normal' by gesturing quotation marks as she speaks. Scare quotes are a resource for heteroglossic expansion, specifically attribute: distance, which speakers use to distance or separate themselves from a proposition (Martin & White 2005: 113). The teacher is thus suggesting that others might consider vaginal sex to be normal, but she does not necessarily agree with this position. In doing so, she is challenging the idea that vaginal/heterosexual sex is the norm, instead suggesting that other forms of sex, especially those might be more common in same-sex or queer relationships, are equally normal. Since 'normal', then, is not necessarily being used as a condition of consensual sex, we may need to revise this as a condition of

consensual sex. For the sake of being exhaustive, I maintain positive normality as a condition, with the caveat that it is not as obvious as, say, capacity and veracity.

3.4.4.1 APPRECIATION and consent

Finally, another factor which seemingly does not impact on consent is APPRECIATION, the sub-system of attitude which deals with our aesthetic evaluations of phenomena. Appreciation is used minimally throughout all these scenarios, with only a handful of instances (e.g. *she's like "oh it's safe"*, positive valuation). It is of course possible to evaluate sex with negative appreciation, for instance as *routine* (impact), *uncomfortable* (quality), *flawed* (balance), a *quickie* (complexity) or *meaningless* (valuation). But these factors do not affect whether or not sex is consensual. Consent, then, is concerned with people's feelings (AFFECT) and behaviours (JUDGEMENT) to do with sex, rather than aesthetic evaluations of sex itself (APPRECIATION). While this is surely appropriate for a legal definition of consent, it is worth noting that pedagogising sex and consent via the law will necessarily focus on what behaviours are illegal and punishable, rather than on what makes sex pleasurable as well as consensual. This is one of the challenges of recontextualising legal discourse for the purpose of teaching consent, a point I return to at the end of Chapter 4.

Above I have provided a description of consent pedagogy, both in terms of its technical legal definition and in an excerpt where this definition is applied to a range of scenarios. This analysis highlighted how consent distils a range of attitudinal meanings as a technical term and continues to accrue even more attitudes when pedagogised. Understanding and unpacking these attitudinal meanings is crucial for students to acquire the technicality of consent, but also for their assessments of scenarios as (non)consensual. As a conclusion to this chapter, I now consider how this analysis could inform the design of a teaching resource which captures all the conditions of consent, and which teaches students how to identify consensual or non-consensual sex in a given situation.

3.4.5 Attitude bingo as a resource for teaching

In this chapter I have shown that there are a range of conditions which must be met for consent to be consensual. This includes those conditions which are specified in the law (e.g. you cannot be *asleep*, *unconscious* or *afraid*), but also extends further to not feeling *uncomfortable*, being *drunk* and more. As a teaching resource, these conditions can be presented as a 'consent checklist', as in Figure 3.17.

<p>CONSENT CHECKLIST</p> <p>How are you and your partner/s FEELING?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do you want to? • Are you happy with the situation? • Are you satisfied with the situation? • Are you sure? <p>How are you and your partner/s BEHAVING?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are you capable? • Are you reliable? • Is this the kind of sex you want? • Are you being honest? • Are you behaving ethically? <p>If you said YES to all of the above – BINGO! You’ve got consent!</p>
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Figure 3.17 Consent checklist

The consent checklist in Figure 3.17 is broken into two sections: how are you feeling, corresponding to AFFECT, and how are you behaving, corresponding to JUDGEMENT. There are a series of question prompts, corresponding to each of the sub-types of ATTITUDE. For AFFECT, there are four prompts: *Do you want to?* (inclination), *Are you happy with the situation?* (happiness), *Are you satisfied with the situation?* (satisfaction) and *Are you sure?* (security). For JUDGEMENT, there are five prompts: *Are you capable?* (capacity), *Are you reliable?* (tenacity), *Is this the kind of sex you want?* (normality), *Are you being honest?* (veracity) and *Are you behaving ethically?* (propriety). The questions can be asked of yourself (*how are you feeling?*) or of your sexual partner/s (*how are your partner/s feeling?*). Since each of these questions must receive an affirmative response (i.e. every attitude must be in positive polarity), the bottom of the checklist says, *If you said YES to all of the above – BINGO! You’ve got consent!*

The checklist provided in Figure 3.17 is intended to be an overview for quick reference only. This can be complemented with a more detailed checklist which lists examples of ‘what YES looks like’ (i.e. positive affect/judgement) and ‘what NO looks like (i.e. negative

affect/judgement). A more elaborated checklist for the veracity prompt *Are you being honest?* is provided in Table 3.4.

ATTITUDE	Question prompt	What YES looks like	What NO looks like
veracity	Are you being honest ?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Keeping a condom on if that's what's agreed to Disclosing HIV positive status Being truthful about your identity Being truthful about whether you and your partner are married 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Removing a condom without telling your partner/s Not disclosing HIV positive status Pretending to be someone else Pretending that you and your partner are married

Table 3.4 Elaborated consent checklist for veracity

Table 3.4 includes examples of what constitutes positive veracity under the heading ‘what YES looks like’. This includes *keeping a condom on if that’s what’s agreed to* (as per the scenario in Example 3.19) and *disclosing HIV positive status*, another example from the classroom talk. The other two examples – *being truthful about your identity* and *being truthful about whether you and your partner are married* – are not taken from the classroom talk, but relate to specific conditions under the law as laid out in the LawStuff handout (see Figure 3.2): that a person cannot consent if they *are tricked or mistaken about who the other person is* or if they are *tricked into thinking the other person is married to them*.

As well as providing students with examples of what being (dis)honest looks like, this teaching resource could have additional space for more scenarios. For instance, in another lesson, in a discussion about the age of consent, a student asks: *what if a person says that they’re older [than they are]?* (Josh lesson 6). Students could add these to the checklist (e.g. if provided as a handout), adding *Being truthful about your age* and *Lying about your age* to the *Are you being honest?* prompt, as shown in Table 3.5.

ATTITUDE	Question prompt	What YES looks like	What NO looks like
veracity	Are you being honest ?	Keeping a condom on if that's what's agreed to Disclosing HIV positive status Being truthful about your identity Being truthful about whether you and your partner are married <i>Being truthful about your age</i> <hr/>	Removing a condom without telling your partner/s Not disclosing HIV positive status Pretending to be someone else Pretending that you and your partner are married <i>Lying about your age</i> <hr/>

Table 3.5 Elaborated consent checklist for veracity with space for additional examples

Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show an elaborated consent checklist for veracity. A fully elaborated checklist for all sub-types of affect and judgement (i.e. all the conditions of consent) is provided in Table 3.6.

ATTITUDE	Question prompt	What YES looks like	What NO looks like
<i>How are you and your partner/s FEELING?</i>			
inclination	Do you want to?	Enthusiastic desire Wanting to start and wanting to continue	Being wary or afraid Not wanting to start, wanting to stop at any point Being pressured, forced, coerced or threatened
happiness	Are you happy with the situation?	Being happy, cheerful and enjoying yourself	Feeling bad, sad, down or gloomy
satisfaction	Are you satisfied with the situation?	Pleased, attentive and excited	Fed up with being asked again and again
security	Are you sure ?	Relaxed, comfortable and confident	Uneasy, uncertain, freaked out or anxious
<i>How are you and your partner/s BEHAVING?</i>			
capacity	Are you capable ?	Sober Conscious Awake Over the legal age of consent (16 in NSW)	Drunk or high Unconscious Asleep Under the legal age of consent
tenacity	Are you reliable ?	Making a considered decision Agreeing on protection around STIs and unwanted pregnancy	Being caught up in the moment Being unprepared and not agreeing on protection
normality	Is this the kind of sex you want?	Each type of sexual act (e.g. oral sex, vaginal sex, anal sex) is agreed to	Changing the kind of sex you are having without asking partner/s first
veracity	Are you being honest ?	Keeping a condom on if that's what's agreed to Disclosing HIV positive status Being truthful about your identity Being truthful about whether you and your partner are married	Removing a condom without telling your partner/s Not disclosing HIV positive status Pretending to be someone else Pretending that you and your partner are married
propriety	Are you behaving ethically ?	Making the decision freely, on your own	Pressuring, forcing, coercing or threatening
If you said YES to all of the above – BINGO! You've got consent!			

Table 3.6 Elaborated consent checklist for all sub-types of affect and judgement

Table 3.6 includes examples of ‘what YES looks like’ and ‘what NO looks like’ for all sub-types of AFFECT and JUDGEMENT. For example, in answer to the question prompt *Are you and your partner/s capable?* (capacity), examples of what yes looks like (i.e. positive capacity) include being *sober, conscious, awake, and over the legal age of consent*. Conversely, examples of what no looks like (i.e. negative capacity) include being *drunk or high, unconscious, asleep and under the legal age of consent*. In order for there to be consent, every condition in the YES column must be met, and none of the conditions in the NO column.

The consent checklist teaching resource is useful in several ways. First, it takes the attitudinal meanings which are distilled into consent and presents them as simple question prompts. This unpacks some of the technicality of consent, including language features such as nominalisation. For example, the condition on the LawStuff handout which reads *A person does not give their consent if they do not have the capacity to consent due to age, or a mental or physical impairment* appears in the consent checklist as *Are you capable?* Second, the consent checklist not only captures the attitudinal meanings in the technical legal definition of consent, it also captures all those meanings which were elaborated in the ‘what if’ scenarios. For example, it includes the examples of not being *asleep or unconscious* (under capacity) which are part of the legal conditions, but it also includes the examples of *removing a condom without telling your partner* (under veracity) and *feeling fed up with being asked again and again* (under satisfaction) from the classroom discussion of different ‘what if’ scenarios. Thirdly, it provides students with a list of examples for each question prompt (i.e. each type of ATTITUDE), making a clear connection between the underlying attitudinal meanings and the ways these might look in a scenario, both real and hypothetical. For example, the inclination prompt *Do you want to?* has examples of ‘what NO looks like’ including *being wary or fearful* and *wanting to stop at any point*. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the consent checklist also includes examples of what consent is, rather than only what it is not. For every question prompt, there are examples of what not to feel (e.g. *afraid, sad, uneasy*) and how not to behave (e.g. *drunk or high, threatening*), many of which are taken from classroom talk. But there are also examples of how you should feel (e.g. *happy, excited, comfortable*) and how you should behave (e.g. *conscious, keeping a condom on if that’s what’s agreed to*). For all the times the word ‘consent’ is used in sex education, it seems our understanding is still so weighted towards how it is negated, what it is not, and what not to do. The consent checklist aims to move beyond this negative conception of consent, teaching students not only which behaviours to avoid, but also which ones to emulate.

3.5 INSIGHTS FROM CHAPTER 3

In this chapter, I highlighted the complex interrelations that students must grapple with when it comes to the technical term *consent* in sex education. I showed how consent laws are recontextualised for the classroom, and that this technical definition distils a range of meanings using field interrelations of extension (e.g. *afraid or unconscious*), enhancement (e.g. *a person does not give their consent if...*) and elaboration (e.g. *consent means...*). This analysis was significant because it revealed the complex ways that the technical term *consent* organises and configures different elements at the level of field, but also because it highlighted that consent is distilled differently depending on whether it is positive or negative. The field interrelations for CONSENT and NO CONSENT are not simply mirror images of each other but must be abduced by students, and the positive distillation especially is left largely implicit. This is an important step forward for our understanding of technicalisation in sex education and offers crucial insight into the demands placed on students when learning about consent.

Recognising this was also significant for understanding that not only ideational but also attitudinal meanings can be technicalised. Previous theorisation on technicalisation has primarily focussed on the way that ideational meanings are distilled, especially in the sciences. However, the analysis in this chapter has demonstrated that attitudinal meanings can also be distilled, such as *afraid* (inclination) and *unconscious* (t-capacity). This meant that I needed to revise the concept of technicality and technicalisation in recognition of technicalised attitude as distinct from technicalised ideation. **Technicalised ideation** is where ideational meanings are condensed and reconstituted (e.g. *nucleus, oestrogen*), and **technicalised attitude** is where attitudinal meanings are condensed and reconstituted (e.g. *consent*). This perspective on technicalisation has important implications for SFL's existing theorisation on technicality and 'axi-tech', clarifying and extending what these terms mean and how they are related to one another. It also offers key insight into the way axi-tech (i.e. technicalised attitude) straddles both ideational and attitudinal meaning; technicalisation 'empties out' interpersonal meaning, but this can be recovered when technicalised attitude is elaborated such as when it is defined or (especially) when it is pedagogised. Throughout this chapter I have highlighted linguistic resources and criteria for identifying technicalised attitude and technicalised ideation such that the concepts of technicality and axi-tech can be revisited in other contexts with clearer parameters.

This new perspective on technicalisation has important implications for interpreting the way consent is taught. It is noteworthy that the class used a range of 'what if' scenarios with

an even more elaborated list of conditions of consent, implicating even more attitudes, including satisfaction (“*ugh*”), security (*uncomfortable*) and normality (*they’re having normal sex*). This demonstrates that teaching consent involves packing in even more attitudinal meaning into this technical term, and that these attitudes must be accessed by students when assessing situations as consensual or not consensual.

This led to my proposal for a teaching resource which encapsulates all the conditions of feeling (i.e. AFFECT) and behaviour (i.e. JUDGEMENT) that must be met for sex to be considered consensual. I initially thought of this as a kind of ‘attitude bingo’, but following interaction I have had with educators this might be better designed as a ‘consent checklist’ for practical teaching purposes. This resource makes clear what all the conditions for consent are by turning each sub-type of ATTITUDE (e.g. veracity) into a question prompt (e.g. *Are you being honest?*). It also includes a range of examples of positive attitude as ‘what yes looks like’ (e.g. *keeping a condom on if that’s what’s agreed to*) and negative attitude as ‘what no looks like’ (e.g. *lying about your age*). This resource is valuable for giving students clear and explicit ways to identify whether a situation is consensual or not by assessing their own feelings and behaviours and those of their sexual partner/s. It also offers young people a crucial tool to learn not only which behaviours to avoid but also which ones to emulate when seeking out healthy, respectful and consensual sexual encounters.

In the next chapter I am going to draw on these understandings of technicalised attitude to look closely at pedagogy to see how consent is learnt. While I have shown here that consent is technicalised in sex education, in the following chapter I show that this technical term is unpacked and repacked. This is where students learn how to put the law on consent into practice and how it relates to the ‘real world’, and crucially, it is what the students must master if they are to succeed in the assessment task. This will position me to make detailed suggestions about how this new perspective on technicalisation not only impacts SFL theory, but also relates closely to pedagogic practice.

Chapter 4 – Learning Consent

In the previous chapter, I described how consent is technicalised in sex education. More specifically, I showed that consent is a technical term from legal discourse which distils a range of attitudinal meanings. While the students' understanding of consent is ultimately based on the law, learning what the law says is not the same thing as understanding how to put it to use. By way of analogy, simply telling students that it is illegal to consume alcohol under the age of 18 does not by itself stop underage drinking. For consent, then, students must master not only what the law says about consent, but also how to put this law into practice. In Chapter 3, we saw students begin to apply consent to a range of scenarios, labelling them as 'consent' or 'no consent'. In this chapter, I will consider how they go beyond simply making an assessment of whether there is consent or not and begin to reason about why they have made this decision. To show this, I take a closer look at consent pedagogy logogenetically – that is, taking a perspective which considers how the technicality of consent is unpacked and repacked as a text unfolds. Whereas I previously considered consent in terms of the realisation hierarchy and the system of field, here I consider consent in terms of the instantiation cline and especially the principles of mass and presence. In Section 4.1, I analyse a stretch of classroom discourse where the teacher unpacks and then repacks the technicality of consent with shifts in mass and presence. This serves as a model for what students must do in the assessment task, which I analyse in Section 4.2. As we will see, students are adept at applying the label of consent/no consent – as they did in the previous chapter; but are less able to unpack this technicality. In Section 4.3, I bring together the insights from the analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 and review the knowledge about language that students must master to succeed in learning consent, and make recommendations for future consent pedagogy.

4.1 UNPACKING AND REPACKING TECHNICALITY

When teachers use a technical term in classroom discourse, they typically do not take the risk that students will understand it without some explanation. Instead, they 'unpack' the technicality in more commonsense terms. (Note that 'unpacking' also refers to turning grammatical metaphor back into its congruent form e.g. *rebellion* unpacked as *people were rebelling*; see e.g. Halliday & Martin 1993b, Hao 2020.) Consider Example 4.1, where the teacher unpacks the technical term *legislation*:

- (4.1) T: *So first up we have **legislation**, which is the idea of laws, and the idea of all of the laws thought about together in one group, not an individual law but all of them together.*
(J5_23m)

In Example 4.1, the teacher uses the technical term *legislation* and then immediately puts this into more commonsense terms: *the idea of laws*, specifically *all of the laws thought about together in one group*. This is a common feature of classroom discourse, and has been described for secondary education, tertiary education and for languages other than English (see e.g. Martin & Maton 2013; Martin, Maton & Doran 2020; see also ‘semantic waves’ e.g. Maton 2013). A particularly common pattern is that technical and abstract concepts are provided in writing such as textbooks, handouts or slides and are then unpacked in spoken language (Martin 1993; Martin & Matruglio 2013; Martin, Maton & Doran 2020). For longer written texts, this may happen in iterative cycles, where the class reads the written text in sections and the teacher stops intermittently to explain what has just been read in more commonsense terms (Matruglio, Martin & Maton 2013: 41).

To describe this unpacking, we can use the SFL concepts of mass and presence. As outlined in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.5), mass is the degree to which meaning has been condensed, and presence is the degree to which meaning is dependent on its context. Compare Examples 4.2 and 4.3:

(4.2) *We both agreed to it.*

(4.3) *There was consent between two persons to a sexual activity.*

Example 4.2 has relatively strong presence, as indicated by specific referents such as *We* and *it*. It also has relatively weak mass, with commonsense terms (e.g. *agreed*). By contrast, Example 4.3 has relatively weak presence, as indicated by generalised reference such as *two persons* and *a sexual activity*. It also has relatively strong mass, indicated by the technical term *consent*. Importantly, while Examples 4.2 and 4.3 are designed to show the more ‘extreme’ ends of mass and presence, these variables are in fact gradable. That is, mass and presence are not on or off, present or absent – rather, they are relatively stronger or weaker.

Mass and presence can be adjusted using a range of language resources. Some of the resources for strengthening mass include technicality versus commonsense terms (e.g. *consent* vs. *agreeing*), idioms versus literal meanings (e.g. *sloppy seconds* vs. *dating someone just after they have broken up with someone else*), and semiotic nouns (e.g. *consent is affected by a number of **factors***). Some of the resources for weakening presence include incongruent

realisations versus congruent ones (e.g. *free agreement* vs. *you agree freely*), generalised reference versus exophoric reference (e.g. *a person* vs. *she*) and higher-order periodicity that features in a well-scaffolded written text (e.g. *This thesis will analyse the language of sex education...*). For the purposes of this chapter, I will primarily draw on discourse semantic systems to describe variations in mass and presence.

Notably, mass and presence are independent of one another but do tend to move together in an inverse fashion, and indeed this is demonstrated in Examples 4.2 and 4.3. That is, stronger presence tends to co-occur with weaker mass and vice versa. This is precisely the case with consent, which can be used more technically with stronger mass and weaker presence or unpacked with weaker mass and stronger presence. For this reason, it is equally useful to analyse how consent is unpacked by looking at shifts in mass or shifts in presence. In fact, presence is particularly useful because the class spends a significant amount of time discussing scenarios, both real and hypothetical, when learning how to put consent into practice. That is, the students are given a specific context and must decide how consent applies in the given setting. As such, presence is particularly useful for the analysis in this chapter and will be considered alongside mass.

Having reviewed mass and presence, let us now turn to consider how the technical term *consent* is unpacked and repacked in sex education. To do this, I return to the lesson where consent is first introduced and defined (lesson 4 of Rhianon's class), but this time focussing on the spoken language of the teacher and students. I analyse this excerpt using mass and presence, as well as providing some genre analysis. Since I am concerned with consent logogenetically (i.e. as text unfolds), I consider longer stretches of discourse and analyse these in detail. As such, the excerpts for analysis are included with the running text, though full transcripts are also provided in appendices (file IDs R4_54m What is consent, R4_56m Sexting; see Appendix B).

4.1.1 Unpacking consent

When the teacher first introduces and defines consent, she begins by reading aloud from the LawStuff handout introduced in the previous chapter (see Figure 3.2), indicated by text in ALL CAPS below:

- (4.4) *But we need to know exactly WHAT CONSENT MEANS, to say, to agree to having sex. So it MEANS you GIVE YOUR FREE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT TO SEX. So*

you have, IT'S NEVER OK FOR SOMEONE TO ASSUME YOU HAVE GIVEN CONSENT OR TO FORCE YOU. So this means without coercion.

Example 4.4 has fairly strong mass and fairly weak presence. It contains technicality (*consent*), the referents are general (e.g. generalised *you*, non-specific *someone*), and there are several metaphorical realisations (e.g. *agreement* vs. *agree*, *coercion* vs. *coerce*). The initial definition of consent, then, is fairly technical and fairly abstract. However, the teacher then unpacks this definition with a series of examples which weaken mass and strengthen presence. The next section of the excerpt is provided as Example 4.5:

(4.5) *When somebody is freely and voluntarily, they haven't gone, "do you wanna have sex? Do you wanna have sex? Do you wanna have sex?" and they keep bugging you, bugging you, bugging you, bugging you. And eventually you're like, "fine! I will" and you're not very happy about it but you've given in because they've pestered you constantly. You have not agreed freely.*
If they've said, "give me a blowjob or we're breaking up and I'm gonna tell everyone and I'm gonna share those [nude] pictures that you gave me", that's not voluntarily, you've been forced and coerced into that situation.

In Example 4.5, the teacher gives two hypothetical examples to demonstrate what consent is (or rather, what it is not). First, she describes someone *bugging you* about having sex until you *give in*, which she says is *not agree[ing] freely*. Second, she describes someone who asks for *a blowjob* and threatens to *break up* and *share those [nude] pictures that you gave me*, which she describes as *not voluntary* but *forced and coerced*. These examples signify a shift in mass and presence, situating abstract concepts in more context-dependent terms and unpacking the more condensed meaning of the preceding talk (i.e. Example 4.4).

In terms of mass, Example 4.5 no longer includes any technicality (e.g. *consent*, *coercion*); the legal concepts are instead explained in commonsense terms (e.g. *you have not agreed freely*, *you've been forced and coerced into that situation*). There are also no semiotic nouns, no idioms or interpersonal grammatical metaphor, and minimal text reference (cf. *that situation*). In terms of presence, almost all realisations between lexicogrammar and discourse semantics are congruent. For example, the metaphorical *free and voluntary agreement* (Example 4.4) is now realised congruently as *you have not **agreed freely***. Another resource for strengthening presence is the use of external conjunctions to sequence activities, as opposed to internal conjunctions which organise discourse. For example, there are several activities in

sequence connected by external conjunction in *they keep bugging you... and (then) eventually you're like "fine!" ... and (then) you're not very happy about it* (additive relations explicit, temporal relations implicit). The order that events are recounted in language mirrors the order of events as they unfold in the field (i.e. text time is the same as field time). In other words, the sequence of activities reflects the 'real world' context. Finally, it is worth noting the shift from reading a written text (Example 4.4) to regular spoken dialogue – spoken dialogue generally has stronger presence, especially compared with written monologue (Martin & Matruglio 2013: 100). The stretch of dialogue in Example 4.5 thus has weaker mass and stronger presence than the preceding talk (i.e. Example 4.4). This is achieved using a range of language resources from across the three metafunctions – for instance variations in IDENTIFICATION (e.g. text reference) correspond to textual meaning, variations in IDEATION (e.g. congruence) correspond to ideational meaning, and variations in NEGOTIATION (e.g. spoken vs. written text) correspond to interpersonal meaning.

So far, we have seen how the teacher unpacks the technical term consent by weakening mass and strengthening presence, helping students to understand the new term they are being introduced to. In the next section of the excerpt, we see how the teacher shifts presence specifically, strengthening it even further:

(4.6) *And I'm worried that might not seem like something you have to worry about, but a number of years ago, not at this school, a number of years ago we had to have a big talk with the entire of year 8 because there was a huge issue. Boys at another school were forcing the girls at our school to give them blowjobs. They said, "well if you don't, we'll break up with you and we'll spread rumours about you online". They were forced into a position they didn't want to be in. So what those boys were doing was highly illegal. They were going to get themselves into big trouble. But we also need to remind our girls, "hey, no boy's worth that".*

In Example 4.6, the teacher gives another illustration of what consent is not, but whereas the previous two examples were hypothetical, this time she recounts from personal experience. At her previous school, the teachers had to *have a big talk with the entire of year 8* because *boys at another school were forcing the girls at our school to give them blowjobs*. This was *highly illegal*, and the boys were *going to get themselves in big trouble*.

The scenario in Example 4.6 is similar to the two scenarios in the preceding talk (Example 4.5), but with even stronger presence. As with the preceding talk, Example 4.6 is spoken monologue (NEGOTIATION) and the realisations between lexicogrammar and discourse

semantic figures are mostly congruent (IDEATION). Example 4.6 also sequences activities using external conjunction (CONNEXION) and its resources for sequencing activities are even richer than the preceding talk. Specifically, Example 4.6 realises an exemplum – i.e. a story whose purpose is to pass judgement. Like other story genres, exemplums recount activities that unfold through time (Martin & Rose 2008: 52). A genre staging analysis of Example 4.6, showing Orientation, Incident, Interpretation and Coda, is provided in Table 4.1.

Orientation	<i>a number of years ago, not at this school, a number of years ago we had to have a big talk with the entire of year 8 because there was a huge issue.</i>
Incident	<i>Boys at another school were forcing the girls at our school to give them blowjobs. They said, “well if you don’t, we’ll break up with you and we’ll spread rumours about you online”. They were forced into a position they didn’t want to be in.</i>
Interpretation	<i>So what those boys were doing was highly illegal. They were going to get themselves into big trouble.</i>
Coda	<i>But we also need to remind our girls “hey, no boy’s worth that”.</i>

Table 4.1 Genre staging analysis for exemplum in R4_54m

In the Orientation stage, the teacher describes the setting in terms of where (*not at this school*) and when (*a number of years ago*). In the Incident stage, she recounts the events: *boys at another school were forcing... girls... to give them blowjobs*. They threatened to *break up and spread rumours... online*, which forced [*the girls*] into a position they didn’t want to be in. The Interpretation provides the judgement of the incident: *those boys... were going to get themselves into **big trouble***, an inscription of negative propriety. The Coda offers a final comment: *we also need[ed] to remind our girls, “hey, no boy’s worth that”*. Examples 4.5 and 4.6 thus both have text time matching field time, a resource for strengthening presence; but in Example 4.6 the sequence of events is more elaborated to build the Incident stage of the exemplum genre.

In addition to the exemplum genre, the main resource for strengthening presence in Example 4.6 is the shift from generic to specific referents (IDENTIFICATION). Compare the use of *I* and *you* in the following pair of examples, one taken from Example 4.5 and another from Example 4.6:

(4.7) *And eventually you're like, "fine I will!"*

(4.8) *I'm worried that might not seem like something you have to worry about.*

In Example 4.7, *you* refers to a general person in a hypothetical scenario and could be substituted by another form of non-specific reference such as *someone* or *a person*. Similarly, *I* in the quoted speech "*fine I will!*" refers back to a non-specific entity. By contrast, in Example 4.8, *I* and *you* refer to the teacher and students in the classroom respectively. The entities are no longer generic but refer to specific people who must be recovered exophorically from the context of speaking. As well as the teacher and students, there are other specific referents, such as *the girls at our school*, who are referred to with definite deixis involving exophoric reference when they are first introduced (see Example 4.6).

Above I have shown how the teacher unpacks the technical, legal definition of consent by weakening mass and strengthening presence in this excerpt. She begins with the technical term *consent*, reading mostly verbatim off the written LawStuff handout (Example 4.4). She then unpacks this definition with a series of examples, two hypothetical and one real from her life as a teacher. Initially (Example 4.5), she weakens mass and strengthens presence with a range of resources, including congruent realisations between lexicogrammar and discourse semantics (e.g. *voluntary agreement* → *agreed freely*), external conjunctions (e.g. *and (then)*) and minimal text reference. These resources vary mass and presence across the three metafunctions: textual (IDENTIFICATION, CONNEXION), ideational (IDEATION) and interpersonal (NEGOTIATION). Finally, she puts consent into even more concrete terms by specifically shifting presence (Example 4.6). She gives a real-life example from her own experience, strengthening presence using similar resources to the hypothetical examples (e.g. congruent realisations, external conjunctions). And she strengthens presence even further with an exemplum genre, which sequences a range of activities as a story, and by shifting from non-specific and generalised referents (e.g. *somebody*, generic *you*) to specific referents (e.g. *I'm worried that might not seem like something you have to worry about*). Unpacking consent thus involves weakening mass, but also – and perhaps especially – strengthening presence.

Whereas the previous chapter described how consent is technicalised, here we see how students are acquiring this technicality. More specifically, we see that the teacher is unpacking the technical term, putting it into more commonsense and more context-dependent terms. So far, this excerpt follows a pattern that is typical of classroom discourse – more technical and abstract concepts are provided in writing such as textbooks, handouts or slides and this is then unpacked in verbiage. What is far less common, however, is the same pattern in reverse –

taking less condensed and more context-dependent talk and then shunting back to technical and abstract discourse. As we will see in Section 4.2, these shifts in mass and presence (from specific context to generalised legal rule) are precisely what students will need to master in order to succeed in the assessment task. The teacher models precisely this ‘repacking’ of consent in the next section of the excerpt.

4.1.2 Repacking consent

After the teacher tells the story about the girls at her old school, a student shares a similar *incident* from another school. She tells the story of a girl who is filmed giving a blowjob to her older boyfriend, and this video is then shared around online. Afterwards, the teacher responds by relating this story back to the law on consent, explaining that there are legal issues in obtaining intimate images of someone, but also in relation to the ages of the people involved. This has the effect of ‘repacking’ consent: starting with a concrete, non-technical example (in this case an actual rather than a hypothetical situation) and then abstracting away to the technical, legal definition of consent. I focus here primarily on presence, since we are now ‘starting’ with a scenario – i.e. a specific context – and deciding how consent applies in the given setting. The student’s story is provided as Example 4.9:

- (4.9) S1: *My friend she goes to another school right. And well last year she told me about this incident that’s like really big.*
- T: *Mm.*
- S1: *Apparently, this girl, right, she was dating an 18-year-old, yeah 18, when she was like 14 or*
- T: *Woah!*
- S1: *Yeah 14, yeah last year right. And apparently, she gave him a blowjob, yeah, and then he took a video*
- T: *Oh my gosh.*
- S1: *And she did kind of want it. And then later he spread it around online and my friends all got everything.*
- T: *[whispered] Far out.*
- S1: *Like the whole grade got like the video right.*
- T: *Mm.*

- S1: *And it spread so much. And like um this, and then he, but he kind of, you know her parents, she was like threatening him to like file a thing, right, you know, the lawsuit.*
- T: *Oh yeah.*
- S1: *But he ran away! And then like when he came back to the school like nothing happened, like you know. She didn't like do anything. And I was confused, like what the hell?*

In Example 4.9, a student shares a story of a situation at *another school* where a girl was *dating an 18-year-old... when she was 14*. The guy takes a *video* of the girl giving him a *blowjob*, which he later *spread[s] around online* and eventually *the whole grade got the video*. The girl and her parents threaten to *file a... lawsuit* but the guy runs away. The guy eventually returns to the school but *nothing happen[s]*.

Like the teacher's real-life example, the student's example has strong presence. Resources for strengthening presence include exophoric reference when the student refers to herself (e.g. *my friend, I was confused*), and congruent mapping between lexicogrammar and discourse semantics, for example *this girl* (entity as nominal group) *was dating* (occurrence as verbal group) *an 18-year-old* (entity as nominal group). The student also uses external CONNEXION to sequence activities, for example *she gave him a blowjob and then he took a video*. In fact, like the teacher's example, the student uses a story genre to more richly structure the events, though where the teacher uses an exemplum, the student uses an anecdote; a story whose purpose is to share an emotional reaction (Martin & Rose 2008: 56). A genre staging analysis of Example 4.9, showing stages Orientation, Remarkable Event and Reaction, is presented in Table 4.2 (teacher dialogue is omitted).

Orientation	<i>My friend she goes to another school right. And well last year she told me about this incident that's like really big.</i>
Remarkable Event	<i>Apparently, this girl, right, she was dating an 18-year-old, yeah 18, when she was like 14 or, yeah 14, yeah last year right. And apparently, she gave him a blowjob, yeah, and then he took a video, and she did kind of want it. And then later he spread it around online and my friends all got everything. Like the whole grade got like the video right. And it spread so much. And like um this, and then he, but he kind of, you know her parents, she was like threatening him to like file a thing, right, you know, the lawsuit. But he ran away! And then like when he came back to the school like nothing happened, like you know. She didn't like do anything.</i>
Reaction	<i>And I was confused, like what the hell?</i>

Table 4.2 Genre staging analysis for anecdote in R4_56m

The Orientation stage describes the setting in terms of when (*last year*) and where (*another school*). The Remarkable Event stage describes a sequence of extraordinary events (e.g. *she gave him a blowjob... and then he took a video, he spread it around online, he ran away*). And the Reaction stage shows the student's reaction to this story with two instances of inscribed affect: *And I was **confused**, like **what the hell?*** (both negative security). As we might expect, the strong presence in Example 4.9 co-occurs with fairly weak presence. For example, the student uses commonsense terms (e.g. *she did kind of want it* vs. *she consented*), and she does not use idioms, interpersonal grammatical metaphor or semiotic nouns. In many ways, then, the student's example from real-life (Example 4.9) is very similar to the teacher's example from real-life (Example 4.6). Both construe story genres (anecdote and exemplum respectively), and both have strong presence and weak mass. But whereas the teacher's story was the end of a stretch of unpacking consent, the student's story here is the beginning of a stretch of repacking consent.

After the student's anecdote, the teacher responds by identifying a number of issues with consent in the scenario. In doing so, she abstracts away from the specific example (*this girl was dating an 18-year-old...*) and relates it back to the generalised law, effectively repacking consent. The beginning of the teacher's response is provided in Example 4.10:

(4.10) T: *So in this case here, the gap is more than 2 years and she's under 16. So this case, highly illegal, he could get himself in massive trouble, he'd get himself on the child sex offender list, because she's a child. On top of that, he's videoed without consent, that's also illegal and doesn't matter what age you are. And thirdly he's then distributed that. So he's distributed child pornography. So even though he's only 18, that's still considered as child pornography.*

In Example 4.10, the teacher identifies three issues with consent in the student's anecdote. First, the girl is under the age of consent (*she's under 16*) and her partner is *more than 2 years* older (recall the close-in-age exemption, or 'Romeo and Juliet' law, which allows 14- and 15-year-olds to have sex if their partner is less than 2 years older; see Section 3.1.1). Second, the guy has *videoed without consent*, which is illegal [*no*] *matter what age you are*. Note that this is not necessarily accurate; in her anecdote, the student says the girl *did kind of want it* – i.e. the video was taken with her consent. The teacher has perhaps misheard or has assumed that the girl did not consent to being filmed, as indicated by her negative reaction to this aspect of the story – *Oh my gosh*. And third, by sharing the video with other people the guy has *distributed child pornography*.

In her response, the teacher has not simply said “there's no consent” or “that's illegal”. Rather, she has deconstructed the student's anecdote into three distinct problems and related each of these back to the law. In doing so, she weakens presence and strengthens mass, shifting from the specific circumstances of the example (e.g. *he spread [the video] around online and all my friends got it*) to the generalised legal rule (e.g. *that's... child pornography*). Her resources for doing this include shifting from external to internal CONNEXION, using text reference and semiotic entities to package up parts of the situation, and using technicality to link to relevant aspects of the law.

To demonstrate this, it is useful to consider the smaller phases within the student's anecdote, specifically the problem phases within the Remarkable Event stage. This is shown in Table 4.3, with interjections from the teacher (e.g. *woah! oh my gosh*) in brackets:

Remarkable Event	
problem 1	<i>Apparently, this girl, right, she was dating an 18-year-old, yeah 18, when she was like 14 or, (T: woah!) yeah 14, yeah last year right.</i>
problem 2	<i>And apparently, she gave him a blowjob, yeah, and then he took a video (T: Oh my gosh) and she did kind of want it.</i>
problem 3	<i>And then later he spread it around online and my friends all got everything. (T: Far out) Like the whole grade got like the video right. And it spread so much.</i>
problem 4	<i>And like um this, and then he, but he kind of, you know her parents, she was like threatening him to like file a thing, right, you know, the lawsuit. (T: Oh yeah) But he ran away!</i>
problem 5	<i>And then like when he came back to the school like nothing happened, like you know. She didn't like do anything.</i>

Table 4.3 Problem phases in Remarkable Event stage of anecdote in R4_56m

Table 4.3 shows that the Remarkable Event stage is made up of five problem phases. In problem 1, a 14-year-old girl is dating an 18-year-old. While details such as age and gender might typically be considered part of the Orientation stage, in this instance it is part of the Remarkable Event stage. The student says the word *fourteen* more loudly and with clearer articulation (*when she was like fourteen*), indicating that this detail is shocking. Similarly, the teacher's reaction *Woah!* indicates that this detail is remarkable and not merely orienting us to the anecdote. In problem 2, the girl gives her partner *a blowjob* and he takes *a video*. Again, the teacher reacts to this problem (*Oh my gosh*). The student clarifies that the girl *did kind of want it [being videoed]*, perhaps because it contrasts with the teacher's own story in Example 4.6 where guys were *forcing the girls at our school to give them blowjobs*. While the student telling this anecdote may not see this as a problem phase, the teacher's reaction indicates that she thinks otherwise. In problem 3, the 18-year-old partner *spread[s]* the video around *online*. The student's friends at the school *all got everything* and eventually *the whole grade got the video*. The teacher reacts with a whispered *far out*. In problem 4, the girl and her parents are *threatening to file a... lawsuit* but the guy runs away. And in problem 5, the guy comes *back to the school* and *nothing happen[s]*. The girl does not *do anything* (e.g. file a lawsuit) and, presumably, neither do her parents, the school or the police.

When the teacher evaluates the issues with consent in the student's anecdote, she is effectively identifying these problem phases. The teacher mentions the age of the two people i.e. problem 1 (*the gap is more than 2 years and she's under 16*), the guy videoing the girl i.e. problem 2 (*he's videoed without consent*) and the guy sending the video on to other people i.e. problem 3 (*he's then distributed that*) – note that the teacher does not mention problems 4 or 5, a point I return to below. The teacher is effectively deconstructing the student's anecdote into story phases, and she relates each of these individually back to the relevant law. That is, she takes the student's concrete example and repacks this into the technicality of consent.

First, we can see how the teacher deconstructs the student's anecdote by looking at her use of CONNEXION. While both the teacher and student mention the same three problem phases, the student is recounting the events in order, whereas the teacher is commenting on and evaluating them. In the student's anecdote, the three problems are activities in sequence, linked with external CONNEXION, as shown in Example 4.11:

- (4.11) *Apparently, this girl, right, she was dating an 18-year-old...*
 and apparently, she gave him a blowjob, yeah
 and then he took a video...
 and then later he spread it around online...

In the teacher's response, the three problems are in the same order, but now linked with internal CONNEXION, as shown in Example 4.12:

- (4.12) (**Firstly**) *in this case here, the gap is more than 2 years...*
 On top of that, *he's videoed without consent...*
 And thirdly *he's then distributed that...*

Examples 4.11 and 4.12 both use conjunctions of successive time, but the student's anecdote uses external CONNEXION whereas the teacher's response uses internal CONNEXION. We are no longer dealing with sequencing activities (i.e. field time) but rather with logically organising discourse (i.e. text time). In other words, the teacher has shifted from recounting events to commenting on and evaluating them.

After identifying each problem, the teacher then links each one back to the law with a recurring pattern. First, she packages up the scenario with text reference, and then she links this to the law in a relational clause. For example (text reference in **bold**, references to the law underlined):

(4.13) *He's videoed without consent, **that's** also illegal and doesn't matter what age you are.*

In Example 4.13, the teacher uses text reference *that*, referring back to *he's videoed without consent*. This corresponds to problem 2 in the student's anecdote: *and apparently, she gave him a blowjob, yeah, and then he took a video*. She then links this to the law in a relational clause: *that's illegal*. The teacher follows a similar pattern when commenting on the other problem phases. She uses text reference to link problem 1 and problem 3 to the law, as shown in Examples 4.14 and 4.15 respectively (text reference in **bold**, references to the law underlined):

(4.14) *So in **this** case here, the gap is more than 2 years and she's under 16. So **this** case, highly illegal, he could get himself in massive trouble.*

(4.15) *He's then distributed **that**. So he's distributed child pornography. So even though he's only 18, **that's** still considered as child pornography.*

In Example 4.14, the teacher uses text reference combined with a semiotic entity, *this case*, to refer to the age gap between the two people and links this to the law: *highly illegal*. Similarly, in Example 4.15 she uses text reference *that* to refer to the guy *distribut[ing]* the video, and links this to a specific legal offence: possessing and/or distributing *child pornography*. The teacher thus evaluates each problem phase using the same pattern: first packaging up the scenario using text reference, and then linking this to some aspect of the law in a relational clause (e.g. *that's illegal*).

In her response, the teacher both weakens presence and strengthens mass. Her primary resource for weakening presence is internal CONNEXION (e.g. *on top of that, thirdly*), which she uses to link each problem rhetorically – which we can contrast with the student's external CONNEXION (e.g. *and then*) which recounts events in sequence. Her resources for strengthening mass include technicality (e.g. *consent, child pornography*), text reference (e.g. *that*) and semiotic entities (e.g. *this case*). These resources vary mass and presence across the ideational metafunction (IDEATION) and textual metafunction (CONNEXION). Repacking consent thus involves weakening presence, especially compared to the student's anecdote, as well as strengthening mass. We can see, then, that consent is not only taught to students as a technical term, but that this technicality is both unpacked and repacked for students. More specifically, this is done using shifts in mass and presence, with the teacher introducing the law and giving examples of what this looks like (unpacking consent), as well as taking an example from a student and relating this back to the law (repacking consent).

While the teacher uses a range of language resources when repacking consent, it is interesting to note that she does not use attitudinal meanings. Consider Example 4.16, an excerpt from the teacher's response:

(4.16) *The gap is more than 2 years and she's under 16. So this case, highly illegal.*

In Example 4.16, the teacher uses technicalised attitude (*illegal*) and graduation (*more than 2 years, under 16*) both of which invoke attitude. However, she does not reconstitute the attitudes which are condensed into the technical term *consent*. Compare Example 4.16 with Example 4.17, a modified version of the teacher's response:

(4.17) *The gap is more than 2 years and she's under 16. So she is too young to be able to consent. So this case, highly illegal.*

Example 4.17 includes two instances of negative capacity: *she is too young to be able to consent*. This is explicit about what kind of attitude is at stake (someone's capacity) and is connected to one of the elements of consent which was distilled in the original legal definition: *A person does not give their consent if they do not have the capacity* [negative t-capacity] *to consent due to age* (see Section 3.3.1). Comparing Examples 4.16 and 4.17, we can see that the teacher does not typically reconstitute attitudinal meanings (e.g. capacity, veracity, inclination) when repacking consent. This relates of course to the function of technicality; meanings can be condensed and do not need to be restated. For example, once the biologist has defined *oestrogen*, they do not have to do so again but can assume their audience understands the meanings which are distilled in this term. However, the absence of attitude on the part of the teacher is noteworthy because it differs from what the students are expected to do when they repack consent in the assessment task. When the teacher repacks consent, she directly relates the scenario (*this case*) and the law (*highly illegal*), bypassing the attitudinal meanings which have been previously distilled into the *consent*. But when students repack consent, they must take an additional step of reconstituting those attitudinal meanings. It is not enough to point out the problematic elements of the scenario (e.g. *the gap is more than 2 years and she's under 16*) and say how this relates to the law (e.g. *that's illegal*); students must also say what attitudinal meanings are at stake (e.g. *she is too young to be able to consent*). This step is not only crucial for students to succeed in the assessment task, it is arguably also what reinforces for them the true importance of consent. I consider this in more detail in Section 4.2.

Finally, it is worth noting that the teacher only addresses some of the problems with consent in the student's anecdote. She comments on the first three problem phases – the age

difference (problem 1), filming without consent (problem 2), and distributing explicit material of someone under the age of 16 (problem 3). However she does not address the final two problems – *he ran away* (problem 4) and *when he came back to the school... nothing happened* (problem 5). These both relate to the partner avoiding legal consequences – he evades them first by running away, and then even when returning there is no punishment from the police or the school. These two phases are not touched on by the teacher. This is presumably beyond the scope of the lesson as it would require acknowledging that the legal system is flawed, especially when it comes to prosecuting cases of sexual harassment or sexual assault. For example, as many as 9 in 10 women who have experienced sexual assault did not report the most recent incident to police, and even for incidents which are reported, 92% do not result in a finalised charge (Our Watch 2021: 22, NSW Law Reform Commission 2020: 16). Despite decades of legislative reform, sexual offences remain “under-reported, under-prosecuted and under-convicted” (NSW Law Reform Commission 2020: 14). While this is an important lesson that students may go on to learn, it perhaps discredits the otherwise clear message that has been advanced so far – namely, if you break the law you will get in *big trouble*.

4.1.3 Mass and presence as resources for unpacking and repacking

Above I have shown how the technical meaning of *consent* is unpacked and then repacked in sex education using shifts in mass and presence. The teacher and students draw on a range of language resources to do this, including variations in internal and external CONNEXION (e.g. *firstly* vs. *and then*), specific vs. generalised referents (e.g. *somebody* vs. *we*), in/congruent realisations between lexicogrammar and discourse semantics (e.g. *voluntary agreement* vs. *agreed freely*) and story genres which sequence events in time (e.g. *we had to have this big talk with the entire of year 8...*). The analysis above is important for showing how consent is not only technicalised, but also how this technicality is pedagogised for students by unpacking and repacking it. The teacher does not simply give students the technical legal definition of consent, she also gives them examples of what this looks like (i.e. she unpacks consent). She then takes an example from a student, deconstructs its problematic elements and relates each of these back to the law (i.e. she repacks consent). As well as teaching students to understand the technical term *consent*, these stretches of unpacking and repacking also serve to teach students what the law looks like in practice. For instance, where unpacking always functions to explain the meaning of a term (like with *legislation* in Example 4.1), unpacking consent specifically functions to explain what the law looks like in a scenario, whether hypothetical or actual, and

is a key component in helping students understand how the law on consent can be applied in real life.

