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The Language of Ideology in China's English Press:
Representations of Dissent

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中國英文報紙中的意識形態語言：
對不同政見的描述

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ABSTRACT

The Language of Ideology in China's English Press: Representations of Dissent

This thesis presents a critical analysis of media discourses produced by China's state-run English press (*China Daily*, *People's Daily Online*, and Xinhua News Agency) on two famous dissenters, Liu Xiaobo (Nobel Peace Prize 2010 awardee), and Chen Guangcheng (blind human rights activist and recipient of Tom Lantos Human Rights Prize 2012).

The thesis begins with the building of the socio-political context through an overview of key theoretical elements such as the Chinese people's struggle for 'dignity' (Lee 2012) set against the backdrop of conflicting orders of discourse involving 'human rights' and 'sovereignty'. The discussion of the polarization within Chinese society is augmented by definitions of what it means to be Chinese and what social actions result from this belief. Currently conflicting discourses are the centripetal forces of Maoism vs. the centrifugal forces of democracy as seen in pro-government vs. pro-democracy confrontations at the recent *Southern Weekend* protests in Guangzhou (Lam 2012, Gao 2013). China's laws on subversion have attracted criticism for their 'malleability' (Béja, Fu and Pils 2012). In its defense, Beijing has embarked on its own 'discourse of rights', which gives the impression of offering a diverse range of rights except the one kind that matters most (Habermas 2010, Donnelly 2003). As a result, China's media, in lockstep with CCP policies, is set in array against the wider world, and, at the same time, is paradoxically attempting a charm offensive through 'soft power' (Nye 2004; Kurlantzick 2006, 2007; Shambaugh 2013).

Discourses of alterity, as a means of Othering, are investigated in this thesis through a historical perspective touching on the Confucian principle of *zhengming* (rectification of names) and 'labeling' as a practice of 'class struggle' during the Cultural Revolution. I argue that traces of the predilection for 'strongly demarcating' the enemy through categorization (Dittmer 1987), as promoted by Mao, continues its relevance in government discourse particularly regarding the West and dissidents who are framed as 'traitors' by their alignment with discourses of democracy. To open the way for economic development China had to reformulate its recent history, which lead to a 1981 document called the *Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China*, which in turn essentially re-structured the national myth and Mao's role in it. This meant that the heterodox became orthodox, by which once sacrosanct doctrines were altered to make way for the 'anathema' of capitalism (Kluver 1996). This change in ideology precipitated a changing 'order of discourse' (Gu 2001) from 'class struggle' to 'economic development', the residues of which are still in conflict today.

Based on the 'ideological square' (van Dijk 1998b, 2011) and 'representation theory' (Hall 1997), this study looks at how the CCP legitimizes its treatment of dissidents through discursive strategies such as trivialization and criminalization entextualized through positive-Self/negative-Other representations. Discourses of victimhood, triumphalism, nationalism, national sovereignty, and *ressentiment* (Fitzgerald 1999) are also utilized by the state media as attempts to reconcile the ideological gap between the orders of discourse. Theoretically, the analysis is influenced by Norman Fairclough's work on media discourse (1995a), Ruth Wodak's discourse-historical method (2001), John B. Thompson's depth hermeneutics (1984, 1990), van Leeuwen's social actor network (2008), and Teun van Dijk's (1998b, 2011) research on the analysis of ideology and its influence in biased and

discriminatory discourses. The influence of ideology and its manifestation as positive-Self/negative-Other representation (Us *vs* Them discourse) is problematized, theorized, and then applied to the collected data through analysis of certain aspects of systemic functional linguistics such as transitivity, passivization, agency, appraisal/evaluation, and particularly relational clauses (identifying and attributive). By this, I show how rhetorical strategies of Us *vs* Them discourses are realized linguistically in China's state-run English press.

From this analysis, salient linguistic features emerge and I am able to interpret the impact of language, ideology, and power inherent in the discourse. Of interest is how these individuals (Liu and Chen), whose qualities are admired in the West, are delegitimized in the Chinese media. The findings show how Liu and Chen are discursively stigmatized (i.e. 'strongly demarcated') as outgroup members (Liu 'a criminal'; Chen a 'mob organizer') involved in treachery and collusion with 'external forces'. Meanwhile, through the same mediatized political discourse, the interests of the governing elite are legitimized, protected and advanced.

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Finally, I thank the longsuffering people of China for their sincerity. Your day is coming.

Foreword

Michel Foucault wrote of a web of prohibitions surrounding our utterances: what we say, when we say it, and where we say it. This ‘complex web’ is most restrictive when ‘dealing with politics and sexuality’ (Foucault 1972: 8). In this thesis, I do not deal with sexuality. However, I do discuss politics and political discourses, or more specifically, the ‘politicized’ discourses of China’s ruling party. By this I do not mean discourses that are directly composed by politicians, but rather the discourses through which what has been said or written *by* politicians (or their political institutions) is represented in the media as what Fairclough calls ‘the order of mediatized political discourse’ (1995a: 184).

The social actors, the texts and the organizations that produce them belong to an intriguing world that is already in existence and operating – I am just a visitor to it. For this research I approach my data, which are drawn entirely from China’s English-language press, with the assumption that even though representations of social actors and the events in which they are involved may be displayed as truth, such truth exists in linguistic form alone. The intention of this thesis then, is to conduct an analysis of the context and discourses surrounding the representation of dissident social actors. Its purpose, in line with the principles of critical discourse analysis, is to explore through empirical data, ‘manipulation, ideology and propaganda in human communication, and to explain how political realities and power are structured in specific processes and structures of language use’ (Hacker 1996: 32).

At the outset I will address the notion of ‘objectivity’ in discourse, academic or otherwise, as ephemeral at best, particularly if dealing with the political realm, where linguistic representations only feint at neutrality. Lincoln and Guba point out that in the ‘drive toward objectivity’ among philosophers of science, the best they could come up with is ‘*managing subjectivity*’ (Lincoln and Guba 2013: 38, emphasis in original). In undertaking this study, it has become clear to me that in the context of official media, language resides in an ideological sphere where ‘truth’ is linguistically engineered (Ji 2004, 2012). Behind the linguistic constructions are ideologies, which ultimately require legitimization. Because ideology, as John B. Thompson famously wrote, is ‘*meaning in the service of power*’ (1990: 7, emphasis in the original), it behooves us to investigate how meaning comes about. Meaning, crafted through various semiotic systems for the purpose of establishing, maintaining and legitimizing power may be a mere construction ‘conveyed by symbolic forms’ of language, images and texts (1990: 7), and even music (Lu 2004). Thompson calls upon analysts to examine the use of such mediated symbolic forms within specific social and historical contexts, in order to bring to light how these forms may ‘establish and sustain relations of domination’ (Thompson 1990: 7).

In this thesis of seven chapters, contextual features, i.e. both socio-political and historical, play a prominent role and are covered in the first and second chapters. Theoretical and linguistic considerations are in the central chapters; the actual analysis is in the fifth and sixth chapters, while the seventh consists of comments, observations, and a prognostic view of the directions China’s English media may take.

Without a detailed background of contextual information one would be hard-pressed to imagine the harsh realities, of which discursive representation is just one part (and the mildest at that), affecting China’s outspoken political dissidents. An initial assumption I would like to remark on at this point is regarding the nature of ideology and the view that it is always covertly lurking in the text. In this particular study I have found that this is not

always the case and that ideological renderings are often explicit, particularly when they result from some legal procedure as seen in the cases of both Liu Xiaobo and Chen Guangcheng. Ideological manifestations in discourse, as often as not, are in no particular need of a critical discourse analyst to locate them. CCP ideology in mediatized political discourse is, in fact, usually easy to detect by way of its repetitive themes, which can appear overtly in various rhetorical guises as, for example, legalism, moralism, triumphalism, victimhood, and others, all of which operate toward the ultimate goal of legitimizing the Party.

Regarding the fields of analysis for this thesis, Thompson warns of the *fallacy of reductionism*, which is the pursuit of an investigation based solely on political and socio-historical elements surrounding the symbolic forms being analyzed, while at the same time missing the implicit ideological meaning intrinsic to the symbolic form. The other side of the coin is the analysis of the symbolic form alone without taking into account the social and historical contexts in which the symbolic forms are produced and distributed. Thompson calls this the *fallacy of internalism* (1990: 291). Mindful of these two fallacies, I have aimed to produce a historically informed, contextualized analysis and interpretation of the subject matter. In doing so, it is inevitable that I too (as analyst) assume an agentive role, however minimal, in this historical process. In the case of the Chinese English-language newspapers, it should be kept in mind that much of what is written by journalists cannot be considered ‘news’ in the conventional sense. Rather, it is the interpretation of world events in a strategically constructed discursive form as seen from the Chinese Communist Party’s ideological perspective. The state media are constrained to reproduce official discourses, wherein events and their repercussions are represented, both overtly and implicitly, in equivocality with China’s orchestrated political master narrative.

Some years ago I read Orwell’s *1984*, and a particular scene, one which expresses concisely the ethos of manipulative political language, remains salient to me. In this specific passage, there is a lunchroom discussion where a character named Syme, a government philologist, exhorts Winston Smith on his lack of passion for *Newspeak*. Syme is proud of the fact that Newspeak is the only language with a diminishing, rather than growing, lexical resource. He asks Smith, ‘don’t you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought? In the end we shall make *thoughtcrime* literally impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it’. During the conversation, Syme indirectly and unknowingly reveals the regime’s fear of uncontrolled language by declaring that, ‘The Revolution will be complete when the language is perfect’. But I cannot help thinking that it is the reverse of this, that ‘the Revolution is incomplete while language can still express dissent’, that perhaps articulates the reality more accurately. Put in contemporary terms, this means that governments cannot be safe until there is no way left for the masses to express defiance, resentment, and indeed, revolution itself. It explains the panic on the part of autocratic governments when voice is given to opposing ideologies. Motives to control and monopolize language (and its many and varied media of expression) are constructed on a government’s most profound fear: that unpermitted political discourse engenders unpermitted political deeds. Actions based on politically unsanctioned thought are the ‘contagion’ of dissent.

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CHAPTER 1

SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXTS OF POLEMIC DISCOURSES IN CHINA

He who controls the past controls the future. He who controls the present controls the past.

– Orwell (1949) 1984

1.1 Introduction

This thesis is primarily about language and how it is used in ‘mediatized political discourse’ (Fairclough 1995a: 184). Because of its political nature, language is also about power and ideology and how these dynamics interact. Each of these elements (language, power and ideology) influences the other two, and the end-product is a linguistic ‘construction’. Roger Fowler sees language as a ‘highly constructive mediator’ that is used, particularly concerning the press, as the element from which ‘ideas and beliefs’ are formed (Fowler 1991: 1).

The subject matter of my research is the language used by China’s state-controlled English-language press to construct representations of particular social actors featured in news reports concerning political dissent. I approach the analysis of such discourses as a critical undertaking with the understanding that the media are, in every sense, political. As the government’s *portavoce*, they are obliged to support the official worldview by following the Party line.

The structure of this thesis is organized according to John B. Thompson’s three-phase method for the analysis of ideology in discourse, which he calls ‘depth hermeneutics’ (explained in Chapter 3). Without going into detail at this stage, I will state that Chapters 1–3 explore phase one of Thompson’s method, a ‘social analysis’.

This involves describing the contextual and theoretical backgrounds framing this study, and is accomplished by a thorough explanation of the socio-political, historical, and ideological context of the research, as well as the linguistic theories informing this analysis. Chapter 4 is a discussion of analytical methods, while Chapters 5 and 6 are Thompson's second phase called 'discursive analysis', which is the application of said theories and methods to the systematic textual analysis of various linguistic features in the data. The third and final phase is the critical 'interpretation' of the analyzed forms with a reflexive commentary in Chapter 7. The commentary not only connects back to the socio-political, historical and ideological contexts with which I begin, but also looks to the future and posits the direction in which China's media appears to be headed.

1.2 The background to this study

As a starting point, I will explain how the discourses in China's English-language press became an object of interest for me. By this, I mean that what was at first a mere curiosity ultimately became an object of research. Having lived and worked in China since the mid-1990s, I have had many opportunities to read and reflect, principally on the *China Daily*, the most common, if not the only English newspaper available to foreigners living away from major cities. In reading the *China Daily*, it was patently obvious that this was indeed a government mouthpiece. As the 'tongue and throat' (*hou she*) of the Party (Tong 2011), it selects for publication only what is in its own interests, i.e. news and feature stories supportive of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) agendas. There was trace of neither debate nor counter-voice in the state-run media, and the understanding that other voices in that vast society had been marginalized was unsettling. Alongside the discourse of state triumphalism (Slaughter 2008; Chen and Chua 2000) there was plenty of antagonistic rhetoric directed toward an 'Other', whoever that happened to be at the time. I became interested in how, exactly, such a monopoly on discourse was managed, not only with regard to the mechanics of propaganda, but also and principally, by the linguistic methods used to attempt this.

It is hoped that this research can shed some light on this topic by contributing to a greater understanding of how the CCP has control of all forms of discursive legitimization, while the voices and actions of dissenters are unequivocally

delegitimized through trivialization, exclusion, suppression at worst (both physical and metaphorical) and disregard at least. The central theme of this study, therefore, is an investigation into how dissidents are framed in China's English press and the discursive manner in which they are represented. More specifically, it enquires into how the English language is used by China's press to construct representations of dissidents as delegitimized persons, while paradoxically promoting the Orwellian vision of an enforced 'harmonious'¹ (*hexie shehui*, 和谐社会) and 'moderately prosperous' (*xiaokang shehui*, 小康社会) society that is suspended somewhere in a 'bright and glorious' future.

At first glance, the *China Daily* looks like a newspaper one might find at newsstands anywhere in the world. It is similar in terms of appearance and structure; it has its signature logo, the banner headlines, color photographs and important articles on the front page with lesser articles on the following pages. The central pages include 'opinion' pieces and editorials, followed by financial news and sports toward the back – but any similarities end there. In looking a little deeper at content over a number of days, a notable pattern begins to emerge. What is salient is not what is read, but what is not read by means of omission. The repeated theme of CCP legitimization predicated on Us/Them discourses, acquires a repetitive and predictable quality so that the sense of curiosity and interest with which one might approach a daily newspaper quickly dissipates.

Through years of media 'guidance', it seems that the state media has managed to fix a synonymy of terms between 'China' and the 'Party' so that, for all intents and purposes, they are practically interchangeable. Although individual voices are sometimes referred to in the media, they are only selected for reproduction if they speak in support of a CCP agenda. With no truly representative voice from the people (*nulla vox populi*), what is left is the predictable reiteration of state ideology. That is not to say that so-called democratic Western media do not exercise control and manipulation in their politicized media language. The seemingly democratic media have been thoroughly researched and critically analyzed within a variety of disciplines (Chomsky and Hermann 1988; Chomsky 2003; Niven 2003; Greenberg and Knight 2004; and Alterman 2004, to name a few) in which cover-ups, hypocrisy, political bias, and scandal are duly exposed. Given China's recent prominence on the global stage and its attempts to reach out through 'soft power' (Nye 1990, 2004;

Huang and Ding 2006; Kurlantzick 2006, 2007), it is perhaps time to investigate not only *what*, but also *how*, the Chinese government is attempting to communicate with the wider world (Wu 2008; Chilton, Tian and Wodak 2012). In the process of analysis, it should be borne in mind that face-value readings, from an ideological viewpoint, are not necessarily what they appear to be. I will discuss this in some detail in later chapters.

China's foreign-language media, in their wider role as the CCP's channel for international communication, provide a viewing portal or site of engagement from which the global community, it is supposed, should form favorable impressions about the Middle Kingdom. The orchestration applied to the public sphere of political life in China is also applicable to the words and images constructed for reproduction in the state press, particularly when it is geared to a foreign readership. Some would argue against 'the representationalist view' when approaching Chinese discourse. This is based on the perception that critical discourse analysis (CDA), the analytical approach used in this thesis, takes 'linguistic communication [as] a mere vehicle of meaning', implying that the notion of analyzing what language 'stands for' is misguided. Shi-xu (2008: 244), for example, claims that to take the position that 'Chinese public official communication is unreliable', is a view that is 'ideologically charged'. When one views or reads a product of China's official media, however, it is difficult to think otherwise due to the well-documented fact that state media organizations are mouthpieces of the CCP and exist to promote its 'interests, policies, and ideology' (Zhou He 2003: 202). As Johnny Unger observed in his review of *A Cultural Approach to Discourse* (Shi-xu 2004), 'CDA practitioners challenge dominant discourses, be they Western or non-Western and bring to light hitherto hidden, marginalized discourses, irrespective of culture' (Unger 2006: 619). Having said that, perhaps this is the point at which to discuss the matter of objectivity, as it is always an issue of controversy when it comes to the discussion of ideologies and their interpretation.

As I suggest in this thesis, non-biased discourse is only theoretically possible – both analyst and writer will be coming to the issue at hand from particular viewpoints. 'The social and linguistic scholar is himself also part of that system which he analyzes', and as such must be aware that her/his 'research is not "value free"', it does not take place in a vacuum, in an ivory tower, so to speak, it is *shaped by interests*, and also the scholar's own interests' (Habermas 1973², cited in Menz

1989: 228, emphasis in original). On this point, Fairclough adds that ‘analysts are not above the social practice they analyze; they are inside it’ (1992: 199). In addressing the reflexivity inherent in critical interpretations, Thompson asks how the analyst can risk assessing ‘the discourse of others, when interpretation is but another interpretation, no different in principle from the interpretations of those whose discourse we seek to assess?’ (1984: 12). This is a risk I am willing to take, as in this analytical endeavor, the claims to truth in the representations of dissident activities should not go unchallenged. Regarding the researcher’s position, Derek Layder observes that

we never enter research with a mind clear of theoretical ideas and assumptions [...] the systematic recognition of one’s theoretical assumptions (including prejudices) and the attempt to harness them to research purposes actually facilitates the production of more powerful and adequate explanations of empirical data. (Layder 1998: 51)

By problematizing the perception that the analyst will instinctively resort to a subjective view, Layder recognizes that assumptions can be positively ‘harnessed’ to generate insightful interpretations of the data. In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Paulo Freire (1970: 50) wrote that ‘to deny the importance of subjectivity’ is to admit the impossible: ‘a world without people’. Freire’s candor on this seems to underscore the point made by Lincoln and Guba – all one can do with subjectivity is ‘manage it’ (Lincoln and Guba 2013: 38). Whatever the fate of this research, because of its critical subject matter, it is certain that others will find it ‘ideological’. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1964) wryly noted that ‘Nowhere is resistance to claims of objectivity greater than in the study of ideology’.

Discourses involving human rights and punitive actions under the affordances of sovereignty (which then appear in the press as the legal and moral orders of things) do indeed warrant a critical analysis. To analyze China’s official press discourse on its dissidents is a politically and socially emancipative act, perhaps more symbolic than anything else. Such research, however, may indeed bear repercussions for the analyst (Link 2013). Holding a ‘committed’ view, according to Henry Widdowson (1995a) in his critique of CDA, can lead to ‘confusion’. Discourse analysts, he suggests, should be ‘wary of it’ (commitment), as it ‘has a way of replacing argument with persuasion and [...] cogency with conviction’ (Widdowson 1995a: 171). Widdowson wisely recommends a cautious approach to interpretation, but it is

not possible to arrive at the juncture of enquiry (regarding politicized discourses) without some sense of setting the record straight. This is particularly the case when the dominant forces producing the discourses control well-financed media networks that include all official means of reproduction and dissemination. When a government in possession of unlimited resources for the linguistic (and therefore, social) ‘construction of reality’ is set in array against a handful of dissenters dispossessed of their voices in the mainstream media, I believe that no one, regardless of cultural or academic sensitivities, can claim that it is unprincipled to investigate the discourses used to delegitimize them. In the interest of non-partisanship, Shi-xu (2004) proposes that critical analysts should adopt an ‘in-between’ position in their research on non-Western discourses. It must be remembered, however, that there is nothing ‘in-between’ about the harsh treatment of dissidents by Chinese courts. The critical analyses of discourses concerning asymmetric power relations, if disqualified from research due to cultural or academic sensitivities would be left undone with the result that discrimination and/or injustice remain unchallenged. A critical approach to analysis is appropriate in such cases where cultural and academic sensibilities, though admittedly relevant, are overshadowed by the consequences of political discrimination against dissidents.

To put it into perspective, though the current narrative of Chinese revival is largely dependent on authoritarian control, this is not entirely negative. The government has made good use of the discourse of ‘social stability’ (Sandby-Thomas 2011) to raise standards of living for the masses. It is, however, the extension of the term ‘social stability’ that raises serious questions about the government’s abolition of civil liberties and alternative forms of political, religious, and artistic expression.

Since I am dealing with the media coverage of dissent, aside from the linguistic aspects of analysis, the related social themes of ‘human rights’, ‘legitimacy’, ‘sovereignty’, and the media’s political function in reproducing these discourses is relevant, as the influence of these factors looms large in the collected data. With the understanding that the press, as Norman Fairclough wrote, is a ‘sensitive barometer’ of social life, in this investigation I will attempt to understand, through the perspective of critical discourse analysis, the linguistic strategies used in China’s English press for the representation of its dissident sons. Such an endeavor best

begins with a brief description of ‘linguistic engineering’ (Ji 2004, 2012), as it provides a view of language as a political tool.