While unpacking technicality is fairly typical of classroom discourse, the reverse process of repacking technicality is far less common (Martin & Matruglio 2013). This is true despite the fact that repacking technicality is typically expected of students if they are to succeed in assessment tasks, and it is crucial for teachers to model these more abstract formulations to give students the best chance of success. As we will see in the following section, sex education students must perform precisely this sort of repacking manoeuvre themselves in the assessment – taking a scenario and relating it back to the law on consent. The above analysis thus serves as a reference point for what students are expected to reproduce themselves, and indeed we will see that most students are able to perform the same shifts in mass and presence that the teacher has modelled here. However, the unpacking and repacking demonstrated by the teacher differs from what students are expected to do in the assessment task in one key way. Students must not only master shifts in mass and presence, they must also re-connect with the attitudes which have been distilled into the technical term *consent* in order to receive full marks. Indeed, while *consent* has been emptied of attitudinal meaning (technically speaking), applying consent to a scenario requires students to bring the attitudes which have been distilled into this technical term back to the surface.

4.2 LEARNING CONSENT IN THE ASSESSMENT

While learning takes place in every lesson, and teachers are constantly evaluating student progress informally, summative assessment remains our most widely sanctioned way of evaluating students' understanding, and our most direct way of determining whether they are acquiring the skills and knowledge of a given subject area. Assessments represent 'high-stakes' writing for students; they must display certain kinds of knowledge in (usually) written form to demonstrate successful mastery of the subject (Maton 2013: 13). In this section, I analyse the portion of the assessment task where students are most directly evaluated on their knowledge of consent. Students must demonstrate that they have mastered a range of knowledge and skills related to consent; that they have learnt its technical definition, that they understand the attitudes which have been distilled into this technical term, and that they can relate both of these to a given scenario. In doing so, students have to mirror the kind of modelling provided by the teacher when she repacks consent. That is, they must use shifts in mass and presence to relate a hypothetical situation to the more abstract legal term *consent*. However they must also

go beyond what the teacher has modelled – by reinstating the attitudes which are distilled into this technical term. If we compare this to the teacher’s modelling above, or to the way students labelled scenarios as ‘consent’ or ‘no consent’ in the previous chapter (see Section 3.4), we will see that the students have to do much more than say whether something is legal or illegal, consensual or non-consensual. They must also be able to reason about this decision by bringing the attitudes which have been distilled into this technical term back to the surface.

In this dataset, the assessment was a 50-minute, in-class written task. It took place in lesson 10, two-thirds of the way through the term (see Table 2.1). Half of the assessment (11/20 marks) required students to read a hypothetical scenario and respond to a series of questions about that scenario, as shown in Figure 4.1.

Year 9 In Class Task	Student name:
<i>Read the scenario below and answer the following questions</i>	
<p>Kit went to a party with her friend Hossein; it was fun until both Kit and Hossein had too much to drink. Kit and Hossein went upstairs and had sex. Neither Kit nor Hossein planned on doing this, so neither had bought protection. Hossein tried to tell Kit that they should stop, but it looked like Kit was really enjoying it so Hossein let it continue. The next day both Kit and Hossein felt really bad about what had happened, but they were too embarrassed to call each other. They were really surprised when they looked at their facebook page and one of their ‘friends’ had posted “Who went upstairs for some private FUN? And tagged them both.</p>	

Figure 4.1 Excerpt from assessment instructions showing hypothetical scenario

The scenario reads:

(4.18) Kit went to a party with her friend Hossein; it was fun until both Kit and Hossein had too much to drink. Kit and Hossein went upstairs and had sex. Neither Kit nor Hossein planned on doing this, so neither had brought protection. Hossein tried to tell Kit that they should stop, but it looked like Kit was really enjoying it so Hossein let it continue. The next day both Kit and Hossein felt really bad about what had happened, but they were too embarrassed to call each other. They were really surprised when they looked at their facebook page and one of their ‘friends’ had posted “Who went upstairs for some private FUN?” and tagged them both.

Students must answer four questions related to the scenario, but my focus here is on question 2 – which most directly assesses students’ knowledge about consent: *Is this unwanted sex? What does the law say about consent?* (3 marks). In answering this question, students must effectively repack consent – they are given a specific example and must then relate this back to the law. This has of course been modelled to them by the teacher, and many students succeed at replicating the teacher’s style of response with shifts in mass and presence. But as we will see, producing the same kind of response as the teacher is not enough to achieve full marks.

In order to understand what students must do to succeed at this question, it is useful to compare responses based on whether they were high scoring (3/3 marks), mid scoring (2/3 marks) or low scoring (1/3 marks). Note that this refers only to a student’s mark for this question and does not reflect whether they were high, mid or low scoring for the assessment overall. There were no instances of students receiving zero marks for this question; this is typically reserved for students who leave the question blank, which none did. A summary of the dataset is provided in Table 4.4.

	Rhianon’s class	Josh’s class
High scoring (3/3)	Students B, E, G, H	Students L, M, N, O, S
Mid scoring (2/3)	Students A, C, D, F, I	Students J, Q, R, T, U
Low scoring (1/3)		Students K, P

Table 4.4 Student answers to question 2 as high, mid or low scoring

Only around half of the students in the classroom consented to their assessment tasks being collected. According to post-teaching interviews, the sample of consenting students skews slightly higher in Rhianon’s class but is fairly representative of the cohort in Josh’s class. All student responses to question 2 are provided in Appendix B.

I begin by analysing the scenario that students must respond to, showing how this is similar to the examples that the class have discussed previously. I analyse the scenario in terms of mass and presence and also use genre staging and phasing to highlight the different problems in the scenario, again following the model that students have been presented with in a previous lesson. I then analyse the students’ responses to question 2 in terms of mass and presence. As I will show, students mirror the teacher’s repackaging of consent, using weaker mass and stronger presence when referring to the scenario, and stronger mass and weaker presence when referring to the law on consent. Finally, I show how students must go beyond the teacher’s model by

identifying which attitudes are at stake, effectively reinstantiating the attitudes which have been distilled in the technical term consent.

4.2.1 Assessment task scenario

It is useful to first analyse the scenario which the students are responding to, reproduced here as Example 4.19:

(4.19) *Kit went to a party with her friend Hossein; it was fun until both Kit and Hossein had too much to drink. Kit and Hossein went upstairs and had sex. Neither Kit nor Hossein planned on doing this, so neither had brought protection. Hossein tried to tell Kit that they should stop, but it looked like Kit was really enjoying it so Hossein let it continue. The next day both Kit and Hossein felt really bad about what had happened, but they were too embarrassed to call each other. They were really surprised when they looked at their facebook page and one of their 'friends' had posted "Who went upstairs for some private FUN?" and tagged them both.*

Like the scenarios analysed in the first half of this chapter, both from the teacher (*We had to have a big talk with the entire of year 8...*) and the student (*my friend... told me about this incident...*), the scenario in Example 4.19 realises a story with multiple problem phases. More specifically, it is an exemplum, a story whose purpose is to pass judgement. A genre staging analysis of Example 4.19, showing Orientation and Incident, is provided in Table 4.5.

Orientation	<i>Kit went to a party with her friend Hossein;</i>
Incident	
problem 1	<i>it was fun until both Kit and Hossein had too much to drink.</i>
problem 2	<i>Kit and Hossein went upstairs and had sex. Neither Kit nor Hossein planned on doing this, so neither had brought protection.</i>
problem 3	<i>Hossein tried to tell Kit that they should stop, but it looked like Kit was really enjoying it so Hossein let it continue.</i>
problem 4	<i>The next day both Kit and Hossein felt really bad about what had happened, but they were too embarrassed to call each other.</i>
problem 5	<i>They were really surprised when they looked at their facebook page and one of their 'friends' had posted "Who went upstairs for some private FUN?" and tagged them both.</i>
Interpretation	[Interpretation omitted in the scenario but must be given by students when answering the question <i>Is this unwanted sex? What does the law say about consent?</i>]

Table 4.5 Genre staging and phasing analysis for exemplum in assessment task

In the Orientation stage, we are introduced to the characters (*Kit, her friend Hossein*) and the setting (*a party*). In the Incident stage, there are a series of problems that occur at the party and the next day. Kit and Hossein have *too much to drink* (problem 1), have *sex without protection* (problem 2), and Hossein *trie[s] to tell Kit that they should stop but let[s] it continue* (problem 3). The next day, Kit and Hossein feel *really bad about what had happened* but are *too embarrassed to call each other* (problem 4), and they then see that *one of their friends ha[s] posted* about the two of them on social media (problem 5). (Note that multiple students pointed out that posting a photo of someone without their permission is a violation of consent; teachers acknowledged this during the exam but said this aspect of consent was not the focus of the question.) The Interpretation stage is not included in the scenario itself, but this is what students are invited to do when they answer the question: *Is this unwanted sex? What does the law say about consent?* As I show below, this primarily involves judgement, and so this scenario can be best categorised as an exemplum, compared to, say, an anecdote whose purpose is to elicit a response, characterised by affect in the final stage.

Just like the teacher's exemplum and the student's anecdote analysed above (see Section 4.1), the exemplum in the assessment task has relatively strong presence and relatively

weak mass. Resources for strengthening presence include sequencing events in time in an exemplum, and using specific referents (e.g. *Kit, Hossein*). While the characters in the story are hypothetical (i.e. *Kit* and *Hossein* do not refer homophorically to real students at the school), they still have relatively strong presence (compare, for example, *a guy and a girl went to a party*). Resources for weakening mass include using commonsense terms rather than technicality, and not using semiotic nouns or text reference. The scenario in the assessment task, then, is very similar to what students have been presented with in class. It is a story genre with strong presence and weak mass; and more specifically it is a story with multiple problem phases, each of which acts as a potential area of concern that students can respond to when relating this back to the law on consent. Let us see, then, how students take up this task.

4.2.2 Students' understanding of consent

To achieve full marks, students have to do three things in their response. First, they have to demonstrate that they know the law on consent. Second, they have to refer to the given scenario. And third, they have to explain why the scenario is consensual or non-consensual. Mirroring the teacher's repackaging of consent gives students the first two marks; but to receive full marks students have to do something which has never been modelled to them previously – reinstating the attitudes which are distilled into consent. In other words they have to explain which attitudinal element of consent is at stake (e.g. capacity, tenacity), which I refer to below as 'passing judgement'. Unsurprisingly, this third criterion has the lowest success rate. In this section I step through each of these three criteria, highlighting the language resources students use in their responses.

4.2.2.1 Exemplar response

In order to demonstrate what is required of students in the assessment task, let us begin with an exemplar i.e. a response which received full marks. Student B's response is provided as Example 4.20:

(4.20) *They both drank which tells me they might be over 18 or 18 which means they were eligible to have sex with a consent of the partner. The fact that they both were drunk tells that they were not eligible to give consent or make a decision. They also felt bad after the party which tells me they didn't actually wanted sex. this is not acceptable by*

the law because both individuals were not in stable state of making a decision. This was unwanted sex. (Student B)

In Example 4.20, Student B deconstructs the scenario into its (potentially) problematic elements. First, they attempt to determine whether Kit and Hossein are old enough to consent: *they both drank which tells me they might be over 18* (18 is the legal drinking age in Australia). While the characters' ages are not specified in this scenario, Student B has recognised that age is relevant to determining whether people are consenting. They then identify a series of issues which correspond to problem phases in the exemplum: *they both were drunk*, corresponding to problem 1 (*Kit and Hossein had too much to drink*) and *they also felt bad after the party*, corresponding to problem 4 (*The next day both Kit and Hossein felt really bad about what had happened*). They then package up these problematic elements with text reference (*this*) and relate this to the law: *this is not acceptable by the law*. Finally, they state that *this was unwanted sex*, a similar construction with text reference (*this*) and a relational clause (*was*), but this time using the wording of the question rather than the technical legal term: *unwanted sex*.

Student B's response repacks consent, and directly mirrors the model provided by the teacher in an earlier lesson. The student identifies different problem phases from the story (e.g. *they were both drunk*), packages them up with text reference (e.g. *this*) and relates it to the law with a relational clause (e.g. *this is not acceptable by the law*). They also use the same resources for shifting mass and presence. For example, they strengthen mass by using technicality (e.g. *consent*) and text reference (*this*), and they weaken presence by shifting from specific referents to generic ones (e.g. *they* → *both individuals*) and by shifting from congruent realisations to incongruent ones (e.g. *they didn't actually want sex* → *unwanted sex*).

At face value, it might seem obvious why Student B received full marks – they refer to the scenario, they accurately cite the law on consent, and they mirror the teacher's model for relating these two things together. But in fact, it is not (merely) these things which mean the student succeeded at this question; it was possible to do all these things and still only receive 2/3 marks. To understand precisely what was required of students, let us consider the full sample of responses to determine how all three marks were awarded.

4.2.2.2 Referring to the law on consent

The first thing students have to do in responding to question 2 is refer to the law on consent. Indeed, this is made explicit in the wording of the question: *what does the law say about*

consent? This is the criterion which students were most successful at, with all students in the sample (high, mid and low scoring) succeeding. For example:

(4.21) **High:** *The law says both people have to consent.* (Student E)

(4.22) **Mid:** *According to the law consent must be given to both the people.* (Student C)

(4.23) **Low:** *The law says that age of consent is 16.* (Student P)

Students have to refer explicitly to *the law*, and also have to cite the law accurately – for example that *both people* have to consent, or that you must be *16* to consent.

When referring to the law, students use relatively weak presence and strong mass. This mirrors what they have learnt in previous lessons, both from the initial definition of consent (e.g. *consent means your free and voluntary agreement to sex*) and in the teacher's repackaging of consent (e.g. *that's still considered as child pornography*). Their resources for weakening presence include generic rather than specific referents (e.g. *individuals*, generalised *you*), for example:

(4.24) **High:** *The law of consent also states that both **individuals** having sex must agree to have sex.* (Student G)

(4.25) **Mid:** *The law says if **you** ask for consent and the other person doesn't agree, **you** shouldn't have sex.* (Student Q)

And incongruent realisations such as *sexual activity* (vs. *sex/have sex*), *severity* (vs. *severe*) and *punishments* (vs. *punish*), for example:

(4.26) **High:** *The law of consent states that both people who are going to take part in **sexual activity** must be in stable condition and say yes.* (Student H)

(4.27) **Mid:** *The law about consent says that you **BOTH** have to agree on having sex & not being forced to do it without your **permission**.* (Student R)

(4.28) **Low:** *In Australia this is considered illegal and has **punishments** depending on the **severity** of the issue.* (Student K)

As well as weaker presence, students use relatively strong mass when referring to the law. Their resources for strengthening mass include technicality, especially the term *consent* itself, for example:

(4.29) **High:** *The law says without a persons **consent** it can be considered rape* (Student M)

- (4.30) **Mid:** *According to the law **consent** must be given to both the people before sex.*
(Student C)
- (4.31) **Low:** *The law says that age of **consent** is 16.* (Student P)

And it also includes other technicality such as *crime* and *offence*, as well as naming the offence (e.g. *sexual assault*). For example:

- (4.32) **High:** *The laws say consent is mandatory otherwise it will be considered a **crime/offence**.* (Student N)
- (4.33) **Mid:** *It can be considered as a **sexual assault or offence**.* (Student J)
- (4.34) **Low:** *This by law is considered as **rape/sexual assault*** (Student K)

All students, whether high, mid, or low scoring, refer to the law on consent in their answers, and they all use relatively weak presence and strong mass when doing so. Common resources for weakening presence include generalised referents and incongruent realisations, and a common resource for strengthening mass is technicality, including the technical term *consent*. These are the most common resources; but students do not have to use all of them simultaneously to receive a mark for referring to the law. This criterion was the easiest to meet, with even low scoring students accurately citing the law on consent. It appears that the most technical aspect of consent (its legal definition) has been effectively acquired by all students. To understand where students were less successful, let us consider how they refer to the scenario.

4.2.2.3 Referring to the scenario

The second thing students have to do in responding to question 2 is refer to the scenario. This criterion is implied in the instructions at the top of the assessment task: *Read the scenario below and answer the following questions* (see Figure 4.1). This criterion had moderate success, with mid and high scoring students referring to the scenario, but low scoring students not doing so. For example:

- (4.35) **High:** *As stated in the scenario “Kit and Hossein felt really bad about what had happened”* (Student L)
- (4.36) **Mid:** *In the scenario it is demonstrated that Both Kit & Hossein were drunk* (Student C)

The more successful students refer explicitly to *the scenario*, quote the text (e.g. *as stated in the scenario...*) and/or refer to the scenario by naming characters and recounting details (e.g. *Kit and Hossein felt really bad, both Kit & Hossein were drunk*).

When referring to the scenario, students use relatively strong presence and weak mass. Again, this mirrors what has been modelled in previous lessons, both when the teacher recounts a real-life situation (e.g. *we had to have a big talk with the entire of year 8...*) and when the student does (e.g. *Apparently this girl, she was dating an 18-year-old...*). Their resources for strengthening presence include specific rather than generic referents (e.g. *they, Hossein, Kit*), for example:

(4.37) **High:** *Both were drunk & didn't know what **they** were doing.* (Student E)

(4.38) **Mid:** ***Kit or Hossein** didn't plan on doing this.* (Student D)

And congruent realisations such as *had sex* (vs. *sexual activity*) and *agree* (vs. *agreement*), for example:

(4.39) **High:** *Kit and Hossein were both drunk which means that none of them were able to consciously **agree** to having sex.* (Student H)

(4.40) **Mid:** *They both went upstairs and they both **had sex**.* (Student Q)

As well as stronger presence, students use relatively weak mass when referring to the scenario. Their resources for weakening mass include avoiding technicality, text reference and semiotic nouns.

In summary, high and mid scoring students refer to the scenario in their answers, and they use relatively strong presence and weak mass when doing so. Common resources for strengthening presence include specific referents and congruent realisations, and common resources for weakening mass include avoiding technicality, text reference and semiotic nouns. Again, these are the most common resources, but students do not have to use all of them simultaneously to receive a mark for referring to the scenario. This criterion was moderately easy to meet, with high and mid scoring students referring to the scenario but not low scoring students. While only a small number of responses in this sample are low scoring, it is noteworthy that their issue is not in mastering the technicality, but have to do with the more commonsense meanings of the scenario. In fact, students of all kinds effectively mastered the technicality, but a slightly smaller number demonstrated that they could refer to a specific context in more everyday terms. We might interpret this as weaker students 'parroting' the

technical definition of consent (i.e. citing the law) without demonstrating an understanding of what the law looks like in practice.

So far, we have seen that students must refer to the law on consent and to the scenario, mastering shifts in mass and presence to do so. All students successfully refer to the law on consent, and most students successfully refer to the scenario. This largely mirrors what students have been taught in previous lessons – i.e. using more abstract, context independent language to refer to the law, and more commonsense, context dependent meanings to refer to situations, whether real or hypothetical. As well as using the right kind of language, students are accurate in determining that the scenario was not consensual. This is unsurprising, since they have had a significant amount of practice in making these decisions when discussing different ‘what if’ scenarios, as analysed in the previous chapter (see Section 3.4). In short, students are very successful in reproducing the same kind of knowledge and language that has been modelled to them in class. But if we turn to the third and final criterion, we will see where students are less successful in demonstrating to their teacher a full understanding of consent. This criterion requires students to reason about their decision by explaining why the situation was consensual or not. As we will see, this requires them to reconstitute the attitudes which have been distilled into the technical term *consent*.

4.2.2.4 Explaining why the scenario is (not) consensual

Let us return to our exemplar response from Student B. Example 4.20 is reproduced here as Example 4.41:

(4.41) *They both drank which tells me they might be over 18 or 18 which means they were eligible to have sex with a consent of the partner. The fact that they both were drunk tells that they were not eligible to give consent or make a decision. They also felt bad after the party which tells me they didn't actually wanted sex. this is not acceptable by the law because both individuals were not in stable state of making a decision. This was unwanted sex. (Student B)*

Above I described how Student B's response closely mirrors the model of repacking consent provided by the teacher in an earlier lesson. They identify different problem phases from the story (e.g. *they were both drunk*), package them up with text reference (e.g. *this*) and relate it to the law with a relational clause (e.g. *this is not acceptable by the law*). This is very similar to the teacher's model where she identifies problem phases in the student's anecdote (e.g. *he's*

then distributed that [video]), packages it up with text reference and/or a semiotic entity (e.g. *that*) and relates it to the law with a relational clause (e.g. *that's still considered as child pornography*). But Student B's response does more than this. Crucially, Student B also explains why the situation was consensual or not, best exemplified in the following excerpt from their response:

(4.42) *This is not acceptable by the law because both individuals were not in stable state of making a decision.*

If Student B were only copying the model provided by the teacher, it would have been enough to only include the first half of this sentence: *this is not acceptable by the law*. This uses text reference to package up the scenario (*this*) and relates it to the law with a relational process: *this is not acceptable by the law*. But in fact it is the second half of this sentence which is the difference between mid-scoring and high-scoring responses: *because both individuals were not in [a] stable state of making a decision*.

In this part of Student B's response, and in other high scoring responses like it, students are explaining relations of cause. This is evident in an analysis of CONNEXION, where students explain the reason for their answer with internal cause. A common resource for doing this was with internal conjunctions such as *because* and *as*, for example:

(4.43) **High:** *This is not acceptable by the law **because** both individuals were not in stable state of making a decision.* (Student B)

(4.44) **High:** *Them giving consent would not be reliable **as** they don't know exactly what they're doing.* (Student E)

Another common resource for this was with *which means* or *which indicates*, for example:

(4.45) **High:** *Kit and Hossein were both drunk **which means** that none of them were able to consciously agree to having sex.* (Student H)

(4.46) **High:** *Kit and Hossein 'had too much to drink' **which indicates** they were not prepared for sex.* (Student G)

In Examples 4.43-4.46, students use internal cause (e.g. *which means*, *because*), to say why the situation was consensual or not. This is used both to explain an aspect of the law (e.g. *this is not acceptable by the law **because**...*) or to explain an aspect of the scenario (e.g. *Kit and Hossein were both drunk **which means**...*). Note that in Examples 4.45 and 4.46, *which means*

is agnate with internal conjunctions of cause such as *so* and *therefore* – this analysis is concerned with *which means* from the perspective of CONNEXION at the stratum of discourse semantics (not to be confused with *which means* from the perspective of clause complexing at the stratum of lexicogrammar, where it is an elaboration).

A second pattern emerges when analysing these examples. When students explain relations of cause, they overwhelmingly include some kind of judgement, for example:

- (4.47) **High:** *Kit and Hossein were both drunk which means that none of them were **able to consciously agree** [negative t-capacity] to having sex.* (Student H)
- (4.48) **High:** *Them giving consent would not be **reliable** [negative tenacity] as they don't know exactly what they're doing.* (Student E)
- (4.49) **High:** *Kit and Hossein 'had too much to drink' which indicates they were **not prepared** [negative t-tenacity] for sex.* (Student G)

Examples 4.47-4.49 show students expressing negative judgements of capacity (e.g. *not able to consciously* [sic] *agree*) and tenacity (e.g. *not reliable*, *not prepared*). High-scoring responses not only explain relations of cause, they also all use at least one judgement of capacity or tenacity in their explanation. These are precisely the attitudes at stake in this scenario – i.e. being drunk affects your capacity (i.e. you are unable to consent), and it can also affect your tenacity (i.e. your consent is unreliable).

Crucially, these judgements are precisely the attitudes which have been distilled into the technical term *consent*. Recall, for example, an excerpt from the LawStuff website which provided the initial legal definition of consent (see Section 3.2), with judgements of capacity in **bold**:

- (4.50) *A person does not give their consent if they do not have the **capacity** to consent due to age, or a mental or physical **impairment**.*

In the assessment task, high scoring students are reinstantiating these same attitudes. They have to unpack the interpersonal meanings which were previously distilled and use these in their explanation of why the scenario is not consensual. While *consent* itself is empty of attitudinal meaning, applying consent to a scenario requires students to bring the attitudes which have been distilled into this technical term back to the surface. Of course, the technical term *consent* distils a range of other judgements, including propriety, normality and veracity. These are not

at stake in this scenario, though presumably these would have been appropriate if, say, one of the characters in the scenario was lying.

Not only do students need to include judgement in their responses, they have to produce their own judgement rather than replicating it from the scenario. Consider the following excerpt, from a response which only received 2/3 marks:

(4.51) *Both Kit & Hossein were drunk, therefore the consent technically was not given.*

(Student C)

Example 4.51 has many of the same hallmarks as the high scoring responses. Student C refers to the scenario (*Both Kit & Hossein were drunk*), refers to the law using technicality (*consent technically was not given*), connects the two using an internal conjunction of cause (*therefore*), and even uses an invoked judgement of capacity (*drunk*). But crucially, this judgement of capacity does not come from the student but is paraphrased from the wording of the scenario: *it was fun until both Kit and Hossein had too much to drink*. Even after including a judgement of capacity – one of the attitudes distilled into the technical term *consent* and one of the attitudes at stake in this scenario – Student C does not receive full marks because they have not expressed their own judgement. What is required here is a re-interpretation of why being *drunk* affects your consent, either with another judgement of capacity (e.g. *unable to consent, impaired*) or a judgement of tenacity (e.g. *unreliable, rash*). Without this, a student is deemed as not sufficiently understanding the cause-and-effect relation between aspects of the scenario (e.g. being drunk) and the lack of consent. Indeed, this is precisely the feedback that the teacher provides on Student C's paper: *Why is this. What is the link between being drunk and consent?* Students are not simply repeating judgement, they must 'pass judgement' – i.e. offer their own evaluation of the characters and their behaviour beyond what is provided by the scenario wording.

4.2.2.5 Succeeding at consent in the assessment task

In sum, students have to do three things in order to get full marks in question 2 of the assessment task. They have to:

1. Accurately cite the law on consent, using weak presence and strong mass (e.g. *According to the law consent must be given to both the people before sex*)
2. Refer to the scenario, using strong presence and weak mass (e.g. *In the scenario it is demonstrated that Both Kit & Hossein were drunk*)

3. Explain why the scenario was not consensual by:
 - a. Using internal cause (e.g. *because, which means*)
 - b. ‘Passing judgement’ i.e. reinstantiating the attitudes which have been distilled into consent, using their own words rather than merely paraphrasing the attitudes of the scenario (e.g. *not reliable, not able to consciously agree*)

All students did (1) successfully, but only mid and high scoring students did (2) successfully, and only high scoring students did (3) successfully. A summary is provided in Table 4.6.

Criterion	Language features	Low	Mid	High
1) Accurately cite law on consent	Weak presence, strong mass	✓	✓	✓
2) Refer to hypothetical scenario	Strong presence, weak mass		✓	✓
3a) Explain why the scenario was not consensual	Internal cause			✓
3b) ‘Pass judgement’ i.e. restantiate attitudes distilled in <i>consent</i> in your own words	Judgements of tenacity and capacity			✓

Table 4.6 Analysis summary for student responses to question 2

Criterion 1 is done successfully by all students, and criterion 2 is done successfully by all but two students in the sample. Unsurprisingly, these are the criteria which have been most clearly modelled to students on multiple occasions – when initially defining consent (see Section 3.2), when labelling ‘what if’ scenarios as (not) consensual (see Section 3.4), and when the teacher unpacks and repacks consent (see Section 4.1). Criteria 3a and 3b, on the other hand, are not specified anywhere in the question wording, and have only been modelled to students implicitly, or sometimes not at all. While students have learnt to label scenarios as consensual or not when evaluating ‘what if’ scenarios, they have not had to explain the reasoning for these assessments (criterion 3a). And while they have learnt about the range of attitudes distilled into consent when learning the initial legal definition, they have not practiced reinstantiating these themselves (criterion 3b).

While some ways of talking about consent have been modelled explicitly for students (e.g. repacking technicality with shifts in mass and presence), other aspects of this curriculum remain hidden. The analysis presented above has important implications for the way that consent is taught, and in the final section of this chapter I propose a series of recommendations for teaching. I consider how the above analysis could inform future consent pedagogy, using specific knowledge about language to help level the playing field for students. In doing so, I am not simply concerned with helping students succeed at this specific (and admittedly historic) assessment task. As I will show, the knowledge about language that emerges from the above analysis also has implications for how students in fact understand consent – i.e. the principles which underpin the law, and the relation of cause-and-effect between a given situation and consent. Teaching about consent in this way attempts to move beyond consent pedagogy in terms of complying with the law, and instead aims towards helping students understand how the law is put into practice, and why the law is the way it is.

4.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TEACHING CONSENT

By the end of the term, students are familiar with the more technical aspects of consent. Every student in this sample was able to accurately cite the law on consent and do so using language resources for stronger mass and weaker presence. In addition, students are able to accurately identify whether a scenario is consensual or not – something they have significant practice at when evaluating ‘what if’ scenarios. However, what is far less common is that students can explain the reason why a scenario is consensual or not. That is, they cannot say which attitudes are at stake (e.g. capacity, tenacity), or how this affects consent using relations of cause. In lay terms, we might think of this as not understanding the principles which underlie consent. Or in the terms I have used in my description of consent pedagogy in Chapters 3 and 4, we can think of this as students not understanding the attitudes that have been distilled into the technicality. If consent is technicalised attitude, it seems the pedagogy that most students in this course leave with is more ‘technicalised’ than ‘attitudinal’. To remedy this, below I propose a series of language resources to help students express 1) what the principles are which underlie consent and 2) the relation of cause-and-effect between a given situation and consent. In both cases, I draw on and extend the consent checklist teaching resource presented in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.4.5).

4.3.1 Language resources for the principles which underlie consent

As described above, succeeding in the assessment task requires students to ‘pass judgement’. That is, students have to identify which attitudes are at stake in the scenario and re-interpret these in their own words (e.g. *not able to consciously agree*) – rather than merely repeating attitudes which were provided in the scenario wording (e.g. *drunk*). In doing so, they are re-instantiating the attitudes which are distilled in the technical term *consent*. The relevant attitudes in the assessment task scenario are capacity and tenacity, but veracity, propriety and/or normality could be equally relevant in other scenarios.

To teach students about the principles underlying consent, we might return to the ‘consent checklist’ teaching resource that I proposed in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.4.5). This resource was designed to capture all the sub-types of AFFECT and JUDGEMENT which are at stake when deciding whether or not sex is consensual. An excerpt is reproduced as Table 4.7.

ATTITUDE	Question prompt	What YES looks like	What NO looks like
capacity	Are you capable ?	Sober Conscious Awake Over the legal age of consent (16 in NSW)	Drunk or high Unconscious Asleep Under the legal age of consent

Table 4.7 Consent checklist excerpt showing capacity

Table 4.7 is an excerpt from the consent checklist showing the JUDGEMENT sub-type capacity. This sub-system deals with whether people are capable or not, and the corresponding question prompt is *are you capable?*. There are examples of *what YES looks like* (i.e. positive capacity), such as being *sober*, *conscious* and *awake*. And there are examples of *what NO looks like* (i.e. negative capacity), such as being *drunk or high*, *unconscious* or *asleep*. The analysis of student assessment tasks above demonstrates that students are able to recognise examples of *what YES/NO looks like* in a scenario. For example, many students pointed out that the people in the scenario were drunk, and that this negated consent. However, only high scoring students explained the reason why this negated consent. This required students to offer their own judgements of capacity (e.g. *not able to consciously agree*) and/or tenacity (e.g. *not reliable*).

What students need to draw on, then, are language resources for expressing judgement. Focussing on capacity, examples for expressing positive capacity include *able to consciously agree* (from Student H), as well as *sensible* and *mature*, while examples of negative capacity include *not able to consciously agree*, *naïve* or *immature*. These could be provided to students or developed together as a class as part of the consent checklist resource. The column *what does YES look like*, which currently contains examples (e.g. *sober, conscious, awake*), could be divided in two: ‘example’ and ‘reason why’. The latter would include language resources for inscribed and invoked judgement. This is shown in Table 4.8.

ATTITUDE	Question prompt	What YES looks like		What NO looks like	
		Example	Reason why	Example	Reason why
capacity	Are you capable ?	Sober Conscious Awake Over the legal age of consent (16 in NSW)	<i>able to consciously agree, sensible, mature</i>	Drunk or high Unconscious Asleep Under the legal age of consent	<i>not able to consciously agree, naïve, immature</i>

Table 4.8 Elaborated consent checklist for capacity, with ‘Example’ and ‘Reason why’

In Table 4.8, the columns ‘what YES looks like’ and ‘what NO looks like’ are each split in two: ‘Example’ and ‘Reason why’. As well as providing Examples (e.g. *sober, conscious, drunk, asleep*), the table now includes a ‘Reason why’ column with judgements of capacity (e.g. *able to consciously agree, sensible, naïve, immature*).

This could be repeated for each of the judgement sub-systems. An example for veracity is shown in Table 4.9.

ATTITUDE	Question prompt	What YES looks like		What NO looks like	
		Example	Reason why	Example	Reason why
veracity	Are you being honest ?	Keeping a condom on if that's what's agreed to Disclosing HIV positive status Being truthful about your identity Being truthful about whether you and your partner are married	<i>truthful, honest,</i> <i>telling the truth,</i> <i>open, candid,</i> <i>direct, genuine</i>	Removing a condom without telling your partner/s Not disclosing HIV positive status Pretending to be someone else Pretending that you and your partner are married	<i>untruthful,</i> <i>dishonest,</i> <i>lying, false,</i> <i>deceitful,</i> <i>deceiving</i>

Table 4.9 Elaborated consent checklist for veracity, with 'Example' and 'Reason why'

Table 4.9 shows the elaborated consent checklist for veracity. As well as providing Examples (e.g. *disclosing HIV positive status, removing a condom without telling your partner/s*), the table now includes a ‘Reason why’ column with inscribed and invoked judgements of veracity (e.g. *truthful, open, dishonest, lying*). Elaborating the consent checklist in this way gives students a series of language resources for reinstantiating the attitudes that have been distilled into the technical term *consent*.

These attitudes can be learnt as part of the technical legal definition (e.g. *a person does not give their consent if they are **unconscious***, see Section 3.3.1), but this resource allows students to bring these attitudes back to the surface when assessing a given situation. It provides a list of language resources which make explicit precisely why something is (not) consensual (e.g. because it is *dishonest*), and places this alongside examples we might find in real or hypothetical scenarios (e.g. because of someone *removing a condom without telling their partner/s*). Of course, in order to make this connection with language students also need resources for internal cause (e.g. *because, which means*), which I explore in the following section. But providing students with language resources for ‘passing judgement’ – i.e. making an evaluation of people and their behaviour in their own words – is one crucial tool for them to express which attitudes are at stake in a given situation. This effect of this is not only important for succeeding in the assessment task of this particular cohort, but also deepens the understanding of consent to one which is explicit about the principles which underpin the law.

4.3.2 Language resources for expressing cause and effect

As well as having the language to ‘pass judgement’, students also need language to express the cause-and-effect relationship between these attitudes and consent. As demonstrated by the above analysis, the key language resource for this is internal cause. This especially includes internal conjunctions (e.g. *because, as, so*) and clause complexing (e.g. *which means, which indicates*). Other useful resources not analysed above might include prepositional phrases (e.g. *as a result*) and adverbs (e.g. *consequently*). Of course, pedagogising the cause-and-effect relationship between a given scenario and consent is not as simple as providing students with knowledge about language. As well as giving students these language resources, they could put them into practice when applying consent to different scenarios. While a detailed re-design of consent pedagogy is beyond the scope of this thesis, let us briefly consider how these resources could be incorporated into the lesson where the class discusses a range of ‘what if’ scenarios

(see Section 3.4). Recall that the teacher would describe a scenario and asks students *is that consent?* For example:

(4.52) *What if, while having sex, so two people are having sex and the guy was wearing a condom, and then part way during sex, without telling the girl, he takes off the condom and kept going. Is that consent?*

In the original lesson, students correctly responded *No*, i.e. they accurately identified that there was no consent in this situation. One way to extend this exercise would for the class to jointly construct a model answer to this question using the language resources outlined above i.e. judgement and internal cause. This would move from simply labelling a scenario as consent/no consent and give students a model for expressing why a scenario is (not) consensual. Possible model answers to the scenario in Example 4.52 might include:

(4.53) *No there's no consent because he's being dishonest because he removed the condom without telling her.*

(4.54) *He removed the condom without telling her which means he's being dishonest which means there's no consent.*

The model answers in Examples 4.53 and 4.54 both use inscribed judgement (*dishonest*) and expressions for internal cause (*because* and *which means* respectively). In Example 4.53, the response begins with the law (*there's no consent*) then connects this to one of the underlying principles of consent (*because he's being dishonest*) and then connects this to a specific example of what this looks like (*he removed the condom without telling her*). In Example 4.54 the same relation is expressed in reverse; referring first to the scenario (*he removed the condom without telling her*), then passing a judgement (*which means he's being dishonest*) then connecting this to the law (*which means there's no consent*). Jointly constructing answers of this kind would provide students with a model of precisely the kind of response they need to produce in the assessment task, using key language resources including judgement and internal cause.

At a later stage in the teaching and learning cycle, these same language resources could be used by students to independently construct their own 'what if' scenarios and responses. Examples of additional scenarios where issues of consent are at stake might include (responses mark judgement in **bold**, cause underlined):

(4.55) **Q:** *Kit found out she had Chlamydia. Hossein wanted to have sex, and Kit did not tell him she had an STI. Is there consent?*

A: *There is no consent because Kit is being **dishonest** because she didn't tell Hossein she has an STI.*

(4.56) **Q:** *Hossein was 14 but told Kit he was 16. Is there consent?*

A: *No, there is no consent because Hossein said he was 16 which means he's **lying**. Also, this is not consensual because Hossein is only 14 which means he is **underage** and **unable** to agree to sex.*

It would also be valuable for students to construct scenarios where consent is present rather than absent, for example (responses mark judgement in **bold**, cause underlined):

(4.57) **Q:** *Kit (16) and Hossein (16) both wanted to have sex. They had spoken about doing it and had both agreed they would use a condom. They were nervous because it was the first time for both of them, but they felt happy and excited. Is that consent?*

A: *Yes, there is consent **because** Kit and Hossein are both 16 which means they are **mature** enough to have sex and are both **able** to agree. They have communicated ahead of time and agreed about protection from STIs and pregnancy which means they are being **reliable**, **honest** and **responsible**. They both want to do it and feel excited which means there is consent.*

Examples 4.55-4.57 use the same key language resources identified above: expressions of judgement and internal cause. These scenarios canvas a range of attitudes at stake when it comes to consent, including veracity (e.g. *dishonest, lying*), tenacity (e.g. *reliable*) and capacity (e.g. *mature*), and links these both to specific aspects of a given scenario (e.g. *[they] are both 16 which means they are mature enough*) and with the law (e.g. *There is no consent because Kit is being dishonest*). One goal of future consent pedagogy could be to work towards constructing scenarios of this kind, with students' learning not only to assess different situations as consensual or not, but also to express the reasons for this in language.

In this section, I have not attempted to analyse curriculum genres in detail, and of course re-designing consent pedagogy would involve more than simply giving students knowledge about language. However, I have proposed a series of recommendations for teaching which

make explicit the language resources students need to master to level the playing field in the assessment task and to deepen their understanding of consent. Imagining how these language resources might be more fully integrated into the teaching and learning cycle is beyond the scope of this thesis, but in Chapter 7 I return to consider what a future project in this area might entail.

4.3.3 Potential impact of these recommendations

In this section I have proposed language resources for teaching consent which aim to address the aspects of consent which proved most challenging for students in the assessment task. I described how inscribed and invoked judgements could be provided to students as language resources to help them ‘pass judgement’, and this could specifically be incorporated into the consent checklist resource from Chapter 3. In addition, I described how using internal cause would allow students to bring these judgements together with either the law (e.g. *he’s being dishonest which means there’s no consent*) or with the scenario (e.g. *he’s being dishonest because he removed the condom without telling her*). While a future project would need to consider how this knowledge about language can be incorporated into the teaching and learning cycle, these are precisely the kinds of linguistic constructions that students need to demonstrate in the assessment task. For example, students who responded with the following answers to question 2 (*Is this unwanted sex? What does the law say about consent?*) could expect to receive full marks:

(4.58) *This is non-consensual sex because Kit and Hossein are not in a stable condition because they are drunk.*

(4.59) *There is no consent because Kit and Hossein are drunk which means they are not able to consciously agree.*

The language resources reviewed here are thus crucial to making the requirements in the assessment task more visible, and for helping to level the playing field for students in sex education. They also get to the heart of what is meant by ‘explaining’ a concept – something that occupies teachers both in and beyond sex education. An analysis of the assessment task responses reveals that ‘explaining’ consent requires students to reconstitute the attitudes that have been distilled into this technical term (e.g. *not able to consciously agree, not reliable*), and to relate these to the law with internal cause (e.g. *because, which means*).

But the recommendations for teaching consent I have proposed here also go beyond simply helping students succeed in this (historic) assessment task – they also have the potential to contribute to deepening students’ understanding of consent. Mastering the resources for expressing judgement and internal cause is a key step towards understanding the principles which underlie consent and moving beyond simply its technical meaning. Rather than parroting a rote-learned legal definition of consent, these resources help to express why something is (non)consensual, for instance because people are being (*dis*)*honest*, or (not) making *sensible* decisions. Giving students the language resources to express these same meanings themselves means giving them tools for reasoning in new situations, and gives them a model which is applicable even as consent laws change or vary in different jurisdictions. I expand on this point further in the final section of this chapter, which summarises insights from this chapter as well as Chapter 3.

4.4 INSIGHTS FROM CHAPTERS 3 & 4

In this chapter, I have shown how the technicality of consent is learnt, and how the law on consent is put into practice. In Section 4.1, I described how the teacher unpacks and repacks the technical term *consent* using shifts in mass and presence. In some ways, this models the kinds of reasoning and linguistic resources that students need to use themselves when applying consent in the assessment task, which I considered in Section 4.2. When applying consent in the assessment, students have to do three things to achieve full marks: 1) accurately cite the law on consent, 2) refer to the given scenario and 3) explain why the scenario was not consensual by a) using internal cause and b) ‘passing judgement’. All students did (1) successfully, using resources for weakening presence (e.g. generic referents such as *individuals, people*) and strengthening mass (e.g. technicality such as *consent*). Only mid and high scoring students did (2) successfully, using resources for strengthening presence (e.g. specific referents such as *Kit, Hossein*) and weakening mass (e.g. congruent realisations). Finally, only high scoring students did (3) successfully. These students explain why the scenario is not consensual using internal cause (e.g. *because, which means*), and they ‘pass judgement’ with expressions of negative tenacity and capacity in their own words (e.g. *not reliable, not able to consciously agree*). This final criterion required students to reinstantiate the attitudes distilled in the technical meaning of *consent* by identifying the relevant attitudes in the scenario and linking these back to the law. In Section 4.3, I took the insights from this chapter and Chapter 3 to propose a series of recommendations for consent teaching. I proposed

that the consent checklist could be elaborated to include ‘Reason why’ (i.e. inscribed and invoked judgement) and suggested a list of resources for internal cause which could be incorporated into model answers that are jointly constructed by the class as well as independently constructed by students at a later stage in the teaching and learning cycle.

Bringing together this chapter with the previous one, we can see how consent pedagogy in lessons necessarily affects students’ success in the assessment task. In the previous chapter, I described how consent is technicalised in sex education. More specifically, I showed that it is an instance of technicalised attitude, meaning that it distils a range of attitudes which are ‘emptied out’ as this technicality is distilled. In this chapter, I described how consent is learnt and how the law can be put into practice. I showed that the teacher unpacks and repacks the technical term *consent* using shifts in mass and presence, modelling similar constructions to those that students need to use in the assessment task. While all students successfully recall the law on consent, and most students successfully recount the scenario, only a handful of high achieving students are able to explain the relationship between these two. This crucial third step requires students to evaluate the characters in the assessment scenario with judgement, and to relate this to either the law or the scenario using internal cause. The analysis of the assessment task highlighted that, while *consent* itself is empty of attitudinal meaning, applying consent to a scenario requires students to bring the attitudes which have been distilled into this technical term back to the surface. This is the key to saying not only whether there is consent or not, but why a situation is consensual or non-consensual. If consent is technicalised attitude, it seems a majority of students understand the ‘technicalised’ aspects, but far fewer understand the ‘attitude’ dimension. The proposed recommendations for consent teaching would help students to succeed in the assessment task but also have implications for students’ understanding of consent beyond the classroom.

4.4.1 Consent beyond the classroom

To return to the analogy used at the start of this chapter, teaching students that the legal age to consume alcohol is 18 does not by itself prevent underage drinking. Similarly, teaching students that having sex without consent is illegal is unlikely to prevent rape and sexual assault by itself. Instead, this must be complemented with an understanding of the principles which underlie consent, and what this looks like in practice. Having a technical, legal understanding of consent might be useful for students who end up in a courtroom, but being able to put consent into practice in the real world requires bringing the attitudes in this technical term back to the

surface, such as wanting to have sex (inclination), being capable of consenting (capacity), and being truthful with your sexual partner/s (veracity). Pedagogising consent with this in mind moves beyond seeing consent as a simple binary (i.e. consent/not consent, legal/illegal) and instead gets to the heart of why something is consensual or non-consensual.

This also has implications for ways that students might extend their understandings of consent as they get older and move beyond the gates of the school. In the high school context, some nuance will necessarily be lost as things are put into simpler, black-and-white terms. For example, students are taught that it is never OK to have sex if someone is in a position of authority (e.g. teacher and student), and that it is never possible for someone to consent if they are drunk. But these rules may look different when students leave school; in some circumstances people can consent even if their partner is in a position of authority, and/or if they are drunk. These may be conditions which negate consent, but this is not always the case, and the law reflects this (see Appendix C). These issues do not necessarily have to be addressed in a high school classroom, but giving students an understanding of the principles underlying consent, rather than a list of hard-and-fast rules, has the potential to set them up for the range of different situations they encounter beyond the gates of the school.