1.3 Linguistic engineering: *Tifa* and selected memories

Ji Fengyuan’s (2004, 2012) concept of linguistic engineering is a constructivist way of looking at the use of language in the media. When understood as the use of language for the purposeful ‘assembly’ of particular meanings, the concept becomes both theoretical and political in that it forms a semantic link between the realms of language and ideology. She defines linguistic engineering as the attempt to affect attitudes and beliefs through the manipulation of language and suggests that it is a tool used in political contexts, where governments, democratic or authoritarian, use language for advancing their interests. Ji focuses on linguistic engineering in modern day China and discusses the notion of ‘thought work’ (Brady 2008, 2012). She also discusses the dissemination, even in the current reform era, of fixed formulations (*tifa*), what Westerners might call ‘slogans’. They were particularly useful for propagating ideology from the 1950s-1970s, and are still operational today as euphemisms for government projects and policies. Nowadays, according to Ji, the use of *tifa* by party members in conversations, speeches, writing, etc., is often for the purpose of displaying ‘membership’. The use of *tifa* signals that an individual is engaged with CCP theory, accepts and approves of official policies, and is ‘on board’ with the Party line. *Tifa* were originally deployed as a way of facilitating the remembrance of important political discourses, what Ji calls the ‘nuclei of mental schema’, the mention of which could trigger the memory of an entire ideological discourse (2012: 100). In addition, because Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought are characterized by the Party as ‘sciences’, they require ‘standardized terminology in order to avoid confusion and ambiguity’ (2012: 100). Ji’s concept, rather than on the discourses themselves, focuses on the social impact of these fixed linguistic formulations (i.e. slogans and their influence in both persuading and affecting the behavior of Party members). The concept, however, ignores the less explicit aspects of manipulative discourse, i.e. those that are *implied* rather than stated overtly, and which follow no particular lexical formulas or patterns. Such aspects work covertly at a discrete semantic level through a variety of discursive strategies and rhetorical devices involving definitions, attributions, metaphors,

inferences and allusions embedded in the lexicogrammar. Ideological language can reside at deeper and more complex levels than the easily identifiable *tifa* of Chinese political discourse, which rest visibly on the textual surface.

The concept of linguistic engineering could be divided into numerous subtopics, but I will direct the discussion toward the immediate focus, which is the discursive representation of dissent in China's English media. Drawing on Ji's concept of linguistic engineering, one particularly excogitated area of any national narrative is that related to 'history'. In his essay *The Chinese Amnesia* (1990), Fang Lizhi described what he called the 'technique of forgetting history', as 'an important device of [CCP] rule', which has the aim of forcing 'the whole of society to forget its history, and especially the true history of the Chinese Communist party itself'. He illustrated this by showing how students of 1989 Tiananmen knew little or nothing of the 'Democracy Wall Movement' of 1979, nor its aftermath of persecution and imprisonment of activists, most notably Wei Jinsheng. Fang wrote that the 'events of a mere ten years earlier, for this new generation, were already unknown history' (Fang 1990).

Jean-Philippe Béja notes how the CCP attaches great importance to 'engineering' representations of the past because 'in a regime that holds no regular elections to confirm its leaders' legitimacy, history is an important asset' (2007: 91). I extend Béja's definition by describing history as not just 'an asset', but a vast inventory of resources for the purpose of legitimization. Béja reminds us that 'memory is a process of selection' (2007: 91) and that 'the Party's memory therefore resorts to forgetfulness so as to build itself' (2007: 91). Control over discourses of the past (possessed by all governments and by no means unique to China) allows the construction of 'versions' of history wherein narrative accounts of the past become the building blocks for discursively legitimizing the present and future. Seeing history as a resource creates the opportunity for selected episodes (e.g. those that venerate the governing party) to be told and retold. This provides a body of mythical acts or 'mythopoesis' (van Leeuwen 2008: 106), strategically positioning the Party as the heroic protagonist of the national narrative. Other versions of the past, particularly those that cast the opposition in any sort of positive light, are forgotten. Discourse analysts James Martin and Ruth Wodak write that 'pasts are rearranged, transformed, recontextualized, substituted, mystified or totally changed' (2003: 2) depending on the purpose at hand. The past can be manipulated to portray an

imagined collective spirit (Anderson 1991) from which all – the entire nation – have evolved as collective sons of a common ‘motherland’. Historical content, as Fischler (2005: 119) observes, ‘offer[s] a rich symbolic resource from which state narratives of overcoming past national humiliations at the hands of foreigners can draw’. On the subject of occurrences of dissent that are deleted or absent from official recounts, Béja notes that when acts of resistance are missing from the national narrative, new generations are deprived of a ‘rich heritage’. ‘The absence of a structured memory means that it has always been difficult to organize an opposition movement’ (Béja 2007: 93). Similar to Fang Lizhi’s example (above), is the Marcusian concept of ‘closing the universe of discourse’² (1964), which can be seen in the fact that the majority of people born in the PRC since the 1990s have minimal knowledge of the events of Tiananmen (from the students’ perspective) in May and June of 1989. Discourses of popular resistance are forbidden from entering the collective narrative for obvious reasons. In such cases, ‘ignorance of the past can delay the process of realization’ (Béja 2007: 92) in the present.

The concept of linguistic engineering, as Ji uses it, is behaviorist and concerned with the dialectical and political character of language rather than its syntactic or systemic features. At the micro-textual level, Ji’s findings are significant, but it is my hypothesis that there exists a deeper nexus of manipulative control. What I refer to here occurs at and through the ideological level of discourse and employs large and sweeping historical images at the macro-discourse level, which transcend the mere use of fixed linguistic formulae (*tifa*). I borrow Ji’s concept here, as a means of illustrating the CCP’s high level of awareness concerning the inherent power of language to construct self-serving versions of both past and present realities. At Ji’s level of abstraction, the behavioral and discursive aspects of linguistic engineering are conflated. But here and in later chapters, I will divide the two elements (the political and the linguistic) and discuss them separately, which process I start below with the contextualization of political, social, and legal factors.

1.4 China and the discourse of human rights

In its methods of dealing with the topic of ‘subversion’, China’s English press take up one or all of a variety of discursive approaches. Recurrent themes include: state triumphalism (or ‘great nationalism’); pointing to how things used to be before the

CCP came to power in 1949 (by which it may lay claim to be making progress on human rights); China's particularism – that China is different from other nations – and is therefore, at its own pace and in its own way, developing a particular form of human rights suited to the Chinese context; that human rights discourse is a Western plot to weaken CCP control through criticism of its internal affairs (i.e. violations of sovereignty); foregrounding the human rights contraventions of other nations (e.g. the U.S., the European Union or Japan) as worse than China's, hence hypocritical (see article, WEST FLAWED ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 29 October 2010, *China Daily*).

In any case, no nation claims to 'not' espouse human rights – it is inherent in the belief system for a nation to consider itself as acting in accordance with moral and legal ethics – and therefore with propriety. In our post-modern era, it is consequently within the definition of what human rights actually is, and the actions that this definition inspires, that contentions between ideologies tend to rise. Various definitions of rights appear to possess a pliable quality, and are constructed from endonormative criteria in conformity with the ideology of the elite. But the 'business end' of human rights is in the ways it is applied – not in the ways it is debated. Transgressions of human rights seems to strike a moral chord, as any nation or ideology that disregards universally held norms is considered aberrant in the eyes of other nations.

The discourse of human rights on an international level began after WWII with the institutionalization of the *United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights* in 1948. It acknowledges a set of universal values due to all humanity 'without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status' (*United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 1948, Article 2). The classic view of human rights discourse sees the framing of circumstances in terms of a dialectic concerning rights, and the violations of those rights.

The dialectic typically posits a perpetrator (usually a state) violating a victim's rights, which are endowed by virtue of the victim's humanity. Human rights are generally understood and explained with reference to this dialectic. The rights/violations framework has many important qualities, including establishing concrete terms for identifying and criminalizing the abuse of power in specific domestic and international settings. The framework is also fundamental for 'naming and shaming' practices that non-state actors use to bring human rights abuses to public attention. (Vulnerability and Resilience: Rethinking Human Rights for the 21st Century, no date)

Indeed, the very definition of human rights, as mentioned earlier, is the point of contention surrounding such disputed issues as dissent.

The appearance of the concept of human rights in China, as it is understood today, emerged during the Qing Dynasty, around the middle to late nineteenth century, when China was desperately seeking to modernize along the lines of a Western European model. Though Chinese academics of the era were persuaded of the transformational benefits of granting political rights to citizens, they based their conception of rights on the Confucian model in which rights were conceived of as a means of enhancing *state* power. This was in contrast to philosophers Locke and Kant's Enlightenment era theories in which political rights were originally regarded as a means of *reducing* governmental authority vis-à-vis the individual. In this regard, Robert Weatherly observes:

as the quest for national survival in China continued unabated, rights were understood not as a means of curtailing state power, as Locke had believed, but as a way of augmenting this power. (Weatherly 1999: 3, emphasis in original)

With the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, the concept of human rights took on what Weatherly calls 'a more Marxian complexion' (1999: 3). By this, he meant the implementation of rights as interpreted through the Maoist ideology of 'class struggle'. Under such ideology, the semantics of an Us vs Them discourse was strongly implemented. The proletariat (workers, soldiers and peasants) were entitled to full civil rights due to their class pedigree as members of 'the People', whereas those designated as 'the Other', as counterrevolutionaries, rightist bourgeois elements, and so on, were abused of their rights (and their dignity) through an elaborate labeling system of vilification (see sections 2.7–2.8 and Appendix 1 on labeling enemies). Such categorizations deprived them of their rights until they had been reformed through re-education³, which involved the degrading process of public criticism, forced labor, or worse.

Weatherly contends that as soon as the Western notion of human rights entered China's political discourse during the Qing Dynasty, as mentioned above, it became 'Confucianized'⁴ (Weatherly 1999: 4). Placing the collective or state interests in a position superior to those of the individual has inevitably led to conflict. The Chinese Constitution, promulgated in 1982 (and revised four times since) has had 31

amendments added to it, and, as a recent media propaganda piece declares, now articulates values such as ‘the protection of private property and human rights’ (FOR CHINA TO RISE, SO MUST STATUS OF ITS CONSTITUTION, *Caixin Online*, 2012).

Weatherly makes two major observations based on the restrictions inherent in Article 51 of the Chinese Constitution (below)

Article 51. The exercise by citizens of the People's Republic of China of their freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society and of the collective. (Chapter II, The Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens. *Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, adopted on 4 December 1982)

Article 51 states that citizens’ rights may be rescinded if deemed detrimental to the ‘interests of the state, of society and of the collective’. His view is that Article 51 transgresses the notion of human rights at the outset by stipulating that communal interests are superior to individual ones. This makes such rights conditional and dependent (not to mention flexible) allowing them to arbitrarily conform to ever-changing vicissitudes of social and political campaigns. This leaves room for a politically expedient interpretation of what, precisely, is meant in any particular case. His second point, also mentioned by Gledhill (1997), is that the struggle over specific definitions can facilitate the abuse of power:

It places absolute and unrestrained authority in the hands of the Chinese party-state, since it is the party-state that both defines the ‘collective good’ and revokes any rights that are deemed to conflict with it. (Weatherly 1999: 103)

The ‘Marxian’ side of this argument, not without merit, is that it is within the collective that individual rights are realized and that, theoretically at least, ‘full realization of the collective interest would guarantee fulfillment of one’s individual rights even if one did not exercise them directly oneself’ (Nathan 1986a, cited in Weatherly 1999: 104). The outcome of the Marxian view is that personal conditions will improve by default when collective conditions improve. This concept, however, seems to be at odds, not only with the concept of democracy and human rights held by the world at large, but also with the ideas held by many Chinese, as noted by Liu Xiaobo in *Charter 08*. He observes that many Chinese, after a rather long history of enduring ‘human rights disasters and uncountable struggles’, now clearly understand that ‘freedom, equality, and human rights are universal values of humankind and that democracy and constitutional government are the fundamental framework for

protecting these values’ (Liu 2008: 1). Prominent legalists who see ‘dignity’ as essential to a democratic polity share this view. The late juris-consult, Walter Murphy, wrote that ‘the great and equal dignity of all men and women – the fundamental moral value of most theories of democracy – requires that every citizen share in making the rules that he or she must obey’ (2007, cited in Lee 2012: 224–5). This statement conveys Kant’s categorical imperative⁵ that the rights of the individual are ends in and of themselves. Murphy (2007) also linked democracy to human rights by calling it a reflection of dignity (cited in Lee 2012: 225).

1.5 Dissent, patriotism, and the search for dignity

Rulers who recognize the dynamics of power never underestimate the role of patriotism and its attendant discourses in a country’s ethos. Currently, there is a nationalist resurgence in sectors of modern Chinese society, particularly the emerging neo-Left movement, causing something of a backlash against anti-government pro-democracy protests (Lam 2012). One recent example of this occurred at the beginning of 2013, when demonstrations took place outside the Guangzhou offices of the controversial newspaper, *Nanfang Zhoumo* (南方周末, *Southern Weekend*). The demonstrations were precipitated by an act of government censorship. The newspaper, renowned for its stories covering provocative issues, was censured for publishing a New Year’s editorial supporting political reforms. State censors disapproving of the article substituted it with their own commentary – a paean of thankfulness to the Party. Staff and supporters of *Nanfang Zhoumo* were infuriated and took to the streets to picket against such heavy-handed censorship. Meanwhile, anti-protesters who assembled across the road, were shouting political slogans, carrying Mao posters, and waving national flags. They denounced the demonstrators for betraying the motherland and working in collusion with (what could only be) hostile foreign forces. Though this episode was eventually resolved by compromise, it nonetheless represented the ideological contradictions and diametrically opposing voices within China’s wider socio-political milieu. The *Nanfang Zhoumo* protests underscored the current tensions between the centripetal forces of neo-Leftism (Maoism) as opposed to the centrifugal forces of democracy, and the discourse of universal human rights versus that of sovereignty. At the core of

the struggle is the elusive value of dignity, the prize for which both sides say they are struggling.

In discussing the *Nanfang Zhoumo* incident and the socio-political complexities surrounding it, writer Helen Gao (2013: 30) describes a metaphorical cline which measures love of country, not by degrees, but by the intensity of patriotic motive. 'At one end', she conceptualizes the 'traditional form of chest-thumping nationalism that builds on resentments based on the era when China was pushed around by foreign powers'. At the other end, the counter-balance: 'a more introspective form of patriotism, one deeply critical of the frustrating realities of life in the PRC'. She describes those who hold the latter view as an emerging category of middle-class urbanites lead by intellectuals, such as social critic Li Chengpeng. Echoing the priorities held by dissidents, Li writes, 'we cannot narrowly interpret patriotism as the bravery to fight external enemies. It is also about confronting domestic woes'; and, 'more important than the territorial integrity of our nation is living with *dignity* and integrity in our daily life' (Li cited in Gao 2013: 34, emphasis added). Many dissidents locate the search for dignity at the affective center of their struggles, and it is the mention of 'dignity' as transcending all other values that I wish to discuss in the following paragraphs.

As noted by Jürgen Habermas, human rights originally developed as a 'response to specific violations of human dignity, [the] moral source' of human rights (2010: 464). He writes, 'the appeal to human rights feeds off the outrage of the humiliated at the violation of their human dignity' (2010: 466). The link between dignity and human rights is also discussed by Hong Kong legal scholar Lee Man-yee (2012), who ties the issue of dissent in China with that of the citizen's innate longing for self-worth and recognition. She places dignity at the heart of the dissident struggle and likens the endeavor to achieve dignity to a 'quest'. Habermas equates the concept of dignity to a 'catalyst', which metaphorically touches off reactions in the 'construction of human rights' (2010: 466). The existence of dissenting voices in any society or organization is to be expected at some level, either implicitly or explicitly, across the range of political and social institutions. One reason for dissent in a society arises from dissatisfaction when socio-psychological, civil, political and material needs (or wants) are deferred or denied by those in power (i.e. made unattainable by conditions for which they are directly or indirectly responsible). In such cases, the individual's pursuit of self-esteem, social relevance, sustenance and

the innate desire for respect remain unfulfilled. Lee Man-yee (2012) cites Asian Studies scholar John Fitzgerald's observation that the spirit of *ressentiment*, substantiated by 'personal indignation', fuels the search for 'individual dignity and human rights' (1999: 48). With reference to philosophers Francis Fukuyama (1992) and Isaiah Berlin (1997), he states that the universal drive for democracy is due to deeper impulses, which are "'irrational' forces" arising from the struggle for recognition' (1999: 49). Fukuyama describes this passion in Platonic terms as *thymos* (θυμός), which can be seen as 'the universal drive that propels people to fight for democracy' (Lee 2012: 210). When China 'stood up'⁶ in 1949, it did so collectively as a nation. Unintentionally, suggests Fitzgerald (1999), it also sowed the seeds for private individuals to 'stand up' in due course. If the nation can stand up, then why not the individual? Fitzgerald writes that dignity is common to 'nationalist discourse [as well as] liberal democratic theory' (1999: 49). Ironically, therefore, he notes that the propounding of Chinese nationalism has

inadvertently incubated an ideal of individual rights and individual self-determination within its discourse on national rights. For almost half a century, official nationalism has developed a popular language of exploitation, oppression, dehumanization and humiliation through which people could explain and resolve affronts to China's dignity. (Fitzgerald 1999: 49-50)

Fitzgerald implies that China, in arguing for its own dignity and individuality among the hierarchy of nations, has fostered the self-same aspirations among its own citizenry. The notion of national dignity has generated the longing for private dignity among individuals, where citizens question, 'what good is national dignity if the individual's dignity is not recognized?' Since the founding of the PRC, the official discourse of national dignity has been strategically incorporated into wider discourses on sensitive issues vis-à-vis the world (i.e. a historical sense of victimhood shared by many Chinese owing to the Other seen as aggressive 'imperialists', and belligerent foreign powers who forced unequal treaties on China). According to Fitzgerald then, these official discourses have supplied dissidents with a 'popular language' (1999: 49) for disseminating their own rhetoric of emancipation, illicit, under the current *zeitgeist*, as that may be.

The discourse of dignity/indignity, closely linked to nationalism and victimhood (Renwick and Cao 1999), is a characteristic theme of what Fitzgerald calls the 'muse of thymotic resentment' (Fitzgerald 1999: 53). This particular muse has been quite busy in shaping official Chinese discourses, as can be seen in any government media

targeting a foreign readership. Alongside a discourse of indignation, ‘*ressentiment*’ also drives the struggle for individual dignity and human rights’ (Fitzgerald 1999: 48). The academic literature on the topic of democracy in China shares the acknowledgment of a sense of indignation felt by dissidents which has arisen among citizens largely due to the realization that they live in a nation that has refused to concede them their due dignity. Resentment is generated, as Fitzgerald notes, by the anger of a people ‘not taken at its worth, and the shame of a people who tried to stand up before their own state and discovered that it could not be done’ (1999: 55).

1.6 A brief history of Chinese laws on subversion

During the first phase of China’s civil war (1927–1936), the CCP was in the Jiangxi countryside where it established the commune-like Chinese Soviet Republic. In this isolated, yet relatively sheltered situation, it was necessary for the CCP to formulate its own codes and regulations for crimes, a major one of which was ‘counterrevolution’. When establishing the post-1949 government after the civil war, regulations in effect during the Jiangxi Soviet era were carried over into the new era becoming the basis for the 1951 *Regulations of the People’s Republic of China for the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries* (Béja et al. 2012). With reform in mind after the Cultural Revolution, China’s Criminal Law was established by the National People’s Congress as of 1 January 1980, and was intended to reflect the new era’s shift from rule by politics to rule by law. The Criminal Law, however, continued to be permeated with the ideological language of class struggle (Béja et al. 2012). Under the revised Criminal Law of 1997, there is a set of twelve Articles in the ‘Special Provisions’ section. Part II, Chapter 1 of this section is entitled *Crimes of Endangering National Security* and is made up of the laws from Articles 102 to 113 (Article 105 is the law on which Liu Xiaobo was convicted of subversion in 2009)⁷. In the revised law of 1997, the original term ‘counterrevolution’ was rephrased as ‘subvert the political power of the state and overthrow the socialist system’. This change in legal terminology was reflective of China’s post-Mao shift from the era of class struggle to the implementation of modernization. But as pointed out by Béja (2012), the change was attributable to cultivating some level of consistency with international legal norms. This, he explains, was also due to the fact that

‘counterrevolution’ was viewed by foreign nations as a political rather than criminal transgression, and on such grounds, extradition to China could be refused. The linguistic vagueness of Article 105 has been a cause of controversy due to its imprecise nature, which can be influenced by arbitrary factors in sentencing. In addition, Béja notes, examples of Articles in China’s Constitution wherein civil rights and privileges are ostensibly granted, seem to be cancelled out by the contradictory stipulations of *other* Articles in the same constitution. His inference is that the Constitution, in essence, may define a particular version of citizens’ rights and obligations, but in practice (due to its manipulability in interpretation) offers little in the way of legal protection to those facing charges of subversion.

A political trend, which has immediate repercussions for dissidents, as noted earlier (Lam 2012), is the revitalization of the neo-Maoist left in Chinese politics. China analyst Willy Lam sees this as a perilous influence due to its attempts to cultivate an ideological strain of nationalism in order to re-inject Maoist discourse, as if it were a tonic, into the veins of China’s current body politic. This includes reviving the penchant for a rhetoric of Othering, through reviling enemies and pejoratively labeling opponents. As ‘lightning rods’ for neo-Maoist ire, Lam cites the works of author Xin Ziling (*The Fall of the Red Sun*, 2011) and critic, Mao Yushi⁸ (no relation to Mao Zedong) for their overt anti-Maoism. Mao Yushi, in his essay entitled *Judging Mao as a Man* (2011), cites what he calls the ongoing ‘farce’ in China, and urges Chinese to ‘strip away the mythology and superstition’ that still surrounds the legacy of Mao Zedong. Neo-Maoists labeled Xin and Mao Yushi as ‘capitalist running dogs’, ‘cow ghosts’, and ‘snake demons’, as was the custom during the Anti-Rightist Movement of the late 1950s and ‘class struggle’ era of the 1960–70s. It is this practice of labeling enemies, which I will discuss in detail in sections 2.7–8 of this thesis.

In the broader context, Lam describes a ‘rapid deterioration of rule of law’ (2012: 11), growing ever more so, in an untenable situation under the policy of ‘stability maintenance’ (*wei wen* 维稳)⁹.