Finally, while there is necessarily a difference between what students say in a classroom or write in an exam versus how they behave in real life, we understand that the two are intertwined. Indeed, the teachers clearly see a connection between success in the assessment task and success in navigating these scenarios in real life. When handing back marked assessment tasks to students, Rhianon comments:

(4.60) *We have a really great understanding of what that [consent] means. And so hopefully in the future should any situation ever arise, you're gonna be like, "no I know exactly what the laws are here and what I can and can't get away with and what you can and can't get away with!" to whoever it is that we're dealing with.* (R13@21m)

Similarly, in the post-teaching interview, Rhianon said she was happy and relieved that her class had understood consent so clearly:

(4.61) *My class seems to understand consent really really well which, thank god. If they got nothing else out of the entire topic, I'm glad they understood that.* (Rhianon post-interview @ 3m)

Importantly, school sex education is not only the primary site for young people's knowledge and values about sex, it is also the stomping ground for them to express their identities,

expectations and experiences of sex. Without wanting to make overly ambitious claims about the applicability of this description, it follows that the way consent is applied in the classroom is potentially directly connected to the way it is applied in the world. The description of consent pedagogy presented in these two chapters can inform future sex education and may also have far-reaching impacts well beyond the gates of the school.

4.4.2 Consent beyond legal discourse

Throughout these two chapters, I have shown how consent as it is taught in sex education is closely intertwined with the law. The teacher uses a resource which is a direct recontextualisation of the NSW *Crimes Act 1900*; students learn a technical, legal definition of this term; and the assessment specifically asks them what *the law say[s]* about consent. While some aspects of this pedagogy may seem more appropriate for a legal studies classroom than a sex education one, it does have the effect of bestowing this concept with significance: violating someone's consent is not merely *bad* or *unjust*, but codified in the law as *illegal*. The goal of this pedagogy is not necessarily for students to recall in years to come that consent is defined in law as *your free and voluntary agreement to sex*. Rather, it is to instil the value that something is right or wrong, legal or illegal. Long after students have left school, they will remember that consent is important precisely because it is sanctioned by the law, whether or not they remember just what that law says.

Despite this, teaching consent in relation to the law does come with some limitations. Most notably, it defines consent in the negative, focusing on which behaviours to avoid rather than which ones to emulate. Throughout the unit on sex education, students overwhelmingly learn about what consent is not, rather than what consent is. From the moment consent is first introduced and defined (see Section 3.2), we see disclaim: deny formulations which explain what consent does not look like (e.g. *you have **not** agreed freely, it's **never** ok for someone to force you*). The conditions of consent which are distilled into this technical term all relate to negative attitudes, either inscribed (e.g. *afraid, threatened*) or invoked (e.g. *asleep, unconscious*; see Section 3.3.1). This is a very faithful recontextualisation of the legal discourse, where disclaim: deny formulations (e.g. *A person does **not** consent to a sexual activity if...*) and negative attitudes (e.g. *cognitive **incapacity**, substantially **intoxicated**, **mistaken** belief*) are equally common (see Appendix C). Similarly, when applying consent, all the scenarios that students are given are examples of non-consensual sex. This is true when the students discuss a range of 'what if' scenarios (see Section 3.4), when the teacher unpacks and

repacks consent (see Section 4.1), and again when students have to apply the law on consent to a scenario in the assessment task (see Section 4.2).

By pedagogising consent in relation to the law, we are thus teaching students what not to expect and what not to do but offering them very little understanding of what they should expect of themselves and their sexual partners. In fact, the only time we see consent defined positively is in the initial definition: consent means *your free and voluntary agreement to sex*. As described earlier in this chapter (Section 4.1), this section of the text is the most technical and the most abstract, with very strong mass and weak presence. When consent is subsequently unpacked, the polarity switches: *this means it's never OK for someone to assume you have given consent*. This means that students are given plenty of examples of what does not constitute consent, but no examples of what does constitute consent beyond the most abstract and technical definition. Further, the meanings which are distilled into consent (see Section 3.2.1) are only made explicit when it is distilled in the negative (e.g. *a person does not give their consent if they are asleep...*). When it comes to the positive distillation of consent, students must abduce the equivalent conditions (e.g. *asleep* → *awake*, *unconscious* → *conscious*) themselves, and the relation between these elements and consent is left implicit. These relations are not simply the mirror image of the negative distillation of consent; the elements are reorganised and reconfigured in different and complex ways. The kinds of behaviours we expect of young people, and the kind of behaviours they should expect of their sexual partners, is left largely unsaid.

While NSW consent laws have been updated since the time of data collection (see Section 3.2.2), even so called ‘affirmative consent’ laws still maintain a largely negative definition of consent. For instance, there is still a long list of conditions which negate consent, for example being *unconscious or asleep*, and participating because of *force or fear of serious harm*. This maintains a negative framing of consent – outlining many more instances of what consent does not look like rather than what it does. Of course, this is the function of the law and especially legislation such as the Crimes Act; to codify those actions which we consider immoral, reprehensible and deserving of punishment. My suggestion here is not that affirmative consent laws are unwelcome, or that we should do away with the idea that consent can be negated by certain conditions. Rather, my point is that pedagogising consent in relation to the law will necessarily always reproduce a negative definition of consent, giving students a long list of behaviours to avoid but very few behaviours to emulate. The law, and especially legislation such as the Crimes Act, functions as a protocol rather than a procedure – that is, it tells us how not to live, rather than how to live. Or in the case of sex education, it tells us how

not to consent, how not to have sex, how not to have a relationship, rather than how to consent, how to value other people's bodily autonomy, and how to develop healthy relationships based on open communication and mutual respect.

It is possible that consent pedagogy already looks different in a post-affirmative consent landscape, and a description of this pedagogy would be a fruitful area of future research, especially in comparison with the current description. However, the law will always foreground what counts as an offence, or what is illegal, because this is precisely its function. If we want students to know what they can and should expect from healthy and respectful sexual encounters, we will necessarily need to move beyond legal discourse. The teaching resources I have provided in Chapters 3 and 4 aim to do precisely this. The consent checklist does include all the relevant aspects of the legal definition of consent, for example not being *unconscious* or *afraid*, and it is also still applicable under the new affirmative definition of consent, with *enthusiastic desire* one of the many conditions. But this resource also goes beyond the legal definition of consent, including behaviours which are immoral even if not illegal, such as *lying about your age*, and including feelings which are essential for pleasurable sex even if they are not a legal requirement, such as being *excited*, *happy* and *comfortable*. These two chapters have thus contributed much more than a snapshot in time of consent pedagogy in one particular setting. They have offered ways of understanding consent which goes beyond the legal definition, which teaches students what feelings and behaviours they should emulate rather than only which ones to avoid, and which provides a grounding in the principles of consent such that this description can transcend a specific classroom, school or jurisdiction. This description, then, is relevant too all young people (and adults) who seek relationships and sexual experiences which are not only compliant with the law, but also pleasurable, communicative and mutually respectful.

Chapters 3 and 4 have described how consent is taught, and especially how it is technicalised in sex education. In Chapters 5 and 6 I now turn to consider a topic of equal importance in sex education, but with a radically different pedagogy: respect.

Chapter 5 – Iconising Respect

In this chapter, I will describe how respect is taught, and specifically how it is iconised, in sex education. In the previous two chapters, I showed how consent is technicalised, and more specifically that it is an instance of technicalised attitude. That is, consent distils a range of attitudes at the level of field (e.g. *afraid, unconscious, want to stop*), but in doing so the interpersonal meaning is ‘emptied out’ leaving ideational meaning in its wake. In this chapter, I show how respect does the opposite: respect is iconised in sex education, that is, it discharges ideational meaning and charges interpersonal meaning. As described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.4), iconisation and bonding icons has been used to analyse museums, national identity texts and youth justice conferencing. However, it remains to be seen how icons and iconisation are used in educational contexts. For example, can iconisation be used in classrooms as a pedagogical tool? What is their application in a subject such as sex education? Can icons be used to apprentice students into certain values systems, for example being accepting of gender and sexuality diversity? And moreover, what is the role of language in iconisation?

In this chapter, I consider how respect is iconised in sex education, and specifically the linguistic resources for iconisation. Section 5.1 analyses the kind of ATTITUDE at play when respect is taught. To do this, I describe the realisations of the lexical item ‘respect’ in both lexicogrammar and discourse semantics. This analysis highlights how certain realisations of respect allow the appraiser, the appraised or both to be backgrounded, effectively discharging ideational meaning. Section 5.2 analyses how interpersonal meanings are condensed into the term respect, which I refer to as instilling. More specifically, I show how respect amasses a range of triggers and targets and charges a consistently positive valency, creating a hypercharged interpersonal meaning. In Section 5.3, I compare the iconisation of respect to iconisation as it has been theorised in SFL to date. I show that the notion of ‘icon’ needs to be specified further, and I propose the terms iconised ideation and iconised attitude. I then bring this together with my analysis of technicalisation from Chapters 3 and 4 and propose a typology of highly condensed meanings.

5.1 REALISING RESPECT

Respect is a term students encounter well before they ever begin learning about sex. Respect appears in school mottos, decorates school crests, and echoes in school halls and on school playgrounds. Respect is enshrined as a ‘core value’ of schools at a state level, alongside values

such as excellence, responsibility and inclusivity (NSW Department of Education and Training 2004). These core values have not simply been imposed top-down by state governments, but have been supported by parents and citizens associations, staff unions, and primary and secondary school principals (ibid.). As a core value, respect informs the development of syllabuses and other materials, is taught explicitly in classrooms, and is celebrated on Harmony Day, Wear It Purple Day⁷ and other events that highlight the importance of treating people with tolerance and kindness even if (and perhaps especially if) they are different to you.

Indeed, in the first ten minutes of the very first lesson in the dataset, the teacher speaks about respect in a way that would not look out of place at a Harmony Day assembly:

(5.1) T: *You need to be **respectful** of the fact that other people have different opinions, feel differently about these things [sensitive topics in sex education]. Doesn't necessarily make those things right or wrong, and you can have a discussion with someone about how you feel or how they think differently to you. But those things [discussions] need to maintain **respect** from both sides at all times.* (J1_7m)

By the time students encounter respect in sex education, they will already have a source of shared knowledge to draw upon as a class. The critical thing the teacher needs to do, then, is bring those ideas to the surface, and agree on what respect means for their purposes. In sex education, respect can be something you do (e.g. *you **respect** the other person*), something you are (e.g. *we are **respectful** to each other*) or an abstract concept all on its own (e.g. ***respect** is really really important*). In order to understand how respect is taught in sex education, I begin by describing its realisations in lexicogrammar and discourse semantics, specifically ATTITUDE. I will provide an account of these different realisations which will serve as a useful reference point for the remainder of the chapter. However, I will also show how some realisations discharge ideational meaning and charge interpersonal meaning. That is, I will show how they contribute to iconising respect.

To begin, consider the lexical item 'respect' in the following set of invented examples (Hereafter in Section 5.1 I use single quotes when referring to the lexical item 'respect' and italics when referring to specific realisations e.g. *respect*, *respectful*):

(5.2) *He **respects** his partner.*

⁷ Harmony Day is a day celebrating cultural diversity, Wear It Purple Day is a day of awareness for LGBTQIA+ young people.

- (5.3) *He is **respectful** of his partner.*
- (5.4) *He is **respectful**.*
- (5.5) *It is a **respectful** relationship.*
- (5.6) ***Respect** for each other is in the relationship.*
- (5.7) ***Respect** is in the relationship.*
- (5.8) ***Respect** is really important.*

All of these examples contain explicit evaluation (i.e. inscribed attitude). For the first few examples, it is easy to identify the appraiser (the one expressing the evaluation) and the appraised (the trigger or target of the evaluation). For instance, in Example 5.2, *he respects his partner*, it is obvious that *he* is the appraiser and *his partner* is the appraised. In Example 5.4, *he is respectful*, we know that *he* is still the appraiser, but we no longer know who or what is being appraised. In Example 5.7, *respect is in the relationship*, we cannot identify the appraiser or appraised, except perhaps to infer a non-specific people or partners in the *relationship*. And in Example 5.8, we do not know by whom or for whom respect is expressed, only that *respect is really important*. While all of these examples contain inscribed attitude, it becomes increasingly difficult to identify the appraiser and appraised as we move down the list. But even in instances where the appraiser and appraised cannot be recovered or implied, we would not want to say that respect is no longer evaluative. Rather, as I will argue in this chapter, respect is at its most evaluative, or most interpersonally charged, precisely when the appraiser and appraised have been ideationally discharged. While Examples 5.2-5.8 are invented – chosen to maximally highlight the different realisations of ‘respect’ – they are very close to real examples which will be considered in this section.

To understand what kind of ATTITUDE is in play at discourse semantics, we need to analyse how ‘respect’ is realised in the lexicogrammar. Below I describe the four most common realisations of ‘respect’ – mental Process or Attribute (at clause rank) and Classifier or Thing (at group rank) – and show how these realise ATTITUDE. I describe the different realisations of ‘respect’ in this order as it best highlights how ideational meaning is discharged and, concurrently, how interpersonal meaning is charged. Note, however, that this does not entirely reflect the order the realisations appear throughout the school term. For instance, it is not the case that ‘respect’ is exclusively realised by a mental Process in lesson 1 (e.g. *he respects his partner*), and then exclusively by a Thing in lesson 9 (e.g. *respect is really important*). As any teacher can attest, progress in pedagogy is more spiral than linear. Rather, I point to realisation as one resource for discharging ideational meaning and charging interpersonal meaning, and

therefore iconising ‘respect’. This description is also not intended to be exhaustive, but rather an account of the most common realisations, comprising approximately 85% of instances in the dataset. It does, however, highlight how ‘respect’ is iconised in sex education, gradually discharging ideational meaning so that its interpersonal significance can come to the fore.

5.1.1 ‘Respect’ as mental Process

Let us begin with the realisation of ‘respect’ which is most explicit about who is expressing the evaluation (i.e. the appraiser) and who or what is being evaluated (i.e. the appraised). The congruent realisation of ‘respect’ is a mental Process realised by a verb (i.e. *respect*). For example:

(5.9) *If you respect and see the other person as a valuable person, you don’t speak to them in that manner. (J2_5m)*

<i>you</i>	<i>respect</i>	<i>the other person</i>
Senser	Process	Phenomenon

‘Respect’ as mental Process (lexicogrammar) realises two kinds of attitude (at discourse semantics). I discuss each of these in turn.

First, ‘respect’ as mental Process realises affect. The Senser maps onto the appraiser and the Phenomenon maps onto the appraised (i.e. trigger). Following Bednarek (2008), here I use the term *emoter* for a person expressing affect since it allows me to more easily distinguish between appraisers of affect (‘*emoters*’) versus judgement and appreciation (‘*appraisers*’) throughout this chapter. For example:

(5.10) <i>you</i>	<i>respect</i>	<i>the other person</i>
Senser	Process	Phenomenon
emoter		trigger

More specifically, ‘respect’ as mental Process realises positive satisfaction, the subtype of AFFECT which deals with telos or the pursuit of goals, and covers feelings such as ennui, displeasure and curiosity (Martin & White 2005: 49). Evidence for coding this as affect includes the fact that it is a mental Process (see Martin 2017b, 2020b), agnation patterns (*you respect/admire/value/appreciate the other person*), and the fact that the evaluation is a reaction

to a specific emotional trigger (*you respect **the other person***). Notably, ‘respect’ as mental Process does not fit the grammatical frame test for AFFECT (Martin & White 2005: 58):

{person feels **affect** about something}
you feel **respectful about the other person*

However, the grammatical frame test requires that attitude is realised adjectivally (ibid.) which, as we will see below, changes the type of attitude for ‘respect’.

Second, ‘respect’ as mental Process also realises invoked judgement or appreciation. ‘Respect’ is part of a set of attitudinal lexis in English which construes an emotional reaction (affect) to people and entities we approve or disapprove of (judgement/appreciation). For example, *proud* in *I felt **proud** that they’d won* both inscribes positive satisfaction in *I felt proud* and invokes positive judgement of the behaviour *that they’d won* (Martin & White 2005: 60-61). Other items in this set include *guilty*, *embarrassed*, *envious* and *disgusted* (ibid.), and Martin and Zappavigna extend this list based in their work on youth justice conferencing to include *sorry*, *disappointed*, *regretful*, *remorseful*, *disappointed* and others (2016: 109; see also Section 2.4.1.3).

The secondary coding for ‘respect’ as mental Process will depend on the target. In Example 5.9, repeated here as Example 5.11, the target is a person or behaviour, and so invokes positive judgement (target underlined):

(5.11) *If you **respect** and see the other person as a valuable person, you don’t speak to them in that manner.* (J2_5m)

<i>you</i>	<i>respect</i>	<i>the other person</i>
Senser	Process	Phenomenon
appraiser		target

Alternatively, the target may be an entity, and so ‘respect’ as mental Process invokes positive appreciation. For example (target underlined):

(5.12) *It would ensure that my friend has **respected** the other person’s opinion.* (Student H_Q5)

my friend *has respected* ***the other person's opinion***
 Senser Process **Phenomenon**
 appraiser **target**

In Example 5.12, *respect* appraises the Phenomenon *the other person's opinion*. This is the trigger for inscribed positive affect, as well as the target for invoked positive appreciation. Note that *opinion* here is specifically a semiotic entity, and we often see 'respect' used with targets such as *opinion* and *beliefs* to appreciate what people think, believe and mean. Other targets are possible when 'respect' enacts appreciation (e.g. *respect for their body*, *respectful relationship*), and I discuss these further below.

The judgement or appreciation in these double codings cannot be readily specified more delicately (as tenacity, propriety, valuation etc.). I take this as evidence that they are the secondary coding, and that they are invoked and not inscribed attitudes. This follows the way Martin and White (2005) suggest dealing with combined inscription and invocation: the inscribed attitude can be described more delicately but the invoked attitude cannot. For example, *he played strongly* inscribes positive judgement, specifically capacity, but *it was a strong innings* invokes positive appreciation and cannot be specified more delicately without arguing from the specific co-text and context (2005: 68).

A summary of ATTITUDE realisations for 'respect' as mental Process is presented in Table 5.1.

Example	Inscribed attitude	Invoked attitude
<i>If you respect and see the other person as a valuable person, you don't speak to them in that manner.</i>	+satisfaction Senser as emoter (<i>you</i>) and Phenomenon as trigger (<i>the other person</i>)	+judgement of Phenomenon (<i>the other person</i>)
<i>It would ensure that my friend has respected the other person's opinion.</i>	+satisfaction Senser as emoter (<i>my friend</i>) and Phenomenon as trigger (<i>the other person's opinion</i>)	+appreciation of Phenomenon (<i>the other person's opinion</i>)

Table 5.1 Summary of ATTITUDE realisations for 'respect' as mental Process

‘Respect’ as mental Process is thus explicit about who is expressing the evaluation (i.e. the appraiser/emoter) as well as who or what is being evaluated (i.e. the appraised). The next realisation of ‘respect’ is also explicit about both of these, but begins to shift the focus from the appraised to the appraiser.

5.1.2 ‘Respect’ as Attribute

‘Respect’ can be realised by an Attribute realised by an adjective (i.e. *respectful*). For example:

(5.13) *We could say that they are **respectful** and things like that.* (J2_5m)

<i>they</i>	<i>are</i>	<i>respectful</i>
Carrier	Process	Attribute

This is the only realisation where we see ‘respect’ negated with morphological prefixing i.e. *disrespectful*. For example:

(5.14) *If someone is **disrespectful** then that makes an unhealthy relationship.* (J2_5m)

<i>someone</i>	<i>is</i>	<i>disrespectful</i>
Carrier	Process	Attribute

Just like ‘respect’ as mental Process, ‘respect’ as Attribute can realise two kinds of attitude. The primary, inscribed attitude is an evaluation of the Carrier. Overwhelmingly, the Carrier is a person or behaviour, so *dis/respectful* enacts a judgement of propriety. For example:

(5.15) ***they** are respectful*
Carrier Process Attribute
target

(5.16) *someone is disrespectful*
Carrier Process Attribute
target

This is agnate to other adjectives such as *considerate*, *polite* and *courteous*. Since we are now dealing with ‘respect’ in adjectival form, we can confirm that this fits the grammatical frame test for JUDGEMENT (Martin & White 2005: 59):

{it was **judgement** of/for person to do that}

*it was **respectful** of them to do that*

‘Respect’ as Attribute can optionally realise a second, invoked attitude. Consider Example 5.17:

(5.17) *As long as we are **respectful** and kind to each other.* (R9_20m)

*we are **respectful** to each other*

Carrier Process Attribute

Just as with Example 5.15 and 5.16, the primary attitude in Example 5.17 is an inscribed judgement of propriety, with Carrier as target:

(5.18) *we are **respectful** to each other*

Carrier Process Attribute

target

However, the Attribute contains additional information: we are not only *respectful*, but *respectful to each other*. At group rank, the Attribute is realised by a nominal group where *respectful* is Epithet and *to each other* is Qualifier:

(5.19)

<i>we</i>	<i>are</i>	<i>respectful</i>	<i>[to each other]</i>
Carrier	Process	Attribute	
		nominal group	
		Epithet	Qualifier⁸

Where *dis/respectful* appears with a Qualifier (e.g. *respectful to each other*), this tells us who or what is being respected. The people or entities in the Qualifier are thus the target of a secondary, invoked attitude, either judgement or appreciation.

If the Qualifier contains a person, the invoked attitude is judgement (target underlined):

⁸ In Example 5.19 and 5.21, *to each other* and *of the fact that other people have different opinions* are analysed as Qualifiers rather than Circumstances because they cannot be predicated Theme (e.g. **it is to each other we are respectful*) or marked Theme (e.g. **of the fact that other people have different opinions, we are respectful*; see Martin, Matthiessen & Painter 2010: 126-8, 199).

(5.20) *As long as we are **respectful** and kind to each other.* (R9_20m)

Alternatively, if the Qualifier contains an entity, the invoked attitude is appreciation (target underlined):

(5.21) *You need to be **respectful** of the fact that other people have different opinions.* (J1_7m)

As with ‘respect’ as mental Process, the secondary codings for ‘respect’ as Attribute cannot be specified more delicately than simply judgement or appreciation. This is evidence that they are the secondary coding, and that they are invoked and not inscribed attitudes.

Notably, these secondary codings are optional because the Attribute *respectful* may not specify who or what is being respected. For example:

(5.22) *Like, it’s [dating a friend’s ex] kind of **disrespectful**.* (R3_7m)

<i>it</i>	<i>’s</i>	<i>kind of disrespectful</i>
Carrier	Process	Attribute

In Example 5.22, *disrespectful* is an Attribute. This realises a negative judgement of propriety, with Carrier (*it*) as target. However, the Attribute does not specify who or what is being disrespected. In some instances, this may be recoverable from the co-text. Example 5.22 is repeated with additional co-text as Example 5.23:

- (5.23) T: *[Reading from slides] So “one of your close friends hooks up with the guy/girl you recently broke up with”. Ooh. OK so what happens in this situation?*
- S1: *We said that maybe the friend should like give you some time or maybe tell you before. Or even maybe um...*
- S2: *Like, it’s kind of disrespectful.* (R3_7m)

In Example 5.23, the teacher describes a situation where *one of your close friends hooks up with the guy/girl you recently broke up with* and then asks a group of students *what happens in this situation?* Student 1 answers that the friend should *give you some time or maybe tell you before*, and Student 2 suggests that the friend’s behaviour is *kind of disrespectful*. While *disrespectful* does not have a Qualifier, we can infer one from the co-text: this behaviour is *disrespectful [to you]*.

Alternatively, if a Qualifier is not recoverable in the co-text, the context – a sex education unit with a significant focus on relationships – may imply a non-specific *someone, each other or a partner*. For example:

(5.24) *But you also need that [discussion] to still be respectful [of **each other**].* (J2_5m)

(5.25) *If someone is disrespectful [to **their partner**] then that makes an unhealthy relationship.*

(J2_5m)

‘Respect’ as Attribute thus foregrounds the appraiser; the primary, inscribed attitude is a judgement of the Carrier, i.e. the person ‘doing’ respect (e.g. *we are respectful, you need to be respectful*). The appraised can be made explicit in a Qualifier, realising a secondary coding of judgement (e.g. *respectful to **each other***) or appreciation (e.g. *respectful of... **different opinions***). But the appraised is backgrounded relative to the appraiser, indeed, it can be omitted entirely (e.g. *someone is disrespectful*).

A summary of ATTITUDE realisations for ‘respect’ as Attribute is presented in Table 5.2.

Example	Inscribed attitude	Invoked attitude
<i>As long as we are respectful and kind to each other</i>	+/-propriety of Carrier (<i>we</i>)	+/- judgement of Qualifier (<i>to each other</i>)
<i>You need to be respectful of the fact that other people have different opinions</i>	+/-propriety of Carrier (<i>you</i>)	+/-appreciation of Qualifier (<i>the fact that other people have different opinions</i>)
<i>If someone is disrespectful that makes an unhealthy relationship</i>	+/-propriety of Carrier (<i>someone</i>)	∅; (possible +/- judgement of non-specific <i>someone, a partner, each other</i>)

Table 5.2 Summary of ATTITUDE realisations for ‘respect’ as Attribute

‘Respect’ as Attribute is thus explicit about both the appraiser and the appraised, but it foregrounds the appraiser. The appraised is optional, and if present is the target of a secondary, invoked attitude rather than the primary, inscribed attitude.

Notably, we are no longer dealing with ‘respect’ realising affect. Above, I showed that ‘respect’ as mental Process is agnate with terms such as *value, admire, regard* and *think highly of*, which foreground the feelings in emotive mental Processes. By contrast, ‘respect’ as Attribute is agnate with terms such as *polite, considerate* and *civil*, which foreground judgements of people and their behaviours. In this way, ‘respect’ as Attribute backgrounds the original appraiser (i.e. the emoter, or the person ‘doing’ respect) and instead emphasises their role as an appraised – as being good, moral and ethical.

So far, we have seen two realisations of ‘respect’ which inscribe different kinds of attitude. ‘Respect’ as mental Process foregrounds expressions of affect (e.g. *you respect the other person*), while ‘respect’ as Attribute foregrounds judgements of people and behaviour (e.g. *we are respectful to each other*). Turning now from clause rank to group rank, we can see how ‘respect’ can also foreground appreciation.

5.1.3 ‘Respect’ as Classifier

Moving from clause rank to group rank, ‘respect’ can be realised by a Classifier realised by an adjective (i.e. *respectful*). For example:

(5.26) *That would be a great sign of a respectful relationship.* (J6_24m)

a respectful relationship
Deictic Classifier Thing

(5.27) *Things like porn have then altered the way people see positive or respectful relationships.* (R5_13m)

positive or respectful relationships
Classifier Classifier Thing

‘Respect’ as Classifier exclusively appears with *relationship/s* as the head of the nominal group (e.g. *respectful relationships*).

It is useful to first establish that *respectful* in this context is a Classifier and not an Epithet. The key test to distinguish these functions is whether or not they can be graded with force. Compare the following two examples, where *respectful* is an Epithet (Example 5.28) and a Classifier (Example 5.29):

(5.28) *“But she’s so disrespectful!”* (R3_7m)

(5.29) *Things like porn have then altered the way people see positive or *very respectful relationships.* (R5_13m)

In Example 5.28, *disrespectful* can be graded with force as *so disrespectful* (indeed this is a real example from classroom talk). Conversely, in Example 5.29, we cannot grade *respectful* as *things like porn have altered the way people see positive or *very respectful relationships*. We can also understand the use of ‘respect’ as Classifier by looking to the sex education

to invoke judgement, the primary, inscribed attitude is the evaluation of a *relationship* as an entity.

A summary of ATTITUDE realisations for ‘respect’ as Classifier is presented in Table 5.3.

Example	Inscribed attitude	Invoked attitude
<i>That would be a great sign of a respectful relationship.</i>	+balance of Thing (<i>relationship</i>)	+judgement of [<i>people in a</i>] <i>relationship</i>

Table 5.3 Summary of ATTITUDE realisations for ‘respect’ as Classifier

At this point, it may be useful to provide an interim summary. The three realisations of ‘respect’ described so far all realise inscribed attitude, but each corresponds to a different sub-type of ATTITUDE. ‘Respect’ as mental Process realises inscribed affect (specifically satisfaction), ‘respect’ as Epithet realises inscribed judgement (specifically propriety), and ‘respect’ as Classifier realises inscribed appreciation (specifically balance). For each realisation of ‘respect’, it is also possible to realise a secondary, invoked attitude. These are either judgement or appreciation, depending on whether the target is a person/behaviour (e.g. *respect the **other person***) or an entity (e.g. *respectful of... **different opinions***). These secondary codings are invoked and cannot be specified more delicately than simply judgement or appreciation.

It is also worth comparing how the appraiser and appraised shift across these three realisations. For ‘respect’ as mental Process (e.g. *you **respect** the other person*), the primary attitude is inscribed affect, and we foreground the feelings expressed by the emoter. For ‘respect’ as Attribute (e.g. *we are **respectful***), we background the original appraiser (i.e. emoter) and instead emphasise their role as an appraised. The primary attitude is an inscribed judgement of propriety, evaluating someone as good, moral and ethical. For ‘respect’ as Classifier (e.g. ***respectful** relationship*), we background the emoter even further. They are still the target of judgement – as one of the presumed people in the *relationship* – but this is not stated explicitly, and it is invoked and so cannot be specified more delicately. The primary attitude is an inscribed appreciation of balance, foregrounding evaluation of a *relationship* as an entity. A summary of the description so far is provided in Table 5.4.

Lexicogrammatical realisation	Example	Inscribed attitude	Invoked attitude
<i>Foregrounding expressions of feeling</i>			
mental Process	<i>If you respect and see the other person as a valuable person, you don't speak to them in that manner.</i>	+ satisfaction Senser as emoter (<i>you</i>) and Phenomenon as trigger (<i>the other person</i>)	+judgement of Phenomenon (<i>the other person</i>)
mental Process	<i>It would ensure that my friend has respected the other person's opinion.</i>	+ satisfaction Senser as emoter (<i>my friend</i>) and Phenomenon as trigger (<i>the other person's opinion</i>)	+appreciation of Phenomenon (<i>the other person's opinion</i>)
<i>Foregrounding judgements of people/behaviour</i>			
Attribute realised by Epithet ^ Qualifier	<i>As long as we are respectful and kind to each other</i>	+/- propriety of Carrier (<i>we</i>)	+/- judgement of Qualifier (<i>to each other</i>)
Attribute realised by Epithet ^ Qualifier	<i>You need to be respectful of the fact that other people have different opinions</i>	+/- propriety of Carrier (<i>you</i>)	+/-appreciation of Qualifier (<i>the fact that other people have different opinions</i>)
Attribute realised by Epithet only	<i>If someone is disrespectful that makes an unhealthy relationship</i>	+/- propriety of Carrier (<i>someone</i>)	∅; (possible +/- judgement of non-specific <i>someone, a partner, each other</i>)
<i>Foregrounding appreciation of entities</i>			
Classifier	<i>That would be a great sign of a respectful relationship.</i>	+ balance of Thing (<i>relationship</i>)	+judgement of [<i>people in a</i>] relationship

Table 5.4 Summary of ATTITUDE realisations for 'respect' as mental Process, Attribute and Classifier

Above I have described how ‘respect’ can realise inscribed affect, judgement and appreciation. I now turn to examples where it becomes increasingly difficult to identify the appraiser and appraised of ‘respect’, and thus increasingly difficult to categorise attitude.

5.1.4 ‘Respect’ as Thing

‘Respect’ can be realised by a Thing realised by a noun (i.e. *respect*). For example:

(5.31) *What about personal boundaries and **respect** for others?* (J13 @ 33m)

(5.32) **Respect** should be something that is in your relationship. (J14_52m)

‘Respect’ as Thing has agnates such as *admiration*, *regard* and *esteem*. It would seem, then, that ‘respect’ as Thing realises affect, foregrounding the expression of feeling. In Example 5.31, this feeling is a reaction to a specific emotional trigger – *respect for others* – and this is further evidence for the realisation of affect. However, we cannot identify an appraiser in Example 5.31 (i.e. who is respecting *others*), and in Example 5.32 we cannot identify an appraiser or an appraised. How, then, does ‘respect’ realise ATTITUDE in these examples?

I will begin with the more explicit case: where an emotional trigger is specified. The trigger may be specified in a Qualifier which modifies ‘respect’ as Thing – for example (Qualifier underlined):

(5.33) *What about personal boundaries and **respect** for others?* (J13 @ 33m)

<i>respect</i>	for others
Thing	Qualifier

(5.34) *OK **respect** absolutely not just for their emotional state but for their body.* (J2_5m)

<i>respect</i>	for their emotional state	<i>respect</i>	for their body
Thing	Qualifier	Thing	Qualifier

In Examples 5.33 and 5.34, the Qualifier gives information about the appraised (e.g. *respect for others*). Just like ‘respect’ as mental Process, these are the trigger for inscribed affect, specifically satisfaction. For example:

(5.35) *respect* *for others*
 Thing Qualifier
 trigger

However, unlike ‘respect’ as mental Process, we cannot identify an emoter who expresses this feeling: they have been backgrounded entirely.

These instances are also double coded for attitude, either for judgement or appreciation, depending on the target. If the target is a person or behaviour, ‘respect’ as Thing invokes positive judgement (target underlined):

(5.36) *What about personal boundaries and **respect** for others?* (J13 @ 33m)

respect *for others*
 Thing Qualifier
 target

Alternatively, if the target is an entity, ‘respect’ as Thing invokes positive appreciation (target underlined):

(5.37) *OK **respect** absolutely not just for their emotional state but for their body.* (J2_5m)

<i>respect</i>	<i>for their emotional state</i>	<i>respect</i>	<i>for their body</i>
Thing	Qualifier	Thing	Qualifier
	target		target

This secondary coding is invoked and cannot be specified more delicately than simply judgement or appreciation.

‘Respect’ as Thing can thus be explicit about what is being respected (i.e. the appraised) by specifying it in the Qualifier (e.g. *respect **for others***). Just like ‘respect’ as mental Process, ‘respect’ as Thing inscribes affect and invokes judgement/appreciation. However, where ‘respect’ as mental Process makes both the appraiser/emoter and the appraised explicit (e.g. *you respect the other person*), ‘respect’ as Thing does not specify the emoter at all (e.g. *respect for others*).

Now I turn to consider examples where neither an appraiser nor an appraised is specified. This occurs where ‘respect’ as Thing realises the nominal group on its own, with no other resources. Consider Example 5.32, repeated here as Example 5.38:

(5.38) **Respect** *should be something that is in your relationship.* (J14_52m)

Respect should be *something* *[[that is in your relationship]]*

Token Process Value

nominal group

Thing

In Example 5.38, evaluation is certainly still present, but the attitude is challenging to analyse as there is no mention of the appraiser or the appraised. At best, it might be possible to insert a non-specific appraised, for example:

(5.39) *Respect [for each other] should be something that is in your relationship.* (J14_52m)

In these instances, the appraiser is backgrounded, and the appraised is only recoverable in a non-specific form e.g. *one, someone, each other* or a *partner*. Without an appraiser or appraised, to what extent can we justify coding this as affect, or indeed as any kind of attitude? And in instances such as this, where the appraiser and appraised cannot be recovered or implied, we would not want to say that respect is no longer evaluative. In fact, when ‘respect’ is realised by a Thing, ‘respect’ itself can be evaluated, for example:

(5.40) **Respect** *is also really really important.* (R2_43m)

In Example 5.40, it is no longer possible to identify the appraiser and appraised of *respect*. Rather, these have been backgrounded and *respect* itself is being evaluated with positive valuation (*important*).

A similar pattern occurs with modals of obligation (e.g. *should, need*), which often occur with ‘respect’ as Thing. For example (modal underlined):

(5.41) **Respect** *should* *be something that is in your relationship.* (J14_52m)

Modals of obligation are part of the realisation of the system of ENGAGEMENT but have an underlying semantic connection with the values of social sanction, especially propriety. Compare, for example, *The government must act in this way* and *It is right/proper/fair that the government act in this way* (Martin & White 2005: 181; see also Martin 1992b). Whereas Example 5.40 evaluates ‘respect’ itself with positive valuation (*important*), we might say Example 5.41 implicitly evaluates ‘respect’ with positive propriety, as something we have to do (*should, must, are required to*), or as something right (*correct, proper, fair*) to do.

Thus, while ‘respect’ as Thing backgrounds the appraiser and appraised, this makes it possible for respect itself to be evaluated. It may be explicitly appraised, for example as *really important* (positive valuation), or it may be implicitly evaluated using modals of obligation (e.g. *should, need*) which are connected to positive propriety. It is therefore not the case that backgrounding the appraiser and appraised means that respect is no longer evaluative. Rather, as I will argue later in this chapter, this is respect at its most evaluative, or most interpersonally charged.

A summary of ATTITUDE realisations for ‘respect’ as Thing ^ Qualifier and as Thing only is presented in Table 5.5.

Lexicogrammatical realisation	Example	Inscribed attitude	Invoked attitude
<i>Backgrounding appraiser</i>			
Thing ^ Qualifier	<i>What about personal boundaries and respect for others?</i>	+satisfaction Emoter not specified, Qualifier as trigger (<i>others</i>)	+judgement of Qualifier (<i>others</i>)
Thing ^ Qualifier	<i>OK respect absolutely not just for their emotional state but for their body.</i>	+satisfaction Emoter not specified, Qualifier as trigger (<i>their emotional state, their body</i>)	+appreciation of Qualifier (<i>their emotional state, their body</i>)
<i>Backgrounding appraiser and appraised</i>			
Thing	<i>Respect should be something that is in your relationship.</i>	N/A	N/A

Table 5.5 Summary of ATTITUDE realisations for ‘respect’ as Thing ^ Qualifier and Thing only

‘Respect’ as Thing thus backgrounds the appraiser and appraised even further. The appraised can optionally be specified in a Qualifier (e.g. *respect for others*), but it can also be omitted entirely (e.g. *respect should be... in your relationship*). And even where it is possible to identify who or what is being respected (i.e. the appraised), it is not possible to identify who is ‘doing’

respect (i.e. the appraiser/emoter). Despite this, ‘respect’ as Thing is still highly interpersonally charged, and in fact can be evaluated itself (e.g. *respect is really important*).

5.1.5 Comparing the realisations of ‘respect’

Above I have described the four main realisations of ‘respect’ in sex education – as mental Process and Attribute (at clause rank) and as Classifier and Thing (at group rank). Having described each of these realisations individually, in this section I will bring them together for comparison. Let us return to the invented examples presented at the opening of this section (Examples 5.2-5.8):

He respects his partner.

He is respectful of his partner.

He is respectful.

It is a respectful relationship.

Respect for each other is in the relationship.

Respect is in the relationship.

Respect is really important.

We can now label these based on the realisation of ‘respect’:

He respects his partner.

(mental Process)

He is respectful of his partner.

(Attribute realised by Epithet ^ Qualifier)

He is respectful.

(Attribute realised by Epithet only)

It is a respectful relationship.

(Classifier)

Respect for each other is in the relationship.

(Thing ^ Qualifier)

Respect is in the relationship.

(Thing)

Respect is really important.

(Thing)

And we can substitute these invented examples for real ones, as in Table 5.6.

Example	Lexicogrammatical realisation
(5.42) <i>If you respect and see the other person as a valuable person, you don't speak to them in that manner.</i>	mental Process
(5.43) <i>As long as we are respectful and kind to each other.</i>	Attribute realised by Epithet ^ Qualifier
(5.44) <i>If someone is disrespectful that makes an unhealthy relationship</i>	Attribute realised by Epithet only
(5.45) <i>That would be a great sign of a respectful relationship.</i>	Classifier
(5.46) <i>What about personal boundaries and respect for others?</i>	Thing ^ Qualifier
(5.47) <i>Respect should be something that is in your relationship.</i>	Thing
(5.48) <i>Respect is really really important.</i>	Thing

Table 5.6 Different lexicogrammatical realisations of 'respect' in sex education

Just as with the examples presented at the beginning of this chapter, the examples in Table 5.6 show a gradual backgrounding of the appraiser and appraised. Let us review each of these in turn. When 'respect' is realised by a mental Process, the appraiser and appraised are both stated explicitly, as in Example 5.42: *If you **respect**... the other person..., you don't speak to them in that manner.* These instances realise two kinds of attitude; they inscribe affect and invoke judgement or appreciation, depending on the target. When 'respect' is realised by an Attribute, the appraiser and appraised might both be stated explicitly, as in Example 5.43: *As long as we are **respectful** and kind to each other;* but it is possible to background the appraised, as in Example 5.44: *If someone is **disrespectful** that makes an unhealthy relationship.* We have lost the affect expressed by the appraiser/emoter and are focused more now on an inscribed judgement of them/their behaviour as *dis/respectful*. When 'respect' is realised by a Classifier, appraiser and appraised are both backgrounded, as in Example 5.45: *That would be a great sign of a **respectful** relationship.* At best, we can imply that there are people/partners in the *respectful relationship*, but the focus is on the *relationship* as an entity, and the primary attitude is inscribed appreciation, specifically balance. When 'respect' is realised by a Thing, it is possible to background the appraiser, as in Example 5.46: *What about personal boundaries and **respect** for others?* Alternatively, we can background both the appraiser and appraised. The appraised may be recoverable in a generic form, as in Example 5.47: *respect [for each*

other] should be something that is in your relationship; or it may not be recoverable at all, as in Example 5.48: respect is also really really important.

In summary, the above analysis of the realisations of ‘respect’ reveals that it:

- Can inscribe affect, judgement or appreciation (primary coding)
- Can invoke judgement or appreciation (secondary coding)
- Can appraise a range of triggers and targets
- Can background the appraiser, appraised or both

On the whole, we can interpret these different realisations as discharging ideational meaning and charging interpersonal meaning. To discharge ideational meaning, ‘respect’ can background the appraiser and/or appraised. When backgrounding the appraiser, the person expressing the evaluation or ‘doing’ respect is either foregrounded as a target rather than an emoter (e.g. *we are **respectful**... to each other*), is only present in a non-specific or inferred sense (e.g. *That would be a great sign of a **respectful** relationship*) or becomes difficult to identify at all (e.g. *What about **respect** for others?*). And when backgrounding the appraised, we are uncoupling the ideational triggers and targets from the attitude that they evoke. They may only be recoverable in a non-specific form (e.g. *If someone is **disrespectful** [of their partner] then that makes an unhealthy relationship*), or they may be entirely omitted (e.g. ***respect** is really important*). While all of these instances contain explicit evaluation, the ideational meaning – whether appraiser, appraised or both – is gradually discharged.

To charge interpersonal meaning, ‘respect’ can inscribe affect, judgement or appreciation. First, ‘respect’ can inscribe affect, specifically satisfaction (e.g. *you **respect** the other person*). This foregrounds expressions of feeling in emotive mental Processes, and ‘respect’ is agnate with terms such as *value, admire, regard* and *think highly of*. Alternatively, ‘respect’ can inscribe judgement, specifically propriety (e.g. *we are **respectful** and kind to each other*). This foregrounds judgements of people and their behaviours, and ‘respect’ is agnate with terms such as *polite, considerate* and *civil*. Finally, ‘respect’ can inscribe appreciation, specifically balance (e.g. *that would be a great sign of a **respectful** relationship*). This foregrounds appreciation of entities, and ‘respect’ is agnate with terms such as *positive* and *healthy*. ‘Respect’ can thus inscribe affect, judgement or appreciation, depending on the trigger/target but also varying based on the realisation in lexicogrammar. As such, it is charging interpersonal meaning: it not only inscribes attitude, it operates across all the types of attitude (i.e. affect, judgement and appreciation).

The analysis presented above is thus more than a simple survey of ‘respect’ and its uses in the dataset. Describing these realisations also highlights how the different realisations allow ‘respect’ to discharge ideational meaning and charge interpersonal meaning in sex education. In other words, the realisation of ‘respect’ in lexicogrammar and discourse semantics is one key resource for its iconisation. While these different realisations of ‘respect’ contribute to its iconisation in sex education, it is important to note that my description is not a strictly linear one. It is not the case the ‘respect’ is initially realised by a mental Process (least iconised) in lesson 1, then by an Attribute, then by a Classifier and eventually by a Thing (most iconised) in lesson 15. Certainly, we can say that it is more iconised at the end of 10 weeks than it was at the beginning, but we cannot say based on this analysis alone that ‘respect’ begins at some ‘trough’ of iconisation in the first lesson and moves steadily to some ‘peak’ in the last. Rather, these different realisations contribute to iconising ‘respect’ at different points throughout the unit, and can be drawn on by teachers and students depending on whether they wish to highlight an expression of emotion (e.g. *you respect the other person*), a judgement of someone’s behaviour (e.g. *we are respectful*), an appreciation of an entity (e.g. *a respectful relationship*) or an attitude with no specific appraiser or appraised (e.g. *respect is really important*). Regardless of which realisation is used at any particular point in the term, ‘respect’ is being used to evaluate a range of feelings, people, behaviour and phenomena and in ways which can background the appraiser, appraised or both. This allows it to accrue a broader interpersonal meaning which goes beyond any specific type of attitude, radiating over an increasingly vast domain. In the following section, I continue to show how ‘respect’ discharges ideational meaning and charges interpersonal meaning by describing how it is instilled in sex education.

5.2 INSTILLING RESPECT

In the previous section, I described the realisations of ‘respect’ in sex education, taking instances from across the dataset. In this section, I conduct a more detailed analysis of a specific excerpt to describe how respect is instilled. By ‘**instilling**’, I mean the condensation of meaning in the service of iconisation. This contrasts with ‘distilling’, which is the condensation of meaning in the service of technicalisation. In Chapter 3, I described how *consent* distils a range of meanings when it is technicalised (see Section 3.2). More specifically, I showed that it distils attitudinal meanings, such as being *afraid*, *unconscious* or *threatened*, and these are organised through field relations and interrelations (see Section 3.3). In this section, I describe how respect instils a range of meanings when it is iconised. This also involves condensing meaning,

and it more specifically involves condensing attitudinal meanings. But whereas distilling a technical term such as *consent* serves to organise a field, instilling an icon such as ‘respect’ serves to neutralise the field. That is, respect is not tied to a particular domain of life; instead it seems to apply in all situations and for all people at all times.

To see how respect is instilled, I analyse the excerpt where respect is first discussed in detail. The excerpt comes from the second lesson of Josh’s class, which focuses on healthy relationships. The extract is approximately 20 minutes long, occurring at the beginning of the lesson (file ID J2_5m Healthy relationships, for full transcript see Appendix B).

The excerpt begins with a discussion of *what a healthy relationship looks like* in terms of its *key traits*. Students suggests a range of traits, such as *good communication*, being *trustworthy* and *the ability to compromise*. After students propose a series of accepted answers, the teacher sums up the discussion:

(5.49) T: *So there are kind of two core ideas... if we were to look through our syllabus and look through a bunch of the things that you said, there tends to be two main things that we come to that are the cores of healthy relationships. Those two things relate to communication [writes ‘communication’ on whiteboard] and on the other side respect [writes ‘respect’ on whiteboard], and those actually cover almost everything that you guys have talked about.*

In Example 5.49, the teacher sums up the preceding discussion into two concepts: *communication* and *respect* (I focus primarily on respect here). This stretch of talk condenses the preceding classroom talk into just these two terms in a number of ways. First, the teacher’s utterance in Example 5.49 is a HyperNew, consolidating the students’ answers using PERIODICITY. Second, he packages up the discussion using the semiotic entity *ideas*, as well as referring back using text reference (*the things that you said*). Third, he sharpens focus⁹ when describing the concepts as *two core ideas* and *two main things*. Finally, he gives the two concepts names: *communication* and *respect*. Notably, these are both nominal groups, specifically realised by Thing. As described in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.2), nominal groups, and especially Thing or Classifier ^ Thing, are a useful resource for condensing meaning. Already, there are a range of meanings being condensed into the term *respect* in this excerpt.

⁹ Note that *core ideas* and *main things* are on the border between sharpening focus (as analysed here) and appreciation. See for example the analysis of terms like *real* in Martin and White (2005: 57).

After the teacher writes the terms *communication* and *respect* on the whiteboard, he asks students to make a mind map for each with *all of the things that these involve*. He specifies that students should add in *all of the different aspects* and try to *come up with five or ten things*, further condensing meaning into these terms. He gives students time to write responses themselves before prompting them to share their answers by asking: *what does respect involve?*. Examples 5.50-5.54 show some of the students' answers:

(5.50) S: *Communication.*

(5.51) S: *Manners?*

(5.52) S: *Respect their feelings and beliefs.*

(5.53) S: *Uh freedom.*

(5.54) S: *Uh respecting their boundaries and what they don't want to do.*

The students' answers to the question *what does respect involve* include examples of things that can be respected such as *their feelings and beliefs* and *their boundaries*, as well as other generally positive items such as *communication*, *manners* and *freedom*. Each of these answers is affirmed i.e. accepted as correct. The teacher may affirm the answer by repeating it, as in:

(5.55) S: *Communication.*

T: *It does involve some **communication**.*

He may affirm the answer using internal CONNEXION such as *OK* or *yep*, as in:

(5.56) S: *Uh freedom.*

T: *Freedom, **yep**.*

He may affirm it by writing it on the whiteboard, as in:

(5.57) S: *Respect their feelings and beliefs..*

T: *OK. For opinions and beliefs. [**Writes 'for opinions and beliefs'**]*

He may affirm the answer with inscribed attitude, as in:

(5.58) S: *Uh respecting their boundaries and what they don't want to do.*

T: *Yep **fantastic** [positive valuation].*

And he may affirm the answer by packaging it up with a semiotic entity (e.g. *idea*) and positively evaluating it, as in (evaluation in **bold**, semiotic entity underlined):

(5.59) S: *Uh respecting their boundaries and what they don't want to do.*

T: *Yep fantastic. And the idea of boundaries is a **really really crucial** [positive valuation] one.*

Notably, every answer that students propose is accepted using one or more of the resources described in Examples 5.55-5.59. As such, they are each added to the whiteboard by the teacher as branches of the respect mind map. The full mind map is shown in Figure 5.1.




Figure 5.1 Mind map for respect (J2@23m)

So far, I have described how meanings are condensed into the term *respect* in this excerpt. The teacher packages up the students' initial discussion into the terms *respect* and *communication*, and then asks them to draw a mind map for each with *all the things that these involve*. When students offer their answers, the teacher accepts them all, culminating in a shared mind map on the whiteboard (Figure 5.1).

While it is clear that a range of meanings are being condensed into the term 'respect', how exactly are these meanings organised? When distilling meaning, we can describe the relations between elements using field. For instance, we can relate items in taxonomies (e.g. *the female reproductive system includes the vagina, uterus, fallopian tubes and ovaries*), or we can relate activities in sequences (e.g. *the rupture of the ovarian follicles causes the egg to be released from the ovary*). If field relations are insufficient, we can turn to field interrelations, as I did for *consent* in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.2.1.2). But these kinds of descriptions do not

work for respect. At face value, it might seem like the mind map depicts relations of taxonomy. For example, *respect for body* is a ‘type’ of *respect*, suggesting a classification taxonomy. Alternatively, we could interpret some elements as ‘parts’ of respect; the activity required writing down *all the things that [respect] involve[s]*, suggesting that *respect* is a whole which includes or comprises several parts (e.g. *manners* is ‘part’ of *respect*). But neither classification nor composition effectively captures all the ways these elements are related. For example, is *work both ways* a type of respect? A part of respect? In addition, taxonomies can typically list a phenomenon’s components or types exhaustively. For example, we can exhaustively list the components of the ovary (*outer cortex* and *inner medulla*), and we can exhaustively classify the types of condom (*male condoms* and *female condoms*). But the same is not true for *respect*. Seemingly all answers are accepted by the teacher – students could have equally proposed *respect for school, for friends and for family* as ‘types’ of respect, and being *nice, generous and considerate* as ‘parts’ of respect. Whether we are dealing with classification or composition, the ‘taxonomy’ of respect is open ended. How, then, are we to understand the relations between such disparate items?

The concept of ‘flexi-tech’ in history is useful here (Martin 2013b). History pedagogy has technical terms such as *trade, economy, society* and *culture*, but they are less thoroughly composed and decomposed and less clearly classified and subclassified than technical terms in the sciences. For example, *society* can cover “some or all of economy, culture, social structure, politics, religion and possibly other things as well” (ibid.: 29). This is especially true for terms ending in -ism, such as *capitalism, socialism, imperialism* and *nationalism*. Even where these terms have a definition, these are loose enough that they can be applied to a wide range of situations (e.g. the Cold War, Indo-China, Palestine; ibid.: 30). In their work on -isms in Modern History, Martin, Maton and Matruglio (2010) describe how these items adopt most of their meaning implicitly from co-text (2010: 448). But the ideational ‘emptiness’ of these terms does still serve a purpose. First, they can be applied to a range of different situations, historical societies and time periods. And second, they can be opposed to other -isms even when they do not belong to the same conceptual order – for instance opposing communism and democracy (rather than opposing, say, communism with capitalism, and democracy with autocracy; Martin, Maton & Matruglio 2010; Martin 2013b). This is particularly significant in history pedagogy, where students must not only demonstrate the ‘facts’ of history but must also adopt the right values and gain a ‘cultivated gaze’ (Maton 2010; Martin, Maton & Matruglio 2010). The concept of flexi-tech can thus be applied to respect in sex education, where disparate elements such as *freedom, giving space* and *positivity* are all condensed into a single term. In

fact, the goal seems to be that of defining respect loosely precisely so that it can apply to a wide range of phenomena and situations.

In sum, a range of meanings are being condensed into respect in this excerpt; but we cannot describe the relation between these meanings using our usual tools. While some elements suggest a taxonomy of classification (e.g. *respect for body*) or composition (e.g. respect includes *manners*), these cannot be listed exhaustively, and they are defined loosely enough that they can apply to a range of situations. Taxonomies and activity sequences are useful for understanding how meanings are distilled; but we need a less ideational lens to understand how meanings are instilled. To show this, I turn now to interpersonal meanings, describing how respect amasses triggers and targets and charges a consistent valency. As we will see, making sense of this mind map is not a matter of organising an ideational field, but of neutralising the ideational field.

5.2.1 Amassing triggers and targets

In Section 5.1, I described the different realisations of respect and showed that it can be used with a range of triggers (e.g. *you respect **the other person***) and targets (e.g. *a respectful **relationship***). Let us consider instances in the present excerpt where respect has a specific trigger/target. When the teacher asks *what does respect involve?*, there are three instances where students propose specific examples of entities or people which can be respected (trigger/target underlined):

(5.60) S: **Respect their opinions and beliefs**.

(5.61) S: *Um like **respecting each other's physical body**.*

(5.62) S: *Uh **respecting their boundaries and what they don't want to do**.*

In Examples 5.60-5.62, students propose different triggers/targets of respect: someone's *opinions and beliefs*, their *physical body* and their *boundaries*. Each of these examples is accepted and added to the whiteboard (as *for opinions & beliefs*, *for body* and *boundaries* respectively; see Figure 5.1). This is not a particularly elaborate list but, notably, it seems that there is almost no limit on what students could have suggested as a possible trigger/target of respect. We can imagine, for example, that answers of *respect for school*, *for family*, *for friends*, *for hobbies* and so on would all be acceptable. We could also be more specific, for example *respect for boundaries* could be expanded as *respect for sexual boundaries*, *for privacy*

boundaries and so on. To demonstrate this, let us briefly consider the various triggers/targets of respect that are used throughout the unit on sex education:

- Different kinds of people (e.g. *friend, your girlfriend, partners, your year group*)
- With different sexualities (e.g. *intersex people, someone who is gay, lesbian, straight, anything else*)
- Their feelings (e.g. *emotional state*)
- Their opinions and beliefs (e.g. *opinions, beliefs, their answer, what they have to say*)
- Their boundaries (e.g. *boundaries, each other's privacy*)
- Their physical body (e.g. *body*)
- Their rights (e.g. *sexual rights*)
- And the ways we talk to those people (e.g. *discussions*)

While only a small list of triggers/targets of respect are proposed in the lesson where the class builds the mind map, it does seem like any of the triggers/targets listed above could have been accepted. As such, these triggers and targets cannot be organised, for example through classification or composition taxonomies. At best, we could loosely categorise the triggers and targets of respect into the field of 'people', or perhaps the field of 'relationships' – broad fields with very few limits.

Respect thus amasses triggers and targets, evaluating people, behaviours and entities which are unrelated or only very loosely related. This has the effect of expanding almost indefinitely the list of possible situations in which respect is applicable. Rather than being limited to certain domains (e.g. school) or certain phenomena (e.g. people's opinions and beliefs), respect instead applies to all domains and all people at all times. The reason that an ideational tool such as taxonomy does not work here is because iconisation does not aim to organise the field, but to neutralise the field. When amassing triggers and targets, respect operates across affect, judgement and appreciation, as described in Section 5.1. As such, we might think of this as not only amassing attitude, but also as amassing triggers and targets.

While I have so far suggested that seemingly all answers from students were accepted into the respect mind map, there is in fact one restriction. This is the second aspect of instilling respect – namely that it charges a consistent valency.

5.2.2 Charging a consistent valency

The seemingly disparate meanings in the respect mind map do have one thing in common: they are all positive. All the meanings condensed into respect thus charge a consistent valency. In instances where respect inscribes attitude towards a specific trigger/target, this is already obvious. For example, *respect their opinions and beliefs* inscribes positive affect and invokes positive appreciation (see Section 5.1). Examples 5.63-5.66 show answers that students gave to the question *what does respect involve?* where there is no specific trigger/target, but where there is still positive evaluation:

(5.63) S: *Communication.*

(5.64) S: *Manners?*

(5.65) S: *Uh freedom.*

(5.66) S: *Give each other space.*

Examples 5.63-5.66 all contain positive evaluation. This can be inscribed (e.g. *freedom*) or provoked (e.g. *give each other space*). Beyond the fact that these answers are all positive, we cannot point to any particular relationship between them. In fact, we often cannot identify an appraiser or appraised, and therefore we cannot say anything about the sub-type of attitude.

Consider the student's answer in Example 5.66 – *communication*. Communication seems to generally be positive, but how might we code for attitude? Who is the appraiser and appraised? Is the act of communication being appreciated, for instance as easy to follow (complexity), appropriate and helpful (valuation), or generically good (quality)? Or are the people doing the communicating being judged, for instance as honest (veracity), or mature (capacity)? We cannot identify the appraiser, appraised or the sub-type of attitude. But regardless, we can say that the meaning being instilled is generally positive.

In fact, a consistent valency (in this case, positive) seems to be the only restriction on whether an answer is accepted. We can imagine any answer being accepted as long as it has positive attitude (e.g. *respect* involves *care, love, kindness, trust*), and we can equally imagine that an answer would be rejected if it had negative attitude (e.g. *respect* involves **lying*). We could, of course, negate negative attitude, for example *respect* involves **not lying**. Indeed, we see an example of this in the excerpt (negative attitude in **red**, positive attitude in **blue**):

(5.67) T: *What would be some signs of an **unhealthy** relationship?...*

S: *Physical **abuse**.*

T: OK, so **abuse**, whether that is physical or other forms, whether it's emotional or verbal, those are definitely signs of **unhealthy** relationships. Anything else?...

S: Uh **disrespectful**.

T: OK **disrespectful**. If someone is **disrespectful** then that makes an **unhealthy** relationship. Uh so, thinking some of the flip sides of those in terms of being a **healthy** relationship, we could flip some of those things and say uh **no abuse**, we could say that they are **respectful** and things like that. Those are **great** signs of a **healthy** relationship.

In Example 5.67, the teacher begins by asking for *signs of an **unhealthy** relationship* (negative balance). Students propose several answers which contain negative attitude: *physical abuse* and being *disrespectful* (both negative propriety). The teacher then switches to positive attitude, saying *we could flip some of those things* to understand the signs of a **healthy** relationship (positive balance). These include *no abuse* and being *respectful* (both positive propriety). Valency is kept consistent throughout Example 5.67, beginning with only negative attitude before giving the positive *flip sides*. The attitudes are otherwise identical, and valency changes are done with a negating prefix (e.g. *respectful* vs. **disrespectful**, *healthy* vs. **unhealthy**) or with deny resources (e.g. *abuse* vs. **no abuse**).

We can see then that valency must be kept consistent when instilling meaning into respect, specifically all meanings must be positive. This happens in one of four ways:

1. 'Respect' inscribes a positive attitude with an explicit trigger/target (e.g. *respect for opinions and beliefs*)
2. The meaning being condensed is an inscribed positive attitude (e.g. *freedom*)
3. The meaning being condensed is an invoked positive attitude (e.g. *give each other space*)
4. The meaning being condensed is a negated negative attitude (e.g. *no abuse*)

I refer to this as charging a consistent valency. By this I mean that all meanings contain evaluation with the same valency, in this case positive. While respect can be used with a seemingly endless range of triggers and targets, it does seem that it can only condense meanings which are positively charged. Indeed, this may be the only common feature shared by a range of otherwise disparate meanings.

5.2.3 An interpersonal perspective on condensing meanings

In this section I have analysed how meanings are instilled into respect in sex education. I began by proposing the term ‘instilling’, by which I mean the condensation of meaning in the service of iconisation. This is an interpersonal alternative to the term ‘distilling’, which is the condensation of meaning in the service of technicalisation. To show how respect is instilled with interpersonal meaning in sex education, I analysed the excerpt where respect is first taught in detail, as part of a lesson on healthy relationships. In this excerpt, respect condenses a range of meanings, culminating in a mind map co-created by the teacher and students. However, the relation between elements in this mind map could not be described using the usual analytical tools of taxonomy and activity sequencing. These tools are useful for understanding how meanings are distilled, but we needed a less ideational lens to understand how meanings are instilled. I then turned towards interpersonal meanings in the mind map, describing how respect amasses triggers and targets and charges a consistent valency.

First, when respect instils meaning, it amasses triggers and targets; evaluating people, behaviours and entities which are unrelated or only very loosely related (e.g. the field of ‘people’). This has the effect of expanding almost indefinitely the list of possible situations in which respect is applicable: rather than being limited to certain domains (e.g. school) or certain phenomena (e.g. people’s opinions and beliefs), respect instead applies to all domains and all people at all times. Another effect of amassing triggers and targets is that respect can inscribe affect, judgement or appreciation, so we might also think of this as respect amassing attitude. Second, when condensing meaning into respect, the class charges a consistent valency. By this I mean that all meanings contain evaluation with the same valency. In the case of respect, attitudes are always positive, whether inscribed (e.g. *freedom*) or invoked (e.g. *give each other space*), or alternatively they may be negated negative attitudes (e.g. *respect involves no abuse*). While respect can be used with a seemingly endless range of triggers and targets, it does seem that it can only condense meanings which are positively charged. Indeed, this may be the only common feature shared by a range of otherwise disparate meanings.

While both instilling and distilling allow meaning to be condensed, distilling functions to organise fields (e.g. *consent* consists of being *awake, conscious, not afraid* and so on), while instilling functions to neutralise fields (e.g. *respect* includes *freedom, positivity, respect for boundaries* and so on). In this way, we can interpret the process of instilling as broadly discharging ideational meaning and charging interpersonal meaning. By discharging ideational meaning, I mean that respect is field neutral. It can be used with a range of triggers and targets

which are unrelated or only very loosely related, and indeed this is precisely the point; it is not limited to a certain domain, but rather it radiates over all domains. It might be useful to think of this as a ‘weakly classified’ field, similar to flexi-tech terms (see Section 5.2). Indeed, it might be better to think of ideation as ‘weakly classified’, ‘neutralised’ or ‘diversified’ rather than discharged, since of course ideational meaning is still present (but more varied than ever). In terms of charging interpersonal meaning, respect operates across affect, judgement and appreciation, amassing attitude, and it charges a consistent valency. While seemingly any meaning can be instilled into respect, the only restriction is that it must continue to imbue respect with the same positive charge.

In this chapter I have described two ways that respect is iconised in sex education. In Section 5.1, I described the realisations of respect in lexicogrammar and discourse semantics, showing that respect can inscribe affect, judgement and appreciation (charging interpersonal meaning) and can background the appraiser, appraised or both (discharging ideational meaning). In Section 5.2, I described how respect is instilled, that is, how it condenses meaning in the service of iconisation. I showed how respect amasses triggers/targets (discharging ideational meaning/neutralising field) and charges a consistent valency (charging interpersonal meaning). Whether considering a specific excerpt or the dataset as a whole, we can see how respect discharges ideational meaning and charges interpersonal meaning in sex education. In the following section, I revisit the concept of iconisation in SFL and show why it needs to be renovated to account for respect in sex education.

5.3 REVISITING ICONISATION

Above I have described how respect is iconised in sex education. In this section, I compare the iconisation of respect to iconisation as it has been described in existing SFL work, showing why it is necessary to review and extend the notion of (bonding) icons. I then bring this together with my analysis of technicalisation from Chapters 3 and 4 and propose topological and typological perspectives on highly condensed meanings.

5.3.1 Iconised ideation and iconised attitude

Iconisation has been described as “the process of instantiation whereby ideational meaning is discharged and interpersonal meaning charged” (Martin 2010: 21). Bonding icons are the ‘end result’ of this process: once an item is sufficiently interpersonally charged, it becomes a bonding icon and radiates specific values for communities to rally around (Stenglin 2004, 2008;

Martin & Stenglin 2007). While respect in sex education is iconised, it is different to other bonding icons in one notable way. Stenglin explains that bonding icons rally communities by “crystallising strong interpersonal attitudes to *ideational meanings*” (2022: 6, emphasis added). For example, a flame (ideation) can be interpersonally charged with meanings of friendship, fair play and solidarity (interpersonal attitudes) to create the Olympic torch (bonding icon). However, for the analysis of iconisation in this chapter, I did not begin with ideation. Since respect is an inscribed attitude even before it is iconised, I took an explicit interpersonal meaning as the starting point. I then showed how this further charged interpersonal meaning (e.g. by charging a consistent valency) and further discharged ideational meaning (e.g. by backgrounding the appraiser and appraised). We might therefore distinguish between **iconised ideation**, where ideational meanings are interpersonally charged (e.g. the Olympic torch), and **iconised attitude**, where inscribed attitude is the starting point and this is iconised further still (e.g. respect). Iconised ideation is an alternative name for ‘bonding icons’ and highlights the relationship to iconised attitude. Iconised attitude is an interpersonal meaning (e.g. inscribed attitude) which has further charged interpersonal meaning and discharged ideational meaning and so become an emblem for communities to rally around.

As a way of turning this concept to purpose, some of the ‘features’ that can be used to identify iconised attitude include that it:

- Inscribes affect, judgement and appreciation
- Backgrounds (i.e. omits) the appraiser and/or appraised
- May be difficult to classify as affect, judgement or appreciation, especially when the appraiser and appraised are omitted and/or it is nominalised
- Appraises a range of triggers/targets that are unrelated or only loosely related (e.g. the field of ‘people’)
- Charges a consistent valency (either positive or negative)
- Is textually prominent (i.e. occurs in HyperTheme/New or MacroTheme/New)

As with technicalisation and technicalised attitude in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.3.2), it is important to consider iconised attitudes not only in specific instances but iconisation as a process. The above criteria may be useful for identifying an iconised attitude in text, but we should not look too synoptically for cut and dried recognition criteria. Instead, when examining iconised attitude we must also consider how they emerge or unfold in time, whether in text (logogenesis), in a lifetime (ontogenetic) or across generations (phylogenetic).

It is also important to ask whether the above criteria apply to iconised attitudes specifically, or to iconisation in general. In other words, are these criteria equally relevant to iconised ideation? To answer this, let us return to Stenglin's (2008, 2022) analysis of the Olympic torch, first presented in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.4.4). The Olympic torch is a bonding icon – or, in my terms, iconised ideation – and we can therefore ask whether it meets any of the above criteria. Indeed, it meets two criteria: it charges a consistent valency, and it can be used with affect, judgement and appreciation. To demonstrate this, consider Stenglin's analysis of attitude in a letter to a newspaper about the Sydney 2000 Olympic torch relay, in which the author moves through affect (in **blue**), judgement (in **green**) and appreciation (in **red**):

(5.68) *What a **wonderful** night!* [positive valuation]

*For all the **corruption, elitism and excesses** [negative propriety] of the IOC, you have to **appreciate** [positive valuation] an event that **draws the community on to the streets** [positive t-valuation], that engenders **a carnival atmosphere** [positive t-quality] and fills people with **joy**. [positive happiness] (Stenglin 2022: 4-5, markup edited from original)*

In Example 5.68, there are instances of affect (e.g. *fills people with joy*), judgement (e.g. *for all the corruption*) and appreciation (e.g. *wonderful night*). Stenglin describes this as bonding icons “moving people through all three attitudinal systems” (2022: 4). While Stenglin does not elaborate on what is meant by “moving people through” the attitudinal systems, we can interpret this as equivalent to the way ‘respect’ inscribes affect, judgement and appreciation, with one key difference. For iconised attitude such as ‘respect’, the icon itself is evaluative lexis (e.g. *respect, respectful*). As such, the iconised attitude inscribes affect (e.g. *you respect the other person*), judgement (e.g. *we are respectful*) and appreciation (e.g. *respectful relationship*). For iconised ideation such as the Olympic torch, the icon does not inscribe attitude but is instead the trigger/target for evaluation. For instance, in Example 5.68, the Olympic torch is the trigger for inscribed affect (e.g. *an event [the Olympic torch relay] that... fills people with joy*) and the target for inscribed appreciation (e.g. *what a wonderful night!*). While it is not the target for judgement in this text, this is alluded to in other parts of Stenglin's work. For example, she describes how the torch is charged with the value of ‘fair play’ (2022), which can be interpreted as positive propriety. In summary, both iconised attitude (e.g. ‘respect’) and iconised ideation (e.g. the Olympic torch) are used with affect, judgement and appreciation. But whereas iconised attitude inscribes these attitudes (e.g. *we are respectful*), iconised ideation evokes these attitudes as trigger/target (e.g. *[the Olympic torch relay] fills*

people with joy). Iconised ideation and iconised attitude thus both meet the criterion of amassing attitude.

The second criterion which applies to both iconised attitude and iconised ideation is that of charging a consistent valency. In Section 5.2.2, I described how the iconised attitude ‘respect’ charges a consistent positive valency. It does this by inscribing positive attitude (e.g. *respect for opinions and beliefs*), condensing positive attitudes (e.g. *respect involves freedom*) and negating negative attitudes (e.g. *respect involves no abuse*). A similar pattern occurs with iconised ideation such as the Olympic torch. In Example 5.68, the Olympic torch is the trigger/target for numerous positive attitudes (e.g. *wonderful night, fills people with joy*). The other attitudes in this text are either positive (e.g. *you have to appreciate, a carnival atmosphere*), or negated negative attitudes (e.g. the concession conjunction *for* in *for all the corruption, elitism and excesses*). This is just one short text, but Stenglin (2008: 61) describes various other positive attitudes evoked by the Olympic torch relay, including hope, harmony and social unity. Iconised ideation and iconised attitude thus both meet the criterion of charging a consistent valency, either by inscribing and invoking positive attitude (e.g. *respectful relationship, wonderful night*) or by negating negative attitude (e.g. *respectful involves no abuse, for all the corruption*).

Above I have shown how the criteria for identifying iconised attitude also apply for identifying iconised ideation. Specifically, I have shown how the Olympic torch – a bonding icon (i.e. iconised ideation) – amasses attitude and charges a consistent valency. While I have only re-examined one example of iconised ideation here, other instances are consistent with my description. For example, Stenglin (2017) describes the iconisation of the artist Marina Abramović in the performance art piece *The Artist is Present*. This bonding icon (i.e. iconised ideation) amasses attitude just like the Olympic torch: as the trigger for affect (happiness) and as the target for judgement (capacity) and appreciation (valuation; 2017: 100-101). These attitudes are also all positive, suggesting that this iconised ideation also charges a consistent valency (ibid.). Notably, Stenglin describes how attitudes towards Abramović shifted from negative to positive during the process of iconisation, and it would be useful for future work to consider how this fits with the notion of charging a consistent valency.

Iconised ideation and iconised attitude thus have overlapping criteria for their identification: they both amass attitude, and they both charge a consistent valency. This finding strengthens my new theorisation of iconisation, demonstrating that the description of iconisation in this chapter is not only relevant to respect in sex education but to iconised attitude and iconisation more broadly. Iconised attitude and iconised ideation also meet these criteria

in distinct and important ways. While they can both be used with affect, judgement and appreciation, iconised attitude inscribes these directly (e.g. *we are **respectful***), while iconised ideation evokes these as trigger/target (e.g. *[the Olympic torch relay] fills people with **joy***). This reinforces the distinction between iconise ideation where ideational meanings are interpersonally charged, and iconised attitude where inscribed attitude is the starting point and this is iconised further still.

5.3.2 Bringing together technicality and iconisation

In this chapter, I have shown how respect is iconised in sex education, and more specifically I have described it as an iconised attitude. By contrast, in Chapter 3, I showed how consent is technicalised in sex education, and more specifically I described it as a technicalised attitude. While consent and respect pedagogy were analysed independently, in this section I bring them together and formalise the relationship between technicalisation and iconisation in SFL theory.

Beginning with technicalised attitude, in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.3) I described how technicalised attitudes such as consent distil a range of interpersonal meanings (i.e. attitudes) at the level of field. These are then related through field interrelations (extension, elaboration and enhancement), such that the technical term ‘consent’ condenses a complex network of attitudinal meanings. While the elements being distilled are interpersonal (e.g. inclination, capacity), the process of technicalisation ‘empties out’ the attitudinal meaning, discharging interpersonal meaning and simultaneously charging ideational meaning. By contrast, in this chapter I described how iconised attitudes such as ‘respect’ condense a range of meanings in the service of iconisation, which I refer to as instilling. I showed how respect accrues ideational triggers and targets, operates across all three sub-systems of ATTITUDE and charges a consistent valency, hypercharging its interpersonal meaning in the process. The process of instilling or iconising respect thus hypercharges interpersonal meaning, and simultaneously discharges ideational meaning. We might therefore think of consent and respect pedagogies as ‘opposites’ in some sense: where consent discharges interpersonal meaning to distil technicality, respect hypercharges interpersonal meaning to instil an icon. Similarly, while both technicalised attitude and iconised attitude condense attitudinal meanings, they do these in opposing ways. Technicalised attitudes organise fields (e.g. *consent* consists of being *awake, conscious, not afraid* and so on), while iconised attitudes neutralise fields (e.g. *respect* includes *freedom, positivity, respect for boundaries* and so on). Below I present two ways to conceive of the relationship between technicalised attitude and iconised attitude. First, we can think of them

topologically: as two ends of a cline from ideational charge to interpersonal charge. And second, we can think of them typologically: as types of highly condensed meaning.

Beginning with the topological perspective, it is useful here to return to the notion of inscribed and invoked attitude. In the APPRAISAL system, Martin and White (2005) distinguish between inscribed attitudes which are more explicit (e.g. *boundaries are really **crucial***) and invoked attitudes which are more implicit (e.g. *you need to **give each other space***). Within invoked attitude, we can distinguish even further. Martin and White (2005: 67) propose provoke (most explicit), flag, and afford (least explicit), and Martin (2020a) extends this further to distinguish between idiom (e.g. *one of a kind*), lexical metaphor (e.g. *giant of history*), interjections (e.g. *wow*), swearing (e.g. *hell of a guy*), raising (e.g. *thousands attended the service*), charged affording (e.g. *don a Springboks jersey*) and neutral affording (e.g. *attend the match*). These distinctions are summarised in a system network in Figure 5.2.




Figure 5.2 System network of inscribing and invoking attitudes (Martin 2020a: 21)

While Martin (2020a) presents this a system network, we could alternatively represent it as a cline from implicit to explicit, as in Figure 5.3.




Figure 5.3 Inscribing and invoking attitude as a cline

Note that Figure 5.3 is not ‘to scale’, and that I have included all the terms that Martin (2020a, in italics) and Martin and White (2005, non-italics) use for the sake of being exhaustive. This has the effect of collapsing certain distinctions; for example, Martin (2020a) positions swearing and raising (i.e. graduation) as options within flagging, whereas I represent swearing, graduation and flagging independently.

Adapting this cline, we can bring together the concepts of technicalised attitude (e.g. *consent*) and iconised attitude (e.g. *respect*). First, rather than using the labels ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ for the ends of this cline, we might think of more explicit attitudes as having stronger interpersonal charge and more implicit attitudes as having weaker interpersonal charge and correspondingly stronger ideational charge. Conceived in this way, we can think of technicalised attitude and iconised attitude as the new ‘extreme’ ends of this cline, as in Figure 5.4.




Figure 5.4 Technicalised attitude and iconised attitude as extremes of dis/charging interpersonal meaning

Figure 5.4 positions technicalised attitude as having fully discharged its interpersonal meaning (thus on the far left), and iconised attitude as having hypercharged its interpersonal meaning (thus on the far right). Conceiving of technicalised attitude and iconised attitude in this way allows us to bring it together with other descriptions of interpersonal meaning (e.g. inscribed and invoked attitude) and allows us to see the intermittent ‘steps’ in the process of iconising and technicalising. The topological representation makes it clear that meanings can be somewhat iconised or somewhat technicalised, and that this is a process that unfolds in time, whether viewed logogenetically, ontogenetically or phylogenetically.

As well as bringing together technicalised attitude and iconised attitude as a topology, we can also think of them in a typology alongside two other terms introduced in this thesis – namely technicalised ideation (e.g. *oestrogen*) and iconised ideation (e.g. the Olympic torch). To show this, I first summarise the difference between technicalised ideation and technicalised attitude, and then I do the same for iconised ideation and iconised attitude.

SFL conceives of technicality as the process of distillation, “whereby meaning is both condensed and reconstituted in lexis construing uncommon sense knowledge of the world” (Martin 2017a: 113). However, as described in Chapter 3, the existing theorisation of technicality in SFL could not account for terms such as *consent*, which are technical terms in legal discourse and sex education, but which distil attitudinal meanings rather than ideational ones. I thus proposed the terms technicalised ideation and technicalised attitude. Both of these are the result of technicalisation (i.e. condensing and reconstituting meaning); but the former condenses ideational meanings and the latter condenses attitudinal ones. Importantly, technicality attitude is not itself attitudinal, since one of the functions of technicalising is to ‘empty out’ attitudinal meaning. However these attitudinal meanings can be recovered when technicalised attitude is elaborated, such as when it is defined or (especially) when it is pedagogised.

In this chapter, I have repeated this same process for iconisation. SFL conceives of iconisation as “the process of instantiation whereby ideational meaning is discharged and interpersonal meaning charged” (Martin 2010: 21). Icons are then the ‘end result’ of this process; once an item is sufficiently interpersonally charged, it becomes a (bonding) icon and radiates specific values for communities to rally around (Stenglin 2004, 2008; Martin & Stenglin 2007). However, as described in this chapter, the existing theorisation of icons and iconisation in SFL could not account for terms such as ‘respect’, which are iconised in sex education but which take interpersonal meaning as their starting point. Whereas existing work has described how icons “crystallis[e] strong interpersonal attitudes to *ideational meanings*”

(Stenglin 2022: 6, emphasis added), here I have shown how ‘respect’ takes interpersonal meaning as the starting point and then further charges interpersonal meaning (e.g. by charging a consistent valency) and further discharges ideational meaning (e.g. by backgrounding the appraiser and appraised). I thus proposed the terms iconised ideation and iconised attitude. Both of these are the result of iconisation (i.e. discharging ideational meaning and charging interpersonal meaning), but the former takes ideational meaning as its starting point while the latter takes interpersonal meaning (e.g. inscribed attitude) as its starting point.

In sum, consent and respect in sex education have ‘opposite’ pedagogies (technicalising vs. iconising), but they have had the same impact on the theorisation of technicalisation and iconisation: the need to distinguish between whether we are technicalising/iconising attitude or ideation. We can now bring these together into a typology, as in Table 5.7.

	technicalised <i>(distilled ideationally)</i>	iconised <i>(instilled interpersonally)</i>
ideation <i>(starts ideational)</i>	e.g. <i>oestrogen</i> (aka ‘technicality’)	e.g. <i>the Olympic torch</i> (aka ‘bonding icon’/‘anticon’)
attitude <i>(starts interpersonal)</i>	e.g. <i>consent</i> (aka ‘axi-tech’)	e.g. <i>respect</i> (aka ‘axicon’)

Table 5.7 A typology of highly condensed meanings

Table 5.7 brings together the concepts of technicalised ideation (e.g. *oestrogen*), technicalised attitude (e.g. *consent*), iconised ideation (e.g. the Olympic torch) and iconised attitude (e.g. ‘respect’; what Martin (2021) calls ‘axicon’). The columns distinguish whether something is technicalised, meaning it has been distilled ideationally, or iconised, meaning it has been instilled interpersonally. Beginning with the first column, technicalised items can distil information about classification (e.g. *premenopausal oestrogen*, *enthusiastic consent*), composition (e.g. *semen contains spermatozoa, proteolytic enzymes and fructose*) and activity sequences (e.g. *menstrual cycle* unfolds as the lining of the uterus thickens, an egg travels to the uterus from the ovaries and, if the egg is unfertilised, the uterine lining is shed as a period). In addition, technicalised items can relate elements using field interrelations of extension, elaboration and enhancement (e.g. *if you are asleep or unconscious then there is no free and voluntary agreement which is called no consent*). In the second column, iconised items can instil interpersonal meaning by amassing triggers/targets (e.g. *respect for others*, *respect for*

opinions and beliefs), amassing attitude (e.g. *[the Olympic torch relay] fills people with joy; what a wonderful night!*) and charging a consistent valency. The rows distinguish whether the underlying meaning is ideation or attitude. This may involve unpacking meaning through definition or a more elaborated explanation such as those found in pedagogy (e.g. *consent means your free and voluntary agreement to sex, it's never OK for someone to force you*). In lay terms, we could say that the rows distinguish whether something 'starts' as ideation (e.g. a flame for the Olympic torch) or as attitude (e.g. inclination for *consent*). We might also think of this as how an item 'looks', regardless of the meanings it has condensed. For example, *consent* might 'look' attitudinal, but it has in fact been technicalised to empty it of any interpersonal meaning. The columns distinguish whether something 'ends up' with stronger ideational charge (through technicalising) or interpersonal charge (through iconising).

The title of this table is 'a typology of highly condensed meanings', capturing the fact that both technicality and icons condense many meanings whether ideational (row 1) or attitudinal (row 2), and whether by distilling (column 1) or instilling (column 2). In this way, technicality and icons can also be viewed from the perspective of mass. These highly condensed meanings all have strong mass, and we might think of these as the items which 'do the heavy lifting' when it comes to building fields ideationally and building communities interpersonally. An alternative title for this table is 'a typology of uncommonsense and sensibility'. While technicality is often described as 'uncommonsense' meaning, we can extend this to 'uncommon sensibility' (see Martin 2004b, Martin & White 2005: 212) to include those complex and highly valued interpersonal meanings that are instilled in icons such as respect in sex education.

5.4 INSIGHTS FROM CHAPTER 5

In this chapter, I highlighted the importance of recognising that attitudinal meanings can not only be distilled, but also that they can be instilled. Whereas in Chapter 3 I showed how consent distils a range of attitudinal meanings in the service of technicalisation, in this chapter I showed how respect instils a range of attitudinal meanings in the service of iconisation. My analysis revealed that both instilling and distilling are processes for condensing meaning, but where distilling functions to organise fields (e.g. *consent* consists of being *awake, conscious, not afraid* and so on), instilling functions to neutralise fields (e.g. *respect* includes *freedom, positivity, respect for boundaries* and so on). This has the effect of expanding almost indefinitely the list of possible situations in which respect is applicable: rather than being

limited to certain domains (e.g. school) or certain phenomena (e.g. people's opinions and beliefs), respect instead applies to all domains and all people at all times. Throughout this chapter I also documented the linguistic resources that contribute to iconising respect in sex education, for example it discharges ideational meaning by uncoupling from its ideational trigger/target, and it charges interpersonal meaning by inscribing affect, judgement and appreciation. This is an important step forward for our understanding of the tools for iconisation, and offers crucial insight into how a range of attitudinal meanings can be condensed either in the service of iconisation or technicalisation.

Recognising this was significant for understanding that not only ideational but also attitudinal meanings can be iconised. Previous theorisation on iconisation has described how bonding icons crystallise strong interpersonal attitudes to ideational meanings; for example a flame (ideation) can be interpersonally charged with meanings of friendship, fair play and solidarity (interpersonal attitudes) to create the Olympic torch (bonding icon). However, the analysis in this chapter has demonstrated that an explicitly attitudinal meaning (e.g. *respect*) can be the starting point which is then iconised by further charging interpersonal meaning (e.g. by charging a consistent valency) and discharging ideational meaning (e.g. by backgrounding the appraiser and appraised). This meant that I needed to revise the concept of icons and iconisation in recognition of iconised attitude as distinct from iconised ideation. **Iconised ideation** is where ideational meanings are interpersonally charged (e.g. the Olympic torch), and **iconised attitude** is where inscribed attitude is the starting point and this is iconised further still (e.g. 'respect'). This perspective on iconisation has important implications for SFL's existing theorisation of iconisation, and throughout this chapter I have highlighted linguistic resources and criteria for identifying iconised attitude and iconised ideation such that this new perspective can be mobilised in other contexts.

This led to my proposal for topological and typological perspectives on highly condensed meanings, bringing together the new perspective on iconisation with the revised theorisation of technicality from Chapter 3. Technicalisation and iconisation can be viewed as complementary perspectives, either as ends of a cline (between discharging and charging interpersonal meaning), or as dimensions of a typology which encapsulates all the concepts of technicalised attitude, technicalised ideation, iconised attitude and iconised ideation. Consolidating these concepts as a typology highlights that both technicality and icons condense many meanings whether ideational or attitudinal, and whether by distilling or instilling. This has important implications not only for our understanding of technicalisation and iconisation as complementary processes, but also extends our theorisation of mass. Icons and technicality

alike can be thought of as highly condensed meanings which ‘do the heavy lifting’ when it comes to building fields ideationally and building communities interpersonally. They thus offer a crucial new perspective on the condensation of meaning in a range of subject areas, from the sciences, to the law, to museums and the fine arts, to the humanities.

In the next chapter I am going to draw on these understandings of iconised attitude to look closely at pedagogy to see how respect is learnt. While I have shown here that respect is iconised in sex education, in the following chapter I provide evidence that this iconised attitude is accepted, with students being successfully apprenticed into this values system and convinced to rally around it. This will position me to make detailed suggestions about how this new perspective on iconisation not only impacts SFL theory, but also relates closely to pedagogic practice.

Chapter 6 – Learning Respect

In the previous chapter, I showed how respect is iconised in sex education. More specifically, I showed that respect is an iconised attitude which inscribes affect, judgement and appreciation and which instils consistently positive attitudinal meanings. In this chapter, I draw on this understanding of iconised attitude to look closely at pedagogy and consider how respect is learnt. This chapter builds on the previous one in the sense that it tries to understand whether the knowledge and values instilled into respect are then taken up (or not) by students. That is, are students successfully apprenticed into the values system of respect and convinced to rally around it as a class? Is respect ‘accepted’ as an iconised attitude, and what evidence do we have of this? More theoretically speaking, this chapter shifts from a focus on instantiation to bring individuation into the picture. Whereas Chapter 5 focussed on iconisation as a process (i.e. discharging ideational meaning and charging interpersonal meaning), this chapter focusses on how iconisation functions in the service of affiliation. In Section 6.1, I analyse two instances of teachers successfully managing competing perspectives on what respect means and highlight the linguistic resources that these two texts have in common. In Section 6.2, I analyse a third excerpt where the teacher is unsuccessful in aligning the class around what respect means. I demonstrate that the teacher uses some but not all of the linguistic resources of the successful texts, and I argue that these differences are key to understanding why (re)alignment succeeds or fails. In Section 6.3, I consolidate the analyses of these three excerpts as five rhetorical strategies and situate these within SFL theory. By way of exemplifying these strategies, I rewrite the unsuccessful text using the successful texts as a model. I also apply the insights from these analyses by proposing a teaching resource for navigating competing perspectives on complex and sensitive topics. In Section 6.4, I review the insights from Chapters 5 and 6.

Broadly conceived, this chapter is my assessment of whether the iconisation of respect ‘works’. While success is difficult to ‘measure’, it is particularly evident in one lesson where a student comes out as bisexual in front of the class. This is evidence that the teacher has succeeded in creating a classroom environment which is accepting, tolerant and welcoming of LGBTQIA+ people. While I cannot prove that all students left the class more respectful than they entered it, the analysis presented in this chapter certainly suggests that they do. For at least one student, the experience of sex education was one that affirmed their sexuality, and made them feel welcome, tolerated and respected despite differing from the status quo.

6.1 RALLYING AROUND RESPECT

In this section and in Section 6.2, I present detailed analyses of three excerpts, offering these as case studies where respect is negotiated both successfully and unsuccessfully. Just as understanding the technicalisation of consent required a close examination of how that technicality is unpacked and repacked (see Chapter 4), understanding the iconisation of respect requires a detailed analysis of how the class rallies around respect as an icon. I take a close look at three excerpts, focussing particularly on genre and APPRAISAL, to highlight precisely which strategies work to align the class around what respect means. Excerpts are reproduced as faithfully as possible, but for reasons of space some regulative discourse is omitted.

To begin, let us look at two excerpts where the teachers successfully manage competing perspectives on what respect means. These excerpts deal with different issues, are taken from different points in the term, and are even taught by different teachers: in Text 6.1, Josh's class negotiates what it means to respect a partner's privacy, and in Text 6.2, Rhianon's class negotiates how to behave respectfully towards members of the LGBTQIA+ community. Despite this, both texts use remarkably similar strategies when (re)aligning students around respect. Most obviously, they both use discussion genres, and at first glance it might seem that this is what makes them both successful. Discussion genres are designed to adjudicate between multiple sides and offer a resolution, and it seems fitting that this genre would do the work of managing competing perspectives. However, there is more to the success of these texts than simply exploring sides around an issue; the teachers are also advising students how to react in certain situations, acknowledging and validating different emotions, and, crucially, they are differentiating between how students feel and how they should behave in light of (or in spite of) those feelings and opinions. The teachers can and do use discussions when doing this, but they can also do this independently of this particular genre. For this reason, I argue that these resources do not sit within the realisation hierarchy (e.g. genre), but are recurring instantiation patterns which function in the service of affiliation to rally the class around respect as an iconised attitude.

6.1.1 Text 6.1: Different beliefs, same behaviour

To begin, let us consider an excerpt where there are competing perspectives on what it means to respect a partner's privacy. The excerpt for analysis is Text 6.1, 'Ground rules', from lesson 3 of Josh's class (file ID J3_13m Ground rules, for full transcript see Appendix B). This follows the lesson where the class instilled a range of meanings into respect (e.g. *freedom, give each*

other space, see Section 5.2) and learnt about the characteristics of healthy relationships. In this lesson, students are learning to apply this new knowledge to their own romantic and sexual relationships, real or imagined. In Text 6.1, they are discussing how to respect a partner's privacy, and whether or not it is OK to look at your partner's phone.

To begin, a student proposes that one of their ground rules in a relationship is *respecting each other's privacy*, as shown in Example 6.1:

- (6.1) T: *What might be a rule that you would set up in your relationship with your partner?...*
- S1: *Respecting each other's privacy.*
- T: *OK respecting each other's privacy. That's actually a really fantastic one. What does that actually involve to you? What does that mean?*
- S1: *Like if we don't want to tell you something.*
- T: *OK respect the other person's ability and right to keep a secret of something they don't wanna share.*

In Example 6.1, The student proposes the ground rule *respecting each other's privacy*. Here, we see a student proposing an example of what respect looks like: in a relationship, you need to *respect each other's privacy*, including *if we don't want to tell you something*, which the teacher rephrases as the *ability and right to keep a secret*. The teacher affirms that this is an appropriate and even a *fantastic* ground rule, agreeing with the student's example of what respect means or looks like in a relationship. However, he anticipates that not all students will agree with this, and that he may need to (re)align the class around a particular idea of respect.