Gradually but inevitably, China has taken on the traits of a police state. Human rights conditions have deteriorated even as the law-enforcement apparatus is committed to ‘nipping all destabilizing forces in the bud.’ In the days of Jiang Zemin the police and state-security personnel just locked up dissidents; in the past few years, they have even incarcerated the spouses and close relatives of public intellectuals such as Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo [...]. (Lam 2012: 11)

To the outside observer this poses a grand paradox: the economy grows – but so does suppression. ‘Freedom of expression’ and ‘civil rights’ have been re-formulated by the government as ‘Western’ concepts, hence alien to the Chinese context. Divorced from the currently official definition of ‘Chineseness’, such values are reframed as ‘un-Chinese’ and therefore obstacles to the socio-political reconstruction of a new Chinese identity under the CCP.

The discussion of an increasingly restrictive society must include mention of the ‘seven silences’ (七个不要讲) or ‘seven don’t speaks’ which, according to dissident journalist He Qinglian (2013), are being newly enforced in university education. Human Rights Watch describes the seven silences as equivalent to ‘a gag order’ on discussing ‘universal values and the Party’s past wrongs’ (Human Rights Watch, *World Report* 2014: 323). The ‘silences’ are the fundamental diktats of a document entitled a ‘Briefing on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere’ or just ‘Document No. 9’ for short (from its file number GO-2013-9). Succinctly put, these seven topics are forbidden from discussion (particularly in classrooms) because they cover areas that lay bare several areas of ideological vulnerability in the Party’s ethos. The seven banned topics include: ‘universal values’, ‘freedom of the press’, ‘civil society’, ‘civil rights’, ‘the Party’s historical errors’, ‘an aristocratic class’, and ‘judicial independence’. Document No. 9 frames the notion of ‘rights’ and the promotion of ‘universal values’ as part of a (Western) plot that seeks to undermine China’s constitutional principles and weaken the CCP.

Some excerpts from Document No. 9 are (as translated from Chinese by He Qinglian):

The core purpose of promoting universal values is to eradicate the leadership of the Party, forcing the Party to make concessions. (He 2013)

The Document further demonstrates the Party’s problematization of the notion of independence of the press, as found in Western liberal media, and as noted, sees it as a subversive strategy designed to destabilize CCP leadership:

To advocate ‘Western journalistic concepts’ is to reject the ‘mouthpiece theory’ that the Party has always adhered to, and is an attempt to rid the Party’s leadership of the media. (He 2013)

Another part of the plot, according to the Document, is ‘historical nihilism’ with the purpose of discrediting China’s version of history through criticism of the CCP and particularly Mao Zedong’s leadership. The official position is that the ultimate goal of historical nihilism is to delegitimize the Party:

The key thing about ‘historical nihilism’ is that it targets historical problems under the leadership of the Party, refuting the facts that people have generally accepted; The marked feature [of historical nihilism] is its strong disparagement of and attack on Mao Zedong and Mao’s thoughts, negating altogether the historical role played by the CPC under Mao’s leadership. The aim of this is to weaken or even subvert the legitimacy of the Party’s leadership. (He 2013)

As noted, the ‘silences’ appear to be designed to curtail any discourses that could lead to the exposure of contradictions in Party ideology. They are considered subversive due to their potential capacity for generating discourses critical of the CCP.

1.7 Discursive representations of ‘rights’ in official discourse

The term ‘rights’ is strategically dispersed in official CCP documents so that rights (as a lexical item) does physically appear in official texts, but the definition of what is signified by the term is ambiguous. Linguistic modifiers, by which ‘other kinds’ of rights are named, attempt to re-conceptualize rights in peripheral terms, such as in the official English translation of a booklet entitled *Fifty Years of Progress in China’s Human Rights* (Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, 2000), which discusses rights as a variety of ‘types’. These are, for example, the ‘right to subsistence’, ‘development rights’, ‘economic rights’, ‘social rights’, ‘cultural rights’, ‘women’s rights’, ‘children’s rights’, ‘protection for ethnic minorities’ and ‘equal rights’. These are what might be called lateral rights and are represented in the document as ‘improvements’, which is fundamentally a designation based on relativism. The changes regarding the above-mentioned rights, as cited in the booklet, have indeed been good for Chinese society, but the improvements are set in contrast to how things were in China before 1949 and do not address concerns related to the current domestic socio-political situation. With the foreign reader in mind, the booklet reaches back several decades to find social changes worth writing about. The rights that are described in the booklet are largely related to tangential social issues and, as such, are politically non-threatening to the CCP powerbase.

Changes highlighted in the booklet established better living conditions, such as reduced rates of measles among children, more equitable marriage laws, an adjusted wage system, improved living standards, and fighting against ‘prostitution, drug trafficking and addiction and gambling’ (2000: 6). Evidence of ‘equal rights’ is ostensibly demonstrated by the information that ‘a fairly large number of ethnic minority personnel working in central and local state organs, administrative organs, judicial organs and procuratorial organs’ (2000: 33). In China’s defense, even ‘the need to appear to be acting on behalf of human rights, however, tells us much about dominant values and aspirations’ (Donnelly 2003: 39).

It gradually dawns on the reader that the Information Office of the State Council, which produced the booklet, has a politicized agenda concerning its concept of rights. It seems to deflect or tangentialize issues of political freedom by substituting a discourse of ‘other’ rights in place of the one kind of rights that is central to democratic governance – *human rights*. In fact, the ‘improvements’ act as provender for self-commendation. The booklet’s writers assert that ‘after [the Party’s] unremitting efforts for over half a century’, the people have

changed the terrible situation of chronic hunger, cold and ignorance, rid China of the label of The Sick Man of East Asia, lead a civilized and healthy life of plenty, and enjoy unprecedented democracy and freedom. We can say that the human rights situation in present-day China is totally different from that of the old China – even compared with the years before the opening-up, the great progress that has been made in this respect is universally acknowledged. (*Fifty Years of Progress in China’s Human Rights* 2000: 39)

Citizens might question that having realized these historical milestones is China still not ready for the ‘other kind’ of rights? Yet, to suggest so publicly in either word or deed is to invite peril, as many dissidents have learned. Jürgen Habermas informs readers of nations that offer citizens autonomy ‘*primarily* through guarantees of economic liberties’, as has been the trend in China. In essence, however, discourses of economic liberty (as a substitute for political liberty) have the tendency ‘to destroy the balance between the different categories of human rights’. He goes on to observe that ‘human dignity, which is one and the same everywhere and for everyone, grounds the *indivisibility* of all categories of human rights’ (2010: 468, emphasis in original). Co-opting the discourse of human rights by offering economic benefits or other ‘rights’ in its stead has been an interim survival strategy sustaining a form of transitory legitimacy for the CCP. However, those in China who defend

the discourse of human rights – often to their own hurt – strongly resist the dilution of their core values.

1.8 The discourse of sovereignty

Reinforcing the view that economic prosperity is the new form of legitimization, media scholar Lee Chin-chuan states that ‘economic growth and nationalism have come to form the *raison d’être* of the regime’s legitimization, replacing the bankrupt communist ideology that finds very few true believers in China today’ (2003: 1). This view of legitimacy through prosperity is, in fact, the one generally noted by scholars discussing China’s transformation from Maoist ideology to a market economy (White 1986). But this type of legitimization is geared toward internal governance of the nation (i.e. providing material opportunities for citizens). It relates to the nation in and of itself, and is generally not applicable to external relations.

Another view suggests that defining the legitimization of a government through economic prosperity may be missing a crucial point (Habermas 2010), particularly in regard to its status among the community of nations. According to international rights theorist Jack Donnelly, ‘in the contemporary world – the world in which there is an overlapping consensus on the Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] model – states are legitimate largely to the extent they respect, protect, and implement the rights of their citizens’ (2003: 43). In order to resist the implications of acts committed in violation of human rights, a government may invoke its ‘sovereignty’ and the sanctity of ‘internal affairs’ as trumping all other criteria. Donnelly writes that ‘Sovereignty is [has become] one standard ground for rejecting international human rights standards’ (2003: 108). He cites Xie Bohua and Niu Lihua (1994) who point to the fact that Chinese officials and institutional scholars assert that human rights are contingent on guarantees of national sovereignty. But according to Donnelly, ‘far from being a guarantee of human rights, sovereignty is typically the mantle behind which rights-abusive regimes hide when faced with international human rights criticism’ (1994: 70).

The Chinese government publication *Human Rights in China* (1991) states, ‘The rights of each country to formulate its own policies on human rights protection in light of its own conditions should [...] be respected and guaranteed’. The insistence in China that sovereignty must supersede individual rights is based on the Treaty of

Westphalia of 1648, increasingly regarded as obsolete in an era of globalization and internationalism. The claims for this view of sovereignty are often framed as non-negotiable tenets, particularly in defense of the government's treatment of dissidents such as Liu and Chen (and a long list of others). Donnelly, however, is of the view that 'both nationally and internationally, political legitimacy is increasingly judged by and expressed in terms of human rights' (Donnelly 2003: 38). He goes on to indicate, in reference to international diplomacy, that the observance of human rights is standard fare. Legal researcher and journalist John Laughland notes that 'The doctrine of universal human rights has therefore quickly become a basis for overriding national sovereignty' (2008: 14), so that in essence, 'the movement for global justice has been a struggle against sovereignty' (Robertson 1999: xviii).

Given that the popular consensus appears to favor the emphasis of human rights over sovereignty as grounds for legitimacy, what becomes of nations that insist on their own formula in relation to the international community? What are the means of legitimizing the contradictions that have occurred between the discourse of sovereignty and that of human rights? In order to counter this, one part of the Chinese government's strategy is the control of public discourse through the amalgamation and subordination of all media to the 'Chinese Communist Party Propaganda Department' (CCPPD), the department dealing with outside or foreign news. At the same time, a second strategy is the initiation media outreach promoting Chinese culture abroad under a policy of 'soft power' (Nye 1990, 2004; Kurlantzick 2006; McGiffert 2009). In this study, China's state-sponsored English media, through its discourse of sovereignty, projects an image of universal legality and justice in its treatment of citizens. Through the critical analysis of such rhetoric, however, the biased discursive practices of trivialization and vilification of dissidents are encountered. Liu Xiaobo, for example, is represented as a 'criminal' colluding with foreign enemies who conspire against China, and Chen Guangcheng is portrayed as 'mob organizer', a 'fraudster' who is also supported by foreign powers hoping for the demise of China. Both therefore, in accordance with the legal system, are deserving of delegitimization at least and imprisonment at worst, as is the current ideological view propagated by Chinese media.

In the next section, I introduce China's English press as a principle vehicle for dissemination of the central government's ideology to the rest of the world through the soft power strategy.

1.9 China's media culture

Perhaps the main influence on China's media these days is the worldwide trend toward globalization, which has reinforced the interdependent relationship among international economies. It is in the broad context of the global media that China finds a platform for sharing its worldviews. Joining the international media community, as Zhang Yonghua (2007) observes, is a strategic move for constructing China's image abroad.

In order to provide a fuller background for textual interpretations and form an understanding of CCP's theory on the press it would be helpful to discuss some workings of China's press system. In *Development and Theory of the Media*, Hachten (2010) explains that the press in China is politically dependent, but financially independent, meaning media enterprises must survive by their own business acumen while at the same time, operate within the boundaries defined by the Party. Hachten describes 'authoritarian capitalism' (2010: 22), a blend of a free-market economy under an autocratic government (i.e. economic independence with political constraints) as responsible for China's current press system, which, he notes, is different from its nominal guiding model of orthodox Leninist theory brought in by Mao at the founding of the PRC.

Due to the oscillation of social forces in China, the media are seen as 'a site of contestation and accommodation'. This view has risen from the contradictions between the old and the new – the former, what Lee Chin-chuan calls the 'revolutionary rhetoric of communism' – and the latter, 'the practical discourses of marketization' (Lee 2003: 17), which are similar to Gu's 'changing orders of discourse' that will be discussed in the next chapter. This underscores Lee's observation that 'China has had to embrace capitalism in order to save socialism' (2003: 1). Lee cites Raymond Williams' (1977) concept of the daily struggle carried out around three social structures: the 'dominant' (CCP ideology), the 'residual' (Confucian ethics), and the 'emerging structure' of integration into the global economy. As the struggle concerning these structures is played out across the media, their contending discourses are also reflected in China's English press. Conversely, it is also known that all state media are monitored by Xinhua News Agency and must work within its specified interpretations of newsworthy events. Discourse

analyst Li Juan notes that reporters must attend the same briefings and write within the same ideological mold. Relying on Xinhua as the official source for articles, ‘there is a high degree of ideological congruency among various national newspapers’ (Li 2006: 131–32).

In the 1990s, the Party changed strategies and published guidelines for the media on how to make propaganda ‘attractive, entertaining and inspiring’ (Brady 2008: 74). China scholar Anne-Marie Brady describes a propaganda offensive in which popular culture was designated a useful tool for ‘political education’ at which point media content, in the attempt to be more persuasive, became less overtly political. This process affected the arts including television shows, game shows, and even pop music, all of which took on a less explicit political content. ‘Artists and writers’ were ‘inspired to write politically acceptable material’ through enticement of material gain (Brady 2008: 74). The extent of the control that is exerted over the flow of information in China is difficult to overestimate, as ‘every means of communication and form of organized social interaction in China is ultimately under the supervision of the Central Propaganda Department and its minions’ (Brady 2008: 18, emphasis added).

Hannah Arendt notes that one-party governments are ‘by far the most effective agencies in shielding ideologies and images from the impact of reality and truth’ (Arendt 2005: 309). In a policy document to mainland China journalists entitled *International Commentary in the Context of Globalization: Forestalling Opponents by a Show of Strength, Actively Channeling [Public Opinion]* (2009), Chen Hegao and Qi Zejian, on behalf of Xinhua, emphasized the high-priority of ‘being artful and strategic in our commentary writing’, for foreign readers. Thus, they add, ‘[w]e must be objective, truthful and clever in expressing our viewpoints, making our reports as convincing as possible’ (Chen and Qi 2009). This admonitory article to state-journalists promotes a strategic rhetorical approach to what is seen as a ‘China vs the West’ dichotomy. Xinhua, to a large degree, constrains journalists to align their voices with the government’s, and in Chen and Qi’s article, reporters are reminded to be ever mindful and ‘unswerving’ in the task of replicating central government policies in their written output. In doing so, they ‘must remain entirely consonant with the spirit of the CCP Central Committee and the policy positions of the government’ (Chen and Qi 2009).

Much of the CCPPD's attempt toward a more persuasive style of discourse is aimed at convincing the international foreign community of the legitimacy of the CCP. In attempting to address foreign perceptions regarding polemic issues such as human rights, China's English media publications attempt a discursive display of 'harmony' – or they might ignore the issue altogether, as seen in the strategic practice of 'silence' on controversial topics (see section 4.6.3). In Chen and Qi's guidelines (2009), it was also recommended that both domestic and public opinion needed to be more effectively channeled. They exhort journalists involved in writing commentary for international readers to 'strictly adhere to correct guidance of public opinion' and 'enhance the intimacy, attraction and vitality [of our commentaries]', while 'at the same time strengthen the aim and actual effect of public opinion channeling [...]' (2009: no page).

China's English press produces discursive objects, which are purposefully designed to speak in accord with contemporary government policy, making it a major carrier of the CCP's image-construction. English-language newspaper production in China has never been of secondary importance to the CCPPD, and the foreign language press has had a major role in China's propaganda system since the early days of the CCP; it is considered central to its outreach efforts. Brady (2003) writes that the CCPPD *waishi* (concerned with outside or foreign news) has long emphasized the friend-foe view towards the foreign as a means of controlling external relationships, which, she suggests, reflects 'a deep mistrust of, and discomfort with, the outside world'. 'Foreign friends' and 'friendship' (as discussed in more detail in section 2.4 of this thesis) 'have become the key words to the CCP's ideology of the foreign in China' (Brady 2003: 251). As a caveat, she observes that any perception of friendship is only on China's terms and strictly in a utilitarian, tactical sense (Brady 2003: 249–254).

1.10 A review of some previous research on China's media

Because the publication of media discourse is inherently political in nature, China's state-run English media have developed a stylized variety of English used to express meanings originating from a blended discourse of traditional Chinese ethos and current CCP ideology. Of particular interest are the linguistic and rhetorical devices used for the creation of this textually idealized China, a discursive construction of

the ‘patriotic’ (Lee 2003) and ‘affluent society’ (Cai 2008). Wodak, de Cilia, Reisigl, and Liebhart (1999/2009) call this the ‘discursive construction of national identity’.

The ‘rhetorical construction’ of a new ideology (Cai 2008: 15) is an important ‘site for [the] critical analyses of politics and ideology’ (Dunmire 2008: 82). Though studies exist on ideological aspects of Chinese media, the discourses legitimating the power designs of the CCP in its *English-language media* have only seldom been investigated from a critical linguistic perspective (see Guo and Huang 2002; Lazarick 2005; Guo and Zhao 2005; Garrison and Messner 2009; Alvaro 2013a, 2013b on China’s English media).

The range and variety of approaches to studies of Chinese media is wide and varied (some examples are Fang Yew-Jin 1994; Guo and Huang 2002; Huang 2003; Lee 2003, 2007; Yang 2003; Chen 2004, 2007; Shi 2005; Winfield and Peng 2005; Wang Jian 2006; Tong Jingrong 2007, 2009, 2011; Yin 2007; Farquhar and Berry 2007; Liebman 2005; Shirk 2007; Wu 2008; Cai 2008; Li 2009 to name some of those who have recently written on different aspects of contemporary Chinese media discourse). Kuo and Wu (2009: 173), however, take the view that researchers of Chinese media generally see discourse as ‘a form of social practice’, suggesting that most employ ‘linguistically-oriented discourse analysis to investigate discursive change of the media in its relationship with the socio-cultural change in the larger society’ (Kuo and Wu 2009: 173).

In the calls from academics to engage with China’s new discourses (Wu 2008; Chilton, Tian, Wodak 2012), one vehicle of discourse that has been relatively overlooked, as just mentioned, is China’s English media. As a central carrier of China’s state-sponsored soft power, it is a platform for the construction of ideological images, stories, information, and narratives created with the intention of spreading beyond domestic borders. It is my hypothesis that the discursive English-language products of China’s state media are principally a means of legitimizing controversial state practices and policies in the eyes of a critical world audience.

In this literature review, I will attempt to give an overview of some salient issues on the political aspects of the mainland press over which the CCP retains jurisdiction, although among scholars, there are varying opinions as to the degree of control. It is my informed impression that even though the media may be in a transitional stage with regards to allowing a *broader range of content*, it is definitely not the same as

media liberalization or the easing of censorship. Media self-determination is actually in decline due to increasingly restrictive policies.

Ann-Marie Brady's *Guiding Hand* (2006) is a fine-grained account of the intricacies and structure of the CCP's propaganda department. She explains that the production of propaganda, depending on its purpose, is divided into two branches: the external (*duiwai*) and internal (*duinei*). The *duiwai*, overseen by the Office of Foreign Propaganda is the branch related to this study, as it controls the media interface with foreigners. The Office of Foreign Propaganda is concerned with China's image abroad, its 'foreign publicity activities as well as monitoring, policing and censoring all activities within China which fit within the foreign propaganda ambit' (Brady 2008: 63). Because of extensive control measures, the only views you will read in the state media are those that the *duiwai* allows you to read.

I will begin by discussing the broader Chinese-language news media as found in a range of various studies to date. A diachronic study by Feng and Wu (2009) using a CDA approach reveals the changing ideologies reflected in a typical Party newspaper at two periods in time, 1980 and 2002. A comparison of texts from the two eras revealed that the periods are in 'sharp contrast' in terms of rhetoric with the former using persuasive tactics based on pre-reform utilitarian values and the latter manifesting a much higher usage of 'hedonistic value appeals and interactive linguistic features' (2009: 218) to lure buyers who are no longer interested in ideology. Huang and Chen (2009), also employing a diachronic CDA approach, discovered an 'emerging trend of discursive democratization' in certain Chinese print media, marked by a gradual reduction of 'explicit power markers' and a turn from negative judgment to the 'increase of implicit power markers of positive linguistic items of appreciation and appraisal [...]' (2009: 199). They hasten to add, however, that the democratization trend is 'only conditional and rather limited under the current political system'. Taking up a more critical position toward Chinese media analysis, Cai (2008) suggests that defining the social boundaries of the *xiaokang* society is 'deeply rhetorical, since it forms attitudes and induces actions by means of selecting objects for attention/inattention, emphasis/de-emphasis, and salience/absence' (2008: 16). He also discusses the rhetorical 'substitution of meanings' citing the word *democracy* as an example. The CCP officials, in their construction of *xiaokang* discourse, give the impression that 'democracy' is espoused, but they are actually referring to 'elements of openness, transparency, and

a certain level of public participation' (2008: 17) and not the true meaning of the term. By using the word as a symbol without the substance, 'the CCP creates a discursive space where it can assuage the burden of introducing representative democracy'.

On constructing the discourse of national identity in Chinese media, Pugsley (2006) discusses the state's plan of 'complex inter-weaving of Chinese 'values' incorporating them into a patriotic narrative on nation-building' (2006: 78). The discursive construction of 'hero narratives' invokes the Maoist era method of activating citizens' will to overcome in times of national trouble. To mainland Chinese citizens, suggests Pugsley, this is a 'familiar narrative, which operates within conceptual frameworks that serve to mobilize the masses and, ultimately, present a positive outcome in which 'the enemy' (a foreign aggressor, corrupt official, or Mother Nature) is defeated' (2006: 78). Taking the media as a revealer of political ideology, Pugsley's article is an example of how textual analysis can uncover seeming manipulations that belie the rhetoric of governments.

On a somewhat more controversial note, Farquhar & Berry (2004: 121) conclude that in the Chinese media there is 'no clear distinction between historical and fictional Chinese narrative' for which they coin the oxymoronic term 'history-fiction'. They discuss Chow Rey's analogy of collective suffering metaphorically calling it the 'logic of the wound', which in the traditional 'yin-yang (陰陽) dualism', comes before healing. This results in the usage of a 'ritual formula, *yiku sitian* (remembering past bitterness is balanced by appreciating present sweetness)' (2004: 121), a textual format or pattern used to construct accounts of 'history-fiction'. Those in power who 'control the media and manipulate the message to integrate present political thought with a restructured past' (2004: 122), possess the means (through China's vast mass media apparatus) to rhetorically conceptualize the healing metaphor of 'a bright future', as found in the ubiquitous discourses of the 'moderately prosperous' and 'harmonious society'.

In a rare article on the English language media in China, Guo and Huang (2002) view it in terms of 'hybridized discourse'. In dealing with China's *English* media, their analysis reveals the emergence of three 'socio-political functions' (2002: 217), which specify the linguistically construed social roles of the media. These functions offer a rationale for why media texts such as the *China Daily*, seem 'both keen to control and eager to please.' This implies that China is changing – but at the same

time, ‘ideological indoctrination remains firmly in place’ (2002: 217). It is acknowledged that English language media, within their ‘stretched realm of discourse’ (2002: 218) have a lesser obligation to echo CCP ideology, but cannot criticize official state views, as CCP ideology must remain unequivocal, a point which I also bring out in this thesis.

Focusing on how ideological positions are rhetorically constructed, Fang Yew-jin (1994) carried out an analysis of the ways in which the *People’s Daily* portrayed nations considered either hostile or friendly to China. In comparing the differing textual representations of these two categories of country, she concludes that the political interests of the CCP provide syntactic structures in how these countries were represented (favorably or unfavorably). In her words, ‘lexical choices and syntactic options are not arbitrary’ (1994: 463), but rather designed to hide causal relationships by choosing intransitivity and the use of the passive voice in order to deflect criticism.

In a rhetorical analysis of Chinese political slogans from 1949, Lu (1999) discusses the use of political language in the form of ‘ideographs’ (McGee 1980), persuasive ideological slogans designed to induce ‘participation in a rhetorical culture’ (Lu 1999: 490). Slogans are instrumental in steering ‘the mind of the public. Political slogans, a particular form of ideographs, are considered the building blocks of ideology [...] controlling mass consciousness and shaping an individual’s “reality”’ (1999: 490). He controversially suggests that the CCP’s disingenuous use of political slogans ‘bear[s] close resemblance’ to the methods used by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany (1999: 504).

These studies have been extremely informative and looked at the features of Chinese media from a variety of not only linguistic, but also social, political, cultural, and economic perspectives. What seems to have been inadequately addressed until now is a critical analysis of contemporary Chinese government discourses on issues of controversy (e.g. human rights, dissent, sovereignty) using a systematically analytical methodology. My approach differs from these above studies in several ways. As noted, there has been little critical discourse analysis done on China’s English-language media. I find its discourses to be a field very pertinent to the study of representation, mainly due to its trans-cultural aspects, i.e. China telling the world what it thinks, its worldview, as it attempts the legitimization of its ideology with the imagined foreign reader. One of several differentiating features of this study is that

most research on Chinese political media has been related to socio-historical and political phenomena in the sociological sense. This study, though multi-disciplinary, is primarily and essentially, a *linguistic* analysis set within a detailed socio-political context that facilitates a critical interpretation. There is a need to bring disparate fields of study such as post-modern political science, the emancipatory philosophy of the Frankfurt School, and a critical approach to the analysis of discourse together in order to produce a relevant commentary on issues of asymmetrical power (such as human rights and dissent), which exist in an emerging global power such as China is today.

Another distinguishing feature of this study is that it is neither a comparative nor contrastive analysis with a foreign media equivalent, which are routes of inquiry often taken by researchers in Chinese media. In the context of the Chinese media, analysts who have applied this approach are, for example, Tse, Belk and Zhou (1989) and their comparison of cross-cultural print media advertising discourse; Chang, Wang, and Chen (1998) on the comparative analysis of post-cold war imagery in American and Chinese TV news; Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998) on the comparative analysis of U.S. and Chinese newspaper coverage of a UN Conference on women; Wang Wei (2006) on a contrastive study of Australian and Chinese newspaper commentaries on terrorism; Li Juan's (2006) comparison of biased discourse in the *China Daily* against the *New York Times* coverage of the same incidents; or Wu Min (2006) on the comparison of HIV/AIDS coverage in Chinese and U.S. medias. This present study, however, will attempt the analysis of data solely from 'within' the archives of Chinese English-language press. Another factor that individualizes this research is that it is on the linguistic strategies of political discourse with ideological purposes. Until now, little research from a critically linguistic perspective, rather than a moral, legal, sociological or political one, has been done on China's English press with regard to its representation of dissent. It is my hope that this study can contribute to an understanding of how linguistic resources of the English language are appropriated for the political purpose of positive-Self/negative-Other portrayal of social actors as a means of reproducing, legitimizing, and (when possible) maintaining the state's construction of unequal power relations. As mentioned earlier, I believe that in bringing together dissimilar fields of the social sciences, new tools of inquiry can be forged. A cross-disciplinary approach empowers analysts to break new ground that is not only of academic

importance, but also of social and political relevance in accord with the emancipatory aims of CDA.

1.11 An outline of subsequent chapters

In setting the context for the present study, this chapter has initiated an orientation to the social and civil polemics currently circulating in China. In the remainder of this chapter, I offer a brief overview of the succeeding chapters (2–7), including a *précis* of the subject matter in each one.

The central task of Chapter 2 is that of offering further contextualization with explanations of key aspects of the socio-historical and political background. It deals with the discourse of ‘alterity’ as a historical concept in China’s politicized rhetoric. The discourse of Othering (i.e. labeling, naming and shaming) is discussed in terms of its use as a political tool of ‘class struggle’ and ‘demarcation’, but which also finds currency as a contemporary media strategy.

Chapter 3 is an account of the multidisciplinary framework through which my research findings are interpreted, as based on the theoretical concepts of the ‘ideological square’ and ‘representation theory’. *Us vs Them* discourse and positive-Self/negative-Other representation form the basis for an understanding of the ideological square. For this research, I argue that any given representation in discourse is not fixed, but is imbued with an unstable quality that may cause meaning to oscillate according to elite interests, particularly as they change over time and are found to be no longer effective for maintaining power. That which was orthodox becomes heterodox in order to introduce a ‘new’ orthodoxy. The Hallidayan notion that language is constituted by various choices (e.g. in terms of grammar, lexis, semantics, etc.) is also considered in light of its ideological intention.

Chapter 4 discusses the methodology for this research, the definitions of particular technical terms of analysis, and a review of the sources of my data. In this chapter I examine discursive strategies and certain aspects of systemic functional linguistics (hereafter, SFL), and the allocation of social actor roles, as well as Appraisal Theory (used in Chapter 6), that are useful in my analysis through the identification of linguistic patterns and their interpretations. Of equal relevance in this chapter are the detailed discussions of several major CDA theoreticians and their research on ideology in media discourses. Unavoidably, this includes the

borrowing of certain aspects of their approaches, but not others. This is simply due to the fact that my research is on the discourse of a non-Western, non-liberal, non-democratic, one-party political system with its roots in an ancient culture – and so is adjusted to fit this context.

Chapter 5, entitled ‘The Criminal’, begins with a brief review of dissident author and 2010 Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo’s political undertakings and a case study of the official press representations about him. Through application of the above-mentioned theories, a critical linguistic analysis of news articles written about Liu in China’s English press is carried out beginning with article headlines. This is followed by the more detailed explication of relational processes using SFL, and on the basis of this data, interpretations are drawn.

Chapter 6 is called the ‘Mob Organizer’. It is a case study of China’s English-language press coverage of Chen Guangcheng, the blind ‘barefoot lawyer’. After a brief historical view of his *pro bono* legal work in defending rural farmers against exploitation and forced abortions, a transitivity analysis of headlines is carried out as in the analysis of headlines on Liu Xiaobo in Chapter 5. Using selected methods from the analytical framework of Appraisal Theory, three opinion-oriented commentaries are studied for the use of evaluative language involving the evaluation of social actors and the processes in which they are involved. Chapter 7 is a discussion of the findings and my critical interpretation in light of the ideological, socio-political and cultural contexts of the linguistic factors arising from the data. In the conclusion, I offer some philosophical reflections on the direction that China’s media seems to be headed (in terms of its agenda), and how it is trying to get there (in terms of its strategies).

As long as there are nations, they will pursue their interests and interpret world events according to what advances those interests. The important thing, and that which is central to my thesis, is that competing definitions of ‘human rights’ and ‘sovereignty’ and their subsequent applications require accompanying discourses, mostly carried by the media, to diffuse, support, and legitimize them. The crux of this investigation is to form an understanding, in terms of language, firstly of *how* these representations are entextualized; secondly, in terms of ideology, *why* are they reproduced in the media; and finally, in terms of power, *who* stands to benefit politically from such representations. To answer these questions, which I formally state in section 4.1.1, I have collected a corpus that is comprised of the entire range

of media articles available from the China's official English-language press, on the prominent dissidents Liu Xiaobo and Chen Guangcheng. The particulars of this research will be explained in more detail in the following chapters.

1.12 Summary

This chapter has dealt with a variety of contextual factors leading to an understanding of China's current frames of reference. In conformity with Thompson's first phase (social analysis), the preceding discussion has explained a variety of extratextual factors, which are needed in setting the relevant scene for a profounder interpretation. I have contextualized the notion of political dissent in China by means of a socio-historical overview of human rights, the inherent pursuit of dignity, and issues related to the current significance of national identity and sovereignty. Also relevant are a review of current laws on subversion, an explanation of how the discourse of sovereignty is used for legitimization, and finally, in terms of China's media, a brief outline of the constraints that currently influence the culture of China's English-language press.

CHAPTER 2

THE CONSTRUCTION OF ALTERITY IN CHINA'S MEDIATIZED POLITICAL DISCOURSE

The enemy of the moment always represented absolute evil...

– Orwell (1949) *1984*

2.1 Introduction

The function of Chapter 2 is to extend the discussion regarding the analytical context in accordance with Thompson's first phase, 'social analysis'. The set of historical and socio-political topics discussed in this chapter will add relevant perspectives to this study. These are, *viz.*:

- China's changing orders of discourse and their legitimization
- The creation and legitimization of a 'new' orthodoxy
- The deployment of a 'rhetoric of polarization'
- The historical view of 'friends and enemies'
- The 'labeling' of subversive elements
- Nationalism and national identity
- The concept of 'historical positioning'

As part of the process of explaining pertinent socio-political and historical influences, I begin with an account of what discourse analyst Gu Yueguo calls the 'changing orders of discourse' in reference to China's ideological shift from Maoism

to marketism. Based on Foucault's concept of 'discursive formations', Gu sees discourse as 'the ways people talk about things under the influence of a particular political ideology' (2001: 32). He views discourse as language in use, and more specifically, as a type of social practice, making it 'a form of action' (2001: 36). This particular definition describes a view of China's English media discourse as being ideological in nature. More than a decade after Gu (2001) wrote his revelatory paper on the contrasts between the changing orders of discourse in China, the discourse of revolutionary class struggle has been de-emphasized – but has by no means disappeared. As a general approach, it has been overtaken by a discourse that embraces aspects of neo-liberalism (Fairclough 2002, 2006), but this is not to say that the latter discourse has entirely displaced the former (revolutionary struggle). Though the militant aspects of class struggle discourse have been generally backgrounded by the Chinese media, it is evident that hyperbolic rhetoric it is still considered a viable linguistic alternative ready for use if and when needed for delegitimizing the Other. In addition, as a practice of Othering, this chapter will also look at dichotomous social categories based on Lowell Dittmer's concept (1987) of a 'world of darkness' and a 'world of light' as seen in his Polemical Symbol Structure (Figure 2.1). The world of binary opposites can be further understood as 'friends/enemies', 'heroes/villains' (Schmitt 2007) and other such dichotomies, including how they are ideologically constructed and represented.

As noted in the preceding chapter, China has received criticism both domestically and internationally over its performance in the area of human rights and the treatment of dissidents, and has often expressed that such global disapprobation is unfounded in light of its sovereignty. In its defense, China has put forth various justifications including reference to constitutional amendments and legal measures taken by the Chinese government toward improving its human rights situation. As egalitarian as new policies and the political slogans may sound (e.g. 'harmonious society', 'moderately prosperous society', etc.), their ambiguities invite a sense of irony. The paradox seems particularly evident when such policies and their accompanying *tifa* seem to disregard the spiritual and/or political aspirations of its population. Citizens who address and challenge these issues have done so at great cost to themselves. As mentioned in section 1.3, a case in point is that of Wei Jinsheng (魏京生), a forerunner of today's dissenters, who brazenly called for a *fifth*

modernization¹⁰ (第五个现代化). In a ‘large character poster’ (*dazibao* 大字报) displayed on Beijing’s Democracy Wall in 1978, Wei proclaimed that without democracy, Deng Xiaoping’s *Four Modernizations* were meaningless. His call for the fifth modernization that day was labeled a crime of ‘counterrevolution’, and earned him a fourteen-year prison term (1979–1993). Wei had left his name and address on the poster intentionally.

Dissidence in China is by no means a new phenomenon. In the 1936 volume entitled *A History of the Press and Public Opinion in China*, Lin Yutang discussed the long and documented tradition of public criticism directed at leadership in China. As he pointed out, ‘no censorship or monarchical absolutism’ has been able to stifle this tendency to censure rulers. As if written yesterday, he wrote ‘The government always claims that it is thinking of the people, but does not quite like to hear what the people think of itself. What the government really wants is that the people should stop thinking altogether [...]’ (Lin 1936: 3). In his day, Lin was very much aware of the contradictions involved in juxtaposing a relatively new concept such as a public press on an ancient and traditional society as China’s. He addressed the fact that this medium had the means to profoundly shape society and politics. But without a history of democratic discourse in China, Lin could only conceive of the Chinese press as a force for good – *if* and *when* it listened to the people. In times past, politics was of little interest to Chinese commoners mainly because of the low rates of literacy, as ‘public criticism was limited exactly in proportion as literacy was limited’ (Lin 1936: 5). In the current era, however, full literacy at every level of society, public opinion is bursting forth and creating problems for China’s censors, because, as Lin presciently noted, ‘a free press is always embarrassing to the government’ (1936: 3).

Though there are a multitude of sophisticated barriers in place to censor and control dissident public discourses, such as the well-known ‘great firewall’ and other systems under the *wei wen* policy, the struggle for expression, particularly through the Internet, continues its furtive journey (Harwit and Clark 2001, Chase 2002, Zittrain and Edelman 2003, MacKinnon 2008, Parker 2014). Indeed, activists have found the Internet particularly suited for the purpose of dissemination, as Liu Xiaobo did when he and co-authors released online the exceedingly controversial *Charter 08*¹¹ in December of that year, a date which coincided with the 60th anniversary of

the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948). Signed by more than 300 prominent scholars, writers, and activists around the country, the power of *Charter 08*'s challenge to CCP power was reflected in the eleven-year prison sentence Liu received.

2.2 The changing orders of discourse

The changes in China's political ideology over the last part of the 20th century have brought the nation from the orthodoxy of Maoism to that of Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms under the *Open Door Policy* (门户开放政策). Discourse has been especially instrumental in articulating and legitimizing this groundbreaking ideological shift. Due to the fact that language when purposeful is by default political, it can be used in the attempt to influence social consciousness in relation to the larger socio-political environment. Paul Corcoran suggests that language and politics are synonymous, particularly in the construal of binary oppositions (i.e. defining the Other):

one cannot distinguish between politics and language because they do not occupy separate spheres of existence [...] In a much stronger sense, language articulates and confirms all the things that we call political: the weak and strong, the valued and rejected, the desired and the undesirable, 'us' and 'them'. (Corcoran 1990: 53)

According to Gu Yueguo (2001: 36), 'order of discourse' refers to the way a particular aspect of social life 'becomes dominant within a speech community at a certain period of time'. These orders of discourse tend to change over time due to political factors often linked to ideological vicissitudes. To illustrate this point, Gu (2001) notes a fundamental distinction in the Maoist and post-Maoist orders of discourse both of which initiated far-reaching social and political changes. He writes of '*Mao's way*' during the ideological era in which social actors were abolitionist, i.e. both 'militant and offensive', and '*Deng's way*' whose social actors were rectificationist, i.e. 'counter-offensive and corrective' (2001: 37, emphasis in original). Mao's discourse tended to first abolish, and then establish; Deng's discourse was aimed primarily at rectification and putting things right.

The purpose for which aggressive rhetoric is most often used is that of identifying and characterizing an opposing force (explained in further detail below). But this discursive strategy has its problems, as integrating an order of discourse from the

past (the combative discourse of class struggle) with one from the present (the discourse of economic development) fosters a sense of disequilibrium. This, in effect, forces the media to attempt to ‘stabilize’ contradictions between the older discourse of class struggle and the newer discourse of reform. One example of this is seen in the appropriation of class struggle language to ‘mobilize’ the masses to continue to embrace a market economy. The outstanding difference is that now the masses are urged to practice capitalism instead of ‘Marxist-Leninist revolution’, as noted by Anne-Marie Brady (2008). She cites the current use of Mao era phraseology for the purpose of arousing action in the present – but the goal is that of economic development rather than revolution. Instead of ‘working to destroy the capitalist system within China and helping to liberate the workers of the world, the propaganda system has the task of creating a good market environment within China and encouraging foreign investment’ (Brady 2008: 14). This is evidenced in the media’s appropriation of class struggle terms such as ‘red’ and ‘revolution’ to depict economic development. An article entitled RED HOT REVOLUTION (17 October 2007, *China Daily*), rather than foment insurrection against ‘U.S. imperialists’, for example, is used to discuss the economic phenomenon of ‘Red Tourists’ going about doing ‘Red Tourism’ thereby bringing local villagers trade and wealth. A local Party Secretary in the article is quoted as saying: ‘The local people [in the village] have all learned from the Red Tourists from all over China that they should be proud. All of this comes from the great deeds of Chairman Mao Zedong [...]’. Clearly, this is a contrived utterance, which attempts to tie the contradictory legacies of ‘Maoism’ and ‘economic reform’ into a seamless whole in order to mitigate the ideological discrepancies between the two.

Regarding this transformation of discourses from class struggle to that of economic development, some significant things should be noted. It is essential to be aware of the essentially dichotomous nature of the discourses, which is largely due to the historical context of this transformation. Though there are presently voices of the new Left attempting to establish the impression that Maoism and Dengism are complementary (Cohen 2014), Maoist discourse and the official discourse of global integration and neo-liberalism are ideologically at odds. The latter would have been seen as strictly heterodox if these two ideologies had happened to occur within the same historical period. Drawing on Foucault, Fairclough noted that discursive formations are ‘systems of rules’ (1992: 40), ‘which make it possible for certain

statements but not others to occur at particular times, places and institutional locations'. Foucault's observation can be seen, even more than thirty years after the fact, in the constant struggle of China's ideologues to come to terms and 'correctly deal' (Cohen 2014) with the contradictions generated by the transition in the orders of discourse (i.e. from Maoism to a market economy). In a speech given on the 120th anniversary of Mao Zedong's birth (26 December 2013), President Xi Jinping stressed the need to ideologically resolve this protracted contradiction (Cohen 2014, and see end of section 2.3). A lingering paradox within the CCP ideological canon indicates that such ideological gaps have not been sufficiently legitimized or 'reconciled'. Hence, they are likely to be interpreted as vacillation, which puts the Party's 'myth of correctness' in a vulnerable position.

After the death of Mao and the end of the Cultural Revolution, one of the first things the Dengists pursued besides economic reform was a reversal of 'erroneous documents' and 'erroneous conclusions', which had been adopted during the reign of the Gang of Four. The reformers were faced with over-turning an entrenched dogma that for years had been heavily inculcated by the masses that, by now, were disenchanted with ideological upheavals and political purges. Correcting these ideological 'errors' presented a major theoretical challenge to the reformists who were faced with undoing the ideological entanglements of Maoism, which had not only encouraged the eradication of rightist elements in their midst, but also stifled any aspirations to entrepreneurialism.

The following section discusses the process of transition from one order of discourse to the next. In this context, the operationalization of the shift in discourse orders could only have been legitimized by portraying it as growing historically and organically out of previous orthodoxy (Ji 2012: 93).

2.3 Legitimizing the changing orders of discourse: From orthodoxy to heterodoxy

The overriding ethos against which all official political discourse is carried out in China is that of legitimization. In order to discuss legitimization in its present-day context it is necessary to consider the post-Cultural Revolution (1978) origins of the current economic reforms. At that time, Deng Xiaoping and other reformers knew that Maoism was ideologically ill-equipped to carry China into to an age of

affluence. The leadership recognized that without change, history would move on. China needed a transformation, and the most delicate part of engineering it was how to ideologically justify the shift from socialism to capitalism, while maintaining the myth of the CCP's heroic struggle *against* capitalism. In other words, an ideologically consistent justification was necessary to rationalize the change. According to Weatherly, 'it became essential for the party to present a coherent Marxist explanation for the reform/opening strategy, otherwise it would be in danger of losing the rationale for its legitimacy in Chinese politics' (Weatherley 2006, cited in Ploberger 2007: 343).

This was largely accomplished at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP on June 27, 1981, with the propagation of a historical document entitled the *Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China* (hereafter, the *Resolution*). In significant ways, it restructured the belief system of the national myth (Kluver 1996). This was achieved by redefining historical events regarding the Cultural Revolution, as well as the pre-1976 political roles of Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and others. In essence, the *Resolution* was a radical reworking of what, up until then, had been the CCP's master narrative. 'Its most important rhetorical function', pivotal to the reform movement, 'was to legitimate a change of focus away from class struggle toward economic modernization' (Kluver 1996: 46).