To make space for different points of view, the teacher sets up a discussion. A discussion is a persuasive genre in which more than one position on an issue is explicitly tendered, with stages Issue ^ Sides ^ Resolution (Martin & Rose 2008: 121, 137). The Issue stage is provided as Example 6.2 (see Appendix D for full genre analysis):

- (6.2) T: *So here's an example of one that people might think of, in terms of ground rules for relationships, if, there's kind of two sides to this one. If you think that you should be able to look at your partner's phone and they look at your phone any time you like and that should be completely open, you should be able to do that any time you like, could you put your hand up? If you think that should be able to happen any time. [Some students raise hands] Fantastic.*

OK. If you think that your phone is your own private place and you think that your partner should NOT be able to touch your phone without asking you, could you put your hand up? So if you think your partner should have to ask you to touch and look through your phone. [Some students raise hands]

OK, good good. So there's a kind of good example of where a ground rule might be different for different people.

In Example 6.2, the teacher elaborates on the proposed ground rule – *respecting each other's privacy* – and gives a more specific example; whether or not you *should be able to look at your partner's phone... any time you like*. Where initially (Example 6.1) the teacher agreed with the student's ground rule *respecting the other person's privacy*, now he is acknowledging that there are competing perspectives on what respect might look like. When setting up the Issue stage, the teacher begins by explicitly stating that there are *two sides to this*, naming the different perspectives using semiotic entities (*sides*) and specifying how many (*two sides*). He then outlines the two positions: that *you should be able to look at your partner's phone... any time you like*, or that *your phone is your own private place*. Rather than simply stating the two sides himself, he builds the Issue stage dialogically with students, inviting them to indicate which side they agree with by raising their hands.

Importantly, both sides are presented as valid options. They are both introduced using heteroglossic expansion, specifically entertain resources (*if you think...*), which acknowledge that there are other possible positions. They are also presented with minimal inscribed attitude, with neither positioned as obviously better or worse than the other. When the students indicate that they agree with a particular position, in both instances the teacher appreciates their position with positive valuation, as *fantastic* and *good good*. The teacher then captures these opposing answers as a *good example of where a ground rule might be different for different people*.

The teacher is thus making space for students to hold different points of view when it comes to *respecting a partner's privacy*. He sets up a discussion genre and invites students to indicate which side of the Issue they agree with. In the following section, he then presents each Side of the discussion himself:

(6.3) T: *Now you might think it's entirely fine to look through your partner's phone any time you like, you just pick it up and look through it and that's fine. And I mean, you should be able to do that because they should be open and shouldn't have any secrets. Your partner however might think "like, I don't really have secrets, but I just don't like the invasion of privacy of you just doing that without asking me or without telling me".*

In Example 6.3, the teacher states the two Sides. Side 1 is the agree position and Side 2 is the disagree position, as presented in Table 6.1.

Side 1	T: <i>Now you might think it's entirely fine to look through your partner's phone any time you like, you just pick it up and look through it and that's fine. And I mean, you should be able to do that because they should be open and shouldn't have any secrets.</i>
Side 2	T: <i>Your partner however might think "like, I don't really have secrets but I just don't like the invasion of privacy of you just doing that without asking me or without telling me".</i>

Table 6.1 Staging of Side 1 and Side 2 in discussion in J3_13m Ground rules

The restatement of Sides is similar to their presentation in the Issue stage, but they now contain more attitude as this is where the persuasive work of the discussion genre takes place. Side 1 appeals to veracity, the sub-system of JUDGEMENT which deals with how truthful someone is. The argument for why you should be able to look through a partner's phone is because they *should be open* (positive veracity) and *shouldn't have any secrets* (positive t-veracity)¹⁰. Side 2 appeals instead to tenacity, the sub-system of JUDGEMENT which deals with how dependable someone is. The issue at stake is not veracity: *I don't really have any secrets* (positive t-veracity), but rather that someone does not like the *invasion of privacy* (negative t-tenacity). Even while advancing a specific argument, both Sides use heteroglossic expansion, specifically entertain, always acknowledging other possible perspectives (*you might think...*, *your partner might think...*). Notably, the teacher attributes the two sides to people in a hypothetical relationship: *you might think* versus *your partner might think*. This allows him to tender two positions, but also reimagines the discussion as a situation that students may find themselves in: a disagreement with a romantic partner. This sets up the discussion genre to perform two functions: to air competing perspectives on respect, but also to model to students how they might manage disagreement in a respectful and healthy relationship. We see this in the Resolution stage, presented as Example 6.4:

¹⁰ *Have... secrets* is negative t-veracity which is then negated with disclaim: deny resources in *shouldn't have any secrets*. This is simplified to simply positive t-veracity. Likewise for *I don't really have any secrets*.

(6.4) T: *Uh and so you might actually need to set up a ground rule or establish something within your relationship so that there is an understanding there. You might want to set up a rule that says, “you can look through my phone any time, as long as you just let me know that you are doing it, as long as you ask first.”*

Example 6.4 realises the Resolution stage of the discussion. The teacher proposes a *ground rule* that works as a compromise between the conflicting positions: *you can look through my phone any time, as long as you just let me know*. He uses entertain resources (*you **might** want to set up a rule*), acknowledging that there are alternative positions and different ways to compromise on this issue. Note that this ‘compromise’ is much closer to Side 2 than Side 1: while discussions ostensibly tender multiple positions, they typically favour one side over the other (see Martin & Rose 2008: 121).

Whereas the Side stages (Example 6.3) were concerned with advancing a particular argument, the Resolution (Example 6.4) is where the teacher adjudicates between the opposing views and arrives at a compromise. This is reflected in the attitude resources of each stage. The Side stages contain more inscribed attitudes which indicate people’s feelings (e.g. *I don’t **like** the invasion of privacy*) and the justification for their opinion (e.g. *they should be **open***). By contrast, the Resolution stage is more implicit in its evaluation and focuses on modelling appropriate behaviours rather than on expressing thoughts and feelings. The teacher proposes a *ground rule*, a technicalised judgement which we could code as invoking tenacity (e.g. being *reliable, loyal*) or, if the rule is more high stakes, perhaps as invoking propriety (e.g. being *moral, law abiding*). The ground rule is established in the HyperNew, amplifying its positive prosody so that it radiates back across the previous stages of the discussion. Finally, when modelling behaviour, the teacher does not only point to general principles but is specific, even giving the wording of the ground rule (*a rule that **says**...*). This gives students the tools to navigate this kind of conflict, and models how students can act respectfully in their relationships.

To summarise, in Text 6.1 the teacher highlights the different opinions people might have when it comes to *respecting* a partner’s *privacy*, and specifically whether or not you should be allowed to look at your partner’s phone any time you want. He does this with a discussion genre, beginning with an Issue stage which he builds dialogically with students, inviting them to indicate which position they agree with. In the Side stages he gives reasoning for each position, using more inscribed attitudes since this is where the bulk of the persuasive work takes place. In Side 1, he appeals to veracity, saying that partners should be *open* and *not*

have any secrets. In Side 2, he appeals to tenacity, arguing that the issue is the *invasion of privacy*. The Side stages also reimagine the discussion as a disagreement between two people in a romantic relationship (*you might think... your partner however might think...*). This sets up the discussion genre to not only resolve two competing perspectives, but also to model how students might manage disagreement in a respectful and healthy relationship. In the Resolution stage, the teacher proposes a *ground rule* which strikes a compromise between the two sides. He does this explicitly, even providing the wording of the rule (*a rule that says...*).

This excerpt is significant because it is the first time we see that there are competing perspectives over what respect means. Whereas in previous lessons almost all meanings were accepted as part of respect (e.g. *respect for body, for opinions and beliefs*; see Section 5.2), here we see the class disagreeing over what counts as *respecting* a partner's *privacy*. Despite these competing perspectives, it appears that the teacher has successfully managed any potential clash, evidenced by the fact that students engage with the scenario (e.g. by raising their hands to indicate dis/agreement) and, unlike another excerpt considered below, they do not push back or expressly dissent. Of course, we cannot say with certainty that students were convinced by the teacher's argument; some may think that their side alone is the right one, and that all other perspectives are invalid. However, when Text 6.1 is considered alongside two other excerpts, it becomes increasingly evident that this text is in fact successful, and that the teacher's choice of linguistic resources (e.g. the discussion genre, inscribed attitudes in the Side stages) are key to its success. In the following section, I analyse Text 6.2 and show that it uses very similar rhetorical strategies to Text 6.1 despite being on a different topic, at a different point in the term, and taught by a different teacher. And later (see Section 6.2), I will show what it looks like when the class clearly does not accept the teacher's proposed meaning of respect. First, let us turn to second instance of a teacher successfully rallying the class around respect.

6.1.2 Text 6.2: Different topic, same strategies

In this second excerpt, we move from Josh's class to Rhianon's, we jump from lesson 3 to lesson 9, and we shift from respecting a partner's privacy to respecting members of the LGBTQIA+ community. Despite this change, we see the same sorts of rhetorical strategies in use: modelling to students how to behave, acknowledging and validating different emotions, and differentiating between feeling these emotions and how to behave in light of/in spite of those emotions. This excerpt is also extremely successful, as demonstrated by the fact that a

student comes out as bisexual in front of the class. While it is not always possible to point to specific, tangible evidence that teaching has had its desired outcome, this excerpt shows very clearly that the teacher has successfully created a classroom environment which is tolerant, accepting and even welcoming of LGBTQIA+ students.

The second excerpt for analysis is Text 6.2, ‘Same-sex attraction’, from lesson 9 of Rhianon’s class (file ID R9_20m Same-sex attraction, for full transcript see Appendix B). (Note that I use the term ‘same-sex attraction’ since this is how it is worded in the data. Terms such as ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’, ‘bisexual’ and/or ‘pansexual’ may be more fitting for someone who is attracted to people of the same gender.) In this lesson, students are learning about gender and sexuality diversity, and, as we will see, the importance of behaving respectfully towards people who are gender and sexuality diverse. The class discusses a series of ‘Statements on sexuality’, provided on a handout (see Appendix C). The teacher calls on students to share whether they agree or disagree, and in Text 6.2 specifically they discuss the following statement:

(6.5) *I’d feel flattered if someone of the same sex asked me out.*

Two students have opposite responses to this statement: one indicates that they ‘agree’ while the other puts ‘strongly disagree’. Thus, just like Text 6.1, Text 6.2 involves competing perspectives that must be resolved. As we will see, the teacher makes space for students to have different feelings in this situation, but asserts that everyone must behave respectfully despite those emotions. Text 6.2 is the longest of the three excerpts, and will be presented and analysed in segments. It begins with a discussion genre, followed by an exemplum, followed by a final segment which is not analysed as any specific genre, but which includes the student coming out to the class and the teacher reacting positively. It is important to analyse this lengthy excerpt in its entirety in order to understand how the teacher arrives at this point, and to see all the linguistic resources she uses along the way.

Just like in Text 6.1, in Text 6.2 the teacher uses a discussion genre: she sets up the Issue, presents two Sides, and offers a Resolution (see Appendix D for full genre analysis). The Issue stage is provided as Example 6.6:

(6.6) T: *Yeah what if someone in your grade was to ask you out, whether you were interested in them or not, so whether you um were sexuality-wise that was what you were interested in or not, if someone from your grade asked you out would you be flattered or would you be freaked out or would you be like “oh thanks, no, but um I’m not interested”. So again it’s gonna vary from person to person.*

Example 6.6 realises the Issue stage of the discussion genre. This is mostly a recasting of the original statement (see Example 6.5), but the teacher recasts the scenario as *if someone in your grade was to ask you out*. (Recall that this lesson takes place at an all-girls' school, so the implication here is that being asked out by someone *in your grade* is the same as being asked out by someone *of the same sex*.) She also uses several instances of inscribed affect to show the different feelings that people might have in this situation, including being *interested* (positive inclination), *flattered* (positive satisfaction) and *freaked out* (negative security). Notably, the teacher specifies that the Issue is not adjudicating between different sexualities (e.g. gay and straight), but specifically how you would feel in this situation: *whether you um were sexuality-wise that was what you were interested in or not, if someone from your grade asked you out would you be flattered?* By specifying that sexuality is not necessarily a factor, the teacher gives the students space to agree with the statement without it suggesting that they are necessarily same sex attracted themselves. While this might seem particular to this scenario, it in fact reflects a pattern that we saw in Text 6.1 and will see throughout Text 6.2 – namely that one's feelings and opinions (e.g. *you... feel kind of flattered; you should be able to look at your partner's phone... any time you like*) are independent of the way you behave. In addition to being *flattered* or *freaked out*, the teacher adds a third option: *or would you be like "oh thanks, no, but um I'm not interested"*. Here, she models an appropriate and respectful response that students could have in this scenario, forming a bridge between emotions (*flattered, freaked out*) and behaviours. Notably, responding with *"I'm not interested"* is suitable for either feeling – she models a reaction which fits both the agree and disagree positions. Again, this draws attention to the difference between how we think and feel (e.g. *flattered, freaked out*) versus how we behave (e.g. saying *"oh thanks... I'm not interested"*). Finally, she acknowledges that there are different perspectives in *so again it's gonna vary from person to person*. The word *again* indicates that this is not the first time she has made this point, indeed she does it several times when setting up the lesson activity and preparing the task. As we have already seen in Text 6.1, acknowledging different points of view is a crucial rhetorical strategy that teachers use when successfully managing competing perspectives (e.g. *there's kind of two sides to this one*). While here we see the teacher acknowledging these points of view in the Issue stage of a discussion, it can also be done outside of a discussion genre, a point I return to below (see Section 6.3.3).

After introducing the Issue, the teacher offers a brief comment phase, as shown in Example 6.7:

(6.7) *So there's nothing wrong if somebody, if someone in your grade did come up and ask you out, they've obviously got a lot of guts to come and ask you.*

Example 6.7 realises a comment phase where the teacher positively evaluates the person in the scenario: *if someone in your grade did come up and ask you out, they've obviously got a lot of guts to come and ask you.* This inscribes positive tenacity (*got guts*) with raised force (*got a lot of guts*), and is proposed as a shared evaluation using a concur formulation (*obviously*). Example 6.7 is analysed as a comment phase because it is not an argument in favour of either Side, nor does it set up the Issue stage. Instead, it is a way for the teacher to offer a brief commentary on the situation, which she uses to positively evaluate a (hypothetical) LGBTQIA+ person and to establish common ground (*obviously*) before moving on to the Side stages which are necessarily opposed. This may only be a passing comment, but it is nonetheless an important way of maintaining a shared evaluative stance among the class in the face of other competing perspectives.

The teacher then presents the two Sides of the discussion, as shown in Example 6.8:

(6.8) *And it's ok for you to feel kind of flattered, if you were interested that's great, even if you weren't interested, it's still nice, somebody thought you were attractive and kind of cute. Whether you like them or not is irrelevant, someone thought you were good looking or that you were a nice person.*

But it's also OK to be a little bit unsure and freaked out by that, no different to if it was some guy from next door who was asking you out and you were like, "um...no..."

In Example 6.8 the teacher states the two Sides. Side 1 is the agree position and Side 2 is the disagree position, as presented in Table 6.2.

Side 1	<i>And it's ok for you to feel kind of flattered, if you were interested that's great, even if you weren't interested, it's still nice, somebody thought you were attractive and kind of cute. Whether you like them or not is irrelevant, someone thought you were good looking or that you were a nice person.</i>
Side 2	<i>But it's also OK to be a little bit unsure and freaked out by that, no different to if it was some guy from next door who was asking you out and you were like "um...no..."</i>

Table 6.2 Staging of Side 1 and Side 2 in discussion in R9_20m Same-sex attraction

In Side 1, the teacher elaborates on the ‘agree’ position. This stage contains many inscribed attitudes, almost exclusively positive, which justify why someone might hold this position. This includes positive affect for feelings you might have (e.g. *flattered, interested*), as well as positive appreciation for ways someone might evaluate your looks (e.g. *attractive, cute, good looking*) and positive judgement for ways someone might evaluate your manner (e.g. *nice*). She positively appreciates same sex attracted people in *if you were interested, that's great* (positive valuation), though again she reinforces that feeling *flattered* does not have to be tied to your sexuality (*whether you like them or not is irrelevant*). In Side 2, the teacher elaborates the ‘disagree’ position. This stage contains several instances of inscribed affect, this time in the negative: *unsure* and *freaked out* (negative security). Importantly, these negative feelings towards the scenario (and, by extension, towards people who are same sex attracted) are tempered: it is graduated down in *a little bit unsure and freaked out*, and then it is directly compared to being asked out by a boy i.e. someone who could be heterosexual: *no different to if it was some guy from next door who was asking you out*. (*Some guy from next door* refers to the neighbouring all-boys school, adjacent to the all-girls school where the lesson takes place.) While elaborating on the disagree position, the teacher does not give students unqualified permission to be *freaked out* by people who are same sex attracted, rather they can be *a little bit freaked out* because it is *no different* to being asked out by a guy. The teacher is thus making space for different feelings, but in doing so she elevates positive attitudes (e.g. *flattered, interested, attractive*) and downplays negative attitudes (*a little bit freaked out*). She is presenting each Side as valid, but is tempering any negative reactions towards LGBTQIA+ people.

The teacher then provides the Resolution stage, as shown in Example 6.9:

(6.9) *It doesn't matter who they are, it's OK to feel comfortable and OK to not be quite sure about it as well. Not everyone's gonna feel comfortable with everything.*

In the Resolution stage, the teacher restates the two positions, though she has replaced being *flattered* (satisfaction) and *freaked out* (security) with *comfortable* and *not quite sure* (both security). Both opinions are positioned as valid with positive normality: *it's **OK** to feel comfortable and it's **OK** to not be quite sure about it.*

This can be analysed using Szenes' (2017, 2021) concept of recoupling. Coupling is the combination of ideational meanings and appraisal "at a particular point in the unfolding of a text" (Martin 2000b: 163-4). For example, the inscribed attitude *feel **comfortable*** combines with the ideational trigger 'being asked out by someone of the same sex'. We can represent this using yin-yang notation (adapted from Hood 2010), as in Figure 6.1.




Figure 6.1 Coupling in *feel comfortable... about it* (R9_20m)

The same ideational meaning – being asked out by someone of the same sex – is also the trigger for the inscribed attitude *feel **not quite sure***. We can represent this as in Figure 6.2.




Figure 6.2 Coupling in *feel...not quite sure about it* (R9_20m)

These couplings are then evaluated themselves: *it's OK to feel comfortable and it's OK to not be quite sure about it*. These are both instances of recoupling,¹¹ which we can represent with a two-layered yin-yang (Szenes 2021), as in Figures 6.3 and 6.4.




Figure 6.3 Recoupling in *it's OK to feel comfortable... about it* (R9_20m)

¹¹ There are various criteria for determining if something constitutes a recoupling, but the most common test is whether it can occur in a relational Process, as in *to be unsure is OK* (see Szenes 2017 section 4.2).




Figure 6.4 Recoupling in *it's OK to not be quite sure about it* (R9_20m)

This sets up a higher order coupling where the feelings of being *comfortable* or *not quite sure* are both validated as *OK* (positive normality).¹² The recouplings bring together affect and judgement, acting as a bridge between how students feel (e.g. *comfortable*, *unsure*) and how they should act. Again, the focus is on linking feelings (e.g. *unsure*, *comfortable*, *flattered*, *freaked out*) with acceptable behaviours (e.g. *there's nothing wrong... it's OK if...*), i.e. linking affect with judgement. The Resolution stage thus positions both sides of the discussion as valid, but while all feelings are *OK*, how students behave as a result of those feelings must still be respectful.

So far, we have seen how the teacher manages competing perspectives in a hypothetical scenario where students are asked out by someone of the same sex. Just like in Text 6.1, the teacher uses a discussion genre to set up the Issue, acknowledge multiples Sides and offer a Resolution. From this analysis alone, we could posit that discussion genres are the key to the successful excerpts. But in fact there is far more than this going on. Discussions are certainly

¹² As with *good* and *fantastic* in Text 6.1, inscribed attitudes such as *nice* and *OK* in Text 6.2 are generic and hence difficult to attribute to any particular sub-system of ATTITUDE. Here I analyse *OK* as positive normality, the sub-system of JUDGEMENT for assessing how un/usual a person or behaviour is because the target is a behaviour (*feel[ing] comfortable* or *not quite sure*).

a key resource for navigating these complex topics, but the teachers are also offering more – i.e. they are advising students how to react in a situation (e.g. *You might want to set up a rule that says...*), they are acknowledging and validating different emotions and opinions (e.g. *it's OK to be a little bit freaked out*) and they are differentiating between those feelings and beliefs and how students are allowed to behave (e.g. saying “*oh thanks... I'm not interested*”). To understand precisely what these excerpts have in common, and thus the key to their success, let us continue the analysis of Text 6.2.

After the discussion genre, Text 6.2 continues with the teacher sharing her own experience of being asked out by someone of the same sex. The next section of the excerpt is provided as Example 6.10:

(6.10) *I once got asked, when I was younger I was extremely tomboy, more so than now. Like I love wearing shorts and pants, that's why my job is awesome, I get to wear trackie pants and joggers to work every day. On rare occasions I'll wear a dress or a skirt. I was extremely tomboy when I was younger and at one point when I had sort of shoulder length hair, I had this, I was at the park with my brother and had this girl come and ask me out. And it was kind of weird. It was like “hey do you wanna go out I think you're kind of cute”, like “uh... thanks but I'm a girl?” [SS laughter] I was very naïve, I didn't even think that she would find me attractive in any other way. And she was like “oh, OK”. I think she thought I was a guy, I don't know. I had that kind of um, I looked like I could've been in Hansen back in the day. I don't know if you've ever seen pictures of the band Hansen, they were three brothers who very much looked like they were three sisters. The length hair. I actually had a friend who looked exactly like Taylor Hansen, and it was really weird, the fact that she looked like him. So it's OK to be a bit unsure, like again I was naïve, I did not know exactly what to do there. Like “um, thanks, but... I'm... not interested?” And then I tell my brother like “that was weird” and then off we went to play soccer.*

In Example 6.10, the teacher shares her own experience of being in this situation. More specifically, she uses an exemplum; a story genre which is intended to share a moral judgement (Martin & Rose 2008: 62). The exemplum includes the stages Orientation, Incident, Interpretation and Coda, as shown in Table 6.3 (comment and reflection phases are elided, see below).

Orientation	<i>I once got asked, when I was younger I was extremely tomboy, more so than now [...] I was extremely tomboy when I was younger</i>
Incident	<i>and at one point when I had sort of shoulder length hair I had this, I was at the park with my brother and had this girl come and ask me out. [...] It was like “hey do you wanna go out I think you’re kind of cute”, like “uh... thanks but I’m a girl?” [...] And she was like “oh, OK” [...]</i>
Interpretation	<i>So it’s OK to be a bit unsure, like again I was naïve, I did not know exactly what to do there. Like “um, thanks, but... I’m... not interested?”</i>
Coda	<i>And then I tell my brother like “that was weird” and then off we went to play soccer.</i>

Table 6.3 Genre staging of exemplum in Rhianon lesson 9 (R9_20m)

In this exemplum, the teacher recounts an experience from when she was younger, presumably around the same age as her students are now (15-16 years old). In the Incident, she is at the park when a girl approaches and asks her out. The exemplum is thus a real-life instance of exactly the hypothetical scenario under discussion: whether or not you would feel flattered *if someone of the same sex asked [you] out*. By drawing on her own experience, the teacher places this hypothetical into the real world, and she can then comment on the situation in the Incident stage and in reflection and comment phases.

Throughout the exemplum, the teacher includes a series of reflection and comment phases. Reflection phases suspend the flow of the story to show the participants’ thoughts, and comment phases suspend the story to show the narrator’s thoughts (Martin & Rose 2008: 83). (Note that the distinction between reflection and comment is not always clear since the participant in the story and the narrator are the same person i.e. the teacher.) An analysis of comment and reflections phases is presented in Table 6.4.

Orientation	I once got asked... When I was younger I was extremely tomboy, more so than now.
comment	<i>Like I love wearing shorts and pants, that's why my job is awesome, I get to wear trackie pants and joggers to work every day and it's great. On rare occasions I'll wear a dress or a skirt.</i>
	I was extremely tomboy when I was younger
Incident	and at one point when I had sort of shoulder length hair I had this, I was at the park with my brother and had this girl come and ask me out.
reflection	<i>And it was kind of weird.</i>
	It was like "hey do you wanna go out I think you're kind of cute", like "uh... thanks but I'm a girl?" [SS laughter]
reflection	<i>I was very naïve, I didn't even think that she would find me attractive in any other way.</i>
	And she was like "oh, OK".
reflection	<i>I think she thought I was a guy, I don't know.</i>
comment	<i>I had that kind of um, I looked like I could've been in Hansen back in the day. I don't know if you've ever seen pictures of the band Hansen, they were three brothers who very much looked like they were three sisters. The length hair. I actually had a friend who looked exactly like Taylor Hansen, it was really weird, the fact that she looked like him.</i>
Interpretation	So it's OK to be a bit unsure, like again I was naïve, I did not know exactly what to do there. Like "um, thanks, but... I'm... not interested?"
Coda	And then I tell my brother like "that was weird" and then off we went to play soccer.

Table 6.4 Comment and reflection phases in the exemplum (R9_20m)

In the reflection phases, the teacher shows her reaction at the time: she found it *kind of weird*, was *very naïve*, and was confused by the situation: *I think she thought I was a guy, I don't*

know. By recounting her feelings in this real-life scenario, she validates this type of response. She says that it is ok to be confused, weirded out or naïve when being asked out by someone of the same sex. This is emphasised again in the Interpretation stage. The teacher uses the same recoupling as she did in the discussion: *it's OK* (positive normality) *to be a bit unsure* (negative security; see Figure 6.4). Again, this acts as a bridge between how students feel and how they should act i.e. between affect and judgement. The teacher validates the response of feeling *unsure* and of being *naïve* and *not know[ing] what to do*. She connects the hypothetical scenario to a real-world example and models how she reacted as (one kind of) appropriate response. While the teacher does find the situation *weird*, she also importantly presents it as something students should not be afraid of or freaked out by, but rather something to be laughed off. (While laughter can be analysed here using Knight's (2010a) model of laughing affiliation, doing so does not add to the present analysis and so is excluded.) The teacher is self-deprecating, impersonating her younger self with high, breathy voice quality and rising tone: "*uh... thanks but I'm a girl?*". She thus portrays herself as clueless and ditsy, and explicitly evaluates herself as *very naïve* (negative capacity with raised force). In general, the teacher presents the entire scenario as silly and light-hearted. This is reinforced in the Coda stage, where the teacher brushes off the Incident: *And then I tell my brother like "that was weird" and then off we went to play soccer*. The entire event is presented as non-threatening, and as a brief interruption to an otherwise unremarkable day at the park.

In the exemplum, the teacher uses a different genre but many of the same rhetorical strategies as we saw in her earlier discussion genre. She continues to downplay negative feelings (e.g. *it was kind of weird*), she validates different responses using recoupling (e.g. *it's OK to be a bit unsure*), and she advises students on how to behave despite their emotions (e.g. saying "*thanks but I'm not interested*"). We can see, then, that the discussion genre is not the only vehicle for these linguistic resources, but that these are in fact rhetorical strategies which can be realised in multiple ways. To see additional realisations of these strategies, let us continue the analysis of Text 6.2.

The next section of the excerpt is provided below:

- (6.11) S1: *I... I would [feel flattered], because like, I'm actually... I'm scared to say because I don't want people to judge me!*
 T: *Well-*
 S1: *I'm actually part of the LGBT- I'm actually bisexual.*
 T: *Oh good for you.*

- S1: *So that likes both boys and girls. And um even if I didn't like have feelings for that person*
- T: *Mm-hmm.*
- S1: *I would still like, I would let them down kindly.*
- T: *Yeah.*
- S1: *Just nicely.*

In Example 6.11, a student shares their opinion on the statement *I'd feel flattered if someone of the same sex asked me out*. They explain that they would feel flattered (i.e. they agree with the statement), but relate this specifically to their own sexuality. They hesitate initially: *I would [feel flattered], because like, I'm actually... I'm scared to say because I don't want people to judge me!*. They express their fear with negative inclination (*I'm scared to say*), and acknowledge that their peers may negatively judge them (*I don't want people to judge me!*). However, they only hesitate briefly, eventually explaining that they would feel flattered because *I'm actually part of the LGBT- I'm actually bisexual*.

This moment is significant in its own right. A majority of LGBTQIA+ young people in Australia report feeling unsafe or uncomfortable at school, and less than a third are 'out' as gender or sexuality diverse to their teachers (Hill et al. 2021). A student coming out like this is evidence that the classroom environment is sufficiently inclusive and supportive of LGBTQIA+ young people, one of the goals of comprehensive sex education. The teacher immediately responds positively, *Oh good for you*, another significant moment: receiving support when coming out has been shown to be protective of wellbeing and mental health (ibid.: 37). The student goes on to explain that, regardless of their interest in the other person, they would still be kind: *even if I didn't like have feelings for that person... I would let them down kindly... just nicely*. The student's response is precisely an example of respect in action: regardless of your particular feelings, you need to treat people kindly. The teacher takes this point and elaborates on it in the final section of the excerpt:

- (6.12) T: *I think maybe part of this, regardless of how you feel, and how you feel about different sexualities, is that as long as we are respectful and kind to each other, which as a year group is something we've always talked about outside of this classroom, about being respectful and being kind. Even if you are totally not interested and it's weird for you, it's a good way you can let that person down, they don't feel like crap at the time.*

But if you are interested or unsure then it's a good way to handle it, being respectful and being kind.

In Example 6.12, the teacher restates the two Sides from the discussion: you might be *interested* or *unsure*. However, these different positions are superseded by another one: while students do not have to feel *flattered*, they do have to be *respectful and kind*. These are both inscriptions of positive propriety, the subsystem of judgement relating to ethics. Values in this sub-system are those that underpin civic duty and a well-functioning society (Martin & White 2005: 52). Indeed, the teacher appeals to a broader school ethos and set of core principles *outside of this classroom* and for the wider *year group*. This is true *regardless of how you feel* [about being asked out] and regardless of students' own sexuality. Practising respect, then, means treating other people kindly, regardless of your own feelings. Throughout Text 6.2, the class touches on each sub-system of AFFECT: you can like girls or not (happiness), you can be flattered or not (satisfaction), you can be interested or not (inclination), and you can be comfortable or freaked out (security), but no matter your feelings, your behaviour must be respectful and kind. The teacher reinforces the right way to behave in the HyperNews of the excerpt, allowing the positive prosody of *being respectful and kind* to radiate back over the preceding text.

To summarise, Text 6.2 is concerned with negotiating respect for same sex attracted young people and other members of LGBTQIA+ community. The class discusses the statement *I'd feel flattered if someone of the same sex asked me out*, which some agree with and others disagree with. The teacher elaborates on this statement, first with a discussion where she presents the agree/disagree positions as Side 1 and Side 2 (*it's OK to feel kind of flattered... it's also OK to be a little be unsure or freaked out*). Throughout the discussion, she brings together different ways of feeling (e.g. *unsure, comfortable, flattered, freaked out*) with acceptable behaviours (e.g. *there's nothing wrong... it's OK if...*), i.e. linking affect with judgement. She evaluates these different feelings as acceptable using recoupling (*it's OK to feel flattered*), and positions both sides of the discussion as valid. The teacher then tells a story of being asked out by a girl when she was younger using an exemplum. She explains her feelings in the Interpretation stage (*I did not know exactly what to do there*) as well as in reflection phases (*it was kind of weird, I was very naïve*), but ultimately presents the event as unremarkable and non-threatening (*then off we went to play soccer*). Following this, a student comes out in front of the class (*I'm actually bisexual*), and the teacher responds positively (*Oh good for you*). Finally, the teacher reinforces the distinction between feelings and behaviours (*regardless of how you feel... as long as we are respectful and kind to each other*). By the end

of Text 6.2, the teacher has successfully modelled how to put respect into practice: while we may have different feelings of happiness, inclination, satisfaction or security, we must ultimately be kind to others.

In this section I have analysed how teachers manage competing perspectives on respect in two excerpts. In Text 6.1, 'Ground rules', the class is negotiating how to respect a partner's privacy, while in Text 6.2, 'Same-sex attraction', the class negotiates respect for same sex attracted young people and other members of LGBTQIA+ community. Both excerpts are successful in how they manage their competing perspectives. In Text 6.1 the teacher makes space for students to disagree while still modelling appropriate behaviour that compromises between different viewpoints, and in Text 6.2 a student comes out as bisexual in front of the class, demonstrating that the teacher has successfully created a classroom environment which is tolerant, accepting and even welcoming of LGBTQIA+ students. Despite focusing on different topics, taking place in different lessons and even being taught by different teachers, these excerpts have remarkable similarity in how they (re)align students to a particular understanding of respect. For instance, they both acknowledge different points of view (e.g. *there's kind of two sides to this one*), they validate all perspectives by presenting them as equal (e.g. *you might think... your partner however might think*) or by affirming different emotional reactions as normal (e.g. *it's OK... to feel kind of flattered*), they both advise students how to behave (e.g. *You might want to set up a rule that says...*), and they both distinguish between the feelings or opinions you have and how you should behave in light of or in spite of those feelings (e.g. *Even if you are totally not interested... [being respectful and kind] is a good way you can let that person down*). These similarities are not merely attributed to the fact that both excerpts include a discussion genre. While it is possible to use the discussion genre in managing competing perspectives on respect (e.g. acknowledge different points of view as Side stages), this can also be done in a different genre (e.g. an exemplum). We therefore need to conceive of these not as options within the realisation hierarchy, but as recurring instantiation patterns which function in the service of affiliation, a point I return to below (see Section 6.3.3). I have highlighted these similarities throughout this section, but I consolidate them in the Section 6.3. But first, let us confirm that these strategies are in fact the key to the success of these excerpts by seeing where a negotiation of respect goes wrong.

6.2 BROKERING RESPECT

So far, we have seen two excerpts where the class has competing perspectives on what respect means but still ultimately ends up agreeing on the importance of respect. That is, they still rally around respect as an icon, even elevating it above other feelings and opinions they might have. I have argued that these are two ‘successful’ negotiations of respect, but it would be possible to say that the class has always agreed about what respect means – indeed we saw this in Chapter 5 when the class instilled a range of disparate meanings into respect (e.g. *freedom, respect for opinions and beliefs*; see Section 5.2). We could argue that Text 6.1 and Text 6.2 are simply a continuation of this pattern – the class agrees because they always agree when it comes to respect, whether that refers to *respecting privacy* or being *respectful and kind* to LGBTQIA+ people. However, we do not always find consensus. In the following excerpt, we see what happens when the class begins to disagree. This demonstrates that the class does not always agree on what consent means, but the disagreement can also be used to reinforce the interpretation of earlier excerpts as examples of successful negotiations of respect and of the class rallying around respect as an iconised attitude.

In this section, I turn to an excerpt where the class disagrees about respect, specifically, whether or not it is disrespectful to date a friend’s ex. The teacher attempts to re-align the class around what counts as dis/respectful but they push back, with one student in particular interrupting repeatedly to dissent. Ultimately, the teacher seems to recognise that her attempt to realign has failed, and acquiesces with students’ original negative evaluation. The class does not align around what respect means, and we might say that the icon ‘loses its charge’. As we will see, this third excerpt uses some but not all of the same rhetorical strategies as Text 6.1 and 6.2, and I argue that these differences are key to the success of the first two texts and the (relative) failure of the third excerpt. The analysis of this third excerpt can thus be used to corroborate the rhetorical strategies at play when iconisation works. Note that I use the terms ‘unsuccessful’ and ‘failure’ relatively, and these excerpts are noticeable in their scarcity. I have already analysed numerous instances where teachers are ‘successful’, and I only wish to highlight how these same examples can be brought to bear in an instance where students did not entirely align. Indeed, later in this chapter I return to this ‘unsuccessful’ text and imagine how it might have gone differently by using the strategies of the successful excerpts as a model to re-write this text, changing it to one where the class might have rallied around the icon of respect.

The third excerpt for analysis is Text 6.3, ‘Dating an ex’, from lesson 3 of Rhianon’s class (file ID R3_7m Dating an ex, for full transcript see Appendix B). In lesson 2, the class instilled a range of meanings into respect, and in lesson 3 students are learning to apply their new knowledge about respect to a range of hypothetical situations. In Text 6.3, the class is discussing whether or not it is OK to date a friend’s ex. More specifically, they are discussing the following scenario, provided in the slides:

(6.13) *One of your close friends hooks up with a guy/girl you recently broke up with.*

When the teacher invites students to share what they think of this scenario, one pair of students suggest that this situation (i.e. hooking up with the recent ex of a close friend) is *disrespectful*. The teacher disagrees with this assessment and attempts to re-align students, but the class pushes back, including one student in particular who interrupts several times to dissent. Ultimately, the teacher seems to recognise that (some of) the students are unconvinced, and she acquiesces with students’ original negative evaluation.

Having introduced Text 6.3 as a whole, I now present and analyse it in segments. The opening of the excerpt is provided as Example 6.14:

- (6.14) T: *OK so what happens in this situation?*
S1: *We said that maybe the friend should like give you some time or maybe tell you before. Or even maybe um*
S2: *Like, it’s kind of disrespectful.*
S1: *It’s kind of disrespectful, exactly. I feel like you should wait, or at least inform your friend and maybe see how they feel.*

In Example 6.14, a student suggests that the friend should *give you some time* or *maybe tell you before*. Another student from the group suggests that the behaviour is *kind of disrespectful*, and the first student agrees (*it’s kind of disrespectful, exactly*). The students have tried to suggest ways to respond in the scenario (e.g. *you should... inform your friend*), but also clearly see the behaviour as unacceptable, perhaps suggesting it should not have happened in the first place. They package up the entire scenario using text reference (*it*), and evaluate it with negative propriety (*disrespectful*), the sub-system of JUDGEMENT which deals with morality and ethics.

Here, then, we see students labelling a certain kind of behaviour as *disrespectful*. This is significant because not everyone agrees, specifically the teacher does not agree with their assessment, and attempts to re-align students in her elaboration, presented in Example 6.15:

(6.15) T: *Yeah. So there's not many fights that happen in our playground, we're a pretty good school for that. But I know of one of the few that I've had to break up, it was actually about this. "Oh she's dating my ex-boyfriend!" I'm like, "but he's not your boyfriend at the moment". "No!" "So, it's not really a problem." "But she's so disrespectful!" and it's like "but you're not dating".*

In Example 6.15, the teacher shares an example of a *fight* that happened *in our playground* where two students argued over one of them dating the other's ex. More specifically, she recounts dialogue between her and one of the students, where she says *it's not really a problem* because *he's not your boyfriend at the moment*, but the student insists that the friend is being *so disrespectful!*

Just like Text 6.1 and Text 6.2, Text 6.3 uses a discussion genre, though in a more spoken mode. Indeed, the teacher presents the two Sides of the discussion as alternations in dialogue between her and the student, for example one Side argues that *she's so disrespectful!*, while the other Side argues that *it's not really a problem*. A staging analysis of Example 6.15 is provided in Table 6.5 (see Appendix D for full genre analysis).

Issue	<i>There's not many fights that happen in our playground, we're a pretty good school for that. But I know of one of the few that I've had to break up, it was actually about this.</i>	
Sides	Side 1	Side 2
(enacted as dialogue)	<i>Oh she's dating my ex-boyfriend!</i>	<i>But he's not your boyfriend at the moment.</i>
	<i>No!</i>	<i>So it's not really a problem.</i>
	<i>But she's so disrespectful!</i>	<i>But you're not dating.</i>

Table 6.5 Staging of Issue, Side 1 and Side 2 in discussion in R3_7m Dating an ex

Table 6.5 shows the Issue and Side stages of the discussion genre. The Issue stage sets up the topic as a *fight*, with the teacher giving a real-life example of two people disagreeing over whether or not it is appropriate to date a friend's ex. She tempers this by saying that *there's not many fights that happen in our playground*, and positively appreciates the school in *we're a*

pretty good school for that (positive valuation).¹³ This is proposed as a shared value that the class can rally around, bringing everyone into agreement before attempting to re-align. This is similar to Text 6.2, where the teacher began by evaluating someone who asks you out as having *a lot of guts*. The Side stages are then enacted as dialogue between the teacher and one of the students in the *fight*. Side 1 (the student) argues that the friend is *so disrespectful*, an inscribed negative judgement of propriety. Side 2 (the teacher) argues that *it's not really a problem* because *he's not your boyfriend at the moment*, using graduation resources to argue that the problem is minor (*it's not really a problem*, softening focus) and that the specific circumstances mean it is permissible (*he's not your boyfriend at the moment*, sharpening focus). Side 2 also uses engagement resources, consistently using disclaim: deny to rebut Side 1's position: *he's not your boyfriend at the moment, it's not really a problem, you're not dating*.

Notably, these two Sides are not positioned evenly. This is most evident in the teacher's voice quality when impersonating the student versus herself in the story. For the student's dialogue, her voice quality is tense, rough, loud and high; features which construe tension, aggression and friction (van Leeuwen 1999: 140-141, see also Ngo et al. 2022). For her own dialogue, the teacher's voice quality is neutral i.e. the same as her normal voice. This contrast positions the student as emotional and irrational while the teacher is calm and reasonable.

So far, we have seen two students suggest that it is *disrespectful* to date a friend's ex, and the teacher's disagreement with this assessment and an attempt to re-align. The teacher uses (the beginnings of) a discussion genre, setting up the Issue and then enacting the two Sides as dialogue. While the teacher does go on to add the final Resolution stage, she is first interrupted by a third student, who strongly disagrees, as shown in Example 6.16:

(6.16) S3: *Miss, you don't date one of your friend's exes.*

T: *I know it is a bit weird there. But I think if we're able to communicate well with our friends. I think if our friend's having to sort of sneak behind our back almost to get to your ex then maybe there's something happening in that friendship. So being a good friend and having a good relationship there is being able to communicate ahead of time, going "hey I know you guys*

¹³ Inscribed attitudes such as *good* and *fantastic* in Text 6.3 are general terms and used across sub-systems of ATTITUDE. Here I analyse *a good school* as positive valuation (agnate with *valuable/worthwhile school*), but we could make a case for alternative analyses, such as positive quality (agnate with *fine/appealing school*).

aren't dating any more, do you mind if I...?" We don't have to say ask permission of our friend-

S3: *Miss you just don't.*

T: *-but going "hey heads up, this is what's gonna happen".*

S3: *Miss don't date them.*

In Example 6.16, Student 3 interrupts the teacher's discussion to categorically disagree: *Miss, you don't date one of your friend's exes*. They use negation (*don't*), a resource for introducing an alternative perspective into the dialogic space but only for the purposes of rejecting it (Martin & White 2005: 118). The teacher acknowledges the student's disagreement: *I know it is a bit weird there*. She uses text reference (*it*) to package up the scenario, evaluates it with negative appreciation: balance (*weird*), but with lowered force (***a bit weird***). The teacher then offers a Resolution to the discussion: *communicat[ing] well with our friends* by speaking to them *ahead of time* to give them a *heads up*. She appeals to veracity, saying friends should *communicate ahead of time* (positive t-veracity), rather than *sneak behind our back* (negative t-veracity) if we want to *be a good friend* (positive veracity) and *hav[e] a good relationship* (positive valuation).¹⁴ The teacher models this behaviour for students, even giving example phrases they could use, such as *"hey I know you guys aren't dating any more, do you mind if I...?"* and *"hey heads up, this is what's gonna happen"*. However, the student remains unconvinced. They repeat their categorical disagreement twice more, each time using disclaim: deny resources to reject the teacher's position. They begin with *you don't date one of your friend's exes*, which they then repeat with raised force as *miss you just don't*. Eventually they switch to declarative MOOD, issuing a command: *miss don't date them*. The teacher's attempt to re-align has clearly failed, at least for this student.

In recognition of this, the teacher appears to abandon her attempt to re-align the students, as shown in Example 6.17:

(6.17) T: *Yeah um, I know with- the term that gets thrown around every now and then is called sloppy seconds.*

¹⁴ As with *good school* in Example 6.15, *good friend* and *good relationship* in Example 6.16 are difficult to attribute to any particular sub-system of ATTITUDE. Here I analyse *good friend* as positive veracity (agnate with *honest/direct friend*), but we could make a case for alternative analyses such as positive tenacity (agnate with *reliable/dependable friend*). I analyse *good relationship* as positive valuation (agnate with *valuable/worthwhile relationship*).

SS: *Aw! [sound of disgust]*

T: *Yeah um so you might hear that every now and then.*

At this point, the teacher seems to recognise that she will not be able to re-align the class, or at least not every student. Where she has previously defended the hypothetical friend as reasonable, justified and respectful (or at least not disrespectful), here she evaluates the friend as *sloppy seconds*, a derogatory term for a person who dates or has sex with someone shortly after someone else. The students react by expressing disgust (*Aw!*), joining the teacher in making fun of the friend. Note that the teacher herself is not making this evaluation, it is just *a term that gets thrown around that you might hear every now and then*. But regardless of whether the teacher herself would use this term, *sloppy seconds* negatively judges the friend as disloyal (negative tenacity) and second-rate (negative valuation). The teacher recognises that the attempts to re-align have not been successful, and instead acquiesces with students' original negative judgement of the friend.

To summarise, Text 6.3 begins with two students judging a hypothetical friend who dates your ex as *disrespectful*. The teacher attempts to re-align students using a discussion genre, drawing on past experience to set up the Issue (*a fight... in our playground*) and Side stages (*she's so disrespectful; it's not really a problem*). A student interrupts to dissent (*miss you don't date one of your friend's exes*), and the teacher offers a Resolution (*communicate ahead of time*) but is met with continued and escalating backlash (*miss don't date them*). The teacher eventually abandons her attempt to re-align, instead negatively judging the friend as *sloppy seconds*.

This excerpt is significant because it is an unsuccessful attempt to rally the class around the icon of respect. While all three excerpts analysed in this chapter involve competing perspectives over what respect means, Text 6.3 is the only time we see clear evidence that the students are not convinced. This analysis on its own demonstrates that the iconisation of respect is a process and its trajectory is not always accepted by students – in fact, at times, it can 'lose its charge' (as here, when the class disagrees on what respect means or how it can be applied to certain situations). But more importantly, this analysis can be contrasted with the successful negotiations of respect to highlight why this attempt to re-align fails.