Deng realized the potency of Mao's image to the CCP's legitimacy in that the national narrative had constantly portrayed Mao as its epic hero. The Party's credibility was inextricably linked to Mao's image and its legitimacy rested largely on his heroic role as liberator of the Chinese people (Kluver 1996). But with new economically progressive directions in mind, a strategy for addressing changes had to be devised. Parts of the historical narrative had to be restructured to accommodate this, for which purpose, the *Resolution* was drawn up in 1981. Mao and his legacy were discursively *re-represented* through this document, which is where the familiar 70:30 ratio (Mao was 70% right, 30% in error) was inferred and some of his key policies were designated as having been traumatic to the nation. The introduction of the notion that Mao had made mistakes created enough rhetorical space for the party to forge a new direction.

In addition to casting Mao as theoretically incorrect 'some' of the time, it also reversed decisions on Deng Xiaoping's former heterodoxy 'and portrayed [him] as

having been intimately involved in the successes of the Party' (Kluver 1996: 49). The *Resolution* absolved Deng by stating that his past vilification as a 'bourgeois reactionary' and 'capitalist roader', etc. in the 1970s had been erroneous (see Extract 2.1 below. This transformative aspect of discourse is explored in more depth in section 3.2 on Representation):

Extract 2.1

The confusing of right and wrong inevitably led to confusing the people with the enemy. The 'capitalist-roaders' overthrown in the 'cultural revolution' were leading cadres of Party and government organizations at all levels, [...] The so-called bourgeois headquarters inside the Party headed by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping simply did not exist. (The Resolution, 1981: 20.2)

The Party also had to make a strategic alteration in the portrayal of Mao. The maintenance of Party legitimacy largely rested on Mao's revolutionary legacy of infallibility, so recasting Mao as no longer unshakable required delicacy. Alan Kluver observed that this was accomplished by creating a discursive distinction between Mao as 'Chairman' and Mao as 'Comrade'. For historical continuity, it was essential to keep Mao as the historical figurehead who embodied the code of the CCP in Mao Zedong Thought. The need to make this distinction was in order to continue using Mao's Thought as a theoretical basis for decisions concerning the Party line. It was vital to the historical legacy of the CCP to uphold the unfailing correctness of Mao Zedong Thought, while at the same time controlling the exclusive rights to interpret it. The CCP was able to further consolidate ideological control over the masses by its metaphorical hold on the title deed to the history of China as a spoil of war. In reserving to itself the right to interpret Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, as well as the entire history of China for its own purposes, the CCP assumed the mantle of authority. With it, came the power to define and determine political theory. This is very important to the preservation of CCP legitimacy because, as pointed out by Ji Fengyuan, the CCP 'has always claimed to be based on correct theory, all additions to its theoretical tradition must appear, at least nominally, to grow out of the existing body of doctrine' (2012: 93). In China's mediatized political discourse, political legitimacy rests in direct proportion to how effectively any given discourse is able to justify its propositions in light of doctrinal history.

As explained above, the *Resolution* was an attempt to make the ideological changes appear as the natural course of history, i.e. a return to the seamless

continuum of the national narrative. A re-appraisal of the collective experience was carried out under the ideological *tifa* of ‘emancipating the mind properly’ and encouraging the people to ‘seek truth from facts’ (the *Resolution*, par. 26: section 1), which are both catchphrases that encouraged the masses to adopt a mindset open to new interpretations – not only of ideology, but of history itself. Mao was dead and the horrors of the Cultural Revolution were blamed on the Gang of Four, which by then had been liquidated. The Party regrouped around a new agenda that was to be set in motion through ‘readjusting, restructuring, consolidating and improving’ the economy, as well as delimiting the notion of ‘class struggle’ (previously considered a ‘key link’ in implementing socialism).

The *Resolution* is indeed a rhetorical *capolavoro*, both exculpatory and justificatory of the CCP. The logic of the ideology that had previously shackled the masses was now used to persuade them to ‘emancipate their minds’ and accept the reinterpretation of history that was being offered them. The historical ‘rectifications’ in the *Resolution* all took place within the boundaries of ideology, where metaphorically, the ‘scriptures’ of ideology alone were able to both sanitize and legitimize the heterodoxy of the new order of discourse. Sociologists Berger and Luckmann note that in pushing ‘new conceptualizations’ beyond their original notions (such as in extending the theoretical definition of ‘socialism’) challenges will arise. As a countermeasure, precise linguistic formulations (*tifa*) create preemptively constructed anchors of legitimization, which can be used to defend the new ideological alterations against the challenges of ‘heretical groups’ (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 125). Pre-fabricated slogans, it is believed, present material realities that are able to vanquish the counter-arguments of dissenters.

If the national myth and CCP ideology in their conceptual forms were not able to accommodate the introduction of capitalism, it was crucial that they were altered discursively to allow for what was previously seen as heterodoxy. This had to be done in such a way as to avoid the admission of error and not compromise the Party’s image. By being specific about the individuals or cliques within the Party who have gone astray, the Party itself never needs to be incorrect – it simply needs to separate itself from the wrongdoers by identifying a scapegoat, such as the Gang of Four. The guilt-reducing principle of focusing blame on the individual remains the designated method, so that ‘the whole’ emerges unscathed, never having to admit error. In the case of actualizing the shift of discourses, rhetorically distancing

itself from Mao's mistakes was a first step. In this way, the Party did not have to lose face by admitting it was going against its previous doctrines by crossing the boundary to heterodoxy, which, just a few years before, was considered criminally deviant. In later years this would allow, for example, the alteration of the key term 'socialism', which, rather than being discarded as anachronistic, became 'socialism with Chinese characteristics'. Kluver (1996) writes of 'scientific' formulations and word choices as exercised by the CCPPD by which he means the effective usage of the most persuasive and effectively convincing language. He suggests that the CCPPD are 'acutely aware of the persuasive and emotional impact of wordplay, and dub those most powerful formulations as "scientific." The phrase might have either one clear meaning, or a multitude of meanings, providing for a variety of subtle changes' (Kluver 1996: 7). Such 'wordplay' has established a method to introduce variations on the core meaning of socialist ideology when it is expedient to do so.

When an ideological juncture is approached that would entail the practice of what might be described as 'non-socialist' (if one were to interpret socialism by the original meaning), the extra scope afforded by the addendum 'with Chinese characteristics' provides the ideological space for justifying practices theretofore considered heterodox. There is little to distinguish a 'socialist market economy' from capitalism, but the use of the word 'capitalism' would be seen as a capitulation of sorts causing a loss of face to the Other's ideology. Giving the impression of having been defeated in the ideological battle with capitalism, as occurred in the former U.S.S.R., contradicts the CCP myth of infallibility. In essence, the current purpose of political rhetoric in China is to resolve such contradictions that exist between the orders of discourse – the pragmatic aspects of government policy on one hand (economic reforms), and the continuity of the national myth on the other. For purposes of justification, inconsistencies must be made to look historically legitimate, and not a betrayal of the fundamental revolutionary narrative. In the rush to provide legitimization for policies that have conspicuously diverged from Marxism-Leninism and the ideology of Maoism, the Party must continuously interpret the national narrative to keep it relevant to the new capitalistic turns while not betraying the revolutionary legacy. The reformulation of ideological demarcations allows discursive space to revise both ideology and myth (Kluver 1996). As mentioned earlier, an example of this can be seen as recently as December of 2013 in a speech given on Mao Zedong's 120th birthday. President Xi directly addressed this

ideological divergence by explaining that ‘the alternating evocations of Mao and Deng do not represent vacillation, but an effort to reconcile the “two undeniabables” of Chinese politics’ (Cohen 2014). The new Left, rather than accept the notion that Mao had promoted reckless policies, seeks to establish the view that the ideological transformation (from class struggle to reform) should be seen as a complementary and organic relationship, i.e. the seamless universality of ‘thesis, and antithesis in need of synthesis’ (Cohen 2014).

In summary, the reforms set in motion by Deng Xiaoping and enacted by the CCP since the end of the Cultural Revolution after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 set China on a course toward continued economic reform. At the *Third Plenum* in 1978, the Party introduced gradual modifications of ideology (e.g. ‘Sinification of Marxism’, ‘primary stage of socialism’), which have allowed it to pursue a course toward a ‘moderately prosperous society’ (*xiaokang shehui*). The introduction of abstractions in the form of *tifa* such as ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, ‘socialist market economy’, ‘practice is the sole criterion of truth’, etc., has broadened the discursive area from which the CCP can rhetorically justify these reforms. The meanings of these formulations are ambiguous, and as such, they deflate contestation. Few, outside of the ideologues who conceived them, actually know what they mean. They can be interpreted on demand to create that obligatory sense of historical progression within which economic reforms, visibly non-Marxist, are legitimized because they seem like an extension of the natural course of events. Acutely aware of the vulnerability brought about by the pre- and post-reform ideological gap, the government continues trying to construct a ‘correct’ explanation for what actually happened. According to journalist David Cohen (2014), the media under President Xi, have been commissioned to ‘heavily emphasize’ a discourse of ‘correctly dealing’ with the ideological transition between the two noticeably inconsistent orders of discourse. It is against this façade of ideological congruence that dissidents are positioned as malcontents and unbelievers – saboteurs of the ‘harmonious society’.

2.4 ‘Who are our enemies?’ – ‘Who are our friends?’

From Mao Zedong’s now famous quotation (below), one thing is abundantly clear: distinguishing between friends and enemies was not just important – it was *crucial* to the success of the revolution:

Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution. The basic reason why all previous revolutionary struggles in China achieved so little was their failure to unite with real friends in order to attack real enemies. (Mao [1926]1971: 1)

A key element in political discourse is the role of the opposing Other. In terms of ideology, the creation of binary distinctions between conflicting elements is essential. According to controversial German political theorist Carl Schmitt (2007), the construction of binary opposition between friend and enemy, has remained a consistent characteristic of political language. In *Concept of the Political* (2007), Schmitt posits that friend and enemy also correspond to other sets of independent antitheses such as bad/good in the moral domain, ugly/beautiful in the aesthetic, poor/rich in the social, and so on. ‘The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced’, Schmitt summarized, ‘is that between friend and enemy’ (Schmitt 2007: 26).

The enemy/friend antithesis, for various ideological discourses, is utilized in the political sphere as a marker of Otherness between those who support the realization of a certain worldview, and those who would oppose it. Such discourses also generate certain social practices leading to censuring the Other, which in the context of this study, is often based on a sense of nationalism. In preparation for the Beijing Olympics in 2008, for example, observers identified overtly nationalistic behavior from students at rallies during the torch-bearing ceremonies. Commenting on the demonstrations, Nyíri, Zhang, and Varral (2010: 27) attributed this nationalistic fervor to ‘a well-established pattern in the official discourse of national history’. They went on to suggest that ‘In China, identifying with heroes and condemning traitors is an important discursive technique for identifying oneself with the nation, which Chinese citizens learn at a young age as part of their school education.

According to Schmitt, ‘Every religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and enemy’ (Schmitt 2007: 70). The views

found in the discourses of China's English media are essentially political because of their propensity for grouping social actors into such binary roles as friends and enemies. Schmitt infers that to exist in the political sphere, a people must recognize the distinction between friend and enemy. 'Therein', suggests Schmitt, 'resides the essence of its political existence' (2007: 82).

On the mediatized political usage of 'friendship terminology', Brady (2003) writes:

Friendship terminology is a means to neutralize opposition psychologically and to reorder reality. Beijing likes to describe positive diplomatic relations between itself and other countries in 'friendship' terms. (Brady 2003: 7)

To illustrate how the labeling of friend and enemy works in China's English media discourse, I offer (below) samples of the strategic usage of the term 'friend' in the context of international relations to describe China's rapport with another nation deemed an 'all-weather' friend (Extracts 2.2–2.3). This is followed by the entextualization of the term 'enemy' (Extract 2.4), and then the concept of the 'non-enemy' (Extracts 2.5):

Extract 2.2

As a friendly neighbor and all-weather friend, China will continue to firmly support the unrelenting efforts of the Pakistani government and people to achieve national stability, Ma said. (CHINA FIRMLY SUPPORTS PAKISTAN'S UNREMITTING EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL STABILITY, 29 October 2009, Xinhua News Agency)

Extract 2.3

With Pakistan, China has built an 'all-weather friendship.' (COMMENTARY: PUSH FORWARD PRAGMATIC COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA, SOUTH ASIAN NEIGHBORS, 14 December 2010, Xinhua News Agency)

From examining the speeches of CCP leaders in *People's Daily*, researcher Lu Xing (2004) found that as a former ideological enemy, anti-U.S. rhetoric usually took shape according to a set of conventional discursive strategies. The anti-American discourse appeared as 'exposing U.S. hegemony', 'sabotaging U.S.-China relations', and 'U.S. hegemony and the violations of international law' (Lu 2004: 175–181). In 1966, for example, the *Peking Review* published the *Communiqué of the 11th Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee*, which 'strongly

demarcated' U.S. imperialism in hyperbolic terms as 'the most ferocious common enemy of the peoples of the whole world' (see Extract 2.4).

Extract 2.4

In order to isolate U.S. imperialism to the maximum and deal blows to it, the broadest possible international united front must be established against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. (COMMUNIQUE OF THE 11TH PLENARY SESSION OF THE EIGHTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE, 1966, *Peking Review*)

At some point since the above excerpt was written in 1966, for the utilitarian purposes of economic development, the U.S., though not a 'friend', is no longer the 'enemy'. China has reformulated its position to emphasize a strategic category for its relationship with the U.S.:

Extract 2.5

[...] China amid its reform and integration within international society will not become a U.S. enemy. (TRIPARTITE AXIS WOULD FAIL, 26 August 2004, *China Daily*)

In creating some distance from the outright 'enemy' category, China has positioned itself as neither friend nor enemy, but as 'not an enemy'. The non-enemy appears to be located between the two poles of the friend/enemy dichotomy.

In constructing negative representations of the Other, rather than direct recrimination, the Other's behavior or character can be framed as *habitually* negative. In this way, when a negative representation is called for, the Other may be depicted as acting 'true to form' by reference to the distrustful character image which has been previously generated. Insinuating that they (the Other) consistently act according to negative expectations by behaving in a presupposed manner (i.e. they have 'done it again') is an implicit way of disparaging the Other's character (Stewart et al. 2012: 300) through inference rather than direct accusation, as seen in Excerpt 2.6. This passage also entextualizes the discourse of perpetual 'victimhood' at the hands of the U.S.:

Extract 2.6

China bashing remains a routine for the two candidates in this year's U.S. presidential race. (CHINA BASHING: SHAME ON AMERICAN POLITICS, 16 October 2012, *People's Daily Online*)

Returning to Schmitt's view of the political world in which national unity depends on the identification of an Other, we see his views corroborated in a study

by Michael Dutton who investigated the practices of Chinese police from 1930 to 2002. Dutton's investigation (2004) chronicles the existence of the friend/enemy paradigm as it was used in controlling enemies for political purposes. In earlier CCP days, the identification of friends and enemies provided an index of those that were likely to oppose the revolution and those that could be relied upon to support it. The middle-class bourgeoisie was particularly suspect because of its ambivalence toward the revolution. Due to its vacillating nature, Mao warned that it would be a chronic and persistent danger to the revolution. By sowing mistrust, he alerted followers to be on 'constant guard lest such wavering breed confusion within the Party' (Thornton 2007: 719). Dutton found that among the defining tasks of the early revolutionary era was the 'drawing and redrawing' of the shifting friend/enemy categorical demarcations. Purges within the Party were an instrumental method not only of 'mobilizing the masses' toward regime goals, but also 'inspiring passionate commitment for the process of socialist transformation' (Thornton 2007: 719).

Dutton (2004) observes that police work in China's revolution was 'to patrol that ever shifting thin red line that separated revolutionary friend from reactionary enemy' (cited in Thornton 2007: 219) accomplished through mass mobilization campaigns and rectification. The designation of 'friends' and 'enemies' in the political realm continues to hold serious implications. The discursive strategies used in the representations of these social actors often follow the ideological vicissitudes of the day where today's hero can be tomorrow's villain and vice versa. I am suggesting that the way social actors are treated in discourse, the manner in which they are evaluated and represented linguistically, as friend or foe, indicates ideological bias (either favorable or unfavorable), at varying degrees of intensity on the part of the discourse producers. Though enmity toward political foes has moderated its overt class-struggle orientation, hostile discourse toward antagonists in the 21st century has by no means disappeared. When contrasted with the fanatical persecution of class enemies during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) the current method of dealing with antagonists (in the rhetorical sense) appears to have been moderated by the need for more strategic and PR savvy discourses, as public opinion is now an influence on media output. In the case of dissidents, one might say the pejoration is more veiled, albeit thinly, behind discourses of 'harmony', legality and 'moderate prosperity'. But the truth of the matter regarding dissidents in China is that they continue to be persecuted and delegitimized with devastating consequences.

Unequal power relations are sometimes rhetorically justified through a discourse of ‘conciliation’ involving a display of tolerance (such as the ‘warm gestures’ referred to in section 4.4.1.1) in the discursive treatment of Taiwan or Hong Kong, where they are reminded of their subordinate places under the *one country* slogan.

As discussed in Chapter 1, much of the ideological struggle occurs between competing definitions of abstract concepts such as national sovereignty and human rights. In order for the defamation of dissidents to take place, the stage must be set against a politically historical backdrop represented by opposing forces. In order for antagonistic discourse to achieve legitimacy, the actors must be located within the narrative of a world divided into two competing sides, one good and one evil. The good side (China) is populated with a stock roster of social actors each possessing the common trait of love for the motherland. The bad side (e.g. Japan and the ‘West’) abounds with enemies, conspirators, anti-China forces and secessionists. A principle method for defamation of dissidents is to report them as either colluding with that anti-China world, or espousing the hostile ideologies originating from within it.

I will return to this topic of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ as social categories after an exploration of the rhetoric of ‘polarization’.

2.5 Polarization and its rhetorical strategies

Polarization has been defined as ‘the process by which an extremely diversified public is coalesced into two or more highly contrasting, mutually exclusive groups sharing a high degree of internal solidarity in those beliefs which the persuader considers salient’ (King and Anderson 1971: 244, cited in Stewart, Smith and Denton 2012: 149). According to King and Anderson, polarization can be reduced to two principal elements. On the one hand, through what King and Anderson call the ‘we feeling’, it creates a sense of cohesion or solidarity, and by default, a dichotomy between Us and Them. On the other hand, it simultaneously provides an efficient way of categorizing the Other, by presupposing ‘the existence of a perceived "common foe" which the group must oppose if it is to preserve the fabric of beliefs out of which the persuader has woven its identity’ (King and Anderson 1971: 244). Regarding the nature of social movements, Stewart, Smith and Denton observe that social actors often use the ‘rhetoric of polarization to transform relationships by creating clear distinctions between the evil other and the virtuous self, a We-They

dichotomy' (Stewart et al. 2012: 149). As Kenneth Burke claims, 'identification implies division' (1961: 45). Tautologically then, division implies identification – in dividing from the Other, we define ourselves.

When an institution uses the rhetoric of polarization to promote a political agenda such as the silencing of dissent, the discourse is represented as one of conflicting values, one virtuous, and the other not. This practice of portraying challenges to power in terms of opposing values lays the groundwork for a discursive vilification of the Other by means of establishing opposing factions based on ethics. Discourse producers, having clearly identified whom the Other is, may then begin the process of attributing negative definitions and characteristics, sometimes overtly, sometimes covertly, creating a We-They dichotomy based on clear discrepancies between the virtuous Self and the unethical Other. King and Anderson go on to describe the two major strategies of polarization rhetoric: *affirmation* and *subversion*.

2.5.1 The rhetorical strategy of affirmation

Based on Walter Fisher's *A Motive of Communication* (1970), King and Anderson define affirmative rhetoric as that which puts forth 'a judicious use of those images that will promote a strong sense of group identity' (1971: 244). Instrumental to positive group identity is behavioral scientist Kenneth Boulding's notion of 'the image' (1956) as a subjective knowledge structure of facts and values that direct our perceptions. Much of the positive-Self representation in the data gathered for this research is predicated on the 'Us image', which can include historically oriented discourses such as those of 'shared victimhood', 'territorial sovereignty', 'great nationism' (and others) operating under the umbrella of patriotism (*aiguo zhuyi*). Such identity-affirmative rhetoric is often found in discourses used to facilitate the acceptance of an 'image', a definition, an identity or a specific interpretation with the purpose of group 'unification'. Unifying a social group through a rhetoric of polarization presupposes the existence of the Other and reinforces the perception of the common enemy. Solidarity can be stimulated by the production of a 'political image', which is perceived as 'legitimate, coherent, and significant' (King and Anderson 1971: 245). This 'self-justifying image' (1971: 246) works discursively by establishing a moral universe that is populated, not necessarily with universal

realities, but with the ideologically constructed ‘definitions’ of realities through which ‘truths’ that are central to the ideology, are consolidated. In terms of the lexicogrammar, the critical analysis of such discourse has often discovered that definitions and attributions find their way into a text through what Michael Halliday calls relational processes. In mediatized political discourse, the use of relational processes is a way of enabling a text to carry aspects of ideological bias. These can be revealed through analyzing the ‘identifying’ and ‘attributive’ functions in the clause. This methodological feature is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, and applied analytically in Chapters 5 and 6.