Text 6.3 uses many of the same linguistic resources as Text 6.1 and Text 6.2 when attempting to (re)align students around respect. Most notably, the teacher uses a discussion genre; setting up the Issue (*one of the few [fights] that I've had to break up was actually about this...*), two Sides (*she's so disrespectful; it's not really a problem*) and offering a Resolution

(*communicate ahead of time*). She also uses graduation to lower the force/soften the focus of negative attitudes (e.g. *you're not dating **at the moment***), similar to what we saw in previous excerpts (e.g. ***a little bit** unsure*); and she models behaviour with quoted speech (e.g. "*hey heads up...*"), similar to what we saw previously (e.g. "*um thanks but I'm not interested*"). Despite this, Text 6.3 is unsuccessful in (re)aligning students around the meaning of respect. The competing perspectives are not resolved, with at least one student explicitly dissenting (*miss you just don't*).

There are also key differences between Text 6.3 and earlier excerpts. Where previously the teachers acknowledged multiple perspectives neutrally (e.g. *there's kind of two sides to this one*), here the teacher describes the difference of opinion in terms of a *fight*. She also does not give equal weight to the two Sides. She favours Side 2 by reasoning with graduation resources (e.g. *he's not your boyfriend **at the moment***) and rebutting the alternative position with engagement resources (e.g. *it's **not** really a problem*). By contrast, Side 1 is attributed to an emotional and irrational student, demonstrated by the teacher's tense, rough, loud and high voice quality when enacting this half of the dialogue, especially in contrast to the neutral voice quality of Side 2. In Text 6.1 and Text 6.2, the two Sides were introduced equally, for example with heteroglossic expansion (e.g. *you **might think**... your partner **might think**...*) or with recoupling which positions both Sides as appropriate (e.g. *it's **OK** to feel flattered... it's **OK** to feel a little bit unsure*). By contrast, Text 6.3 positions one side as emotional and irrational and the other as measured and reasonable.

Here I have briefly highlighted the similarities and differences between all three excerpts. These are the key to understanding the success or relative failure when trying to rally the class around an icon, and so I consolidate them more fully in the following section. I also return to Text 6.3 to consider how it might have gone differently, drawing on the rhetorical strategies of previous successful excerpts.

6.3 RHETORICS OF RE-ALIGNING

Above we have seen how teachers successfully rally students around respect (Texts 6.1 and 6.2) and sometimes unsuccessfully negotiate respect when differences of opinion arise (Text 6.3). In this section, I consolidate the above analyses, highlighting the similarities and differences between these three excerpts. This is the key to understanding how teachers allow space for competing perspectives on what respect means while still ultimately arriving at its importance as an iconised attitude, including over and above other feelings or opinions that the

class might hold. I begin by outlining the five rhetorical strategies that are shared by the successful texts and describe some of their different linguistic realisations. I then show how the unsuccessful text uses some but not all of these strategies, and imagine how this excerpt might have gone differently by re-writing it using the successful texts as a model. I then situate these rhetorical strategies within SFL theory, arguing for the need to consider these as recurring instantiation patterns which function in the service of affiliation rather than as part of genre or the realisation hierarchy. Finally, I turn the analysis in this chapter to purpose by proposing a teaching resource, translating the linguistic description into a tool for sex education pedagogy.

6.3.1 Identifying successful rhetorical strategies

In Section 6.1, I analysed Texts 6.1 and 6.2 in detail, and throughout I highlighted the similarities between these two excerpts. Despite their different topics, lessons and teachers, Texts 6.1 and 6.2 have many commonalities, which we can consolidate as five **rhetorical strategies**. Both teachers do the following five things, in roughly this order:

- a. Acknowledge that there are different positions
- b. Explain each point of view evenly
- c. Separate feelings from behaviours
- d. Model appropriate behaviours
- e. End on a positive note

An explanation of each strategy is provided below. A summary of the rhetorical strategies and their linguistic resources is provided in Table 6.6.

- a. Acknowledge different positions

When acknowledging different positions, teachers explicitly state that there are two (or more) ways of viewing an issue. They may use semiotic entities (e.g. *sides*, *opinions*, *perspectives*) and quantify them (e.g. *there's... **two sides** to this one*). They use little or no inscribed attitude so that neither side is positioned as better or worse than the other. Instead, the positions might be described as different or varying (e.g. *it's gonna **vary** from person to person*).

- b. Explain each point of view evenly

When explaining each point of view evenly, teachers make the case for each side, and do so in a way which does not clearly privilege one over the other. They may use more inscribed attitudes which indicate people's feelings (e.g. *feel **flattered***) or the justification for their

opinion (e.g. your partner should be *open*). Negative attitudes may be tempered with graduation (e.g. *I don't really have secrets, a little bit unsure*). Even while advancing a specific argument, teachers will use entertain resources to indicate that there are alternative viewpoints (e.g. *you might think...*).

c. Separate feelings from behaviours

When referring to feelings, teachers use affect, either positive or negative, where students are emoters (e.g. *would you be flattered or would you be freaked out*). When referring to behaviours, teachers use judgement where students are the target, and this is exclusively positive (e.g. *we are respectful and kind*).

Teachers can separate feelings from behaviours in multiple ways. In Text 6.1, the teacher separates them with genre staging: affect primarily appears in the Side stages of the discussion, while judgement appears more in the Resolution stage (see Examples 6.3 and 6.4). In Text 6.2, the teacher counterposes affect and judgement using conjunction, including condition conjunctions (e.g. *regardless of how you feel... as long as we are respectful*) and concessive conjunctions (e.g. *even if you are totally not interested... [being respectful]'s a good way you can let that person down*).

d. Model appropriate behaviours

When modelling appropriate behaviours, teachers give a specific example of the behaviours from (c). Teachers do this by giving examples of what to say using quoted speech (e.g. *would you be like, "oh thanks, no, but um I'm not interested"*), or by specifying the wording of a ground rule (e.g. *You might want to set up a rule that says, "you can look through my phone any time... as long as you ask first."*)

e. End on a positive note

When teachers end on a positive note, they use inscribed positive attitude, optionally with raised force, to evaluate the preceding discussion. They use semiotic entities to refer back to preceding classroom talk (e.g. *a great example of a ground rule*), and to re-enforce the appropriate behaviours that are espoused in (c) and (d) (e.g. *it's a good way to handle it, being respectful and being kind*). (Note that *a great example of a ground rule* appears in Text 6.1 but is omitted in the above analysis because it occurs as a MacroNew after other intervening talk not analysed here, see Appendix B for full transcript.) By ending on a positive note (i.e. the attitude appears in the HyperNews), the positive prosody radiates back over the preceding text.

Rhetorical strategy	Linguistic resources
Acknowledge different positions	Semiotic entities to refer to <i>sides, opinions, perspectives</i> etc. Avoid evaluating sides with inscribed attitudes so that all options are positioned as valid Can describe the sides as <i>different, varied</i> or <i>distinct</i>
Explain each point of view evenly	Inscribed attitude which does the persuasive work Lower force/soften focus of negative attitudes Entertain resources to indicate that there are alternative viewpoints (e.g. <i>might, perhaps, think, believe</i>) Recoupling to validate different feelings (e.g. <i>it's OK to feel...</i>)
Separate feelings from behaviours	Counterpose affect where students are emoters (feelings) and judgement where students are target (behaviours) Affect and judgement in different genre stages Condition conjunctions (e.g. <i>as long as, if/then</i>) Concessive conjunctions (e.g. <i>but, however, even if, even so</i>)
Model appropriate behaviours	Specific examples, quoted speech when modelling communication
End on a positive note	Positive attitude, optionally with raised force Semiotic entities that refer back to preceding discussion (e.g. <i>example</i>) Appears in HyperNews so the positive prosody radiates back over the preceding text

Table 6.6 Linguistic resources for each rhetorical strategy

Table 6.6 outlines the five rhetorical strategies shared by the excerpts where teachers successfully rally the class around respect and the different linguistic resources the teachers use in doing so. It also shows that there is more than one way to realise each strategy. For example, to explain each point of view evenly, Josh uses heteroglossic expansion in Text 6.1 (*you **might think**... your partner **might think**...*). By contrast, Rhianon uses recoupling to validate different reactions as appropriate (*it's ok for you to feel kind of flattered... it's also OK to be a little bit unsure...*). In both cases, the teachers present both positions evenly, each one repeating their particular linguistic resource (*might think...*, *it's OK to...*).

While I have presented these strategies as largely consecutive, it is possible to use the same strategy more than once and thus to change their order. For example, in Text 6.2, Rhianon (d) models appropriate behaviour at multiple points. She does this in the discussion genre as part of the Issue stage (*would you be like, “oh thanks, no, but um... I’m not interested”*) and again in one of the Side stages (*you were like, “um... no”*), and she also does it in the exemplum (*“um, thanks, but... I’m... not interested?”*). Indeed, in Text 6.2, Rhianon uses several rhetorical strategies more than once. Notably, Text 6.2 is the longest and also the most successful excerpt, evidenced by the fact that a student comes out as bisexual in front of the class. While there are many things which could have contributed to the specific success of this lesson (e.g. the rapport between the teacher and student, the specific cohort in the room that day), this does suggest that iterating these rhetorical strategies can further rally a class around an icon in what we might call ‘rallying cycles’.

6.3.2 The key to succeeding with rhetorical strategies

While the rhetorical strategies identified above are common to both the successful negotiations of respect (i.e. Texts 6.1 and 6.2), some of them are also used in the unsuccessful negotiation of respect (i.e. Text 6.3). To understand why this is, let us take another look at Text 6.3 through the lens of these rhetorical strategies to pinpoint precisely how these strategies must be used to effectively rally the class around respect. I run through each of the strategies in Text 6.3 in turn.

a. Acknowledge different positions (Text 6.3)

The teacher acknowledges different positions in Text 6.3 when she says *There’s not many fights that happen in our playground... But I know of one... that was actually about this*. She recognises that the issue of dating a friend’s ex is something students can and do disagree on, however she negatively evaluates this as a *fight* (negative satisfaction), rather than introducing both sides neutrally.

b. Explain each point of view evenly (Text 6.3)

The teacher does explain each point of view in Text 6.3 when she acts out the dialogue between her and the fighting student in her story: *“she’s so disrespectful!” ... “but you’re not dating.”* However, the teacher does not present the two sides evenly. As described above (see Section 6.2), she uses different voice quality when impersonating the student versus herself. This contrast positions the student as emotional and irrational and the teacher as calm and reasonable, rather than suggesting that both points of view might have merit. She also uses

heteroglossic contraction, specifically deny resources, when putting forward her position (e.g. *it's not really a problem*), rather than expansion like we saw in the successful texts (e.g. *you might think...*). This means that alternative viewpoints are acknowledged, but only in ways which immediately dismiss them.

c. Separate feelings from behaviours (Text 6.3)

The teacher does separate feelings from behaviours in Text 6.3 when she says *I know it is a bit weird there, but I think if we're able to communicate well with our friends...* She uses appreciation rather than affect (*it is a bit weird there* vs. *you might feel a bit weird/uncomfortable/unsure*), but otherwise the rhetoric is very similar: she counterposes a negative evaluation from students (*a bit weird*, negative balance) with positive judgement of students (*we're able to communicate well*, positive t-veracity) using a concessive conjunction (*but*).

d. Model appropriate behaviours (Text 6.3)

The teacher does model appropriate behaviours in Text 6.3, giving examples of how to communicate in quoted speech (e.g. *hey I know you guys aren't dating any more, do you mind if I...?*”).

e. End on a positive (Text 6.3)

The teacher does not end on a positive in Text 6.3, presumably as a result of the above being unsuccessful. Instead, she abandons her attempt to re-align and ends by negatively judging the imagined friend as *sloppy seconds*.

To summarise, the teacher does use rhetorical strategy (c) (i.e. separate feelings from behaviours) and (d) (i.e. model appropriate behaviours) in a way which more or less matches the successful texts. However, her use of rhetorical strategies (a) (i.e. acknowledge different positions) and (b) (i.e. explain each side evenly) are clearly biased in favour of her own position. She describes differences in opinion as a *fight* rather than more neutrally as *taking sides* or *having differing perspectives*, and she positions her own opinion as superior to the fighting student's one using with contrasting voice quality (e.g. *she's so disrespectful!*) and heteroglossic contraction (e.g. *he's not your boyfriend*). This differs from the successful excerpts, where teachers used heteroglossic expansion (e.g. *you might think...*) and positioned both sides as valid (e.g. *it's OK to be a little bit unsure*). The failure, therefore, seems to come from inadequately setting up the topic with strategies (a) and (b). Even with strategies (c) and

(d) in use, the teacher is unable to realign students and end on a positive note (strategy e). We might say that her re-alignment comes too early – while it is OK to advocate for a specific position, your bias cannot show until you have acknowledged how other people might think and feel differently.

6.3.2.1 Re-writing respect

Having identified the key differences between teachers successfully rallying around respect (Texts 6.1 and 6.2) and unsuccessfully negotiating respect (Text 6.3), we could bring this to bear by re-writing the third excerpt with the five rhetorical strategies in mind. Table 6.7 presents a re-written version of Text 6.3, exemplifying the rhetorical strategies used in the successful texts.

Rhetorical strategy	Text
a. Acknowledge different positions	<i>There's different ways that people go about it.</i>
b. Explain each point of view evenly	<i>Some people think it's not on, that it's kind of disrespectful or disloyal. Some people think it's fine, or that maybe you just need let your friend know beforehand.</i>
c. Separate feelings from behaviours	<i>Whether you feel OK with it or not, you should always communicate openly with your friends about how you're feeling.</i>
d. Model appropriate behaviours	<i>You might say, "hey I'm feeling a bit uncomfortable about this, could we maybe talk about it?"</i>
e. End on a positive note	<i>At the end of the day, maintaining a good and healthy friendship means being able to talk about any issues that come up.</i>

Table 6.7 Re-written version of Text 6.3 Dating an ex (R3_7m)

The re-written version of Text 6.3 begins by acknowledging different positions more neutrally: *there's different ways that people go about it*. When explaining each point of view, there is heteroglossic expansion (e.g. *some people **think**...*) and both sides use inscribed attitudes to state their case (e.g. *it's kind of disloyal, it's fine*). The next two rhetorical strategies, (c)

separate feelings from behaviours and (d) model appropriate behaviours are where the re-written text is closest to the original. For (c), we use a concessive conjunction (*whether*) to separate students' feelings (*you feel OK with it or not*) from their behaviours (*you should always communicate openly with your friends*). For (d), we model this appropriate behaviour with example dialogue in quoted speech: "*hey I'm feeling a bit uncomfortable about this, could we maybe talk about it?*". Assuming the above has been a success, we end on a positive note which scopes back over the preceding text: *At the end of the day, maintaining a good and healthy friendship means being able to talk about any issues that come up*. While there is no guarantee that this re-written version would have been successful, the success of other texts which it is modelled off gives us reason to think it would at least be received better than students continually and categorically disagreeing.

Above I have consolidated the similarities and differences in three excerpts where the teachers must manage competing perspectives on what respect means. Following detailed analyses in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, I consolidated five rhetorical strategies which are the key to successfully rallying around respect, or unsuccessfully negotiating respect. Below, I situate these strategies within SFL theory, and argue for the need to consider these strategies as recurring instantiation tropes which function in the service of affiliation.

6.3.3 Situating rhetorical strategies

In this section, I situate the rhetorical strategies within the theoretical cartography of SFL. First, I show how these strategies play out in the schematic of the discussion genre but also consider how these strategies are distinct from the discussion genre. As such, I then argue that they need to be considered not as part of genre and the realisation hierarchy, but as patterns of instantiation which function in the service of affiliation. Note that despite the label 'rhetorical strategies', I do not situate these within existing work on rhetoric (e.g. Humphrey 2008, McCormack 2001). I do however acknowledge that this body of work is significant and return to consider it further in Chapter 7 (see Section 7.2).

First, the rhetorical strategies can be realised by the stages of a discussion genre, but importantly this is not their only realisation. It is perhaps the most succinct option, and it is more or less what the teacher uses in Text 6.1. Table 6.8 shows the discussion staging of Text 6.1 and marks each rhetorical strategy in **red** (text abbreviated from original):

Rhetorical strategy	Stage	Text
Acknowledge different positions	Issue	T: <i>There's kind of two sides to this one.</i>
Explain both sides evenly	Side 1	T: <i>Now you might think it's entirely fine to look through your partner's phone any time you like</i>
	Side 2	T: <i>Your partner however might think "like, I don't really have secrets but I just don't like the invasion of privacy".</i>
Separate feelings from behaviours	Resolution	T: <i>Uh and so you might actually need to set up a ground rule so that there is an understanding there.</i>
Model appropriate behaviours		<i>You might want to set up a rule that says, "you can look through my phone any time, as long as you ask first."</i>

Table 6.8 Rhetorical strategies realised by discussion stages in J3_13m Ground rules

Table 6.8 shows that the rhetorical strategies can mostly be aligned with a genre stage in a discussion. Strategy (a) (i.e. acknowledge different positions) is realised by the Issue stage, and (b) (i.e. explain both sides evenly) is realised by the two Side stages. The Resolution stage realises both (c) (i.e. separate feelings from behaviours) and (d) (i.e. model appropriate behaviours). Strategy (e) (i.e. end on a positive note) does not appear in the discussion staging, but appears later after additional classroom talk (see Appendix B for full transcript). This significant alignment suggests that what I have called ‘rhetorical strategies’ could simply be a modification of the discussion genre stages. However, the discussion genre is not the only place these strategies are realised, and using a discussion genre is also not a guarantee that the teacher will succeed in rallying the class around respect.

For one thing, using a discussion genre is not a guarantee that the teacher will succeed in rallying the class around respect. Recall that in the unsuccessful excerpt, where the class disagrees on whether or not it was respectful to date a friend's ex (Text 6.3), the teacher uses a discussion genre. She sets up the Issue (recounting a *fight... in our playground*), argues two Sides (*she's so disrespectful; it's not really a problem*) and offers a Resolution (*communicate ahead of time*). Despite this, she is not able to (re)align the class around what respect means, and students push back and explicitly dissent (*miss you don't date one of your friend's exes*). A discussion genre is thus no guarantee of success when managing competing perspectives.

Rather, I would argue that the key to successfully realigning students are the five rhetorical strategies identified above, which the teacher in question uses some of but not all. For instance, she (b) explains both sides but does not do so evenly – one side is positioned as measured and reasonable, while the other is positioned as emotional and irrational; this is demonstrated most notably by differing voice quality when enacting each Side in dialogue.

For another, these rhetorical strategies can be used outside of a discussion genre. For example, in Text 6.2, the teacher (d) models appropriate behaviour within the discussion (e.g. *would you be like, “oh thanks... I’m not interested”*), but she also does so in the exemplum (*“um thanks but I’m not interested”*). Similarly, she (a) acknowledges different positions in the discussion (e.g. *it’s gonna vary from person to person*), but she also does so outside of the discussion (*if you are interested.... or unsure*) and at multiple other points in the lesson, for example when introducing the task to students (*we’re gonna have some variation*) and when calling on students to share their answers (*what was one that you picked that was **different** to... somebody else you were talking with*). Indeed, the entire premise of the ‘Statements on sexuality’ task is designed to draw attention to students’ differences of opinion on this topic (*tick whether you **agree** or **disagree** with the statement*; see Appendix B for full transcript and Appendix C for Statements on sexuality handout).

The rhetorical strategies I have identified thus can be realised by discussion genre stages (as in Text 6.1), but this is only one possibility. They can also be realised outside of a discussion genre (as in Text 6.2), and in addition the discussion genre is not a guarantee that the teacher will succeed in rallying the class around respect (as in Text 6.3). This highlights the need to propose rhetorical strategies which operate independently of the discussion genre, and which can hypothetically operate across any specific genre. We could argue that these rhetorical strategies are not genre stages but genre phases – i.e. a common set of resources which can occur in different genres and in variable sequence (e.g. reflection, comment, problem; Martin & Rose 2008: 82). Like genre phases, these rhetorical strategies are characterised by a “significant measure of consistency and congruity” (Gregory & Malcolm 1981 as cited in *ibid.*). However, while these patterns recur across different sex education lessons and with different teachers, I would argue that they have not (yet) reached the level of generality of a genre phase. These rhetorical strategies might eventually emerge as formalised genre phases or stages, but for now it is useful to view these strategies as distinct from genre and the realisation hierarchy.

For the above reasons, we need to situate these rhetorical strategies not within the realisation hierarchy (e.g. genre), but as recurring instantiation patterns – as couplings (of

couplings of couplings) that function in the service of affiliation. They do not function in the service of a genre's ideational telos, nor are they realised by a specific genre, stage or phase. Rather, they are interpersonal tools in the service of bonding and affiliation, and for rallying the class around respect as an iconised attitude. We can situate these strategies alongside other tools for affiliation, such as communing, laughing and condemning (e.g. Knight 2010a, b) and rallying, adjusting and deferring (e.g. Zappavigna 2018, 2019). Note that these affiliation strategies take couplings as their basic unit of analysis, where ideation and attitude co-occur at a certain point in text (e.g. *great + example*). However, what I have described in this chapter are strategies for rallying around an icon rather than a coupling. Of course, couplings are still involved – as established in Chapter 5, respect couples with a range of triggers and targets when it is instilled (e.g. *respect + opinions and beliefs*, see Section 5.2.1). But the nature of iconised attitudes is to couple with a wide range of ideational triggers/targets to neutralise the field and radiate over an increasingly vast domain. The rhetorical strategies are thus additional affiliation strategies alongside those identified in previous work (e.g. laughing, condemning), though they are used to rally around an icon whereas other affiliation strategies have been described as rallying communities around a bond. It is certainly possible that any and all of these affiliation strategies could be used with icons or with bonds (e.g. laughing affiliation could be used to rally around respect as an icon), but investigating this is beyond the scope of this thesis. A future project could consider how these different strategies are used alternately (or indeed cooperatively) in different contexts such as education or casual conversation.

It is useful here to clarify the connection between instantiation and affiliation (i.e. individuation). Previous work on bonding and affiliation (e.g. Knight 2010a, b; Zappavigna 2018, 2019) has viewed evaluative couplings that are instantiated in text as the base unit or 'phoneme' for bonding (e.g. *fun + pie party*, Knight 2010a; *beautiful + border wall*, Zappavigna 2018). Similarly, I view rhetorical strategies in sex education as a broader set of couplings (of couplings of couplings) that are instantiated in text again and again, for the purpose of affiliating students into the values system of respect. Just as Knight and Zappavigna examined evaluative couplings in the service of affiliation, so too I look at couplings (i.e. meanings that are co-instantiated in text) in the service of affiliation. I look more generally at which meanings are co-instantiated rather than restricting myself to ideation-attitude couplings, though I include these too (e.g. *respect + opinions and beliefs*).

Having situated rhetorical strategies within SFL theory, I now turn from this theoretical implication to a more practical one. Below I take the insights offered by this new theoretical concept and turn it towards an application within education. More specifically, I take the

linguistic description of rhetorical strategies and translate them into a teaching resource for sex education pedagogy.

6.3.4 Rhetorical strategies as a resource for teaching

In this chapter, I have described five rhetorical strategies which can be used to manage competing perspectives around what respect means in sex education. These rhetorical strategies are useful for (re)aligning students around respect, but can also more broadly be used to rally around iconised attitudes and to apprentice students into certain values systems. This is a stated goal of sex education, which aims to “equip children and young people with knowledge, skills, *attitudes and values*” (UNESCO 2018a: 16, emphasis added). To help teachers navigate this process, I propose a teaching resource which captures the five rhetorical strategies outlined above using the mnemonic acronym RE-SEE, as shown in Figure 6.5.




Figure 6.5 RE-SEE it: Rhetorical strategies as a teaching resource

As well as this general overview, a list of possible language resources is presented in Table 6.9.

	R	E	S	E	E
	Recognise different positions	Explain both sides evenly	Separate feelings from behaviours	Exemplify appropriate behaviours	End on a positive
How to start →	<i>Different people have different views on this...</i>	<i>Some people think... While other people think...</i>	<i>You might feel... But you still need to...</i>	<i>An example of that would be...</i>	<i>The important thing to remember is...</i>
Other language you can use →	<i>Views, opinions, perspectives, sides Different, varying, two sides</i>	<i>Think, believe Might, possibly</i>	<i>A bit, somewhat, kind of, sort of + angry, unhappy, unsure, freaked out, confused But, however, even so Kind, respectful, honest</i>	<i>Examples of what to say in quotation marks</i>	<i>Good example, nice way, important point Respect, honesty, communication, friendship Core school values e.g. fairness, cooperation</i>

Table 6.9 RE-SEE it: Language resources

The RE-SEE it teaching resource captures the five different rhetorical strategies: recognising different positions, explaining both sides evenly, separating feelings from behaviours, exemplifying appropriate behaviours, and ending on a positive. It also provides teachers with a list of language resources for each of these steps, including how to start (e.g. *different people have different views on this...*) and other examples of language they can use (e.g. *views, opinions, different, varying*). This teaching resource distils the analysis of this chapter in a concise and accessible format, and offers teachers a way to navigate complex and sensitive topics in sex education. Indeed, the teachers in this study recognised the need to manage competing perspectives in their classrooms, even identifying this as a key challenge in sex education. For example, in an interview before teaching the unit, Rhianon said:

(6.18) T: *It is a controversial and sensitive topic. A lot of the girls don't want to talk openly. But then there's gonna be others that will blast it across the class and not care. So I think I need to be really mindful with this class in particular I think about the various levels of potential experience that they might have had, or what their values and ethics are behind it too because I'm gonna see a lot of variety there as well. Yeah, just guiding the conversation to make sure they're not scaring the pants off each other or making anyone else feel awkward.*

(Rhianon pre-interview @ 4m)

Before running this unit, Rhianon acknowledged that it was a *controversial and sensitive topic* and that her students had *various levels of potential experience* and also *variety in what their values and ethics are*. She knew it was important to *guid[e] the conversation* so that students were not *scaring the pants off each other or making anyone else feel awkward*. The RE-SEE it teaching resource is designed to help teachers achieve precisely this: *guiding the conversation* so that the class can discuss *controversial and sensitive topics*, while accounting for *different experience, values and ethics* without *making anyone feel awkward*. Evidently, Rhianon largely succeeding in doing this in her lessons, as demonstrated by a student coming out in front of the class. The teacher was able to create a classroom environment which is accepting, tolerant and welcoming of LGBTQIA+ people, and it is hoped that this teaching resource, drawing as it does on Rhianon and Josh's own pedagogy, can help other teachers do the same.

6.4 INSIGHTS FROM CHAPTERS 5 & 6

In this chapter, I have shown how the iconised attitude respect is learnt. I presented detailed analyses of three excerpts, offering these as case studies where respect is negotiated both successfully and unsuccessfully. I compared these three excerpts, using their similarities and differences to identify precisely what allows teachers to rally the class around a shared understanding of respect. I consolidated these as five rhetorical strategies: (a) acknowledge that there are different positions, (b) explain each point of view evenly, (c) separate feelings from behaviours, (d) model appropriate behaviours and (e) end on a positive note. I demonstrated the merit of these rhetorical strategies by re-writing the unsuccessful excerpt and imagining how it might have gone differently.

This meant that I needed to review the understanding of instantiation and the way that couplings (of couplings of couplings) come together as syndromes of meaning in the service of affiliation. The rhetorical strategies I identified are distinct from the discussion genre, and rather than being situated in the realisation hierarchy should instead be viewed as recurring instantiation tropes in the service of affiliation (i.e. individuation). They sit alongside other affiliation strategies such as laughing, communing and deferring, though where these strategies have been identified for rallying communities around bonds, the rhetorical strategies identified here rally the class around an iconised attitude.

This perspective on iconisation has implications for understanding the way respect is taught and led to my proposal for a teaching resource. The ‘RE-SEE it’ resource distils the rhetorical strategies in a concise and accessible format and offers teachers a way to apprentice students into respect and other iconised attitudes. This has obvious applications in sex education, where teachers must navigate complex and sensitive topics with a group of students who are likely to have conflicting opinions.

Bringing together this chapter with the previous one, we can view respect pedagogy both from the perspective of instantiation and from individuation. In Chapter 5, I was concerned with instantiation, describing how respect discharges ideational meaning and charges interpersonal meaning logogenetically and ontogenetically. By contrast, in this chapter I was concerned with recurring instantiation patterns but particularly in how these function in the service of affiliation (i.e. the individuation hierarchy). Together, these two chapters describe how respect comes to be valued in sex education, and how students are initiated into this values system. Furthermore, respect comes to occupy a particularly significant place for the class, where it is elevated over and above other feelings and opinions that the class might

have. Regardless of how students think or feel, the way they behave as a result of those thoughts and feelings must be respectful. ‘Practising’ respect means that you can have a range of different feelings on an issue (e.g. *flattered, unsure, don’t like*), and you can make an argument as to why your preference is the correct one (*kind of weird, invasion of privacy*), but ultimately you need to behave in ways which accommodate other people’s feelings and preferences even where they are different to your own.

Just as with the pair of consent chapters (Chapters 3 and 4), Chapters 5 and 6 should be taken together as a description of how respect is pedagogised as a whole. Chapter 6 builds on the previous chapter by trying to understand how respect is learnt. That is, it examines whether students are successfully aligned with respect as iconised attitude and are convinced to rally around it as a class. Essentially, it asks whether the knowledge and values established in the classroom are then taken up (or not) by students. This chapter was thus my assessment of whether the iconisation of respect ‘works’. While it is of course difficult to ‘measure’ success, there is certainly evidence that the iconisation has succeeded, particularly in one excerpt where a student comes out as bisexual in front of the class. This offers a rare instance where we can point to specific, tangible evidence that sex education has had its desired outcome – i.e. creating a classroom environment which is tolerant, accepting and even welcoming of LGBTQIA+ students. While I cannot prove that all students left the class more respectful than they entered it, the analysis presented in these two chapters certainly suggests that they did. For at least one student, the experience of sex education was one that affirmed their sexuality and made them feel welcome, tolerated and respected despite differing from the status quo.

The previous four chapters have described sex education pedagogy in terms of technicalisation and consent (Chapters 3 and 4) and iconisation and respect (Chapter 5 and 6). In the final chapter, I bring together all of the insights from this thesis and review the theoretical and practical implications of this work for SFL and for sex education.

Chapter 7 – Interpersonal Education: Beyond Ideation

This thesis has explored the language of sex education pedagogy. Using video recordings of high school health lessons, it has provided a detailed description of two key topics in sex education: consent (Chapters 3 & 4) and respect (Chapters 5 & 6). This analysis revealed that consent discharges interpersonal meaning by way of technicalising attitude, while respect hypercharges interpersonal meaning by way of iconising attitude. This investigation offers a number of contributions to theory, description and practice and also suggests areas for future research. This final chapter reviews the implications of this study for SFL theory and description in Section 7.1 and for sex education pedagogy in Section 7.2. In Section 7.3, future research directions are considered, including implications for interpreting realisation, individuation and instantiation, and for mobilising the description in teaching/learning practice.

7.1 THEORETICAL AND DESCRIPTIVE IMPLICATIONS

This thesis makes a number of contributions to SFL theory and description. Below I outline these contributions and their implications for the three hierarchies of realisation, individuation and instantiation.

7.1.1 Technicality and technicalisation

The first major theoretical and descriptive contribution of this thesis is to our understanding of technicality and technicalisation, namely the distinction between technicalised ideation and technicalised attitude. An analysis of field inter/relations for the term ‘consent’ revealed that consent is a technical term which distils a range of attitudes (e.g. *afraid*, *unconscious*) at the level of register. This development indicated a need to revise concept of technicality as it had been previously theorised in SFL. As described in Chapter 2, technicality has historically been motivated by research on ideational meaning, especially in the sciences; but more recent work has been concerned with how interpersonal meanings can be technicalised as axiologically-charged technicality (‘axi-tech’). This distinction has now been formalised as the concepts of **technicalised ideation** and **technicalised attitude**. In both cases, ‘technicalised’ indicates the process of condensing and reconstituting meaning, but whereas technicalised ideation is the result of condensing and reconstituting purely ideational meanings (e.g. *Testosterone* condenses ideational meanings such as *steroid* and *androstane*), technicalised attitude is the

result of condensing and reconstituting attitudinal meanings (e.g. *consent* condenses attitudinal meanings such as *afraid* and *unconscious*).

This analysis extends and clarifies the theorisation and description of technicality in several ways. First, it formalises a definition of axi-tech as technicalised attitude – i.e. technicality which distils attitudes at the level of field. While axi-tech had been identified in a range of different fields (e.g. law, engineering, psychology), it did not yet have a clear definition. Second, the work of this thesis explains how technicalised attitude emerges – i.e. how it is distilled logogenetically and ontogenetically through the process of unpacking and repacking. And third, it demonstrates how technicalised attitude simultaneously straddles both ideational and interpersonal meaning. The apparent contradiction of axi-tech is that it ‘appears’ attitudinal in commonsense terms, but it is in fact technical (e.g. *pleading guilty*). This thesis has offered a description of how technicalised attitude ‘empties out’ attitudinal meanings as part of the distillation process (i.e. establishing the term), but these meanings can return to the surface when the technicality is unpacked, such as when defining or (especially) pedagogising them. This theorisation has meaningful implications for future work on technicality, including expanding our understanding of the fields where technicality is a relevant concern. Rather than merely being associated with the sciences, technicality is now a vital consideration for the distillation of knowledge in the law, medicine and in any field which seeks to distil interpersonal meaning.

7.1.2 Icons and iconisation

The second theoretical and descriptive contribution of this thesis relates to icons and iconisation – namely, the distinction between iconised ideation and iconised attitude. An analysis of the realisations of respect, coupled with an analysis of how it condenses meanings, revealed that respect is iconised in sex education (i.e. it discharges ideational meaning and charges interpersonal meaning). This development required a revision of iconisation as it had been previously described in SFL. As presented in Chapter 5, icons and iconisation have primarily been used to describe how ideational meanings become interpersonally charged to create bonding icons, especially for artefacts (e.g. the Olympic torch). However, the description of iconisation in sex education needed to extend this model to distinguish between **iconised ideation** and **iconised attitude**. In both cases, ‘iconised’ indicates the process of discharging ideational meaning and charging interpersonal meaning; but iconised ideation takes ideational meanings and interpersonally charges them (e.g. a flame is iconised to become the Olympic

torch), whereas iconised attitude takes interpersonal meaning as the starting point and further charges them (e.g. inscribed attitude such as *respect* in sex education).

This analysis extends the previous theorisation and description of iconisation in several ways. First, it demonstrates that interpersonal meanings and ideational meanings alike can be iconised and it formalises this distinction. Second, it identifies a range of linguistic resources for iconisation, including amassing attitude and charging a consistent valency. While these resources were used to describe the iconisation of respect in sex education, they also retrospectively apply to iconisation as it has been described in other contexts. For example, the Olympic torch as an instance of iconised ideation equally charges a consistent valency. Third, this study extends our understanding of icons in terms of their function in educational contexts. Where icons have previously been identified in work on museums, national identity texts and youth justice conferencing, this study demonstrated that icons and iconisation can also play a crucial role in education. For example, the iconised attitude respect is used to apprentice students into a particular values system, even where there are competing perspectives on what respect means (see also ‘Pedagogical implications’, Section 7.2). This expanded theorisation has implications for future work on iconisation and would be critical for research concerned with ‘core values’. The concept of core values plays a key role in a variety of communities, including schools (e.g. tolerance, excellence, responsibility), corporations (e.g. integrity, transparency, teamwork) and nations (e.g. freedom, fairness, equality of opportunity). These values are not merely inscribed attitudes; understanding their full meaning requires interpreting them as iconised attitudes. That is, they are attitudinal meanings (e.g. *responsible*, positive capacity) which have been further charged with interpersonal meaning and become an emblem for their respective communities to rally around. This thesis provides the theoretical and descriptive grounding for exploring iconised attitudes in these and a range of other contexts, and offers a crucial step forward in our understanding of iconisation, affiliation and interpersonal meaning.

7.1.3 Topological and typological perspectives on technicalisation and iconisation

The third theoretical and descriptive contribution of this thesis is in relation to instantiation and highly condensed meanings – namely topological and typological perspectives on technicalisation and iconisation. An analysis of consent and respect, while initially motivated only by a general interest in these topics, in fact revealed that they were pedagogised in ‘opposite’ ways. Where consent discharges interpersonal meaning to distil technicality, respect

hypercharges interpersonal meaning to become an icon. Just as analysing consent led me to propose a distinction between technicalised ideation and technicalised attitude, analysing respect led me to propose a symmetrical distinction between iconised ideation and iconised attitude. This was consolidated as a complementary theorisation of technicalisation and iconisation, which can be viewed both topologically and typologically.

Topologically, technicalised attitude (e.g. consent) and iconised attitude (e.g. respect) were shown to be points on a cline of dis/charging interpersonal meaning, as presented in Figure 7.1.




Figure 7.1 Topological perspective on technicalised attitude and iconised attitude

The topological perspective in Figure 7.1 positions technicalised attitude and iconised attitude as the endpoints or ‘extremes’ of a cline with respect to dis/charging interpersonal meaning. Technicalised attitude on the far left has fully discharged its interpersonal meaning to distil technicality, while iconised attitude on the far right has hypercharged its interpersonal meaning to instil an icon. This perspective not only brings together technicalised attitude and iconised attitude, it also relates them directly to other evaluative meanings such as graduation, idioms and inscribed attitude. These can be viewed as ‘steps’ along the cline, indicating that meanings can be somewhat technicalised or somewhat iconised, and that this is a process that can be viewed at different timescales (i.e. logogenetically, ontogenetically, phylogenetically). The analyses of Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 demonstrated this for logogenesis and ontogenesis by considering how consent and respect are learnt. A detailed analysis of certain excerpts demonstrated how these processes unfold logogenetically in discourse (e.g. how the technicality of consent is unpacked with shifts in mass and presence), as well as how they unfold ontogenetically over the course of a school term (e.g. how respect is iconised such that the class finishes the school term more respectful than they began). This offers an important

step forward for our understanding of the ways interpersonal meaning is instantiated in text through time. Where the ‘steps’ of this cline have previously been viewed from the perspective of realisation (e.g. inscribed attitude and graduation within APPRAISAL), here they are viewed as stages in the logo/onto/phylogenetic charging and discharging of interpersonal meaning. This shift in perspective allows us to view interpersonal meaning more dynamically and would be of particular use to the many researchers using APPRAISAL to analyse text.

As well as a topological perspective, this thesis offers a typological perspective on technicalisation and iconisation. Whereas the topological perspective brings together technicalised attitude and iconised attitude, the typological perspective brings both of these together with the other terms proposed in this thesis – namely, technicalised ideation and iconised ideation, as presented in Table 7.1.

	technicalised <i>(distilled ideationally)</i>	iconised <i>(instilled interpersonally)</i>
ideation <i>(starts ideational)</i>	e.g. <i>oestrogen</i> (aka ‘technicality’)	e.g. <i>the Olympic torch</i> (aka ‘bonding icon’/‘anticon’)
attitude <i>(starts interpersonal)</i>	e.g. <i>consent</i> (aka ‘axi-tech’)	e.g. <i>respect</i> (aka ‘axicon’)

Table 7.1 Typological perspective on technicalisation and iconisation

The typological perspective brings together technicalised ideation (e.g. *oestrogen*), technicalised attitude (e.g. *consent*), iconised ideation (e.g. the Olympic torch) and iconised attitude (e.g. ‘respect’). We can distinguish between whether we ‘start’ with ideational meaning (row 1) or attitudinal meaning (row 2), and whether that meaning is then distilled ideationally (i.e. technicalised, column 1) or instilled interpersonally (i.e. iconised, column 2). Consolidating these concepts as a typology highlights that both technicality and icons condense many meanings, whether ideational or attitudinal, and whether by distilling or instilling. This has important implications not only for our understanding of technicalisation and iconisation as complementary processes, but also extends our theorisation of mass. Icons and technicality alike can be thought of as highly condensed meanings which ‘do the heavy lifting’ when it comes to building fields ideationally and building communities interpersonally. This new perspective on the condensation of meaning has far-reaching applications. Each corner of the typology is canonically associated with a different specialisation, from the sciences

(technicalised ideation), to the law (technicalised attitude), to museums and creative arts (iconised ideation) to the humanities (iconised attitude). As such, the typology is a crucial tool for understanding how different fields organise their knowledge and values, and for appreciating the potential compatibilities and incompatibilities between these fields for the exchange of ideational and interpersonal meaning.

Finally, these topological and typological perspectives view technicalising and iconising as processes which unfold in discourse, bringing together ideational and interpersonal meaning via a more dynamic perspective. As described in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.5), the ideational and interpersonal are largely kept independent of each other along the realisation hierarchy – what Martin (e.g. 2017a) has referred to as the ‘tyranny’ of metafunctions. Where technicality has previously been described in relation to ideational meaning and icons have previously been described in relation to interpersonal meaning, this thesis has highlighted the need interpret them in relation to one another. A topological perspective treats them as complementary processes of (dis)charging: where technicalising involves discharging interpersonal meaning and charging ideational meaning, and iconising the same process in reverse. Previous work has focused on how ideation is distilled as technicality (technicalised ideation e.g. *ovulation*), and how ideation is interpersonally charged as bonding icons (iconised ideation e.g. the Olympic torch). But this thesis has shown that attitudes too can be distilled as technicality (technicalised attitude e.g. *consent*) and instilled as icons (iconised attitude e.g. *respect*). Of course, other aspects of SFL theory bring together interpersonal and ideational meaning, for example APPRAISAL highlights the need to bring together attitudes with their ideational trigger/target (e.g. *tricky + situation*). But the description of technicalisation and iconisation in this thesis has pushed this much further, viewing these as complementary processes within instantiation.

The topological and typological perspectives on technicalisation and iconisation developed in this thesis also encourage a move from a more synoptic view to a more dynamic view of meaning. As described in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.5), the realisation hierarchy offers a synoptic view of meaning: it captures the full range of choices which are available in language, mapping meaning potential as system and structure across strata, ranks and metafunctions. By contrast, the instantiation hierarchy offers the possibility of a more dynamic view, showing how these choices come together as a text. This is crucial for our understanding of technicalisation and iconisation as processes that unfold in discourse – for example for showing how the technicality of consent is unpacked and repacked (Chapter 4) and how rhetorical strategies pattern repeatedly to rally students around respect (Chapter 6). Moreover,

the rhetorical strategies identified in Chapter 6 draw attention to patterns that would be challenging to formalise as genre stages and phases (see Section 6.3.3). This is because these strategies represent patterns that recur across different sex education lessons and with different teachers but which have not (yet) reached the level of generality of a genre or register variable. An instantiation perspective opens up a more practical and more promising avenue of research by enabling work on coupling (of couplings of couplings) as ‘syndromes’ of meaning in the service of affiliation. This is crucial to the work of this thesis which seeks to understand what is going on in the classroom, but also what the repercussions of this pedagogy are for both ontogenetic and phylogenetic change (i.e. re-affiliation).

Taken together, the theoretical and descriptive contributions of this thesis bear on our understandings of all three hierarchies in SFL. The hierarchy of realisation is extended by new theorisation on technicality; the cline of instantiation is extended by new theorisation on highly condensed meanings; and the scale of individuation is extended by new theorisation on iconisation. Thus this thesis offers novel insights into far-ranging corners of the theoretical map.

7.2 PEDAGOGIC IMPLICATIONS

As well as the theoretical and descriptive implications outlined above, this thesis has a number of pedagogic implications. The primary goal of this thesis was to ‘get close’ to sex education. Where research in this field has tended to highlight the outcomes that sex education can have (e.g. lowering rates of STIs, increasing acceptance of gender and sexuality diversity), this thesis developed an understanding of how these outcomes are actually achieved; it has lifted the lid on the ‘black box’ of sex education. The study was motivated by a need to shift from general recommendations about the nature of sex education (e.g. as ‘adaptable’, ‘flexible’, ‘engaging’) towards concrete descriptions of how it actually unfolds. To that end, I collected and analysed video recordings of real sex education classrooms, following two teachers over the course of a school term. This allowed me to describe in detail the pedagogy of two key topics: consent and respect. My analysis revealed that consent and respect have ‘converse’ pedagogies. Consent is technicalised (distilling interpersonal meaning) and is taught using a definition which is recontextualised from legal discourse; respect on the other hand is iconised (instilling interpersonal meaning) and functions to rally the class around a shared value irrespective of field.

A secondary motivation of this description was to propose tools and resources which have implications for how to deliver sex education. This is in line with Halliday's notion of applicable linguistics (2008, see Section 2.2), but is also especially significant to sex education where teachers frequently request additional resources and support – motivated in part by fear of backlash from parents and the wider community and fear of 'getting it wrong'. Throughout this thesis I have highlighted the linguistic resources that teachers might draw on for sex education, and I have suggested two teaching resources in particular.

In Chapter 3, I described how consent is technicalised, distilling a range of attitudes at the level of field. These attitudes come from the legal definition (e.g. *afraid, coerced*), and are extended even further in a range of 'what if' scenarios to include all sub-types of affect (e.g. what if you feel *uncomfortable*; negative security) and all sub-types of judgement (what if a guy removes a condom *without telling the girl*; negative veracity). An important consideration for pedagogy is how to make this knowledge explicit, which I consolidated as the **consent checklist** teaching resource. This checklist captures the complex set of field interrelations from the original legal definition (e.g. *a person does not give their consent if they are afraid or unconscious or...*), but renders these as a list of questions (e.g. 'Are you happy with the situation?', 'Are you capable?'). It is explicit about what attitudes are at stake in the technical definition of consent, and makes clear that all of these conditions must be met in order for sex to be consensual ('If you said yes to all of the above – BINGO! You've got consent'). As well as these general prompts, the consent checklist offers examples of what each attitude looks like in practice, such as being wary or afraid (negative inclination). This effectively 'unpacks' the technicality of consent, giving students a real-world instance that they can connect to the law. Importantly, the checklist provides examples of both positive valency ('what yes looks like') and negative valency ('what no looks like'), making explicit which behaviours students should emulate rather than only which ones to avoid. In Chapter 4, I extended the consent checklist further to providing students with language resources for linking specific situations with the law by 'passing judgement'. By providing language resources to express judgement (e.g. *not able to consciously agree, honest*) and relations of internal cause (e.g. *because, which indicates*), students are enabled to specify precisely why something is (not) consensual, connecting examples we might find in real or hypothetical scenarios with the law on consent.