Fisher suggests that a discourse of persuasive intent is successful to the degree that it supplies ‘signs of consubstantiality’. This means that the image presented by the persuader conforms in some way to an image already internalized by the audience, similar to van Dijk’s concept of ‘mental models’, which are stored in each individual’s autobiographical ‘Episodic Memory’ (2011: 390, capitals in original). Affirmative discourse can also work in reverse, i.e. to fortify *negative* images of the Other. This can be seen in the pre-supposed negative frames of meaning surrounding groups or individuals such as Falun Gong, the Dalai Lama, Japan, the U.S., and sometimes even the West in general (a point discussed in section 2.4 as the Other acting according to ‘habit’ in Extract 2.6). James Aho describes this process of consolidation as one that ‘becomes with each retelling, “common sense”’ (Aho 1994: 31). The Chinese press has supported unceasing rhetorical campaigns against these Others for decades, which in effect, has created a ‘reservoir’ of bias toward them. Through the discursive work of ideologues, historical and biographical myths about the Others are entextualized through a ‘rhetorical strategy of affirmation’. Brady, for example, writes that the CCPPD instructed the media ‘to refer to self-immolation by Falun Gong followers as “terrorist acts”’ (2008: 99) in order to circumvent any arousal of reader empathy. Through a ‘rhetoric of affirmation’, the media substantiates the view that Falun Gong intends to do harm. The purpose, according to sociologist James Aho, is to show why ‘they act as they do – namely, as evil ones. It is a [...] way to validate defamatory labels’ (Aho 1994: 30).

One of sociologists Berger and Luckmann’s five steps in the process of reification is mythmaking, which is often associated with the phenomenon of ‘sedimentation’ and is an effective means of rhetorical affirmation. Berger and Luckmann describe the reservoir concept mentioned above, as ‘a depository’

residing principally in language (1966: 87). According to them, sedimentations can be acquired ‘monothetically’, meaning as a cohesive whole thereby negating the need to re-construct its origins in incremental doses to new generations. To Aho, sedimentations are also a reservoir (or ‘stock of knowledge’) useful for ideological purposes in confirming an inimical prejudice as ‘common sense’:

Once experience has been formulated in word and myth, it can be transmitted from one person to the next or, more significantly, across generations. In this form the experience becomes available to those who have never had it [...] Through this process, legends come to have lives of their own. Detached from the original act of naming or storytelling, they evolve into anonymous parts of the everyday taken-for-granted ‘stock of knowledge’ of society. What was a first a demeaning label, [...] becomes with each retelling ‘common sense’ – what everybody ‘knows’ to be true about ‘them’, the enemy. (Aho 1994: 30–1)

This can be seen, as noted above, in China’s media discourse on the aforementioned Dalai Lama, considered a treacherous antagonist in the eyes of the Chinese government for his stance on Tibetan independence. Because of the ubiquitous negative affirmations in the state’s anti-Dalai Lama discourse, China’s English press had little difficulty in defaming a dissident such as Liu Xiaobo by simply connecting him discursively to the same pre-existing reservoir, or ‘stock of knowledge’ (Aho 1994: 30) surrounding the Dalai Lama. This is done by discursive attachment so that Liu is perceived to be of the same type, as in the extract below (2.7). Through cohesive linguistic formulas (‘one...’ and ‘the other...’; ‘the former...’ and ‘the latter...’), Liu and the Lama are no longer separate individuals, but they are now ‘the two Chinese’ represented as a single entity through discursive association:

Extract 2.7

the Nobel Committee has awarded its Peace Prize to two Chinese, one is the Dalai Lama, and the other is dissident Liu Xiaobo. The former is a separatist [...], and the latter is an offender held in custody for inciting the subversion of state power. What the two have been doing has nothing to do with any criteria of the award. (NOBEL PEACE PRIZE GOES ASTRAY POLITICALLY, 18 November 2010, *People’s Daily Online*)

Returning to Walter Fisher’s notion, the ‘rhetorical strategy of affirmation’ can be seen in the provision of symbolic images as linguistic formulae designed for generating group identity. This facilitates the promotion of the common bond of patriotism through separation from the evil Others. Government-generated images are ubiquitous in China’s media and attempt to spawn the ‘illusory consciousness of

a common identity' (King and Anderson 1971: 247) across the wide and disparate range of social groupings in Chinese society (Chan 2009). By ignoring the antagonisms existing across China's current social categories and directing attention to the collective national identity of 'Chineseness', against the backdrop of an antagonist, the government attempts the creation of what Fisher calls a 'real fiction' (1970: 132). That is to say, a social construction created with words and images, like Benedict Anderson's (1991) imagined community, the discursive representation of a promised realm of 'harmony' and 'moderate prosperity' – to those who support the CCP.

Boulding posits that 'the political image is essentially an image of roles' (1956: 103), which in authoritarian structures alludes to a tension between the higher and lower levels within society. In such cases, he writes, 'the image which is possessed by those in higher roles, of the images of the lower roles becomes increasingly unreal'. This tension between social ranks causes the higher status group, in some cases, 'to see treachery where there is none' (1956: 101) – a very dangerous situation for dissenters easily labeled as traitors, but who, in fact, love their country. He compares the higher roles to extreme paranoiacs who, *by* their fears, *confirm* their fears due to 'heated imaginations'. According to Boulding, in order to force those of lower status to accept their position in the role structure, the hierarchy will use threats of violence.

2.5.2 The rhetorical strategy of subversion

Fisher's second rhetorical strategy of polarization is that of subversion (this does not mean 'subversion' in the political sense). A rhetoric of subversion occurs 'when a communicator attempts to weaken or destroy an ideology' (1970: 137) by appropriating images that delegitimize the *ethos* of the opposing ideology. Subversive rhetoric is an

anti-ethos rhetoric; that is, it invariably is an attempt to undermine the credibility of some person, idea or institution. One of its chief modes accords with what is sometimes called the 'devil theory' of persuasion. The strategy is to make a man, idea or institution consubstantial with Satanic attributes and intentions. (Fisher 1970: 138)

Positing the image of a ‘harmonious society’, in a sense draws a rhetorical enclosure around ‘believers’. This implies that there are social elements considered inharmonious. The discourses of harmony and prosperity alone, as mentioned above, are not enough to maintain solidarity among China’s ever more incongruent social groups (Chan 2009). Historically, the rhetorical strategy of subversion may be disseminated in order to ‘materialize’ the enemies of the harmonious society as a way of subverting their ideology. This strategy relies on a discourse of pejoration and defamation that delegitimizes the ethos of the Other. Allegations of collusion with foreigners, recollections of betrayals, tales of victimhood (at the hands of the Other) and every trope in the nation’s historical archives are available for subverting the adversary’s ideology. King and Anderson observe that ‘at the heart of any attempt to materialize a common foe lies the “projection device”, whereby one seeks to transfer the internal ills of a people to a scapegoat, thus purifying them by dissociation’ (King and Anderson 1971: 249). They cite Kenneth Burke’s view that the ‘scapegoat’ stratagem is ‘especially medicinal’ (1971: 249):

if one can hand over his infirmities to a vessel, or ‘cause’, outside the self, one can battle an external enemy instead of battling an enemy within. And the greater one’s internal inadequacies, the greater the amount of evils one can load upon the back of ‘the enemy’ [...] (Burke 1941, cited in King and Anderson 1971: 249)

Essentially, the discourses of China’s English media utilize a strong ‘rhetoric of subversion’ to criminalize the cause of dissidents like Liu and Chen and others, as well as the ‘projection device’ of scapegoating to vilify political activism and weaken the ethos of human rights. No government will ever say it is against human rights. But, if those among the population who agitate for human rights are somehow actually found to be ‘criminals’, then they ‘deserve’ whatever legal consequences may befall them.

2.6 Social orders: Replacing the old

A learned specialist on Chinese migrations, Wang Gungwu (1993), suggests that in the Chinese context, the tension between revolution and reform has given rise to a set of contradictions in terms related to the state of flux in China’s society. This is seen in the constant struggle between the *status quo* and the impetus for change, also

referred to as the binary distinctions of left and right (Bobbio 1996), such as in the contradictory orders of discourse discussed above. When a newly enthroned political entity, such as in post-1949 China, initiates its plan for restructuring society, it simultaneously attempts to rectify the erroneous ways of the old structure. What emerges then is a fundamental paradox between the old society, negatively characterized, and the new structure bursting with hubris. The discourses and institutions of the former society (e.g. pre-1949 China) are systematically repudiated by the new so that the old is thoroughly delegitimized. The problem with this, according to China expert Lowell Dittmer (1987), is that the old cannot be repeatedly condemned as the culprit over an extended period, because as an opposing force, it eventually dissipates and ceases to exist in any significant way.

When social and political problems persist (or fresh ones arise), the new system, which cannot endlessly compare itself to the previous one, comes across as ineffectual and incapable of delivering on its promises to resolve inequalities that existed in the old. The new, bereft of competition, has moved to center-stage, where now it alone occupies the limelight and is unable to escape scrutiny because there is no other significant contender toward which it might deflect blame. Thus, the new structure is criticized as incompetent, corrupt or repressive (or all of these), by any number of dissenting voices depending on its revealed weaknesses, threatening its monopoly on legitimacy. Its virtues, so apparent at the incipient stage, rested largely on the contrast between itself and the corrupt ideology of the previous structure over which it has been victorious. After successfully dismantling the credibility of the old structure, reminders of the new system's virtues and 'heroic' accomplishments appear to ring increasingly hollow to the public. There is now little or nothing left of the old with whom it may be favorably contrasted, and, with no evil Other to act as a foil, the discrepancies of the new become obvious. Promises of a harmonious and prosperous future are made and idealistic slogans are initiated, but the control of civic freedoms becomes even stronger. The 'center-stage' metaphor shows how the ruling party may be exceedingly vulnerable to public censure, particularly in one-party systems. This has created a lively counter-culture of popular criticism that revels in sarcasm, is often unforgiving, and ranges between irony and art at one end, to vindictive denunciations at the other. Such flourishing counter-discourses were described by Bakhtin (1984) in his image of the medieval *carnavalesque* where 'unofficial' dialogues thrive in ribald celebration against the pompous solemnities of

official discourse. Cultural critic Slavoj Žižek discusses the term *kynicism*, which is essentially the rejection of official culture ‘by means of irony and sarcasm’. He describes *kynicism* as a popular way of confronting elitist hypocrisy:

pathetic phrases of the ruling official ideology — its solemn, grave tonality — with everyday banality and to hold them up to ridicule, thus exposing behind the sublime noblesse of the ideological phrases, the egotistical interests, the violence, the brutal claims to power. (Žižek 1989: 29)

Popular sentiment, always an unstable factor for those who rule, may turn to indignation precipitating a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ (Shue 2004). When such a point is reached, the asymmetry of power relations becomes evident as the regime scrambles to override the voices of those who dare to point to the glaring ideological discrepancies. This precipitates the authorization of desperate campaigns to reactivate a nostalgic loyalty for symbols from the past in order to rekindle allegiance in the present. The ‘channeling’ of public opinion is thus managed (in part) by directing attention away from the elite. Lauding old heroes and designating new enemies is a familiar discourse strategy. Dissidents are discursively portrayed as a ‘common enemy’ (Burke 1941), borrowed either from collective historical experience or the current political context. The production of anti-Other discourses involves the ‘selection of representative criticism targets and other mnemonic devices’ (Dittmer 1987: 81). In other words, power holders must either construct or ‘uncover’ antagonists, an opposing force against which legitimization can be claimed. Dittmer explains how this phenomenon took place in post-1949 China after most opponents had been purged within the first decade of power, as the Party’s newly won political currency was ‘soon depleted’ by internal problems. The Party had to ‘devote increasing attention to shoring up the credibility of its existence’ (Dittmer 1987: 50) – a process which continues to this day.

2.7 Dividing the world through ‘strong demarcation’

The depreciation of plausibility in the emergent structure gradually gives way to cynicism or the ‘ritualization of mass criticism’ (Dittmer 1987: 81). The elite’s attempt to deflect such criticism opens the legitimacy of their mandate to contestation, leaving what Dittmer calls the ‘structure of polemical symbolism to

function as the sole source of meaning’ (1987: 81). Polemical symbolism is eventually integrated into the institutionalized ‘segmentation of reality’ (1987: 81) and is metaphorically reproduced as the experience of two worlds, which Dittmer hypothesizes as the primal binary dichotomy of good and evil. He conceptualizes five distinct dimensions of binary oppositions: (i) Apparent-Real; (ii) Light-Darkness; (iii) Revealed-Concealed; (iv) Pure-Defiled; and (v) Active-Passive. ‘Polemical symbolism’ between the world of light and the world of darkness is shown below in Figure 2.1 (from Dittmer 1987: 88). The upper row suggests positivity and virtue, whereas the bottom row indicates negativity and evil (see Dittmer 1987: 81–85 for more on this).

APPEARANCE	LIGHT	PUBLICITY	PURITY	ACTIVITY
REALITY	DARKNESS	CONCEALMENT	DEFILEMENT	PASSIVITY

Figure 2.1 Polemical Symbol Structure (from Dittmer 1987)

The strong division between these two worlds was what Dittmer described as a ‘formidable barrier’ that existed between good and evil where one must ‘draw a clear line of demarcation’ (1987: 86–7), as signified by the heavy black dividing line in Figure 2.1. Mao described the act of strongly ‘demarcating’ the enemy as essential to the success of the Revolution. Acting on this belief (i.e. ‘entextualizing’ it) accounts in part for the CCP’s particular manner of discursively representing the Other.

Above is the world of appearance, full of light, purity, public spirit and virtuous action; underground, stealthily concealed, a world of darkness, selfishness, defilement, passive dependency. Dividing the two worlds is a formidable barrier, which seems to arouse intense ambivalence. (Dittmer 1987: 87)

In brief, Dittmer’s description of the binary opposition of *Light-Darkness* is portrayed in metaphors of color. For example, the color red, because it indicated ‘orthodoxy’ (e.g. red flags, red hearts, Red Guards, the red sun, etc.) was synonymous with light, as shown, for example, in the slogan, ‘Mao Zedong’s Thought is the red, red sun in our hearts’ (1987: 82). Black, on the other hand, symbolized evil as in the so-called ‘black categories’ of landlords and other

counterrevolutionaries who spoke ‘black language’ and followed a politically reactionary ‘black line’ (1987: 82). The *Publicity-Concealment* dichotomy was conceived of as openness versus cover-up, the latter indicating conspiracy. This was used to represent counterrevolutionaries who moved about in shadows hiding their true nature, likened to snakes lurking underground in holes. The symbolic archetype for this metaphor is that of hell, ‘that of an underworld, or Hades’ (Dittmer 1987: 84). The dichotomy of *Purity-Defilement* is metaphorized as a cleansing torrent of war, storms, and revolution against the filth and feces of the enemy and old society. The opposition between *Activity-Passivity* was portrayed in cataclysmic terms as what Dittmer calls ‘the desire to feel part of a vast, impersonal, destructive force: with the “fury of a hurricane”’ (1987: 85). This desire for confrontational head-on struggle was portrayed as virtuous, the opposite of the internal enemy who traitorously sues for peace, for example, with Soviet and American revisionism by attempting to avoid violent revolution.

An aggressive approach to enemies was perceived as synonymous with dedication to Maoist ideology – but acting within a world divided in two also aroused powerful contradictions. This belligerent stance resulted in ruthless actions, and once the traditional Confucian fear of confronting authority was overcome, ‘psychic barriers were breached [and] the distinction between symbolic and physical violence proved impossible to maintain’. Under such circumstances, ‘the struggle soon began to escalate to truly lethal proportions’ (Dittmer 1987: 85).

The possibility of characterizing the opposition as evil during the Cultural Revolution was thereby facilitated and imbued with excessive levels of energy, but this encouraged the ‘gross and basic emotions’ to become ennobled ‘through contact with social values’ (Turner 1970, cited in Dittmer 1987: 102). In her work entitled *Rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution* (2004), Lu Xing describes the rhetorical influence of various cultural products such as (but not only) songs and revolutionary operas, which ‘went far beyond the functions of aesthetics and entertainment’ (2004: 97). This is pertinent to a fuller understanding of the context of the time in that these revolutionary songs became effective tools in creating an emotional and passionate hatred of class enemies. Her analysis of over three hundred songs of the Cultural Revolution led to categorization into basic types: ‘(i) songs of eulogy; (ii) songs of Mao’s quotations and poems; and (iii) songs of radicalization’ (Lu 2004: 101). I will discuss ‘songs of radicalization’, which is directly related to this topic.

As mentioned earlier, the May 4th Movement (1919) had a transformative impact on the language system in China. Based on Lu Xun's¹² (鲁迅) anti-traditionalist philosophy, Mao's Yen'an Talks¹³ of May 1942 further articulated the need for art and cultural products to conform to the peasant vernacular. One of the immediate effects was providing simpler lyrics for songs, which by using unsophisticated linguistic expressions made the songs easier to memorize. Lu Xing describes how these songs agitated the masses toward polarization:

Through the promotion of popular revolutionary songs the Chinese people became increasingly more radical and polarized in their thinking. The lyrics of these songs were not known for their well-reasoned arguments, but instead their totally emotional and fanatical appeal [...] These songs not only totally negated alternative ideology and views [...] they also attacked alternative views, in order to demonstrate their total allegiance to Mao. (Lu 2004: 122)

In extreme acts of Othering, the Red Guards would shame their class enemies by making them sing *The Song of Cow Devils and Snake Spirits* (below). Based on interviews with class enemies who had been traumatized during that era, Lu's interviewees related the profound sense of mental torture they had undergone. In retrospect, He Shu writes 'the song was an unprecedented embodiment of human evil that reached its climax during the Cultural Revolution. No one has ever created a song for the self-humiliation of prisoners, not even the Nazis [...]' (He 2000 cited in Lu 2004: 114).

The Song of Cow Devils and Snake Spirits

I am a cow devil and snake spirit.
I am the enemy of the people.
I have committed a crime.
I deserve the punishment of death.
People should smash me to pieces.

I am a cow devil and snake spirit.
I need to confess my crime.
I have committed crime.
I must reform myself.
I will meet death in the end if I do not confess [my crime].

(He 2000, cited in Lu 2004: 114)

In the next section, I will discuss the discursive practice of labeling enemies and the nuanced exercise it became during certain periods in Chinese history, particularly in times of ideological upheaval.

2.8 A history of naming and categorizing enemies

Critical linguist Roger Fowler makes the point that categorization ‘is a discursive basis for *discrimination*’ (1991: 93, emphasis in original). As such, I suggest that it has had significant social and political implications through enabling discourses of bias and Othering, traces of which continue to linger in China’s politicized media discourses. Labeling, as a practice of Othering, was utilized for turning public opinion (based on class struggle) against individuals or groups, and was carried to the extreme during the Cultural Revolution. Individuals who were outcast according to their ‘suspect social strata’ (Schoenhals 1992: 105) were strongly denounced with all the negative consequences this implies.

In his analysis of the CCP’s early concept of the ‘united front’ strategy, historian Lyman van Slyke (1967) cited Zhou Enlai’s statement on the division of people into three general groups as directed by the natural laws of ‘social development’ and ‘man’s thinking’.

people often generally fall in their thinking and standpoint into three categories – the progressive, the intermediate, and the backward – and often divide themselves into leftists, those in the middle, and rightists. This is not an artificial classification. It is determined by the objective law of social development and the objective law of development of man’s thinking. (Zhou Enlai, 1957)

Van Slyke relates this penchant for categorization into social groupings of ‘for’, ‘neutral’ or ‘against’ the Party, as part of the united front concept that guided policy-making and mobilization of the masses. Under this principle, Zhou Enlai also sorted intellectuals into types: i.e. ‘active (40%), fairly active (40%), backward (10%) and reactionary (10%)’ (Zhou 1956). Van Slyke describes these as the typical ‘left-middle-right enemy breakdown that is the hallmark of the [CCP’s] united-front frame of mind’ (van Slyke 1967: 257). ‘United fronts’ are a strategy of creating factional relationships based on the Leninist tactic of ‘forging enemy ranks’ (Brady 2003: 22). It has also been described as a ‘community of interest between potential allies and the CCP’ with the purpose of defining ‘the enemy in terms as manageable as possible and [seeking] to isolate him’ (van Slyke 1967: 115).

Concerning the notion of enemies and their treatment, Mao had his own method for identifying antagonisms. He viewed this as friction between social classes, which

he expressed in his treatise *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People* (1957). He explained that it was necessary to distinguish between contradictions amongst equal-status members of the proletariat (i.e. class peers) and contradictions between members of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Mao identified disputations ‘among the people themselves’ (proletarian peer to peer) as distinct from those between ‘ourselves and the enemy’. He clearly defined ‘the people’ and ‘the enemy’:

we must first be clear on what is meant by ‘the people’ and what is meant by ‘the enemy’ [...] At the present stage, the period of building socialism, the classes, strata and social groups which favor, support and work for the cause of socialist construction all come within the category of the people, while the social forces and groups which resist the socialist revolution and are hostile to or sabotage socialist construction are all enemies of the people. (Mao 1957: 2–3)

Mao further extended the friend/enemy dichotomy in the distinction made between ‘People’, ‘persons’ and ‘non-persons’. Michael Schoenhals (1992) documented the incremental assignation of *non*-human attributes to certain class enemies. The designation of sub-humanism began with official explanations of the terms and their particular usages in a complex rationalization from one of the ‘eight immortals’, senior CCP member Bo Yibo. Bo divided the population into classifications such as ‘the People’, and ‘nationals’ (*guomin*), the latter of which included antagonistic classes such as landlords. He also demarcated the label ‘citizen’ as different from both ‘nationals’ and the ‘People’. Bo defined the People as a dictatorship with ‘the worker-peasant alliance as its main body: [wherein] “People” includes workers, peasants, the urban poor, intellectuals, etc., but certainly not landlords and comprador bourgeois elements’ (Bo, cited in Schoenhals 1992: 3). Designations such as these laid the ideological groundwork for the category of ‘non-People’. In other notable uses of formulations in categorizing rightist and capitalist elements, Mao applied the vilifying expression *yaomo guiguai* (‘evil spirits’ and ‘monstrous freaks’) and *niugui sheshen* (‘ox-monsters’ and ‘snake-demons’) (Schoenhals 1992: 13), which ‘eventually gained widespread popularity’ as an umbrella term for many varieties of evildoer (1992: 10). This term, in fact, became interchangeable with ‘non-people’ and ‘bourgeois rightists’ (1992: 13) creating an intense atmosphere of betrayal and perfidy, even of one’s own family members. Such an environment is reminiscent of Orwell’s notion of *facecrime* (1949: 210), where ‘the smallest thing could give you away. A nervous tic, an unconscious look

of anxiety...anything that carried with it the suggestion of abnormality, of having something to hide'. The terror of being identified as an ideological deviant at that time in China led to the spread of 'logophobia' – an intense fear of being labeled (Young 1991: 25).