Suggesting resources for consent which teachers can draw on is particularly timely, as consent education will be mandatory in Australian primary and high schools from 2023. Around 4 million students are set to start learning about consent as this thesis goes to print (ABS 2022), delivered by teachers who likely have not been given much additional time,

resources or training to do so. The consent checklist provides these educators with some tools they can draw on to pedagogise consent in a way which captures the legal definition accurately, which gives examples of what (non) consent looks like in real life, and which supports students to identify and challenge negative or illegal experiences and to seek out positive experiences of sexuality. The consent checklist resource is designed to be flexible and open-ended and can thus be used in different settings and with different cohorts. For instance, additional examples can be added when students are presented with new scenarios (e.g. *what if someone lies about their age*), and the question prompts can be adjusted as needed to align with different meanings of consent across Australian jurisdictions. The consent checklist could also be adapted as a spiral resource for different age groups, for instance references to sex could be replaced with other sexual behaviours (e.g. kissing, intimate touching) for younger high school students, or with non-sexual behaviours (e.g. hugging, borrowing someone else's belongings) for primary school students. This resource is thus one crucial mechanism for empowering teachers during a time of heightened attention and controversy around consent education, and for supporting students to grapple with complex and vital understandings of the law, civil society and their nascent sexuality. Of course, intervening in education is a serious challenge, requiring transdisciplinary work and serious engagement with practice. Language and semiosis can support this effort, but must be part of a rigorous dialectic between theory and practice.

A second teaching resource was proposed in Chapter 6. In this chapter, I described how teachers apprentice students into the value system of respect. More specifically, I showed that teachers use five rhetorical strategies to successfully rally the class around the iconised attitude 'respect', even where there are competing perspectives on what respect means. An important consideration for pedagogy is how to manage contested values, especially in a subject such as sex education, and I thus consolidated the rhetorical strategies as a possible teaching resource called **RE-SEE it**. This resource provides a concise and accessible overview of the linguistic features for (re)aligning students, including semiotic entities (e.g. *views, opinions*), heteroglossic entertain (e.g. *think, possibly*) and negative affect with lowered force (e.g. *kind of unsure*). As described in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.1.1), one of the stated aims of sex education pedagogy is to equip students with the knowledge but also the attitudes and values needed to navigate healthy, respectful and positive relationships. The RE-SEE it resource shows us how this can be achieved, rallying students around a shared value even while giving them space to have different opinions.

This resource offers a potential contribution to the teaching of attitudes and values in sex education and would perhaps be especially useful for very sensitive topics such as pleasure

and pornography. These topics are an important part of young people's learning about sex and sexuality; but they are also areas where teachers are most likely to feel uncomfortable or even embarrassed. Indeed, the teachers in this study expressed this feeling themselves. For example, in a post-teaching interview, Rhianon said:

(7.1) *Pleasure... would be a great topic to be able to talk to the kids about because it's very open in the public about men's pleasure and what's important for them, and for women it's very, "ooh that's taboo or silly or something really trivial". And it's not taught or even guided as to what the expectation should be. But it's really hard to bring up in an appropriate, PG [parental guidance] kind of way. So that's something I still need to try and figure out.*

(Rhianon post-interview @ 12m)

As expressed in the interview, Rhianon recognises the importance of teaching about pleasure, especially at an all-girls school where the cohort is more likely to have received the message that their pleasure is *taboo or silly or something really trivial*. She feels it is important to *guide... [them] as to what the expectation should be*, but that *it's really hard to bring up in an appropriate, PG [parental guidance] kind of way*. The RE-SEE it resource provides teachers like Rhianon with some ideas they could draw on to navigate their way around these sensitive issues. It thus provides more than a description of pedagogy, and more than a resource for teaching respect; it offers a portable set of strategies for navigating complex and sensitive topics both within and beyond sex education.

While I have used the label 'rhetorical strategies' to refer to patterns such as 'acknowledge different positions' and 'separate feelings from behaviours', it was beyond the scope of this thesis to relate this terminology to existing work in rhetoric. Relevant work includes Humphrey's SFL-informed work on activist literacies (e.g. 2008, 2010, 2013) and McCormack's writing on epideictic discourse (e.g. 2001, 2002, 2005; see also McCormack 2016 for an overview of rhetoric studies). This field of research is concerned in part with rousing people to create change and is certainly relevant to sex education's goal of equipping students with knowledge, skills and values that they will take beyond the walls of the classroom and outside the gates of the school. Equally, this work could be situated within a Positive Discourse Analysis (PDA) agenda (Martin 2004c; Bartlett 2012, 2017), a type of discourse analysis which looks for exemplary or model texts in order to understand "how change happens, for the better, across a range of sites" (Martin 2004c: 7). Since this thesis has aimed to propose positive models of sex education pedagogy, it is certainly aligned with the tradition

of PDA. Again, a detailed examination of PDA and sex education is beyond the scope of this thesis, but future research could consider how this analysis can contribute to these fields.

While there are already a range of resources available to sex educators, a major contribution of the resources suggested in this thesis is that they are based on a close analysis of actual sex education teaching. To my knowledge, this study is the first to conduct such an analysis, and the suggestions I make are thus uniquely grounded in pedagogic practice and are deeply embedded with teachers' own expertise. Related to this, another possible contribution of these resources is that they can be drawn on to provide a more positive model for sex education pedagogy. Where much research has focussed on what sex education gets wrong, here I have aimed to highlight the strengths and successes of sex education teachers. There are, of course, exceptions; but broadly my intention in this study was not to criticise what I witnessed. This was partly motivated by a desire to be sympathetic to the teachers who generously participated in this study; but it was also motivated by a desire to make the potential applications of this work as far-reaching as possible. As described in Chapter 2, sex education is incredibly diverse, with variation both between and within schools. My positive perspective provides a model which has the potential to inform settings far beyond the current one. Fortunately, the teachers in this study were exemplary, managing complex and contested topics in classes with students who had different beliefs, religious backgrounds and life experiences. While the teachers' success and professional expertise is not something I can hope to quantify, the fact that they self-selected to be in this study – and to have their teaching both observed and recorded – speaks to their confidence and competence as educators. The teaching resources I have suggested, and indeed all outputs of this thesis, accordingly reflect quality teaching practice.

The description of sex education pedagogy in this thesis, and the two suggested teaching resources, contribute towards the ultimate action research goal of this study. As described in Chapter 2, this thesis is situated within the context of the 'Sydney School' approach to curriculum and pedagogy, and as such aims to move beyond a mere description of what can be found in sex education classrooms and instead take a step towards finding out what works in sex education and the language resources we need to get there. The suggested teaching resources offer teachers a series of tools for pedagogising consent in a way which makes explicit the attitudinal meanings it distils, and for pedagogising respect and other contested values in a way that allows space for competing perspectives while ultimately (re)aligning the class into a tolerant and supportive community.

The resources proposed in this thesis might also be useful in other pedagogic settings beyond the immediate context of sex education. For example, SFL work on youth justice conferencing (e.g. Zappavigna & Martin 2018) has highlighted the importance of iconisation in (re)aligning young people with positive values of particular communities. The rhetorical strategies outlined in the RE-SEE it teaching resource might be useful for settings such as this, where iconisation and (re)alignment is at stake. Importantly, conferencing of this kind has been used productively in a range of other institutional settings, including anti-bullying schemes in primary and secondary schools, workplace-based community conferences, and even in larger processes such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (ibid.: 6). One way to take the work of this thesis forward would be to consider how the teaching resources proposed here might be valuable in this broader range of pedagogic settings which are designed to change behaviour.

7.3 LOOKING FORWARD

The findings of this thesis also point to future directions for research. In this section I suggest possible avenues for description and application in both SFL and sex education.

7.3.1 Future directions for SFL research

In this thesis, I have revised and extended SFL accounts of technicalisation and iconisation and clarified these with four concepts: technicalised ideation, technicalised attitude, iconised ideation and iconised attitude. On the basis of this thesis, we could return to some of the previous work on axi-tech and bonding icons. For example, work on axi-tech in engineering, psychology and administration could be re-visited with the criteria for technicalised attitude in mind, and work on bonding icons in museums could be re-visited with the criteria for iconised ideation in mind. This is an important step for confirming and/or refining the definition of the concepts outlined in this thesis and for understanding how they emerge in other contexts. While there is SFL work that could be revisited for technicalised attitude (i.e. axi-tech) and iconised ideation (i.e. bonding icons), the same cannot be said for iconised attitude. This concept is thus ripe for future exploration in other settings. Contexts where iconised attitudes are highly relevant might include political speeches and activism, as well as in the ‘core values’ of schools, corporations and nations (see Section 7.1.2).

A second direction for future research would be to investigate how these four concepts can be used to characterise similarities and differences between fields. Technicality is

canonically associated with the sciences (e.g. *oestrogen*) and icons are canonically associated with the humanities (e.g. the Olympic torch). There are of course exceptions, for instance the sciences have icons such as Einstein and Marie Curie (see also Martin & Unsworth in prep on the iconisation of the double helix). But taking this as a broad distinction, future work might consider how technicalised ideation, technicalised attitude, iconised ideation and iconised attitude are associated with different fields. Research in this area might compare the literacy demands of different school subjects, especially in senior secondary schooling. The literacy demands of secondary schooling are both complex and diverse, culminating in high stakes written assessment and either the end of schooling or the transition to university. The typological perspective on technicalisation and iconisation offers a crucial new perspective on these literacy demands and the resources that students must muster across different subject areas. This work could also consider how these demands play out across different modalities. Indeed, work in this area may already be underway, for example in Martin and Unsworth's (in prep) analysis of technicality and iconisation in infographics.

A third direction for future research in SFL is deepening our understanding of the realisation, individuation and instantiation hierarchies. As described in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.2.1), realisation, instantiation and individuation offer complementary perspectives on meaning, and all three have been used to explore sex education pedagogy. Throughout this thesis, I have been concerned with technicality and icons as items as well as technicalisation and iconisation as dynamic processes. For example, the technicalised attitude consent can be viewed as a specific term which distils many other meanings. Alternatively, we can consider the process by which consent becomes technicalised, for example the way those meanings are packed and unpacked as a text unfolds, or over the course of the school term. These two perspectives are both valuable for describing consent pedagogy, but it remains to be understood how we conceptualise the complementarity of the two. Future research could consider at what point we classify something as 'fully' technicalised, and whether there is some 'tipping point' in the technicalising process. Similarly, future research could explore how we 'measure' the amount of iconisation, and when we can consider something 'fully' iconised. We should expect that the 'amount' of iconisation waxes and wanes when dealing with greater time scales (e.g. ontogenetically, phylogenetically), but we need a theoretical model that accounts for this. For example, in Chapter 5, I described respect as most interpersonally charged when the appraiser and appraised are backgrounded (e.g. *respect is really important*). This represents the extreme end of discharging ideational meaning, and on this basis we could say that respect is 'fully' iconised. But would we want to consider these instances as more iconised than when, say, a

student comes out in front of the class? If this excerpt is the instance where the teacher has most successfully rallied the students around respect, can we ‘measure’ this in her language? Is respect an icon in both instances, and if so, is it ‘equally’ iconised? Answering these questions must be part of a broader goal of untangling the realisation, individuation and instantiation hierarchies in SFL.

As described in Chapter 2, the majority of work in SFL has focused on the realisation hierarchy, with individuation and instantiation receiving far less attention. But all of these perspectives need to be considered if we are to understand the functions of language: what choices we have when using language (realisation), how we co-ordinate those choices (instantiation), and why we make those choices to commune (individuation). The point here is not to favour one hierarchy over another, but rather how we distinguish between these three hierarchies when they are complementary perspectives on the same thing. Clarifying the role of each of these hierarchies in description and practice, and so determining what each perspective can offer to our understanding of pedagogy and beyond, is a formidable but necessary challenge for future research.

7.3.2 Future directions for sex education research

The findings of this thesis are also relevant for pursuing future research in sex education. As noted in Chapter 2, sex education teachers consistently report feeling underprepared, especially when teaching sensitive or controversial topics. In this thesis I have proposed resources and flagged knowledge about language which would be useful for teaching consent and respect. But there is a lot of work to do to determine how this might be implemented in pedagogy which best supports teachers and which operates in the spirit of the visible democratising pedagogy of the Sydney School (Rose & Martin 2012). Such a project would first need to establish a shared metalanguage for talking about language resources. For example, in the RE-SEE teaching resource, terms such as semiotic entities (e.g. *views, opinions*) and entertain resources within ENGAGEMENT (e.g. *might, possibly, think*) would need to be translated for audiences without SFL training. This could draw on extensive metalanguage already available within the Sydney School tradition, and existing metalanguage for evaluation would be an especially fruitful starting point (see e.g. Martin & Rose 2008 on attitude in story genres, Coffin 2006 on evaluation in history and Hao & Hood 2019 on values in health science).

In addition, the teaching resources would need to be pedagogised in relevant or newly designed curriculum genres involving teaching/learning cycles. For example, the consent

checklist as proposed in this thesis (see Chapter 3) represents a breadth and depth of meaning that we would only expect students to grasp towards the end of a unit on sex education, including the full list of conditions which affect consent (e.g. being *capable*) as well as examples of what this looks like (e.g. *conscious* vs. *unconscious*). It could therefore be used at a later stage in a teaching and learning cycle, with scaffolded activities which introduce students to this technicality gradually. For example, the class could jointly deconstruct the LawStuff website/handout to unpack the technical definition of consent and all its associated attitudes (e.g. capacity, inclination) as described in Chapter 3. They could then jointly construct a series of scenarios where these attitudes are at play, following the formula of the ‘what if’ scenarios described in Chapter 4. Students could then independently construct responses to these scenarios, practicing their ability to reason about why a situation is consensual or not before they are asked to do this in the written assessment task. Designing pedagogy of this kind would be useful not only for students of high school sex education, but for the millions of students who are set to learn about consent in Australian schools from 2023. This is an obvious site for immediate enquiry, with SFL’s joint consideration of theory, description and practice perfectly poised to meet the growing mandate in schools.

Another ambitious but essential area worthy of further research concerns assessing the value of sex education pedagogy. This would involve conducting an educational intervention and measuring the impact of this pedagogy on students’ knowledge and values. This could also incorporate a comparison of different contexts – for example returning to the girls’ school where this study took place and comparing it to the neighbouring boys’ school. Such a project certainly presents a range of challenges. While there is robust evidence supporting the potential positive impact of sex education, specific outcomes can be difficult to measure, especially where they concern social outcomes as opposed to health outcomes. One option is to survey and/or interview students on their reported knowledge and skills before and after an education intervention. This could follow the methodology of Lamb and Randazzo (2016), who surveyed students on their belief in rape myths and their likelihood of intervening as a bystander in troublesome sexual situations before and after a curriculum on sexual ethics. Of course, surveys and interviews capture reported or hypothetical behaviour, rather than actual behaviour. More impartial measures to capture behaviour change might include reports of sexual violence before and after receiving a sex education intervention, though there remain many barriers to reporting sexual violence and this measure is also far from ideal.

Social outcomes such as greater acceptance of gender and sexuality diversity are equally challenging to measure. A student coming out in class certainly speaks to the teacher’s

ability to provide a welcoming and tolerant classroom environment; but standalone moments such as this should not be the only indication that such classrooms exist. Assessing the effectiveness of sex education in this regard could again involve surveys assessing students' attitudes towards LGBTQIA+ people, or more objective measures such as reports of gender and sexuality-based bullying. Overcoming the challenges in assessing educational intervention is complex but crucial if we are to understand how students take the knowledge and values of sex education from the classroom out into the world. The transition from hypothetical scenarios to real ones and the shift from thoughts to action are precisely what we must investigate if we want to see how students navigate sexual experiences, learn to intervene on behalf of others, and build more respectful communities.

7.3.3 Towards the iconisation of consent

A final area for future research would be to consider the complementarity of technicalisation and iconisation in sex education pedagogy. For the purpose of my analysis in this thesis, I separated technicalisation and iconisation as these neatly mapped onto consent and respect respectively, and I treated these as separate topics with complementary but distinct pedagogies. But it would also be interesting to imagine how these discreet concepts could be cross-pollinated. For example, rather than looking at consent as a technical term recontextualised from legal discourse, we might imagine what it would look like if consent were iconised and functioned to rally students around a shared set of values. In other words, we might consider what would it look like to teach consent like we teach respect.

In fact, there is some evidence that this is happening in contexts outside of high school sex education. Consent slogans, such as those we might see on placards at protests or in campaigns for decreasing gendered violence, allow consent to amass attitude – as *enthusiastic* (affect: inclination), as *a normal and necessary part of sex* (judgement: normality) and as something that *matters* (appreciation: valuation; Consent Labs as cited in O'Brien 2022, NSVRC n.d., University of Sydney 2022). Similarly, we see evidence that consent is becoming more field neutral. When technicalised, consent has a technical definition which is specific to the law and to sexual acts. But increasingly, we see examples of consent being uncoupled from its legal definition and related to a wider set of behaviours, such as borrowing someone's belongings, posting photos of a friend on social media and general life skills such as setting boundaries (see e.g. Raising Children 2021, Love Is Respect n.d.). Amassing attitude and neutralising field are two criteria associated with icons and iconisation, and the brief picture

presented here suggests that consent may already be in the process of being iconised. Indeed, the recent surge in mainstream attention around consent suggests that it is already an issue around which many are rallying.

What might be the benefits of an iconising pedagogy of consent? Certainly there is value in technicalising consent, as documented in this thesis; the technical definition includes the numerous conditions which negate consent, and can be unpacked to relate it to scenarios, real or imagined, that students might encounter. Iconising consent runs the risk of discharging this technical meaning; but it does offer something valuable in exchange. While technicalising consent necessarily focuses on what counts as legal or illegal, iconising consent offers a pedagogy which focuses on what is good, fair or morally correct. This does not necessarily make it less powerful – indeed, iconising respect and rallying the class around this icon was so successful that a student felt comfortable enough to come out as bisexual in front of the class. Iconising consent could similarly have the power to rally the class around the importance of consent as a shared value, and to encourage students to pursue relationships and sexual encounters that are good as well as legal. In this way, iconising consent also tends towards a more positive pedagogy, affording a range of positive associations with consent, such as being *enthusiastic* and *normal*, and that consent *matters*. We might think of this as a pedagogy which is more ‘carrot’ than ‘stick’, and which informs students of what constitutes good, healthy and pleasurable sexual encounters rather than simply legal ones.

There is evidence that this approach can be effective by looking to work on youth justice conferencing (e.g. Zappavigna & Martin 2018). In some sense, youth justice conferences are designed to steer away from the ‘stick’ of the law – although they remain legal proceedings, designed to respond to a criminal offence and with police officers in attendance. But in another sense they offer a ‘carrot’; they typically do not focus on threatening young people with punishment (e.g. a criminal record, time in juvenile detention), but are concerned with socialising them as responsible citizens. Consider the following excerpt from a youth justice conference:

Police Youth Liaison Officer: *This is a huge turning point in your life, and you can go one way or you can go the other. And the way that you're going is a very hard and long and lonely road... if you start to do the wrong thing it's going to make your relationships hard and things like that. Or you can start to do the right things and life will be a lot easier, and you'll feel better about yourself.*

(Martin & Zappavigna 2018: 106)

In this excerpt, a police youth liaison officer tells a young person that they are at *a huge turning point*, either facing *a long and lonely road* or *starting to do the right things*. But they do not threaten the young person with jail time or a court sentence for their offence, but rather with a choice between *mak[ing] your relationships hard* and life being *easier and you'll feel better about yourself*. Excerpts such as this make it clear that the goal of these conferences is more pedagogic than judiciary, and restorative justice processes such as this are generally considered more satisfying to both victims and offenders than court-based remedies (ibid.: 12). Forms of restorative justice such as this indicate that there is a place for both technicalisation and iconisation when dealing with the law, and draw attention to the value of iconising consent in sex education. Of course, there is still a place for technicalising consent, and indeed there may be contexts where it is more appropriate to instruct students with respect to the strong arm of the law than with the promise of (re)affiliation. For instance, it might be better to be categorical about consent law when it comes to imbalances of power (e.g. between teachers and students). But the complementarity between ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ (i.e. between what the schools says and what the law says) may be a valuable strategy for navigating an issue which is simultaneously technical, controversial and at the same time absolutely vital.

7.4 BETTER SEX EDUCATION, BETTER OUTCOMES

Sex education has the capacity to contribute to a range of positive outcomes, improving young people’s health and social wellbeing. This thesis has explored precisely how this change takes place by looking at sex education up close, and the potential contribution of this project is perhaps best understood by looking at different timescales. Logogenetically, this thesis helps us understand how the concepts of consent and respect unfold in discourse through processes of technicalisation and iconisation. Ontogenetically, this thesis helps us see how students develop their understanding across the course of a term. And the ultimate goal is to grasp the phylogenetic implications of this work – i.e. understanding the role of sex education in changing the culture and improving sexual health and gender equality for future generations. The findings of this thesis have the potential to be used by practitioners promoting such change since learning about consent has the capacity to reduce the incidence of rape and sexual assault, and learning about respect has the ability to make people more tolerant of gender and sexuality diversity – indeed, this thesis already demonstrates evidence of the latter. These timescales can be viewed independently but are of course also interrelated; knowing how values are negotiated

at the discursive level is the necessary first step to understanding how we attempt to change attitudes in individual interactions, in classrooms and in society at large.

Without wanting to overstate the potential impact of this research, it is worth acknowledging the real effect that education can have and the way in which society looks to schools to contribute to change. It is notable that the recent call to action around consent in the Australian mainstream was not concerned with judicial reform but with educational reform. In February 2021, Chanel Contos posed the question on Instagram: “*If you live in Sydney: have you or has anyone close to you ever experienced sexual assault from someone who went to an all-boys school?*” The question went viral, and she received 1200 anonymous testimonies within just three days. Importantly, she did not then call for better avenues for reporting sexual assault, nor for further criminalisation of gendered violence, nor for increased prosecution rates – hers was not the familiar ‘law and order’ response to criminal behaviour. Instead, she started a petition for better consent education. Even as a victim/survivor of sexual assault herself, her concern was not to see her assaulter behind bars, but whether “if that boy knew what consent was... maybe he never would have done it [assaulted me] in the first place” (as cited in FitzSimons 2022). Contos understood the potential for education to change the early experience of sex for herself and for thousands of other young people like her, and she successfully recruited the Australian public and the Australian government to recognise it too. A linguistic description of sex education pedagogy is well positioned to meet this call to action, and to contribute to effecting change in classrooms and bedrooms the world over.

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Appendix A – Transcription Conventions

When transcribing classroom data, T refers to ‘teacher’ and S refers to ‘student’. For example:

T: *What might be some signs of an unhealthy relationship?*

S: *Always arguing.*

(J2_5m)

SS refers to ‘students’, used for when the multiple students or the whole class speak in unison.

This is typically for short utterances (e.g. *yes, no*) and exclamations. For example:

T: *Is that consent?*

SS: *No.*

(R5_27m)

Students are numbered (e.g. S1, S2) where their dialogue needs to be followed across multiple related turns, for example:

S1: *My friend she goes to another school right. And well last year she told me about this incident that’s like really big.*

T: *Mm.*

S1: *Apparently this girl, right, she was dating an 18-year-old, yeah 18, when she was like 14.*

(R4_56m)

If a student speaks across multiple unrelated turns, they will not necessarily be numbered. This is done for two reasons. First, it was not always possible to identify when the same student was speaking across turns, especially for the lessons with a fixed camera angle (lessons 7-15) where most students are out of frame. Second, identifying students as generically as possible (i.e. S rather than S1, S2) helps to anonymise their talk further. Transcribing the dialogue in this way is unlikely to cause misunderstanding or significant loss of meaning. In the assessment task data, students are given pseudonyms (e.g. Student A, Student B).

Square brackets are used for author comments, including glossing, for example:

T: *You need to be respectful of the fact that other people have different opinions, feel differently about these things [sensitive topics in sex education].*

(J1_7m)

To describe actions, for example:

T: *Those two things relate to communication [writes 'communication' on whiteboard] and on the other side respect [writes 'respect' on board].*

(J2_5m)

And to anonymise student names, for example:

T: *What are some signs or characteristics of a healthy relationship? [Name]?*

S: *Good communication and being trustworthy.*

(J2_5m)

Dialogue is transcribed as accurately as possible. Where dialogue is unclear or not transcribed this is also noted in square brackets, for example:

S: *I don't know, I don't know. [multiple students talking in overlap]*

(J3_13m)

For reasons of space, instructional discourse (e.g. teachers shushing students) may be excluded when inserting examples in text.

Appendix B – Transcripts

This appendix contains transcripts that are analysed in detail, including student assessment task responses. Transcripts are listed in the order they appear in text.

Chapter 3

Is that consent (R5_27m)

T: So in this case we've got a couple of different scenarios. So what if one person is really drunk and the other person isn't. Can there be consent?

S: Yes.

S: Yes.

S: No.

S: No.

S: No.

S: No, not really.

T: No. Cos it's not just, it doesn't matter who's the drunk person, um only one of those people is able to consent and a consensual relationship means BOTH people have to say, have to be in agreement. So you don't have to both go emphatically "YES! LET'S DO IT!" Um, you don't need, it's, but it needs to be clear enough. So if one person is very very drunk, and the other person is not, just don't do it.

What if both people are really drunk, can there be consent?

S: No.

S: No.

T: Right, no.

S: Cos they don't know what they're doing.

T: But the other difficulty that can come with this is, if both people are really drunk, and so neither of them can give consent, if they then had sex, and then somebody wakes up the next morning and goes "oh my god, I had sex and I was so drunk and I didn't want it and I feel really bad about it", who would get in trouble?

S: The person who... both... [inaudible]

T: Potentially, both. Because neither have been legally able to give consent. So if both people have gone out, had a raging night at a party, very drunk, ended up in someone's room, had sex um and then the next morning woke up and really regretted it, um and they remembered bits

of it because they're black out so they remember certain bit of their memory but not all of it. That's a really really difficult situation, because neither of them have consented. And it's quite possible that they were both quite happy with the situation at the time, because alcohol and hormones is an interesting combination, but it doesn't legally mean they were able to consent. So they're either both in trouble, or both not in trouble, it's a tricky situation.

Um what if someone asks you over and over and over and over again and eventually you gave in and said "oh fine yes". Um and it might not even be that "ugh" kind of, it might be the "oh well, OK then", the uncomfortable 'well I don't really want to but you've kind of asked many times now and I kind of feel obliged that maybe I should', is that consent?

SS: No.

S: Because you've coerced the person.

T: Good, you remembered that from last lesson and from this?

S: Yeah.

T: Excellent. So that one, think the terms of, it's the, was it consent is um, where's the line in there in particular [picks up handout from student's desk] means giving your free and voluntary agreement. That's that line there, that free and voluntary agreement. So that means that person was not free in making that comment, they were coerced and kind of forced into that decision. So that also is not consent. The "oh... well OK then...".

S: So Miss, it wasn't their decision, it was someone else's decision.

T: Yes! Somebody else has kind of tricked them into making that decision. Alright, can we think of any other what if type scenarios that we could add there? Maybe we've seen in a movie or a show or we've read or we've seen in social media. Is there another what if situation there? Alright I'll give you an interesting one that has come up in the media and has now been before law courts at different points. What if, while having sex, so two people are having sex and the guy was wearing a condom, and then part way during sex, without telling the girl, he takes off the condom

S: He took it off

T: And kept going

S: That's not consent

T: Is that consent?

S: No.

T: No. Why not?

S: Cos he didn't tell her, and she didn't consent to taking it off.

T: Good. She didn't agree to that change in circumstance, and so it's not consent. So in that case there he would get himself in very big trouble, and it actually has been tested in courts more recently, to say yes he would get in big trouble. It's only something that's more recently come about. Yeah?

S: What if it's a girl though? Like what if she wants it.

T: Oh.

S: What if he's like not sure but like, you know what I mean? Like some people do want it but then the dude's like he doesn't want to take responsibility if there's a child, but she's like oh it's safe. You know what I mean?

T: Oh, so. In this case here, notice how we didn't use gender at all. Cos it wasn't whether the guy pressured the girl, or the girl pressured the guy, cos this can go either way. You know, what if the guy's the one who's really drunk and the girl's the one like "yeah yeah let's have sex" and she's perfectly sober. Is that consent?

SS: No.

T: No. Only one of those person is in a situation where they're able to give consent, um the other person is not, and he doesn't want it either. So you've got two things going against them. Um so it doesn't matter the gender of each person, what often happens though, and I had a very interesting discussion with um with [other PDHPE teacher] about this. We reckon there's probably a lot more cases of sexual misconduct that go where the female is the person causing the trouble, she's the uh the perpetrator and he's the victim. But for a guy to speak up and talk about that, that would be considered quite "unmanly" [makes air quotes] maybe, and questioning his masculinity; "you didn't want sex?! What kind of man are you?" What if this was a same sex relationship?

S: Um.

S: No.

T: Yeah still no, good.

S: You still have to have consent.

T: Good, you still have to have consent, it doesn't matter what gender the other person is, if they're not even entirely sure which gender they are, um, or they're gender fluid, they're male, female or somewhere in between, um, it literally does not matter the gender. It's about whether one person gives consent to the other person for the sexual contact in which they are both agreeing to make. Yeah?

S: What if like some people, like what if like, cos I've seen, like I've read a lot of scenarios about this. Like not really necessarily books but like usually it's like one person right? They

just pressure the people who's not sure about the um sexuality right, they're not sure which one, they pressure them to have sex. Like, like is that like OK? Like I mean it's not OK but like, what do people, what do, what if they want to file like a thingamajig you know? Like as...

T: So if they wanted to go to the police and um, not file a complaint, I'm having a brain fart now. Um you know if they wanted, if they wanted to go to the police, and if this person, "I did not consent to the sexual activity that we engaged in, I really feel uncomfortable about it" and then they find someone, one of the officers to support them and then they talk their way through it, um, to discuss what's gonna happen from there. So again it doesn't matter the gender of either person, but also the type of sexual engagement that occurs as well. Some person might be really happy with um oral sex but they don't want um vaginal or anal sex.

S: What?

T: Or they might be in the... You know it could be, a male and female having sex

S: Oh

T: they're having you know "normal" [does air quotes] sex, the guy's penis in her vagina and everything's happy and then he decides to go a bit more adventurous and he decides he wants to try anal sex and she's not happy with it. If she says "no I don't want that" and he does it anyway, it's not consent [T makes cross with her arms]. Part way through, while having sex, all of a sudden it's become illegal. [T makes cross with her arms]

S: Don't you, can't you just "nup"?

T: Oh it's quite possible the person would like kick him or pfff [mimes kicking], um so

S: Would it be before it like gets to [laughs]

T: Jeez you'd hope so! But

S: Like, like

T: It's not like he went "surprise", boop! [Mimes pelvic thrust] [SS laughter] That'd be weird, wouldn't it?

S: Miss I heard, Miss I, Miss I heard that um, I, I, just don't ask how I got this please.

T: Alright

S: But

T: So there's "I heard that somebody", if in doubt we "I heard that somebody" um yep

S: OK I heard that, I heard that you could actually, if you actually do anal, if you you know

T: If someone has anal sex, yep

S: You're like, the back end

T: If somebody, I'll say it, so if somebody had anal sex

S: Like how they had the back, they're doing it from the back, you know

T: Yeah

S: Like, I heard that you can get actually AIDS from that sometimes

T: So, um, one of the things we're gonna look at, in the next couple of lessons we're gonna look at some different sexually transmitted infections, so why it's important to

S: Miss some, some guy had like AIDS but he didn't tell the girl and she, didn't tell the girl and stuff

T: Yeah there was a case

S: And she got it

T: In New South Wales, I think it's actually about ten years ago now, nah maybe it shouldn't be that long, I think it was maybe not too long before I came here, so he was HIV positive, so he had you know Human Immunodeficiency Virus, so HIV

S: Miss is that

S: AIDS

T: Pretty much it just means that your immune system deteriorates to the point that you don't have an immune system anymore and a basic cold will kill you, um,

S: Ow, my legs

T: So he had HIV, he did not tell his partner, um, they had unprotected sex because she didn't know that there was anything wrong. Um she then contracted HIV, they had kids together, it wasn't until their youngest child died of an HIV/AIDS related illness they went "what the hell's going on?" They went and tested her, tested the child, tested the husband, and HIV's an unusual virus and they can actually trace um where the virus has come from because it mutates ever so slightly with each person, so you can actually do like a "DNA" test with the HIV, so that's how they knew that son had got it from mother, mother had got it from the husband, he got it from somewhere, but he had never disclosed it. In fact HIV is one of the few diseases where if you are HIV positive you must disclose it to your sexual partner before you engage in sexual activity. Um if you don't, consent is not, does, has not been um applied.

Chapter 4

What is consent (R4_54m)

T: But we need to know exactly what consent means to say, to agree to having sex. So it means you give your free and voluntary agreement to sex. So you have, it's never OK for someone to assume you have given consent or to force you. So this means without coercion. When somebody is freely and voluntarily, they haven't gone "do you wanna have sex? Do you wanna have sex? Do you wanna have sex?" and they keep bugging you, bugging you, bugging you, bugging you. And eventually you're like "fine! I will" and you're not very happy about it but you've given in because they've pestered you constantly. You have not agreed freely. If they've said "give me a blowjob or we're breaking up and I'm gonna tell everyone and I'm gonna share those pictures that you gave me", that's not voluntarily, you've been forced and coerced into that situation. And I'm worried that might not seem like something you have to worry about, but a number of years ago, not at this school, a number of years ago we had to have a big talk with the entire of year 8 because there was a huge issue. Boys at another school were forcing the girls at our school to give them blowjobs. They said "well if you don't we'll break up with you and we'll spread rumours about you online". They were forced into a position they didn't want to be in. So what those boys were doing was highly illegal. They were going to get themselves into big trouble. But we also need to remind our girls "hey, no boy's worth that".

Sexting (R4_56m)

S1: Coz um my friend she goes to another school right. And well last year she told me about this incident that's like really big.

T: Mm.

S1: Apparently this girl, right, she was dating an 18-year-old, yeah 18, when she was like 14 or

T: Woah!

S1: Yeah 14, yeah last year right. And apparently she gave him a blowjob, yeah, and then he took a video

T: Oh my gosh.

S1: And she did kind of want it. And then later he spread it around online and [laughs] my friends all got everything.

T: [whispered] Far out.

S1: Like [laughs] the whole grade got like the video right.

T: Mm.

S1: And it spread so much. And like um this, and then he, but he kind of, you know her parents, she was like threatening him to like file a thing, right, you know, the lawsuit.

T: Oh yeah.

S1: But he ran away! And then like when he came back to the school like nothing happened, like you know. She didn't like do anything. And I was confused, like what the hell?

T: So in this case here, the gap is more than 2 years and she's under 16. So this case, highly illegal, he could get himself in massive trouble, he'd get himself on the child sex offender list, because she's a child. On top of that, he's videoed without consent, that's also illegal and doesn't matter what age you are. And thirdly he's then distributed that. So he's distributed child pornography. So even though he's only 18, that's still considered as child pornography. If somebody ever does send you something like that, it's really important that you delete it off your phone or emails straight away. Because then you are also in possession of child pornography and you could also get yourself in trouble, even though you didn't create it and you didn't send it on. If you have it in your possession. So if you ever got sent that you were like delete, get rid of, tell the authorities, "hey by the way this video's just been sent by... from their...". The police can backtrack through um the ISPs and through different telecommunications companies where it's come from, they can source all of that part. But don't keep it to go "look what I found!" There was a question here, [name]?

S: There's sometimes, if it's video without consent sometimes it's kind of necessary in case that person you're filming is violent and is trying to hurt, if they hurt you that you can send that video to the police.

T: Yep. What I mean by video without consent is video of sexual or an intimate situation without consent, that's illegal.

Student answers to assessment question 2

Rhianon's class

Student A (2/3) Yes, this is unwanted sex because both of them were drunk and regretted after. This situation shows that both of them didn't have consent since they both were drunk and not in their full senses, Hossein should have stopped immediately when he realised but he wouldn't get the full blame for it since he was drunk too.

Student B (3/3) They both drank which tells me they might be over 18 or 18 which means they were eligible to have sex with a consent of the partner. The fact that they both were drunk tells that they were not eligible to give consent or make a decision. They also felt bad after the party which tells me they didn't actually wanted sex. this is not acceptable by the law because both individuals were not in stable state of making a decision. This was unwanted sex.

Student C (2/3) Yes, this is unwanted sex, because both of them were drunk & were clueless of what was happening. According to the law consent must be given to both the people before sex. in the scenario it is demonstrated that Both Kit & Hossein were drunk, therefore the consent technically was not given.

Student D (2/3) Yes, this is an unwanted sex because Kit or Hossein didn't plan on doing this. The law says if you want to do sexual activity then you should ask about consent. The law also says that you should be sixteen years old to have sex but if you're sixteen and you're in a relationships then you can do sexual activity with someone that is two years younger than you.

Student E (3/3) I view this as unwanted sex. This is because neither Kit or Hossein planned to have sex. There was no given consent before the incident & during the incident when they were drunk. The law says both people have to consent & if a person is drunk, they are not in the right mindset to behave how they would if sober. (Drunk people can't give consent) Them giving consent would not be reliable as they don't know exactly what they're doing. This means drunk people can be taken advantage of. And since both were drunk & didn't know what they were doing. I don't think anyone is to blame but they must take ownership of their mistakes/actions.

Student F (2.5/3) This was unwanted sex. They both was drunk so it is not approval. If Kit and Hossein are over 16 or one of them is 16 and the other one is 2 years younger, it's fine to have sex. But one of them is 16 and the other one is 2 years younger but 2 years younger person didn't agree to that and you still had sex then it's illegal. Also if you under 16 is also illegal. If they really want to have sex they should have been in control/have sex when they are normal.

Student G (3/3) The law of consent states that, in relation to Kit and Hossein, each individual should be in a conscious state of mind to give consent when having sex. However, Kit and Hossein 'had too much to drink' which indicates they were not prepared for sex and are not

legally permitted to continue until both are fully sober. The law of consent also states that both individuals having sex must agree to have sex and not be either 'caught up in the moment', afraid, forced, etc into it. As Kit was 'really enjoying' it so 'Hossein allowed it to continue' it proves that this is 100% not consent as Hossein was feeling unsure and asked Kit to stop which means one did not consent to sex. They should make 'sudden, rash decisions' when it comes to sex. As sex must be 'pleasurable and useial' (??) they should not have 'felt bad the next day'.

Student H (3/3) This is unwanted sex as neither Kit nor Hossein were ready or prepared to have sex. The law of consent states that both people who are going to take part in sexual activity must be in stable condition and say yes. This means that neither of them are supposed to be drunk or unstable in any other case. They both must say yes without any pressure and must be completely agreeing to having sex. However, in this particular scenario, Kit and Hossein were both drunk which means that none of them were able to consciously agree to having sex. However, this scenario also suggests that Kit and Hossein enjoyed it, however, Hossein wanted to stop. This still goes against the law of consent as neither of them were in a stable condition to agree to having sex.

Student I (2/3) No it is unwanted because they were too drunk to give consent. That you must have consent to have sex or it is illegal and can be accused for rape

Josh's class

Student J (2/3) Kit had made an attempt to suggest they should not continue to have sex. Hossein chose to guess and ignore Kit's proposal and also did not verbally ask Kit, in the scenario given. Both sides are at fault. The law states, of Hossein behaviour, it can be considered as a sexual assault or offence. This may be if Hossein planned this earlier w/ the intention of have intercourse w/ Kit without Kit knowing. Kit can file a report if she or he feels violated, physically or mentally. But Kit has also failed to voice his or hers intention to stop.

Student K (1/3) This is unwanted sex on behalf of Hossein mid way. This by law is considered as rape/sexual assault and will have jail time if matters get worse. In Australia this is considered illegal and has punishments depending on the severity of the issue.

Student L (3/3) The scenario above mentions that both individuals were under the influence of excessive amounts of alcohol. Although they both willingly had sex together, there are legislations in place that state that people who have consumed alcohol cannot give consent as they are not technically 'aware'. It is not considered rape because both people were drunk and they both gave consent, therefore, it is considered unwanted sex. The two individuals immediately regretted what they did the previous day but know the only reason it did happen

was because they had consumed large amounts of alcohol. As stated in the scenario “Kit and Hossein felt really bad about what had happened”, primarily due to the reason that they were unaware of what was happening. The quote shows that it was unwanted by both people.

Student M (3/3) The scenario can be considered unwanted sex as they had too much to drink. They weren’t in the correct head space to make decisions like that. The law says without a persons consent it can be considered rape and there are charges towards them. Although this considered unwanted sex there are times were both Kit and Hossein could have prevented unwanted sex, for example they could have controlled their drinking and use protection like condoms or the pill. Overall this scenario is considered unwanted sex because in that time they weren’t able to think for themselves.

Student N (3/3) Both Kit and Hossein were drunk when they had sex, which means they weren’t making well-thought decisions. However, Hossein wanted to stop but just let it continue, there was no talk of consent between them either. Also, the fact that they both felt bad the next day makes this unwanted sex. The law says consent is mandatory otherwise it will be considered a crime/offense. Also that both people should be over the ages of 16.

Student O (3/3) This is definitely unwanted sex as the scenario states “Neither Kit nor Hossein planned on doing this”. This proves that not only did they want it, but it wasn’t planned. And the both of them didn’t give consent. This is proven when the scenario states “Hossein tried to tell Kit that they should stop, but it looked like Kit was really enjoying it so Hossein let it continue”. The laws states that both must give consent for it to be wanted sex, though Hossein didn’t officially give Kit consent. There was no real communication, which is key before having sex. This could actually be a criminal act if the both didn’t give consent, especially being under an influence.

Student P (1/3) The law says that age of consent is 16, and since Hossein is 17 & Kit is 16 they are legally allowed to have sex although they probably shouldn’t be under the influence when making that decision.

Student Q (2/3) This is not so much unwanted sex because they both went upstairs and the both had sex but they were bit worried. They should have talked through it before doing sex so they both had an agreement. The law says if you ask for consent and the other person doesn’t agree, you shouldn’t have sex.

Student R (2/3) This isn’t unwanted sex because they both had the chance to stop but they decided to continue on. The law about consent says that you BOTH have to agree on having sex & not being forced to do it without your permission.

Student S (3/3) This is unwanted sex because the two partners never gave consent. The law clearly says two partners willing to have sex have to give consent. One partner doesn't give consent and they just have sex it could be charged as rape or assault. Also the partners have to be at least 16 to have sex as the law has recommended.

Student T (2/3) Yes, as they both were drunk and didn't know what happened. The law says that before having sex, both partners should give consent and be fine with having sex.

Student U (2/3) I believe that this is unwanted sex on Hossien's part. Hossien felt pressure to continue having sex with Kay because Hossien felt as though Kit was really enjoying it. The law states that both parties who are contributing to sex have to give consent, but Hossein never gave consent, in fact Hossien said "stop".

Chapter 5

Healthy relationships (J2_5m)

T: Alright so next little bit, underneath that, can you please add for me what a healthy relationship looks like. So thinking about maybe a healthy relationship you've seen, or one that you imagine, or your future healthy relationship, what are some things that that looks like? What are some key traits of the relationship? Not necessarily of either person specifically, but of the relationship. Thinking about describing a healthy relationship.

NB. Students write down their responses, then discuss their answers to 'what are the traits you look for in an ideal partner'. Answer to 'what makes a healthy relationship' begins at 8 minute timestamp.

T: So then, thinking about the relationship. What are some signs or characteristics of a healthy relationship? [Name]?

S: Good communication and being trustworthy.

T: Fantastic, good communication, being trustworthy. [Name]?

S: They get along without arguing a lot.

T: Get along without arguing. [Points to student]

S: The ability to compromise.

T: The ability to compromise, that's a great one. Uh, what other things? A good, healthy relationship. OK, so. Ooh, go? [Points to student]

S: Accepting.

T: Accepting, good. What might be some signs of an unhealthy relationship?

S: Always arguing.

T: OK, always arguing. And it's good, because there is a difference between never arguing and always arguing. There is a middle ground that you are two unique, different people, and if you never disagree on anything then one of you is irrelevant, because if you never disagree on anything then why do you have two people there, OK? So you do actually need to disagree on things, but there's a difference between arguing about those things and disagreeing about them. There is a difference there between having a fight and an argument and, and that kind of attitude, and there's a difference to hey we think differently about different things and that's why we work together well because we can actually be a team and, and work together. Uh I would add that in a healthy relationship there is an aspect of teamwork, that you are two unique, individual, different people working together towards something where you are both adding something, OK? If you are both the same, then why do you need two people if they're both the

same? OK? You need two for their two different perspectives. Uh, what else would be a sign of an unhealthy relationship? [Points to student]

S: Uh like sir about then, so why do people say like ‘if you have things in common it’s good’?

T: Things in common is good. Everything in common is... not the same. So you do wanna have some things in common, whether it’s some similar life goals or similar beliefs or values, uh people have different opinions on how you get to those goals, and that sort of thing is where you want some great discussion and debate and maybe argument from time to time. But you also need that to still be respectful.

S: So opposites attract is

T: Sometimes is true. Not always, but sometimes is true. [To student walking in late] Quickly. So unhealthy relationship, what would be some signs of an unhealthy relationship? Arguing all the time. [Points to student]

S: Going places without telling each other.

T: OK, any time someone is keeping things secret or sort of hiding things away that’s always a bad sign. [Points to student]

S: Physical abuse.

T: OK, so abuse, whether that is physical or other forms, whether it’s emotional or verbal, those are definitely signs of unhealthy relationships. Anything else?

S: Verbal abuse.

T: Verbal abuse, I did just say that, good listening. [S laughter] [Points to student]

S: Uh disrespectful.

T: OK disrespectful. If someone is disrespectful then that makes an unhealthy relationship. Uh so, thinking some of the flip sides of those in terms of being a healthy relationship, we could flip some of those things and say uh no abuse, we could say that they are respectful and things like that. Those are great signs of a healthy relationship.

So there are kind of two core ideas, and we covered these a little bit, but two core ideas that if we were to look through our syllabus and look through a bunch of the things that you said, there tends to be two main things that we come to that are the cores of healthy relationships. Those two things relate to [writing on board] communication and on the other side respect [writing on board], and those actually cover almost everything that you guys have talked about. So something like not telling each other where you’re going relates to communication. Things like verbal abuse obviously relates to communication. Physical abuse would relate to respect. Verbal abuse relates to respect as well, if you respect and see the other person as a valuable person, you don’t speak to them in that manner.