Then, as now, lexis was extremely important for the CCP. It amounted to a 'fixation with politically correct language' (Alvaro 2013b: 148) so that slogans, formulations and labels were not chosen without deliberation. Mao was aware of the 'correctness' of terminology and was influenced by the Confucian doctrine known as the 'rectification of names' (*zhengming*), which held that if words were not accurately spoken and societal roles were not properly defined the eventual result would be social chaos. He said:

A single word may rejuvenate a country; a single word may bring disaster to country. This is the mental changing the material. Marx is one word, which says there must be proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship; isn't this a case of a single word rejuvenating? Khrushchev is also one word, one which does not want class struggle and does not want revolution. Isn't this a case of a single word bringing disaster? (Mao Zedong 1963, Speech At The Hangchow Conference)

Concerning the 'rectification of names', in the first volume of *The History of Chinese Philosophy*, Fung Yulan discusses the role of 'naming' in the political context of ancient China (1953: 59). He describes the Confucian belief that deterioration in politics and society began at the highest levels of government. Degeneration would worsen by degree if each of the successive levels of ruler did not correctly perform his role in the kingdom. The inevitable result, wrote the sage, was that revolution by the people would eventually take place. To restore order in such situations, Confucius believed that each level of government should be properly named, and then exclusively perform its designated role. 'Arrange affairs so that the Emperor would continue to be Emperor, the nobles to be nobles, and ministers to be ministers and the common people common people. That is, the actual must in each case, be made to correspond to the name' (Fung 1953: 59). Fung explains further that 'every name possesses its own definition, which designates that which makes the thing to which the name is applied be that thing and no other'. This means that all things that possess names should follow the code of behavior to which they are bound by their names. Fundamentally, 'the name is that thing's essence, or concept' (Fung 1953: 60). In shaping standards of

comportment for humanity, Confucius expounded this doctrine ‘believing that once the meanings of names were made fixed, they would serve as standards for conduct’ (Fung 1953: 54).

In discussing the political practice of ‘labeling’ in more recent times, according to Schoenhals’ account, non-People were ‘the running dogs of imperialism – the landlord class and bureaucrat-bourgeoisie, as well as the representatives of these classes, the *Guomindang* reactionaries and their accomplices’ (1994: 2). Perhaps because it was in the aftermath of civil war, that according to Schoenhals, Mao Zedong considered the lives of non-People to be of less value than animals. In 1956, Mao implied that ‘even expending [counterrevolutionaries] for the sake of comforting beasts was a legitimate political option’ (1994: 8). The class enemies of post-liberation society were an outgroup entitled ‘five black categories’ (*hei wulei*). This group included ‘counterrevolutionaries’, ‘bad elements’, ‘rightists’, ‘landlords’, and ‘rich peasants’. The ‘five red categories’ (*hong wulei*) are those with a ‘class pedigree’ and included such as ‘revolutionary cadres, revolutionary soldiers, revolutionary martyrs, workers and poor and lower-middle peasants’ (Ji 2004: 80). This gave way to the cultivation of a ‘sense of superiority based on their “red” class origin’ (Ji 2004: 80). The five red categories were in a class struggle with the five black categories and other reactionaries. In essence, the Maoist culture fostered at the Yen’an Talks propagated the view of a polarized world divided between ‘righteous revolutionaries and evil reactionaries’ (Ji 2004: 248).

Citing the ‘creativity in the use and abuse of political dysphemisms in the official media’, Schoenhals describes a lexicon of labels for the ‘heinous crimes’ of ‘bourgeois rightists’ (1994:12–13). The full list is too extensive to include here, but following are a few selections: ‘Rightist hard-core element’, ‘vicious rightist counselor’, ‘utterly evil rightist element’, ‘utterly despicable anti-party element’, ‘anti-party buffoon-gang accomplice’, ‘anti-communist valiant general’, ‘anti-communist rocket gun’, ‘rightist element oozing anti-communist toxin from the depths of the soul’ (Schoenhals 1994: 13). The dysphemistic terminology does not end there, but continues with more standardized terms of abuse such as ‘double-dealer’, ‘scum’, ‘renegade’, ‘turncoat’, and ‘shameless literati’, etc. Some female rightists who were unable to avoid labeling were designated as ‘rightist woman general’, ‘ferocious woman general’, ‘anti-Party clique woman general’, and ‘fierce and tough rightist woman general’ among other labels (Schoenhals 1994: 14–15).

Drawn from data in the *People's Daily*, Wang Cheng-chih offers us yet another set of enemy categories, which Mao said must be 'opposed, fought against, and eliminated' (2002: 84). Wang found that the terms generally fell under five major headings: 'Unaffiliated Adversary' (e.g. 'class enemy'); 'Imperialist' (e.g. 'imperialist lackey', 'imperialist running dog'); 'Feudalist' (e.g. 'feudal landlord'); 'Bureaucrat-Capitalist' (e.g. 'bourgeois monopolist'); and 'Counterrevolutionary' (e.g. 'internal/external reactionary', 'counterrevolutionary', 'KMT anti-People group') (see Appendix 1 and Wang 2002: 84–87, CCP-Constructed Enemy Labels). Under these five categories are listed a large number of sub-classes, but as in the Schoenhals inventory, are too numerous to reproduce in full. The point to emphasize is that the categorical designation of naming enemies was a nuanced, serious, life-and-death enterprise.

The variation in terms introduced by both Schoenhals and Wang can be accounted for by the sources of their data with the former drawing his data from original government directives and the latter, from the *People's Daily*. Wang (2002: 90) suggests that the term 'protracted class struggle' describes the process of dealing with enemies over the long term – which necessitates the constant identification of new enemies as the old ones are neutralized. Once the more visible problems in a society have been dealt with, potential enemies are reduced in number, which as noted, raises the question of perhaps directing blame for emerging problems at the new elite, which is a pattern also discernible in contemporary China. The 'People' and 'non-People' distinction was useful in political purges because it exculpated the perpetrators in their harsh dealings with the victims because they were not entirely human. Things became rather complex, however, when the masses were alerted to the fact that 'some' among the people, who acted, spoke and looked like peasants, may *not*, in reality, be peasants but 'dangerous representatives of the non-People' (Schoenhals 1994: 19).

Wang documented Mao's creation of a 'political rhetoric' and suggested that it had 'genocidal consequences',¹⁴. According to Wang, this came about as a result of instituting a policy of showing no leniency to counterrevolutionaries (Wang 2002: 47), again based on the practice of 'strongly demarcating' the enemy. In Extract 2.8, as an example of the vindictive rhetoric directed at those designated enemies during the Cultural Revolution, is a passage (among many) from the English-language

Peking Review (1966) published at the outset of the Cultural Revolution, targeting the categories of ‘specialists’, ‘scholars’, ‘authorities’, and ‘venerable masters’ by personifying them as a ‘horde of monsters’

Extract 2.8

hundreds of millions of workers, peasants and soldiers and vast numbers of revolutionary cadres and intellectuals, all armed with *Mao Tse-tung's Thought*, have been sweeping away a horde of monsters that have entrenched themselves in ideological and cultural positions [...] routing the bourgeois ‘specialists’, ‘scholars’, ‘authorities’ and ‘venerable masters’ and sweeping every bit of their prestige into the dust. (SWEEP AWAY ALL MONSTERS, 3 June 1966, *Peking Review* 9(23): 4–5)

The demarcation between Us and Them was predicated along class lines with many examples of enemy behavior being countered by ‘good’ revolutionary actions which reinforced the animosity toward those not of the right class. Struggling against the enemy was portrayed as character building. An example of this is the case of peasant Li Wan-hsi (Extract 2.9), who by clearly marking the enemy, became a more dedicated and ‘stauncher peasant-intellectual’:

Extract 2.9

Inspired by Chairman Mao's teaching: “It is good if we are attacked by the enemy, since it proves that we have drawn a clear line of demarcation between the enemy and ourselves [...] Li Wan-hsi battled resolutely against the class enemies. In these struggles, he himself was forged into a stauncher peasant-intellectual. (PEASANT—COLLEGE STUDENT—PEASANT, 1 November 1968, *Peking Review* 11(44): 9–11)

In this passage (above), we again see the use of the term ‘demarcation’ described as being ‘a clear line’. This theme of demarcation appears consistently throughout all anti-Other rhetoric. The masses were not encouraged to simply ‘dislike’ the enemy, but to demonstrate their revulsion, as noted by Dittmer, by going beyond the merely rhetorical.

2.9 Nationalism and the Other: Constructing political identities

At this point in my thesis, I will consider the role of nationalism and national identity and the important part it plays in the politicized discourses of Othering. This is an essential constituent of ideological discourse as it pertains to governance. The construction of national identity can be directly related to the representation of

dissident social actors who are often branded as traitors based on disloyalty to the country and the notion of ‘Chineseness’. Gerlinde Hardt-Mautner (1995: 179, my emphasis) writes that ‘National identity emerges very much as a relational concept, the construction of *self* being heavily dependent on the construction of *Other*’. The promotion of national identity is an effective means of reinforcing the identity of Us as distinct from the Other.

Governments have found that there is perhaps no better way to manipulate or control the population than through the convincing ideology of nationalism. The construction of nationalism requires a concurrent and complementary formulation of a national identity. At the turn of the 20th century (preceded by the watershed year of 1895 with China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War), Chinese acknowledged the deep need for a re-definition of what it meant to be Chinese. The reconstruction of national identity, which gathered particular impetus through the May 4th Movement of 1919, has been recognized as central to China’s resurgence. Writers such as Lu Xun and Liang Qichao¹⁵ articulated this longing for a true Chinese identity through their literature on what it meant to love the nation. The CCP, as have many governments before it, seized upon nationalism as a strategy of legitimization. Nationalism provides wide resources, such as the country’s long historical narrative, for constructing the idea of a ‘great nation’. Through the process of rhetorically creating a national identity, the authors of the new identity gain the opportunity for self-validation by being the architects, custodians and defenders of modern ‘Chineseness’. The changing role of the CCP from the vanguard of class struggle to the brokers of national pride reflects the shift in ideology – from legitimization through class struggle to legitimization through economic prosperity.

Purveyors of nationalism are highly conscious of the Achilles’ heel nature, what political scholar Michael Freeden calls the ‘essentially contestable core concept’ (1998: 250), of their ideological center. Because of this inherent fragility, they seek to enhance it, through discourse, by lending strength and substance to it. This entails imbuing the fragile core of nationalism with greater resilience by employing linguistic strategies that result in difficult-to-contest meanings. At the discourse production stage, strengthening nationalistic discourse requires ideological deliberation over linguistic representation in, for example, how social actors (both friend and enemy) as individuals, institutions, or nations, will be depicted, and how

contentious political events will be constructed in relation to historical antagonists. These relationships are represented in the media, favorably or unfavorably, according to the current state of relations between China and the other opposing entity. Nations drift in and out of ‘warm relations’ and ‘all-weather’ friendships according to their degree of alignment with China’s current political designs.

In theorizing the relationship between nationalism and patriotism, John Flowerdew makes a distinction based on Orwell’s concept of patriotism being ‘defensive, both militarily and culturally’, whereas nationalism’s purpose ‘is to secure more power and prestige [...] for the nation’ (Orwell 1945, cited in Flowerdew 2012: 154). Zhao Suisheng (1998), as did Fang Lizhi, views this trend in China not as ‘patriotism’, but as nationalism. He identifies the source of current nationalism, from the bottom up and ‘not as a result of the official propaganda’ (1998: 287). Zhao characterizes the popular indignation resulting in nationalist sentiment as a reaction to ‘wounded national pride’ and bitterness, particularly toward the U.S. and Japan. Invoking the discourse of victimhood, the state media instigated a top-down campaign to capitalize on the groundswell of nationalism due to the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (May 7, 1999) and the Hainan spy plane incident (March 31, 2001) both at the hands of the U.S. In addition to this, as cited before, there is the on-going disputes with Japan over ownership of the previously mentioned East China Sea islands, as well as other territorial disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam, that has generated the resurgence of nationalist sentiments on all sides. It seems that territorial expansion increases in proportion to rhetorical expansion fueled by the ‘greatness’ discourse.

In the post-Tiananmen (1989) crisis of legitimacy (Shue 2004), the CCP continued a re-education campaign for the masses that was founded on the portrayal of China as victimized and embattled by foreign powers. One particular rhetorical strategy related to the victimization discourse is to claim that an offending nation ‘hurt the feelings’ of the Chinese people. *Danwei*, an online research firm that tracks Chinese media and Internet, published an article entitled ‘Mapping the hurt feelings of the Chinese people’¹⁶ (Martinsen 2008) which produced a list of 42 nations that had offended China either recently (Extract 2.10), or during the earlier diasporic eras of Chinese immigration (Extract 2.11). (Note: The following extracts are not part of the textual analysis, but are shown to illustrate the point being made.)

Extract 2.10

Duran expressed his understanding for the Chinese people's emotion, saying that 'Obviously, recent sabotage incidents in Paris during the Olympic torch relay hurt feelings of the Chinese people, made them angry and triggered their protests.' (INTERVIEW: CARREFOUR SUPPORTS BEIJING OLYMPICS: CHAIRMAN, 23 April 2008, Xinhua News Agency)

Extract 2.11

for many people, not addressing our past was the kind of hurt feelings the Chinese had around their treatment in the 1800s and early 1900s, he said. (CANADIAN CITY TO APOLOGIZE FOR RACIST PAST. Online, 29 June 2010, Xinhua News Agency)

This discourse of victimization is facilitated by use of the term 'the Chinese people' as an assumed collective entity as if all are of one accord in homogeneous national aspiration (Anderson 1991). An example is shown in the following excerpts from *China Daily* articles in reaction to its frustration at the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the jailed human rights activist Liu Xiaobo in 2010. The Nobel Committee that awarded the Prize to Liu is excoriated for not understanding 'the Chinese people' (Extracts 2.12 and 2.13).

Extract 2.12

[...] they [the Committee] should come to China and talk with ordinary Chinese people and ask them what they need and want. They would realize how little they know about China and the Chinese people. (PEACE PRIZE MOCKERY OF ITS IDEALS, 14 December 2010, *China Daily*)

Extract 2.13

[...] the 1.3 billion Chinese people are working hard to maintain stability and development at home and promote the building of a harmonious world. (PEACE PRIZE A POLITICAL FARCE, 11 December 2010, *China Daily*)

One of the key discursive manifestations of the structural core of nationalism according to Freeden is *positive valorization*, what he describes as 'loyalty demands directed at its members' (1998: 753). This is especially manifest not only in what patriotic behavior is, but also in what *unpatriotic* behavior is. Following the dichotomous Us/Them discursive strategy, Liu Xiaobo is represented not only as a criminal, but a traitorous one who has sided with foreign elements (Extracts 2.14 and 2.15)

Extract 2.14

Liu Xiaobo's words prove he uses his remarks to ingratiate himself with hostile elements in the West and make money. (PRIZE WINNER IS ANTI-CHINA, 1 November 2010, *China Daily*)

Extract 2.15

Liu Xiaobo, the 2010 awardee, is behind bars serving an 11-year term for "openly slandering and inciting others to overthrow our country's State power," [...]. (PART OF THE PLOT TO CONTAIN CHINA, 11 October 2010, *China Daily*)

This manner of discursive treatment also includes long-time 'enemy of the state', the Dalai Lama, who has been criticized for his alleged 'splittist' activities (below):

Extract 2.16

'The Dalai Lama is never an ordinary religious figure, but a political exile who has long been engaged in splitting the country under the pretense of religion,' Sun said. (EU'S OPEN, EQUAL DIALOGUE WELCOME CHINA, 14 April 2000, *China Daily*)

In continuing the discussion of nationalism, Freedén suggests that the elevation of 'nationalism to the apex of political expression' (1998: 751) comes about as the result of ideological amendments as well as exclusions and suppressions in original key ideological documents. In his explanation of nationalism as 'thin-centered ideology', Freedén (1998: 250) notes that such ideology separates itself from its original core structure by removing certain tenets and replacing others. As recounted earlier in this chapter, this is what the CCP was able to accomplish by propagating the *Resolution*. In light of Freedén's theory, the bottleneck of Maoism was removed in order for the country to move toward greater development. Freedén's observation that 'the power struggle engaged in by narrow nationalism enforces the selection, prioritization and combination of certain political concepts and the elimination of others' (Freedén 1998: 750), is realized in the government's need to constantly attempt the rectification of its ideological transformation.

China, according to mass communications expert Zhao Yuezhi (2008: 180), is negotiating its way in the international order. It has become an established, though sometimes petulant, partner in global capitalism. But what is yet left incomplete is China's full integration into the political global order of developed nations. As new agents of prosperity, 'the party-state now legitimates itself by legitimizing capital' (Zhao 2008: 180), so that when viewed pragmatically, much of the current friction between China and other nations 'can be interpreted as inter-capitalist rivalry'

(2008:180). China's 'communist' legacy still affects its current relations with much of the developed world and as long as the U.S. and other Western forces are seen as following a strategic policy of containing China, the anti-western forces of China's neo-Maoists may have just cause.

The dissident activists Liu Xiaobo and Chen Guangcheng are accused, not only of being disloyal to the motherland, but of aligning with foreign (enemy) forces. The creation of the notion that a Chinese dissident of Han ethnicity is anti-China and affiliated with Western governments is a powerful tool for enmification. Such a strategy is often used by governments for the purpose of stigmatization. The disloyal 'traitor' is a well-known character with a long history in nearly every national narrative. In China, historically an inward-looking nation, the association between a dissident and foreigners at the political level carries presuppositions, which can provide sufficient warrant for China's official media to represent dissident behavior as collusive and unpatriotic.

Charged with the duty of constructing and promoting a national identity, official mediatized political discourse almost invariably begins with a sense of nationalism constructed in opposition to an Other. Dedaić suggests that 'every dispute starts with *othering*' (2003: 1, emphasis in original) in which Us vs Them language is inherent. Construction of nationalistic imagery, patriotic myths, and legends of heroism against historical enemies are all powerful methods of creating a national identity, each of which is enacted through discourse.

In closing this section on nationalism and identity, I would like to qualify the notions of nationalism and patriotism as explained by Henrietta Harrison (2001). She writes of the distinction between 'patriotism' and the far less admirable sentiment of 'politicized nationalism' (2001: 256). To conceptualize the difference, she cites dissident Fang Lizhi's reflection, presumably with regret, as he looked back on his Cultural Revolution days when he joined in on the criticism of 'our poor old teachers'. Fang went on to draw a bittersweet distinction between true patriotism, which means loving 'your native place, your rivers, your soil, your cities, your kin'; and politicized nationalism, which is the bleak prospect of 'loving the state' (Fang cited in Harrison 2001: 256). Clearly, these two 'patriotisms' are not the same.

2.10 ‘Historical positioning’: The example of an official narrative

Discursive alignment with historical characters is a way of either strengthening the ingroup or weakening the cause of the outgroup. In acknowledging the importance of the struggle for control of discourses, Foucault wrote that ‘discourse is not simply that which translates struggles of systems of domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle; discourse is the power which is to be seized’ (1984: 110). That is to say, in terms of the political, controls over ways of representation are a vital part of hegemonic discursive practice.

In the Chinese political context, it is through a historical perspective (i.e. ‘historical positioning’) that one is entitled to legitimacy, a critical component necessary for political authority (Kluver 1996). Actors within the political landscape of China, along with their policies and persona, find a historical counterpart in order to set themselves within a narrative that provides a type of justification. Historical exemplars have a clarifying effect on actions and positions, making them understandable because they are aligned with certain traditional antecedents (Kluver 1996). Carolyn Hsu (2001) calls these ‘*political narratives*’, which in essence are ‘stories which make sense of political situations by connecting actions with virtues or vices, and to eventual consequences. By articulating causal connections, these narratives lay blame or direct praise for political circumstances, thereby shaping the response to those circumstances’ (Hsu 2001: 26, emphasis in original). Legitimacy is accorded if they are seen to follow a prescribed historical model, but ‘if there is no historical analogy for an event [...]’, notes Kluver, ‘it is difficult to explain its existence’ (1996: 127). He gives the example of students in Tiananmen (1989) who portrayed themselves as a courageous continuation of the revolutionary May 4th student movement of 1919. The Chinese government, however, did not see them that way and chose to depict them as evil seed, ‘counterrevolutionaries’ who could not be allowed to appropriate any aspect of the heroic narrative from the mythical May 4th Movement. They were instead, ‘strongly demarcated’ as ‘counterrevolutionaries’. Hence, forceful measures were now a viable option. Due to their actions, they had been categorized as subversive elements under the influence of external agitators.

According to Kluver, any ‘ideological or political innovations must conform to the broad parameters of the myth’ (1996: 127) or they lack legitimacy. ‘Historical positioning’ is essential to establishing moral authority of leadership and ‘every

significant player that comes to the political scene must find a historical parallel to account for his or her existence' (1996: 127). The May 4th Movement has always been revered as a righteous and patriotic uprising against oppression, an event that the CCP jealously claims as the genesis of its own heroic narrative. Not about to share the legitimizing power of this connection with challengers, it was crucial for the state to unambiguously and utterly break any connection between the students of May 4th 1919 and those of June 4th 1989.

My intention in considering these four extracts below (2.17–2.20) from Xinhua's official English-language press releases is to present a broad orientation to the way in which dissident social actors and material processes were severed from legitimization through discursive criminalization. The following discussion is not part of my discursive analysis *per se*, but can be seen as a pre-analytical example of how 'historical positioning' is crucial to both legitimization and delegitimization. Such discourse as presented in China's English press tends to assert a note of finality on these events, and in a sense, both anticipates and responds to the counter-narrative (Bakhtin 1981). By foregrounding this account of events, it attempts to preempt accusations by 'closing the universe of discourse' (Marcuse 1964).