So can you make two quick mind maps on a page in your book, and I'd like you to mind map all of the things that these involve. In your mind, what does communication involve in a relationship? What does that look like, what is healthy communication? What is good communication? And we're looking at all of the different aspects of both of these two things in relationships. So quick mind map, try and come up with five or ten things that you think about what that looks like, what it involves.

Students write for approx. 2 minutes.

T: Alright, anyone want to add anything for communication? What's that involve? [Points to student]

S: Confiding.

T: OK. [Writes 'confide in'] And probably worth adding to that that it should go both ways, so confide in one another, not just one person doing so. [Writes 'one another'] Anyone else, what's communication involve, well good communication in particular, what does that involve? [Name]?

S: Like bottling things inside, like not bottling

T: OK yep. [Writes 'Not holding things inside'] Not holding things inside. And if we were to break that one down a little bit more, what do you mean by 'not holding things inside'? Like does that mean that you don't keep a secret from your partner ever? Because then how do you throw them a surprise birthday party?

[SS laughter]

T: But what does it mean by not bottling things inside? What do you mean by that [name]?

S: Um, maybe like how you're feeling, or if something like troubles you, talking it out.

T: Keep going, troubles you in relation to what? Like, your bad workplace?

S: Yeah maybe.

T: Yep, there's more there. [Points to student]

S: Um so, telling each other, not letting each other state their opinion.

T: OK, both [Writes 'Both stating opinions']. That's a good one. I wanna come back to this [points] 'not holding things inside' for a second. So that, from the sound of what you're saying, is a little bit to do with things like resentment or bitterness, and so communication as in if you have a problem with your partner that you don't just hide that inside and hide it until it explodes. Um, [Writes 'avoid resentment'] and avoiding resentment or bitterness, where you're holding an issue with your partner inside. There's obviously a little bit of a difference between you had a bad day at work and you don't share that with your partner, or you have a big issue with your partner and you hold that inside and don't share that.

Uh, both stating their opinions, absolutely, very important that both people have a voice in the relationship. Anything else? Communication. [Name].

S: Like how you arrange stuff together.

T: OK. [Writes 'work together'] So the idea of working together or arranging things together, yeah. What else? There's a lot more in here, there's plenty to say for good communication. Both people should state opinions. Any things that we should specifically avoid? Other things we should avoid or NOT have? No-ones...

S: Dominating.

T: Say again.

S: Dominating the other.

T: Yep great, so not dominated by one person.

S: What does that mean?

T: Uh when you dominate something is where you sort of cover over it so that one voice isn't heard. So maybe both people say their opinion but one person then is just like "yeah that's fine but what I say goes". They're dominating their partner. [Writes 'not dominated by one person'] So not dominated by one person. What else? Communication, what else is in there. [Points to student]

S: Um like you guys have boundaries and you tell each other what makes you uncomfortable.

T: Absolutely, very important. [Writes 'Boundaries'] That you have boundaries. [Writes 'what makes you uncomfortable'] What makes you uncomfortable. Fantastic. So, boundaries, what makes you uncomfortable. Now we can actually jump into a second thing off that. What if you have a problem with what makes someone uncomfortable? What if one partner has a problem with something that someone, that the other partner said makes them uncomfortable?

S: Talk about it.

T: If you have good communication, well you wanna talk about it, great. If you have good communication how would you talk about that? How would you go about that?

S: Sit down with a cup of tea. [SS laughter]

T: OK, yes. Uh so I might add to this one, able to discuss hard things or difficult things [Writes 'able to discuss difficult things']

S: What sir what do you mean? Do you mean like when someone's doing something and the other one doesn't like that the other person

T: Well let's say for example your partner's family is something that they're very sort of protective about, but their mum is doing something that you don't particularly like, let's say

you have kids and their mum keeps telling you what you should do with your kids and how you should raise them and you really don't like that.

S: Oh then you just [inaudible]

T: Can you actually talk to your partner about that?

S: Yes.

T: OK so while you have boundaries and they've said like they don't like you dissing their family, do you have a method of communicating and talking about that. And in a good healthy relationship, you'll have a way of getting to that conversation. You'll have a way of being able to say "look your mum is doing this and I really don't like it and I don't appreciate her saying these things about me it makes me feel this way" without your partner blowing up and just being like "oh you just hate my family!" And you can actually get to that good conversation and get to the problem-solving.

Some other quick little things that you might think about. You might think about things like conflict resolution [writes 'conflict res'] which is related to that same idea [points to 'talking about difficult things'] and well as problem solving [writes 'problem solving'].

So then, if you don't have very many things in your mind map, you do not have to have every single one that I have there but uh try and make sure you have five to ten in your mind map, and if you had less than five definitely add a few in.

Uh you might add other things like both people listening and actually listening to the other person's opinion. Just because both people said their opinion does mean that both people listened, so you might want to have things to do with listening in communication. You might want to have things like, that you actually talk enough, there is a lot of particularly guys out there who uh just don't speak enough to their partners and they'll come home and they'll sort of grunt about how their work was and how their day was and then go and do their own thing and not actually talk to their partner, so you actually wanna have enough communication, where you're aware of what's going on in each other's lives. You could add things like that.

T: Second one, respect, what does that involve? Sorry lights coming back on. [turns on lights]

S: Give each other space.

S: Mutual space.

T: OK. Giving space. [Writes 'giving space'] Should work both ways, so mutual. [Writes 'work both ways'] What else does respect involve? [Name]

S: Um treating the other nicely.

T: Ooh let's not use the word nicely, what's 'nicely' mean?

S: Nice.

T: Yeah what's 'nice' mean?

S: Good.

T: What does 'good' mean?

S: Positive.

T: We want some more specific things, OK so some positivity. [writes 'positivity'] [Name]?

S: Uh freedom.

T: Freedom, yep. [writes 'freedom'] Absolutely, there should be freedom, you should not be dominated by your partner in the sense that you can't do things.

S: Respect their opinions and beliefs.

T: OK. For opinions and beliefs. [writes 'for opinions & beliefs'] Absolutely. Anything else? What does respect involve?

S: Communication.

T: It does involve some communication. So if someone gives you space and freedom and they're positive, are they respecting you? And that's it? That's all they have to do?

S: Manners?

T: It might be as simple as manners, yep. [Writes 'manners'] We could say manners, and you could jump that off into a bunch of things like tone, the words they use [writes 'tone', 'words they use'] you could jump off into a whole bunch of other things in terms of how you speak to someone and respecting that. Anything else there about these things? [Points to student]

S: Um like respecting each other's physical body.

T: OK respect absolutely not just for their emotional state but for their body as well. [Writes 'for body'] [Name]?

S1: Uh respecting their boundaries and what they don't want to do.

T: Yep fantastic. [Writes 'boundaries'] And the idea of boundaries is a really really crucial one. How do you know what your partner's boundaries are?

S1: Talking to them and asking or if they say no, that's their boundary.

T: OK. So you just find out about them at the point where they say no?

S1: No you ask them first.

T: You ask them, how would you go about that? Tell me a bit about that conversation. [S laughs] "Hey what are your boundaries?" [SS laughter]

S: Yo, tell me your boundaries.

S1: Like, wait what like, what concept, in what type of way?

T: You pick one.

S: "Are you comfortable when I do this?"

T: OK, yep. So the point that I'm sort of poking you towards is that maybe boundaries, rather than just something you pick up on the way, and yes you pick up on some things along the way, if you're in a good relationship you will notice over time, hey they like when I do this or they don't like when I do that, so I'll shift and be a bit more like this. Um but if you were in a great relationship you might actually stop and talk about some boundaries of things. You might talk about where you wanna go, what your boundaries are, things that you will and won't do, things that you want for your life and the direction you want for your life, and you might actually have that conversation early on in your relationship so that then you actually know those things before you arrive to it and one person's all thinking "yes! we're going this way" and the other person just suddenly has a dead-end is like "nup I'm not going there". "Wait what but we were, everything was good". If you'd talked about that earlier, then maybe you would avoid some of those situations, and that applies to things to do with sex, it also applies to things to do with like your life direction or maybe raising children. It applies to things to do with freedom and free time, space from your partner. Some people think that their partner should text them every night just before they go to bed, about ten seconds before they go to bed, [Name]'s already nodding. [SS laughter] Uh other people are like "heck no once it's like past 9 o'clock I'm like kinda drowsy and I don't even wanna talk to anyone, don't bother texting me". Um sometimes it's like that, different scenarios, different boundaries. You might want to talk about those in advance.

Chapter 6

Ground rules (J3_13m)

T: Alright let's get some answers from the crowd. [Name] what might be a rule that you would set up in your relationship with your partner?

S1: Um knowing your boundaries and like around girls, like hugging them.

T: OK so what would be a boundary or ground rule that you might agree with them about other girls? [SS laughter] Sshh, I would like to hear [Name]'s answer. Sshh.

S: Yeah. Like don't hug them.

T: OK.

S1: You just give a little handshake.

T: Fantastic. So for [Name], she does not want her partner hugging other girls. Great, that's a good example. [Name].

S: Oh sir but what if

T: One sec we'll come back to you. [Name], tell us a ground rule you might set up in your relationship.

S: That we're allowed to have guy friends, or girl friends.

T: OK, a different perspective. Being allowed to have other friends of the opposite sex. [Name].

S: Um consensual sex.

T: OK that is a good start, though I would say that might need to be a little more than just a ground rule but like a automatic rule for everyone in life. [points to a student]

S2: I'm the king of the relationship. [SS laughter]

S: Aaww!

T: Sure.

S: You're the king. You're the king.

S: I knew it.

T: Sure. Uh keep in mind your ground rule needs to be agreed upon, so they

S: They must agree.

T: in this theoretical relationship

S: Yes

T: need to be agreeing on this as well.

S2: He will have no chance but to agree.

T: Thank you [Name]. Some other perspectives? [Name]. Sshh, one second [Name], just waiting for people to be listening in like [Name].

S3: Respecting each others' privacy.

T: OK respecting each others' privacy. That's actually a really fantastic one. What does that actually involve to you? What does that mean?

S3: Um

T: Sshh.

S3: Like if we don't want to tell you something.

T: OK respect the other person's ability and right to keep a secret of something they don't wanna share. Uh if you are comfortable, so here's an example of one that people might think of, sshh. In terms of ground rules for relationships, if, there's kind of two sides to this one. If you think that you should be able to look at your partner's phone and they look at your phone any time you like and that should be completely open, you should be able to do that any time you like, could you put your hand up? If you think that should be able to happen any time. [some students raise hands] Fantastic.

S: Any time?

T: Yeah they should be able to look through your phone any time you like. OK. If you think that your phone is your own private place and you think that your partner should NOT be able to touch your phone without asking you, could you put your hand up? So if you think your partner should have to ask you to touch and look through your phone.

S: Yeah yeah I, yeah.

S: I don't know, I don't know.

[multiple students talking in overlap]

T: OK, good good. So there's a kind of good example of where a ground rule might be different for different people. Now you might think it's entirely fine to look through your partner's phone any time you like, you just pick it up and look through it and that's fine. And I mean, you should be able to do that because they should be open and shouldn't have any secrets. Your partner however might think "like, I don't really have secrets but I just don't like the invasion of privacy of you just doing that without asking me or without telling me". Uh and so you might actually need to set up a ground rule or establish something within your relationship so that there is an understanding there. You might want to set up a rule that says "you can look through my phone any time, as long as you just let me know that you are doing it, as long as you ask first." Uh and, you know, you might get all your answers if your ask to look at their phone and they go "oh yeah yeah just a second".

S: Yeah.

T: I mean that might tell you all that you need to know. But they just might like the privacy of you saying the question before you just pick their phone up and look through it. Uh if someone's phone is just there, [Name]'s phone's on her desk. It's quite different me asking "oh can I look at that?", or a partner asking "can I look at that?" than them walking over, picking it up and starting to scroll through things. OK? So great example of a ground rule, something that you might want. Some more ground rules to think about, sshh. In terms of things in public, some people think that public displays of affection are really important, they want their partner to hold their hand, hug them in public, display that they're their partner. Some people are like "don't touch my hand in public, don't come near me, if you touch me it's over". So think about where you sit in those. Can you quickly think a little bit more about your ground rules, some things that you might need to discuss. We'll give you about 30 more seconds to discuss with the people next to you.

Same-sex attraction (R9_20m)

T: For some of us when we're answering these questions it might be from personal experience, what we've heard guys talk about or experiences of how they've spoken to people, either to ourselves or to the people around us. For something of these other questions, it might be what we've heard in the playground, it might be what we've seen on TV or in movies, um so we don't have a personal experience of any kind to draw upon with some of these. So each person's response is going to be, girls shh shh shh, we're not going to all have agree for the same things and disagree for the same things, we're gonna have some variation.

T: Um [name] what was one that you picked that was different to what somebody else you were talking with.

S1: I dunno.

T: You're not sure. Were you talking about it as you did it?

[Students discuss among themselves]

S2: Yeah so we got a different...

T: So [name] what was it that you said, then?

S2: Uh so it was "I'd feel flattered if someone of the same sex asked me out." I wrote 'agree'.

T: OK.

S2: She wrote 'strongly disagree'.

S1: Wait, what does that mean again?

[SS laughter]

S2: That means...

S1: What I just forgot what the...

T: So that question might be...

S1: I got it messed up.

T: Yeah what if someone in your grade was to ask you out, whether you were interested in them or not, so whether you um were sexuality-wise that was what you were interested in or not, if someone from your grade asked you out would you be flattered or would you be freaked out or would you be like "oh thanks, no, but um...I'm not interested". So again it's gonna vary from person to person, and that's actually something we're gonna look at today about how uh all the different influences in our life shape how we feel when we're interacting with other people and who we might be interested in and why we might feel that way. So there's nothing wrong if somebody, if someone in your grade did come up and ask you out, they've obviously got a lot of guts to come and ask you. And it's ok for you to feel kind of flattered, if you were interested that's great, even if you weren't interested, it's still nice, somebody thought you were

attractive and kind of cute. Whether you like them or not is irrelevant, someone thought you were good looking or that you were a nice person. But it's also OK to be a little bit unsure and freaked out by that, no different to if it was some guy from next door who was asking you out and you were like "um...no...". It doesn't matter who they are, it's OK to feel comfortable and OK to not be quite sure about it as well. Not everyone's gonna feel comfortable with everything.

I once got asked, when I was younger I was extremely tomboy, more so than now. Like I love wearing shorts and pants, that's why my job is awesome, I get to wear trackie pants and joggers to work everyday. On rare occasions I'll wear a dress or a skirt. I was extremely tomboy when I was younger and at one point when I had sort of shoulder length hair, I had this, I was at the park with my brother and had this girl come and ask me out. And it was kind of weird. It was like "hey do you wanna go out I think you're kind of cute", like "uh... thanks but I'm a girl?" [SS laughter] I was very naïve, I didn't even think that she would find me attractive in any other way. And she was like "oh, OK". I think she thought I was a guy, I don't know. I had that kind of um, I looked like I could've been in Hansen back in the day. I don't know if you've ever seen pictures of the band Hansen, they were three brothers who very much looked like they were three sisters. The length hair. I actually had a friend who looked exactly like Taylor Hansen, and it was really weird, the fact that she looked like him. So it's OK to be a bit unsure, like again I was naïve, I did not know exactly what to do there. Like "um, thanks, but... I'm... not interested?" And then I tell my brother like "that was weird" and then off we went to play soccer.

S3: Um Miss, Miss can I...

T: Yeah.

S3: Like what you said before... Um you said, you said that, [looks at sheet and tries to find statement on sexuality] that other one that you was just talking about.

T: Yeah.

S3: About the same-sex thing?

T: Mm-hmm.

S3: Um, can I say two?

T: OK.

S3: OK so the first one um same-sex I... I would, because like, I'm actually... I'm scared to say because I don't want people to judge me!

T: Well...

S3: I'm actually part of the LGBT, the LGBT, I'm actually bisexual.

T: Oh good for you.

S3: So that likes both boys and girls. And um I would because even if I didn't like have feelings for that person

T: Mm-hmm.

S3: I would still like, I would, I would...

T: Girls, shh shh.

S3: I would let them down kindly.

T: Yeah.

S3: Just nicely. And if I did I would probably, you know. If I wasn't, if I wasn't bisexual I would hopefully still give them a chance.

T: I think maybe part of this, regardless of how you feel, and how you feel about different sexualities, is that as long as we are respectful and kind to each other, which as a year group is something we've always talked about outside of this classroom, about being respectful and being kind. Even if we do that in that situation, then that's... Even if you are totally not interested and it's weird for you, it's a good way you can let that person down, they don't feel like crap at the time. But if you are interested or unsure then it's a good way to handle it, being respectful and being kind.

Dating an ex (R3_7m)

T: [Name], which scenario did you discuss?

S1: The second last one.

T: The second last one. So “one of your close friends hooks up with the guy/girl you recently broke up with”. Ooh. OK so what happens in this situation?

S1: We said that maybe the friend should like give you some time or maybe tell you before. Or even maybe um...

S2: Like, it's kind of disrespectful.

S1: It's kind of disrespectful, exactly. I feel like you should wait, or at least inform your friend and maybe see how they feel.

T: Yeah. So I don't, often I think, there's not many fights that happen in our playground, we're a pretty good school for that. But I know of one of the few that I've had to break up, it was actually about this. “Oh she's dating my ex-boyfriend!” I'm like, “but he's not your boyfriend at the moment”. “No!” “So, it's not really a problem.” “But she's so disrespectful!” and it's like “but you're not dating”

S3: Miss you don't date one of your friend's exes.

T: I know it is a bit weird there. But I think if we're able to communicate well with our friends. I think if our friend's having to sort of sneak behind our back almost to get to your ex then maybe there's something happening in that friendship. So being a good friend and having a good relationship there is being able to communicate ahead of time-

S4: Miss that's happened to me once.

T: -going “hey I know you guys aren't dating any more, do you mind if I...?” We don't have to say ask permission of our friend-

S3: Miss you just don't.

T: -but going “hey heads up, this is what's gonna happen”.

S3: Miss don't date them.

T: Yeah um, I know with-

S4: [inaudible]

T: The term that gets thrown around every now and then is called sloppy seconds.

SS: Aw!

T: Yeah um so you might hear that every now and then.

Appendix C – Other materials

This appendix contains other materials (e.g. handouts) that are analysed in detail. Materials are listed in the order they appear in text.

Chapter 3

NSW Crimes Act 1900 No 40 section 61HE [2020 version]

Applicable at time of data collection (5 August 2020)

61HE Consent in relation to sexual offences

(1) **Offences to which section applies** This section applies for the purposes of the offences, or attempts to commit the offences, under sections 61I, 61J, 61JA, 61KC, 61KD, 61KE and 61KF.

(2) **Meaning of “consent”** A person *consents* to a sexual activity if the person freely and voluntarily agrees to the sexual activity.

(3) **Knowledge about consent** A person who without the consent of the other person (the *alleged victim*) engages in a sexual activity with or towards the alleged victim, incites the alleged victim to engage in a sexual activity or incites a third person to engage in a sexual activity with or towards the alleged victim, knows that the alleged victim does not consent to the sexual activity if—

- (a) the person knows that the alleged victim does not consent to the sexual activity, or
- (b) the person is reckless as to whether the alleged victim consents to the sexual activity, or
- (c) the person has no reasonable grounds for believing that the alleged victim consents to the sexual activity.

(4) For the purpose of making any such finding, the trier of fact must have regard to all the circumstances of the case—

- (a) including any steps taken by the person to ascertain whether the alleged victim consents to the sexual activity, but
- (b) not including any self-induced intoxication of the person.

(5) **Negation of consent** A person does not consent to a sexual activity—

- (a) if the person does not have the capacity to consent to the sexual activity, including because of age or cognitive incapacity, or

- (b) if the person does not have the opportunity to consent to the sexual activity because the person is unconscious or asleep, or
 - (c) if the person consents to the sexual activity because of threats of force or terror (whether the threats are against, or the terror is instilled in, that person or any other person), or
 - (d) if the person consents to the sexual activity because the person is unlawfully detained.
- (6) A person who consents to a sexual activity with or from another person under any of the following mistaken beliefs does not consent to the sexual activity—
- (a) a mistaken belief as to the identity of the other person,
 - (b) a mistaken belief that the other person is married to the person,
 - (c) a mistaken belief that the sexual activity is for health or hygienic purposes,
 - (d) any other mistaken belief about the nature of the activity induced by fraudulent means.
- (7) For the purposes of subsection (3), the other person knows that the person does not consent to the sexual activity if the other person knows the person consents to the sexual activity under such a mistaken belief.
- (8) The grounds on which it may be established that a person does not consent to a sexual activity include—
- (a) if the person consents to the sexual activity while substantially intoxicated by alcohol or any drug, or
 - (b) if the person consents to the sexual activity because of intimidatory or coercive conduct, or other threat, that does not involve a threat of force, or
 - (c) if the person consents to the sexual activity because of the abuse of a position of authority or trust.
- (9) A person who does not offer actual physical resistance to a sexual activity is not, by reason only of that fact, to be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity.
- (10) This section does not limit the grounds on which it may be established that a person does not consent to a sexual activity.
- (11) In this section—

sexual activity means sexual intercourse, sexual touching or a sexual act.

NSW Crimes Act 1900 No 40 section 91FA [2020 version]

Applicable at time of data collection (5 August 2020)

Division 15A Child abuse material

91FA Definitions

For the purposes of this Division—

child means a person who is under the age of 16 years.

child abuse material—see section 91FB.

data includes—

- (a) information in any form, or
- (b) any program (or part of a program).

material includes any film, printed matter, data or any other thing of any kind (including any computer image or other depiction).

young person means a person who is of or above the age of 16 years and under the age of 18 years.

91FB Child abuse material—meaning

(1) In this Division—

child abuse material means material that depicts or describes, in a way that reasonable persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, offensive—

- (a) a person who is, appears to be or is implied to be, a child as a victim of torture, cruelty or physical abuse, or
- (b) a person who is, appears to be or is implied to be, a child engaged in or apparently engaged in a sexual pose or sexual activity (whether or not in the presence of other persons), or
- (c) a person who is, appears to be or is implied to be, a child in the presence of another person who is engaged or apparently engaged in a sexual pose or sexual activity, or
- (d) the private parts of a person who is, appears to be or is implied to be, a child.

(2) The matters to be taken into account in deciding whether reasonable persons would regard particular material as being, in all the circumstances, offensive, include—

- (a) the standards of morality, decency and propriety generally accepted by reasonable adults, and
- (b) the literary, artistic or educational merit (if any) of the material, and
- (c) the journalistic merit (if any) of the material, being the merit of the material as a record or report of a matter of public interest, and

(d) the general character of the material (including whether it is of a medical, legal or scientific character).

(3) Material that depicts a person or the private parts of a person includes material that depicts a representation of a person or the private parts of a person (including material that has been altered or manipulated to make a person appear to be a child or to otherwise create a depiction referred to in subsection (1)).

(4) The *private parts* of a person are—

(a) a person's genital area or anal area, whether bare or covered by underwear, or

(b) the breasts of a female person, or transgender or intersex person identifying as female, whether or not the breasts are sexually developed.

91G Children not to be used for production of child abuse material

(1) Any person who—

(a) uses a child who is under the age of 14 years for the production of child abuse material, or

(b) causes or procures a child of that age to be so used, or

(c) having the care of a child of that age, consents to the child being so used or allows the child to be so used,

is guilty of an offence.

Maximum penalty—imprisonment for 14 years.

(2) Any person who—

(a) uses a child who is of or above the age of 14 years for the production of child abuse material, or

(b) causes or procures a child of that age to be so used, or

(c) having the care of a child of that age, consents to the child being so used or allows the child to be so used,

is guilty of an offence.

Maximum penalty—imprisonment for 10 years.

(3) (Repealed)

(4) For the purposes of this section, a person may have the care of a child without necessarily being entitled by law to have the custody of the child.

(5) Where on the trial of a person for an offence under subsection (1) the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under subsection (2), it may find the accused not guilty of the

offence charged but guilty of the latter offence, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly.

(6) Proceedings for an offence under this section against a child or young person may only be instituted by or with the approval of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

91H Production, dissemination or possession of child abuse material

(1) In this section—

disseminate child abuse material, includes—

- (a) send, supply, exhibit, transmit or communicate it to another person, or
- (b) make it available for access by another person, or
- (c) enter into any agreement or arrangement to do so.

possess child abuse material includes, in relation to material in the form of data, being in possession or control of data (within the meaning of section 308F (2)).

produce child abuse material includes—

- (a) film, photograph, print or otherwise make child abuse material, or
- (b) alter or manipulate any image for the purpose of making child abuse material, or
- (c) enter into any agreement or arrangement to do so.

(2) A person who produces, disseminates or possesses child abuse material is guilty of an offence.

Maximum penalty—imprisonment for 10 years.

(3) Proceedings for an offence under this section against a child or young person may only be instituted by or with the approval of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

91HAA Exception

A person does not commit an offence under section 91H of possessing child abuse material if—

- (a) the possession of the material occurred when the accused person was under the age of 18 years, and
- (b) a reasonable person would consider the possession of the material by the accused person as acceptable having regard to each of the following (to the extent relevant)—
 - (i) the nature and content of the material,
 - (ii) the circumstances in which the material was produced and came into the possession of the accused person,
 - (iii) the age, intellectual capacity, vulnerability or other relevant circumstances of the child depicted in the material,

(iv) the age, intellectual capacity, vulnerability or other relevant circumstances of the accused person at the time the accused person first came into possession of the material and at the time that the accused person's possession of the material first came to the attention of a police officer,

(v) the relationship between the accused person and the child depicted in the material.

91HA Defences

(1) **Innocent production, dissemination or possession** It is a defence in proceedings for an offence against section 91H that the defendant did not know, and could not reasonably be expected to have known, that he or she produced, disseminated or possessed (as the case requires) child abuse material.

(2) It is a defence in proceedings for an offence against section 91H not involving the production or dissemination of child abuse material that the material concerned came into the defendant's possession unsolicited and the defendant, as soon as he or she became aware of its nature, took reasonable steps to get rid of it.

(3) **Public benefit** It is a defence in proceedings for an offence against section 91H that the conduct engaged in by the defendant—

(a) was of public benefit, and

(b) did not extend beyond what was of public benefit.

(4) Conduct is of public benefit if, and only if, the conduct is necessary for or of assistance in—

(a) enforcing or administering a law of the State, or of another State, a Territory or the Commonwealth, or

(b) monitoring compliance with, or investigating a contravention of, a law of the State, or of another State, a Territory or the Commonwealth, or

(c) the administration of justice.

(5) The question of whether a person's conduct is of public benefit is a question of fact and the person's motives for engaging in the conduct are irrelevant.

(6) **Law enforcement officers** It is a defence in proceedings for an offence against section 91H that—

(a) the defendant was, at the time of the offence, a law enforcement officer acting in the course of his or her duties, and

(b) the conduct of the defendant was reasonable in the circumstances for the purpose of performing that duty.

(7) **Classified material** It is a defence in proceedings for an offence against section 91H that the material concerned was classified (whether before or after the commission of the alleged offence) under the [*Classification \(Publications, Films and Computer Games\) Act 1995*](#) of the Commonwealth, other than as refused classification (RC).

(8) **Approved research** It is a defence in proceedings for an offence against section 91G or 91H that the conduct engaged in by the defendant—

(a) was necessary for or of assistance in conducting scientific, medical or educational research that has been approved by the Attorney General in writing for the purposes of this section, and

(b) did not contravene any conditions of that approval.

(9) **Person producing, disseminating or possessing depictions of himself or herself** It is a defence in proceedings for an offence against section 91H of possessing child abuse material if the only person depicted in the material is the accused person.

(10) It is a defence in proceedings for an offence against section 91H of producing or disseminating child abuse material if—

(a) the production or dissemination of the material occurred when the accused person was under the age of 18 years, and

(b) the only person depicted in the material is the accused person.

(11) Material that depicts a person other than the accused person is taken, for the purposes of this section, to depict only the accused person if the material would no longer be child abuse material were the depiction of the accused person to be removed.

(12) The onus of proving under subsection (9) or (10) that material depicts the accused person and no other person lies with the accused person on the balance of probabilities.

LawStuff Handout What does consent mean

What does age of consent mean?

The age of consent is the age at which the law says you can agree to have sex.

If you are under the age of consent, the law says that you cannot legally agree to have sex, and any person that has sex with you has broken the law.

In NSW, the age of consent is 16. If you are 16 years old, another person can have sex with you if you agree to it (unless they are your carer or supervisor).

BUT, there is a legal defence available to you if you have sex with another person who is 14 or 15 years old *if* you are less than 2 years older than them *and* the other person agreed to it. According to this defence, if you are aged 14-16 years old, you can legally agree to have sex with another person who is less than 2 years older than you (as long as you both agree to it).

What does consent mean?

“Consent” means giving your free and voluntary agreement to sex. It is never ok for someone to assume you have given consent or to force you to keep going if you want to stop.

A person does not give their consent if they:

- do not have the capacity to consent due to age, or a mental or physical impairment;
- are asleep or unconscious;
- are threatened, forced or afraid;
- are restrained against their wishes;
- are tricked or mistaken about the nature of the act, or who the other person is; or
- are tricked into thinking the other person is married to them.

Also, in some cases, you can argue that you did not give consent because of another factor. For example, if you:

- are significantly intoxicated or under the effect of drugs; or

- are forced due to the position of authority by another person.

What do we mean by sex?

Sex means:

1. When a penis, finger, object or any part of a person is partially or fully inside another person's vagina or anus; or
2. Any kind of oral sex.

Sex does not involve kissing or touching if there isn't penetration of the mouth, anus or vagina. However, please be aware that other sexual activity that doesn't technically involve penetration may be considered sexual touching or a sexual act, and there are laws that apply to this kind of behaviour too.

There are also special laws that apply to filming, photographing or sharing sexual images online or by phone. For more information about these laws please see our page on [sexting](#).

NSW Crimes Act 1900 No 40 section 61HF [2022 version]

Applicable at time of publication (December 2022)

Subdivision 1A Consent and knowledge of consent

61HF Objective

An objective of this Subdivision is to recognise the following—

- (a) every person has a right to choose whether or not to participate in a sexual activity,
- (b) consent to a sexual activity is not to be presumed,
- (c) consensual sexual activity involves ongoing and mutual communication, decision-making and free and voluntary agreement between the persons participating in the sexual activity.

61HG Application of Subdivision

- (1) This Subdivision applies to offences, or attempts to commit offences, against sections 61I, 61J, 61JA, 61KC, 61KD, 61KE and 61KF.
- (2) This Subdivision sets out—
 - (a) the circumstances in which a person consents or does not consent to a sexual activity, and
 - (b) the circumstances in which a person knows or is taken to know that another person does not consent to a sexual activity.

61HH Definitions

In this Subdivision—

consent has the same meaning as in section 61HI.

sexual activity means sexual intercourse, sexual touching or a sexual act.

61HI Consent generally

- (1) A person *consents* to a sexual activity if, at the time of the sexual activity, the person freely and voluntarily agrees to the sexual activity.
- (2) A person may, by words or conduct, withdraw consent to a sexual activity at any time.
- (3) Sexual activity that occurs after consent has been withdrawn occurs without consent.
- (4) A person who does not offer physical or verbal resistance to a sexual activity is not, by reason only of that fact, to be taken to consent to the sexual activity.
- (5) A person who consents to a particular sexual activity is not, by reason only of that fact, to be taken to consent to any other sexual activity.

Example—

A person who consents to a sexual activity using a condom is not, by reason only of that fact, to be taken to consent to a sexual activity without using a condom.

(6) A person who consents to a sexual activity with a person on one occasion is not, by reason only of that fact, to be taken to consent to a sexual activity with—

- (a) that person on another occasion, or
- (b) another person on that or another occasion.

61HJ Circumstances in which there is no consent

(1) A person does not consent to a sexual activity if—

- (a) the person does not say or do anything to communicate consent, or
 - (b) the person does not have the capacity to consent to the sexual activity, or
 - (c) the person is so affected by alcohol or another drug as to be incapable of consenting to the sexual activity, or
 - (d) the person is unconscious or asleep, or
 - (e) the person participates in the sexual activity because of force, fear of force or fear of serious harm of any kind to the person, another person, an animal or property, regardless of—
 - (i) when the force or the conduct giving rise to the fear occurs, or
 - (ii) whether it occurs as a single instance or as part of an ongoing pattern, or
 - (f) the person participates in the sexual activity because of coercion, blackmail or intimidation, regardless of—
 - (i) when the coercion, blackmail or intimidation occurs, or
 - (ii) whether it occurs as a single instance or as part of an ongoing pattern, or
 - (g) the person participates in the sexual activity because the person or another person is unlawfully detained, or
 - (h) the person participates in the sexual activity because the person is overborne by the abuse of a relationship of authority, trust or dependence, or
 - (i) the person participates in the sexual activity because the person is mistaken about—
 - (i) the nature of the sexual activity, or
 - (ii) the purpose of the sexual activity, including about whether the sexual activity is for health, hygienic or cosmetic purposes, or
 - (j) the person participates in the sexual activity with another person because the person is mistaken—
 - (i) about the identity of the other person, or
 - (ii) that the person is married to the other person, or
 - (k) the person participates in the sexual activity because of a fraudulent inducement.
- (2) This section does not limit the grounds on which it may be established that a person does not consent to a sexual activity.

(3) In this section—

fraudulent inducement does not include a misrepresentation about a person's income, wealth or feelings.

61HK Knowledge about consent

(1) A person (the *accused person*) is taken to know that another person does not consent to a sexual activity if—

(a) the accused person actually knows the other person does not consent to the sexual activity, or

(b) the accused person is reckless as to whether the other person consents to the sexual activity, or

(c) any belief that the accused person has, or may have, that the other person consents to the sexual activity is not reasonable in the circumstances.

(2) Without limiting subsection (1)(c), a belief that the other person consents to sexual activity is not reasonable if the accused person did not, within a reasonable time before or at the time of the sexual activity, say or do anything to find out whether the other person consents to the sexual activity.

(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the accused person shows that—

(a) the accused person had at the time of the sexual activity—

(i) a cognitive impairment within the meaning of section 23A(8) and (9), or

(ii) a mental health impairment, and

(b) the impairment was a substantial cause of the accused person not saying or doing anything.

(4) The onus of establishing a matter referred to in subsection (3) lies with the accused person on the balance of probabilities.

(5) For the purposes of making any finding under this section, the trier of fact—

(a) must consider all the circumstances of the case, including what, if anything, the accused person said or did, and

(b) must not consider any self-induced intoxication of the accused person.

Chapter 6

Statements on Sexuality handout

Statements on sexuality

The hardest thing about being an adolescent is not being trusted by your parents.

Contraception is always the girl's responsibility.

Boys brag to their friends if girls have sex

Sexuality is different to sex.

Young people should experiment with sex.

People don't have to have vaginal sex to have sex.

Girls have it easier than boys in relationships.

It's OK to send a nude photo of your boyfriend to other students at your school.

It's hard for same sex-attracted young people to come out at school.

If a girl enjoys sex, she is a slut.

Boys who don't watch porn are not very masculine.

Boys always put pressure on girls to have sex.

Sex should only be with someone you love.

I would support a friend who told me he or she was gay or lesbian.

Condoms are the safest way to avoid getting a STI.

I would know how to help a friend who had been sexually harassed.

Young people don't have to worry about getting a sexually transmissible infection (STI); this only happens to adults.

I'd feel flattered if someone of the same sex asked me out.


Oral sex is equally enjoyed by both partners.

It doesn't matter what the age difference is between people when they have sex, as long as they freely consent.


Appendix D – Analyses

This appendix contains analyses (e.g. genre, APPRAISAL) for certain excerpts. Analyses are listed in the order they appear in text.

Field interrelations for CONSENT



Field interrelations NO CONSENT



Is that consent (R5_27m) ATTITUDE analysis

Key: **Inscribed attitude** **Invoked attitude**

Appraiser	Text	Target/Trigger	Attitude
Teacher	<i>So what if one person is really drunk</i>	<i>one person</i>	-capacity
Teacher	<i>it doesn't matter who's the drunk person</i>	<i>person</i>	-capacity
Teacher	<i>only one of those people is able to consent</i>	<i>only one of those people</i>	+capacity
Teacher	<i>a consensual relationship means BOTH people have to say, have to be in agreement</i>	<i>relationship</i>	+propriety
Teacher	<i>but it needs to be clear enough</i>	communication about consent	+composition
Teacher	<i>So if one person is very very drunk</i>	imagined young person	-capacity
Teacher	<i>What if both people are really drunk</i>	imagined young people	-capacity
Teacher	<i>But the other difficulty that can come with this is</i>	situation	-balance
Teacher	<i>if both people are really drunk</i>	imagined young people	-capacity
Imagined young person	<i>"oh my god,</i>	situation	-security
Imagined young person	<i>I had sex and I was so drunk</i>	imagined young person	-capacity
Imagined young person	<i>and I didn't want it</i>	having sex	-inclination

Imagined young person	<i>and I feel really bad about it”,</i>	having sex	-happiness ¹⁵
Teacher	<i>who would get in trouble?</i>	<i>who</i>	-propriety
Teacher	<i>So if both people have gone out, had a raging night at a party,</i>	<i>night</i>	-composition
Teacher	<i>very drunk</i>	imagined young people	-capacity
Imagined young people	<i>then the next morning woke up and really regretted it,</i>	having sex	-security
Teacher	<i>they’re black out so they remember certain bits</i>	imagined young people	-capacity
Teacher	<i>That’s a really really difficult situation</i>	<i>situation</i>	-balance
Imagined young people	<i>they were both quite happy with the situation at the time,</i>	<i>the situation</i>	+happiness
Teacher	<i>because alcohol and hormones is an interesting combination</i>	<i>alcohol and hormones</i>	+impact
Teacher	<i>but it doesn’t legally mean they were able to consent.</i>	imagined young people	+capacity
Teacher	<i>So they’re either both in trouble,</i>	imagined young people	-propriety
Teacher	<i>or both not in trouble</i>	imagined young people	-propriety
Teacher	<i>it’s a tricky situation.</i>	<i>situation</i>	-balance
Imagined young person	<i>Um and it might not even be that “ugh”</i>	having sex	-satisfaction
Imagined young person	<i>the uncomfortable</i>	having sex	-security
Imagined young person	<i>‘well I don’t really want to but you’ve kind of asked many times now’</i>	having sex	-inclination
Imagined young person	<i>‘I kind of feel obliged that maybe I should’</i>	having sex	-inclination

¹⁵ This example (*I felt really **bad***) could be analysed as negative happiness (agnate: *unhappy, sad, down*) or negative security (agnate: *uneasy, freaked out*). The former is presented here.

Imagined young person	<i>Because you've coerced¹⁶ the person.</i>	having sex	-inclination
Student	<i>Because you've coerced the person.</i>	imagined young person	-propriety
Teacher	<i>Good, you remembered that from last lesson and from this?</i>	Student answer	+valuation
Teacher	<i>Excellent</i>	Student answer	+valuation
Teacher	<i>So that means that person was not free in making that comment</i>	imagined young person	+capacity
Imagined young person	<i>they were coerced</i>	having sex	-inclination
Teacher	<i>they were coerced</i>	imagined young person	-propriety
Imagined young person	<i>and kind of forced into that decision.</i>	<i>that decision</i>	-inclination
Teacher	<i>and kind of forced into that decision.</i>	imagined young person	-propriety
Teacher	<i>Alright I'll give you an interesting one that has come up in the media</i>	example scenario	+impact
Teacher	<i>then part way during sex, without telling the girl, he takes off the condom</i>	guy from example scenario	-veracity
Teacher	<i>Good</i>	student answer	+valuation
Teacher	<i>So in that case there he would get himself in very big trouble</i>	guy from example scenario	-propriety
Teacher → "law courts	<i>yes he would get in big trouble</i>	guy from example scenario	-propriety
Imagined girl	<i>Like what if she wants it.</i>	having sex	+inclination
Imagined guy	<i>What if he's like not sure</i>	<i>having sex</i>	-security

¹⁶ *Force* and *coerce/coercion* are double coded for affect/judgement, but they are both inscribed because we can identify the subtype (inclination & propriety, respectively).

Imagined young people	<i>Like some people do want it</i>	having sex	+inclination
Imagined guy	<i>he doesn't want to take responsibility if there's a child</i>	<i>to take responsibility if there's a child</i>	+inclination
Student	<i>he doesn't want to take responsibility if there's a child</i>	imagined guy	+tenacity
Student → “imagined young person	<i>but she's like oh it's safe.</i>	having sex	+valuation
Imagined girl	<i>Cos it wasn't whether the guy pressured the girl,</i>	having sex	-inclination
Teacher	<i>Cos it wasn't whether the guy pressured the girl,</i>	imagined guy	-propriety
Imagined guy	<i>or the girl pressured the guy,</i>	having sex	-inclination
Teacher	<i>or the girl pressured the guy,</i>	imagined girl	-propriety
Teacher	<i>what if the guy's the one who's really drunk</i>	imagined guy	-capacity
Teacher	<i>she's perfectly sober</i>	imagined girl	+capacity

Chapter 6

Genre analysis for J3_13m Ground rules

Discussion genre stages and phases

Issue	<p>T: <i>Uh if you are comfortable, so here's an example of one that people might think of, sshh. In terms of ground rules for relationships, if, there's kind of two sides to this one. If you think that you should be able to look at your partner's phone and they look at your phone any time you like and that should be completely open, you should be able to do that any time you like, could you put your hand up? If you think that should be able to happen any time. [some students raise hands] Fantastic.</i></p> <p>S: <i>Any time?</i></p> <p>T: <i>Yeah they should be able to look through your phone any time you like. OK. If you think that your phone is your own private place and you think that your partner should NOT be able to touch your phone without asking you, could you put your hand up? So if you think your partner should have to ask you to touch and look through your phone.</i></p> <p>S: <i>Yeah yeah I, yeah.</i></p> <p>S: <i>I don't know, I don't know. [multiple students talking in overlap]</i></p> <p>T: <i>OK, good good. So there's a kind of good example of where a ground rule might be different for different people.</i></p>
Side 1	<p>T: <i>Now you might think it's entirely fine to look through your partner's phone any time you like, you just pick it up and look through it and that's fine. And I mean, you should be able to do that because they should be open and shouldn't have any secrets.</i></p>
Side 2	<p>T: <i>Your partner however might think "like, I don't really have secrets but I just don't like the invasion of privacy of you just doing that without asking me or without telling me".</i></p>
Resolution	<p>T: <i>Uh and so you might actually need to set up a ground rule or establish something within your relationship so that there is an understanding there. You might want to set up a rule that says, "you can look through my phone any time, as long as you just let me know that you are doing it, as long as you ask first."</i></p>

Genre analysis for R9_20m Same-sex attraction

Discussion genre stages and phases

Issue	<i>Yeah what if someone in your grade was to ask you out, whether you were interested in them or not, so whether you um were sexuality-wise that was what you were interested in or not, if someone from your grade asked you out would you be flattered or would you be freaked out or would you be like “oh thanks, no, but um I’m not interested”. So again it’s gonna vary from person to person.</i>
comment	<i>So there’s nothing wrong if somebody, if someone in your grade did come up and ask you out, they’ve obviously got a lot of guts to come and ask you.</i>
Side 1	<i>And it’s ok for you to feel kind of flattered, if you were interested that’s great, even if you weren’t interested, it’s still nice, somebody thought you were attractive and kind of cute. Whether you like them or not is irrelevant, someone thought you were good looking or that you were a nice person.</i>
Side 2	<i>But it’s also OK to be a little bit unsure and freaked out by that, no different to if it was some guy from next door who was asking you out and you were like “um... no...”..</i>
Resolution	<i>It doesn’t matter who they are, it’s OK to feel comfortable and OK to not be quite sure about it as well. Not everyone’s gonna feel comfortable with everything.</i>

Exemplum genre stages and phases

Orientation	<i>I once got asked... When I was younger I was extremely tomboy, more so than now.</i>
comment	<i>Like I love wearing shorts and pants, that's why my job is awesome, I get to wear trackie pants and joggers to work every day and it's great. On rare occasions I'll wear a dress or a skirt.</i>
	<i>I was extremely tomboy when I was younger</i>
Incident	<i>and at one point when I had sort of shoulder length hair I had this, I was at the park with my brother and had this girl come and ask me out.</i>
reflection	<i>And it was kind of weird.</i> <i>It was like "hey do you wanna go out I think you're kind of cute", like "uh... thanks but I'm a girl?" [SS laughter]</i>
reflection	<i>I was very naïve, I didn't even think that she would find me attractive in any other way.</i> <i>And she was like "oh, OK".</i>
reflection	<i>I think she thought I was a guy, I don't know.</i>
comment	<i>I had that kind of um, I looked like I could've been in Hansen back in the day. I don't know if you've ever seen pictures of the band Hansen, they were three brothers who very much looked like they were three sisters. The length hair. I actually had a friend who looked exactly like Taylor Hansen, it was really weird, the fact that she looked like him.</i>
Interpretation	<i>So it's OK to be a bit unsure, like again I was naïve, I did not know exactly what to do there. Like "um, thanks, but... I'm... not interested?"</i>
Coda	<i>And then I tell my brother like "that was weird" and then off we went to play soccer.</i>

Genre analysis for R3_7m Dating an ex

Discussion genre stages and phases

Issue	<i>There's not many fights that happen in our playground, we're a pretty good school for that. But I know of one of the few that I've had to break up, it was actually about this.</i>	
Sides	Side 1	Side 2
(enacted as dialogue)	<i>Oh she's dating my ex-boyfriend!</i>	<i>But he's not your boyfriend at the moment.</i>
	<i>No!</i>	<i>So it's not really a problem.</i>
	<i>But she's so disrespectful!</i>	<i>But you're not dating.</i>
Resolution (student challenges elided)	<i>But I think if we're able to communicate well with our friends. I think if our friend's having to sort of sneak behind our back almost to get to your ex then maybe there's something happening in that friendship. So being a good friend and having a good relationship there is being able to communicate ahead of time, going "hey I know you guys aren't dating any more, do you mind if I...?" We don't have to say ask permission of our friend, but going "hey heads up, this is what's gonna happen."</i>	