Extract 2.17 shows the official version of events. The students surrounding the 4th of June 1989 Tiananmen incident, through lexicalization, are represented as violent troublemakers bent on creating mayhem. They are marginalized by terms such as 'instigators', 'ringleaders', who were a 'mob of over 1,000'. The use of scare quotes, such as 'autonomous workers' union', etc., also creates the sense of irony and distance.

Extract 2.17

[...] the instigators of the upheaval became more vicious [...] the ringleaders of the illegal organizations known as the 'autonomous students union of Beijing universities' and 'autonomous workers' union' distributed knives, iron bars, chains and sharpened bamboo sticks, inciting the mobs to kill members of the security forces. [...] the 'Autonomous workers' union' urged the people 'to take up arms and overthrow the government.' A mob of over 1,000 people pushed down the wall [...] stole tools, reinforcing bars and bricks, ready for street fighting. (THE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY REBELLION IN BEIJING, 15 June 1989, Xinhua News Agency)

They are instigators of chaos who are engaged in threatening material processes such as *distributing* weapons, *inciting* mobs to kill, *urging* people to take up arms, and *overthrowing* the government, etc.

In Extract 2.18 (below) the deployment of Us vs Them discourse in the form of positive-Self/negative-Other representations is explicit in these media portrayals of events as the government shows itself in a compassionate parental role in helping the fasting students. The ‘party and the government’ do not miss this moment for positive-Self representation by emphasizing their concern for the students who were portrayed as ‘hostages’ being manipulated into fasting with the intention extorting concessions from the government. In this passage (below) Xinhua News Agency manages a negative-Other representation of the ‘handful of persons’, who are leading the students astray by characterizing them as bereft of any ‘iota of humanism’. The scare quotes on the word ‘hostages’ covertly constructs the scenario of a sequestration, i.e. that students, under duress, were forced against their will by a ‘handful of persons’ to engage in counterrevolutionary activities.

Extract 2.18

some of the students on hunger strike on Tiananmen square are continuing their fasting, their health is seriously deteriorating and the life of a few is in imminent danger. Actually a handful of persons are using the hunger strikers as ‘hostages’ to coerce and force the party and the government to yield to their political demands [...] they have no iota of humanism. The party and the government [...] taken every possible measure to treat and rescue the fasting students. (LI PENG’S SPEECH AT BEIJING CADRE MEETING, 20 May 1984, Xinhua News Agency)

Extract 2.19 (below) lays emphasis on the misguided nature of the students who are in conspiracy with ‘hooligans’ and ‘ruffians’ who harbor ‘hatred’ of the CCP and work in ‘gangs’ with ‘overseas’ reactionaries. The students do not simply erect a ‘statue’, but rather an ‘idol’ that is modeled on the iconic Statue of Liberty to ‘stir up worship’, which brings to mind the loaded imagery of idolatry. By the use of scare quotes and capitalization, the passage is made to appear as if ‘Freedom and Democracy’ are what Xinhua News Agency also values, but it is the ‘American-style’ of it that is abhorrent. They too revere freedom – just not the ‘American’ kind.

Extract 2.19

They ensnared hooligans, local ruffians and people with a deep-seated hatred of the Communist Party [...] to cobble together gangs [...] With funds and materials provided by overseas reactionary political forces. [...] They erected an idol [...] the ‘Statue of Liberty’ and later the ‘Goddess of Democracy’, in an attempt to stir up worship of American-style ‘Freedom and Democracy’. (THE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY REBELLION IN BEIJING, 15 June 1989, Xinhua News Agency)

In the attempt to establish an anti-narrative to the allegations of carnage circulating in foreign press at the time, Extract 2.20 (below) endeavors to rebut the claims of slaughter. According to this official account, the students left the square ‘in an orderly manner’ through a ‘wide corridor’ prepared by the PLA. Consistent with the Xinhua press release, ‘no-one died’ and any suggestions to the contrary are ‘completely unfounded’. The slaughter is characterized as a fabrication, a vicious rumor intended to slander the CCP:

Extract 2.20

the students joined hands and started to leave the square in an orderly manner at about 5:00 am. Troops vacated a wide corridor [...] to allow the students to withdraw unhindered [...] By 5:30AM the clearing operation of the square, which has lasted only half an hour, was complete. During the whole process of this clearing operation no-one died. This shows that rumors of ‘rivers of blood’ running in Tiananmen Square were completely unfounded. (THE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY REBELLION IN BEIJING, 15 June 1989, Xinhua News Agency)

Such representations clearly attempt several things. The state media endeavor to rupture the students’ claim to any form of legitimacy by dissolving (discursively) the students’ conceptual link to the hallowed May 4th Movement of seventy years before. The students’ claim to a ‘historical precedent’, according to Xinhua, is unjustifiable according to the CCP’s version of events. Merely mentioning that ‘no-one died’ is an inadequate (lame) rebuttal to the eyewitness accounts and photographs of that day, which strongly suggest that indeed, people did die.

Centered on the concept of positive-Self/negative-Other representation, the government portrays itself as essentially caring and humanitarian (i.e. concerned about the students’ health and wellbeing), while attempting to show that blame for leading students astray lies with career dissidents under foreign influence. Xinhua patronizingly emphasizes the positive points of student behavior, while discrediting the notion that students’ demands may be legitimate. This is an attempt at the strategy of ‘granting a minor concession’ in the portrayal of students, in order to make the larger assertion more palatable (i.e. that the students’ political demands are reprehensible).

By not detailing student demands to the foreign reader, the state media does not allow them a voice. The press did not articulate what the students wanted and why they were protesting. The strategy of omitting this crucial element of the narrative may have the opposite of the intended effect. Questions such as ‘Why are the

students protesting in Tiananmen?’ and, ‘What do these students want?’ come to the fore. At the same time, the media’s core duty of supporting the government’s description of events is accomplished by foregrounding a positive representation of the Party’s compassion in helping the students. Another part of the media’s duty (i.e. to disparage those who oppose the CCP) is accomplished through emphasizing the ‘violent’ and ‘mob-like’ actions of the students. These discursive moves of Othering cut off any claims to legitimacy, which the students might have hoped to achieve.

The Party blamed itself – but not for its actions on the square that night – it blamed itself for not having exercised stricter ideological control over the media in the previous decade. In retrospect, the party attributed the Tiananmen uprising to the error of having de-emphasized propaganda and ‘thought management’ (Brady 2012) in favor of more liberal debate during the 1980s (Morozov 2011: 132). The government, post-Tiananmen, realized the necessity of reasserting its hold on ‘information flows’, a euphemism for more control through propaganda. In order to implement this, the Party revived the slogan ‘seize with both hands, both hands must be strong’ (*liang shou zhua, liang shou dou yao ying*) (Brady 2008: 3), which signified that ‘both economic development and propaganda should serve as sources of political legitimacy’ (Morozov 2012: 132). In the wake of Tiananmen, propaganda once again became a key area for consolidating and legitimizing the CCP’s hold on power.

2.11 Reflections on the construction of alterity in China’s English press

We live in a politicized world, and the media is one means of reproducing ideological perspectives, what Simpson calls ‘angles of telling’ (Simpson 1993: 2). As mentioned earlier, my intention is to examine how dissident social actors are portrayed in China’s English press and how ‘angles of telling’ influence those discursive representations. This chapter, together with Chapter 1, has been a discussion of relevant perspectives with the purpose of providing a social, historical and political backdrop for the analysis.

In contextualizing the historical practice of the construction of alterity, this chapter has explored in some detail the ideological change in China’s orders of discourse and, the mechanics of how this was accomplished. The notion of ‘dividing the world’ and seeing it in terms of binary opposition, to some degree, may seem

simplistic. But the essential thing to remember is that this way of seeing the world was given great importance by Mao Zedong. He spoke into existence – literally – a dualistic world. When he said ‘Who are our enemies? – Who are our friends?’ China’s world was split in two. According to Mao, political uprisings in China failed due to the inability to definitively answer this question. This has led to something of a conventional discursive practice on the part of the state concerning those of political outgroups. Others, particularly those perceived as turncoats, as the formula goes, are identified, labeled, and debased. According to Mao’s rhetorical enemy/friend question, the costs of not making a clear delineation, not boldly drawing the line, not choosing the light over darkness, not ‘uniting with real friends to attack real enemies’ was the essence of failed Chinese revolutions. The weak link was in the failure to make the demarcation strong enough, as seen in the double-bold line in Dittmer’s opposing worlds of ‘polemical symbols’ (Figure 2.1). Perhaps Mao’s concept of ‘demarcation’ is one of the sources of intolerance toward any current day individuals or groups that represent a threat to power. The enemy/friend dichotomy, as Mao said, ‘is a question of first importance for the revolution’, and, I argue, continues to play an influential role in official discourses. Due to the emphasis on the repudiation and punishment of enemies during much of the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s, it is not surprising that traces of such rhetoric are still in the CCP’s discursive repertoire as the lingering residues of an older order of discourse that surfaces if and when ‘repudiation’ is called for.

2.12 Summary

Chapter 2 has been a discussion of the various discursive practices used both historically and contemporarily in China for the construction and maintenance of alterity. Since the implementation of the new order of discourse with the ratification of the *Resolution* in 1981, the legitimization of CCP policies continues. The process of legitimization of Self entails the delegitimization of the Other, i.e. those who oppose. The practice of identifying, labeling and categorizing ‘enemies’ continues to this day, but it is no longer based on ‘class struggle’, but more so on the polemics of human rights and sovereignty, which in essence, has redefined to some degree what constitutes the ‘enemy’. Combatting opposing discourses involves the evocation of discursive strategies that discredit the Other while positively representing Us. The

investigation of such practices from the perspective of critical discourse analysis is explicated in the following chapter beginning with the discussion of a multidisciplinary theoretical framework.

CHAPTER 3

TOWARDS A MULTIDISCIPLINARY THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

*...ideology is, strictly speaking, only a system, which makes a claim to the truth...
but a lie experienced as truth, a lie which pretends to be taken seriously.*

– Žižek (1989) *The Sublime Object of Ideology*

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will attempt to establish a theoretical framework for the critical analysis of China's English language media discourse concerning the famous Chinese activists, Chen Guangcheng and Liu Xiaobo. The term 'multidisciplinary' in this chapter title signifies my belief that each research site will generate its own specificity of methods that suit the particular data and the area of enquiry, resulting in an eclectic discourse analytical approach. In this study I will draw on traditional CDA partner-disciplines such as linguistic analysis, social identity theory, the 'ideological square', ideological critique as well as certain aspects of cognitive psychology (Rahimi and Riasati 2011: 106).

This chapter considers the theories and methods of noted analysts who have contributed greatly to the field of CDA in the study of asymmetrical power relations. These are Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, Theo van Leeuwen, and sociologist John B. Thompson. I review their research in the areas most closely related to this study. Concerning their methodologies, I will discuss how their work has informed my approach within certain limits, and, in the process of discourse analysis, how I might address those limits. So far in this research, I have dealt with two principal factors, primarily contextual. These are the complex issues associated with the changing orders of discourse such as dissidence, human rights, sovereignty, and legitimacy, which are occurring at this critical juncture of China's integration with the wider world in Chapter 1; and, the nature of alterity in China's political discourse from both a historical and contemporary perspective in Chapter 2. This

chapter (3) will shift from the discussion of the socio-political context to the formulation of a theoretical framework for discourse analysis.

Embedded in China's mediatized political discourse resides the omnipresent aim of the state: CCP legitimization. To achieve this goal, the discourse producers utilize various linguistic strategies in order to manifest this particular ideological worldview in what they hope to be an 'appreciable' light. Linguistic constructions that show support for an ideology do not necessarily have to concur with the 'truth'. In terms of CDA, it is my belief that the manner in which messages are mediated through language is what is of greatest interest – irrespective of 'truth' (Sornig 1989). In eschewing the discussion of 'truth' as 'slippery' (Fairclough 1995a: 47), Fairclough suggests that 'The question of whether a taken-for-granted proposition helps produce or reproduce relations of domination is independent of judgments about its truth or falsity' (1995a: 15). He adds that at the same time, 'critical analysis cannot be indifferent to questions of truth' (1995a: 15). He explains, that 'representations can be compared in terms of their partiality, completeness, and interestedness' (1995a: 47), which allows the analyst to approach truth as being a matter of relativism rather than absolutism.

3.2 The ideological square

The explanation of my analytical framework begins with the concept of the *ideological square* (van Dijk, 1998b, 2011; Oktar 2001; Machin and Mayr 2012). The ideological square is essentially a way of understanding the default strategies of ideology in discourse through the conceptualization of an Us *vs* Them dichotomy. Due to the prejudicial nature of the discourses in this study, the influence of ideology has inexorably forged a link with social identity theory. This is fundamentally that people belonging to one group (ingroup) view themselves in positive terms, while viewing the other (outgroup) in negative terms (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner and Giles 1981; Hogg and Abrams 1988; Abrams and Hogg 1990). Social identity theory is instrumental to the Us *vs* Them configuration of the ideological square, which in turn has proven revelatory in the analyses of discourses concerning asymmetries of power, such as those concerning group dominance (Oktar 2001), racism (Teo 2000), anti-Semitism (Wodak 2001), and other manifestations of asymmetrical power relationships in social and/or political

settings. As South African analysts Peter Matu and Hendrick Lubbe put it, the ideological square is influential in ‘exposing the ideologically-based contextual strategy of juxtaposing positive presentation of the self and negative presentation of the other in text structure, thereby serving as a site of hegemonic struggle’ (2007: 405). The ideological square ‘originated partly from the social categories to which individuals belong, [and] impels them to view the in-group as superior to the out-group’ (Oktar 2001: 318).

Of the five means of control listed by van Dijk’s (2011: 395) taxonomy of expressions of ideological schemas in discourse (i.e. ‘group identity’, ‘activity’, ‘norms and values’, ‘group relations’, and ‘resources’), the ideology schema of ‘group relations’ is the principal mode of expression found in the Chinese English press coverage of domestic political dissidents. This schematic category asks ‘Who are our allies and opponents?’ (van Dijk 2011: 386), which begs the identification of in- and outgroups. It is essentially the same question asked by Mao Zedong regarding the demarcation of ‘the enemy’, discussed in section 2.4. It is within the group relations category where the discourses of Othering and positive-Self/negative-Other representations have their theoretical foundations. Having identified and labeled the outgroup, the discursive strategies used to define them, evaluate them, and describe their activities, can occur through the ‘complex meta-strategy of the ideological square’ (van Dijk 2011: 397). Van Dijk defines it as:

the way ingroups and outgroups are represented in text and talk, prototypically represented by the ideological pronouns *Us* and *Them*. Since the underlying ideological structure of that category is largely *polarized*, we may expect the same to be the case in ideological discourse [...], which we have called the *Ideological Square* because of its four complementary overall strategies. (van Dijk 2011: 397, emphases in original)

The ideological square can be related to the four following identifiable strategies: (i) emphasize positive information about us; (ii) emphasize negative information about them; (iii) repress negative information about us; and (iv) repress positive information about them. In moves (iii) and (iv), to ‘repress’ can simply mean to not mention or otherwise maintain silence regarding negative information about Us, and the same regarding any positive information about Them. Indirectly, the second move (ii) can imply a rhetoric of *schadenfreude* in emphasizing outgroup misfortunes (e.g. the West, Japan) in terms of social problems, economic failings, etc., as a means of enhancing Self-representation. Jeffrey Wasserstrom (2013)

observes that China's leaders delight in bad news, as long as it is from other countries, which, he suggests, 'they have gone to great lengths to highlight'. According to Wasserstrom (2013), 'This is done to discourage people from viewing foreign countries as potential models for emulation and to encourage them to wonder whether a change in how China is governed might result in the country spiraling off in a disturbing direction'.




Figure 3.1 The *ideological square* (based on van Dijk 2011: 396).

Critical discourse analyst Li Juan writes that the four moves of the square comprise 'the processes of the contextual strategy of positive-Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation that play a specific role in the processes of ideological construction' (Li 2006: 153). '*Ideological polarization*' (van Dijk 2011: 396, emphasis in original), which predominates in the group relations schema and characterizes the semantic differences between Us and Them representations, can be juxtaposed on the friend/enemy dichotomy, which was discussed in Chapter 2. Further on this, van Dijk writes:

Given the positive bias in ideological self-schemas, we may thus expect a generally positive representation of Us, and a negative representation of Them, at all levels of discourse. (van Dijk 2011: 396, emphasis in original)

In conformity with the ideological square, it becomes evident that *Us* is consistently depicted as ‘right’ (evaluated as good, strong, just, righteous, benevolent, etc.); and the *Other*, as fundamentally ‘wrong’ (evaluated as evil, unjust, unfair, selfish, incorrect, biased, etc.), as see in the Figure 3.1 above. This graphic depiction of the ideological square shows the center (purely conceptual) of the ‘theoretic neutrality’ where discourse carries no authorial evaluations or bias; in other words, it is the state of absolute impartiality. Such a state however, can only be conceived of theoretically, because ‘a “pure” unbiased statement’ (Sornig 1989: 95), void of some degree of intent, does not exist. As one moves away from (or out of) this theoretical center of neutral linguistic representation, increasing degrees of evaluation-bearing language are encountered. The outer edges of the four squares represent a rhetorical state of overt bias. As one regresses toward the center from the outer edge of any of the four squares, the degree of ideological directness is reduced. In approaching the center, the discursive effects are manifest as mitigations, concessions, hedging, indirectness, expressions of modality, and other increasingly assuaged forms of language, finally terminating in the hypothetical state of objectivity at the graphic’s midpoint. The center can only be conceptualized in terms of the abstract, as it is accepted that no utterance is without some level of authorial partiality or ideological orientation. This is particularly so in the realm of mediatized political discourse, which finds its genesis in the binary opposites of *Us* vs *Them*. When putting forth a controversial agenda, the closer the discourse is to this center of theoretical neutrality, the more persuasive it appears to be, so that credibility is related to the degree of subtlety in inserting ideological content into the text. Discourse analyst Werner Holly writes of credibility in political language which attempts to prevent readers from seeing through ‘the whole meaning-complex’ and making a distinction ‘between overt and covert intentions’. The writer will ‘suggest a simple uncontroversial reading’, giving the ‘impression of overttness’ (Holly 1989: 122).

Concerning ideology in media discourse, Svetlana Kureteš (2004) discusses the unwritten rules of what she calls ‘journalistic ideology’ (2004: 579). Van Dijk defines this same principle as, ‘opinions that hold that news should be true, fair, balanced and non-partisan, focusing on facts instead of opinions’ (van Dijk 1989: 205). It is toward this unspoken norm of objectivity that is assumed to be at the heart of journalistic ideology that political ideology, through media discourse, attempts to

approximate itself. Put another way, the linguistic choices an author makes in attempting to construct a credible politicized discourse for the media, will be geared toward making the text read unlike politicized ideology, but rather more like ‘commonsense’, or in other words, without easily detectable bias. Ideological views will often be tacitly interwoven into the text so to appear impartial. To paraphrase Althusser, ideology (generally) works covertly by disguising its ideological nature (cited in Fairclough, 1995b: 82).

As a precursor to undertaking CDA, researchers Kuo Sai-huo and Mari Nakamura recommend that ‘if we want to know what ideologies actually look like, how they work, and how they are created, changed and reproduced, we need to look closely at their discursive manifestations’ (2005: 394). One way of understanding such manifestations is through the ideological square. The ‘discursive manifestations’ of ideology in a text usually cannot be read at face value, as political writers tend to make their views implicit (van Dijk, 1995: 142). This approach is shared by other CDA practitioners who are cognizant of the fact that ‘ideology will not always be apparent and its political implications not always obvious’ (Kress 1983: 45). Because the most persuasive ideologies may not be explicit, van Dijk also reasons for ‘a series of theoretical steps to elucidate the indirect ideological control of discourse’ (1995:142).

Regarding *overt* bias in representation, inasmuch as rhetoric that appears to be value-free is considered more persuasive, explicit devaluation (leading to delegitimization), can in some circumstances, be a convincing means of Othering. It is my observation that pejoration of the Other, in certain cases, may be carried out overtly when it is done based on institutional legitimacy (e.g. through legal means). As a case in point, we can take the official narrative of the Tiananmen incident discussed in Section 2.10 of this thesis. The negative discursive representations of outgroup members will generally involve a narrative or story within which the evaluation of their characters, their motives, and their actions take place. To be acceptable to readers, this is often done in a less direct manner – but – when the individual has been legally criminalized *in a court of law*, the state media may indulge in more explicit forms of labeling (such as in the outer limits of Figure 3.1). This might involve the foregrounding of negative features and activities, wherein direct categorization as, for example, a criminal, traitor, mob organizer or conspirator can be cited with impunity. At the same time, negative traits such as

dishonesty, trickery, rebelliousness, treachery, and collusion may be ascribed. Such representations are ‘legal’ and need no longer be encoded in the sense that they have been established by lawful means hence the ‘covertness’ of bias can be dispensed with. Criminalization has taken place publicly through a court of law (circumventing public debate), outside of the text, so that ‘strongly demarcating’ the enemy no longer appears to be a matter of authorial judgment. The court, synonymous with legitimacy, has officially proscribed and sentenced the individual; this has now become an objective fact. Having achieved the status of truth, the ‘fact’ no longer requires the services of innuendo. It only needs to be ‘reported’ by the press.

With an understanding of the ideological square as a means of conceptualizing Us vs Them discourse strategies, the next section looks more closely at the ambiguous concept of ideology itself and what it means in relation to language and discourse in this research.

3.3 Ideology, language and discourse

Since ideology is considered a guiding or formative element in the construction of representations, it can therefore be understood that language is (one of) the principle semiotic system(s) through which ideology is expressed, connecting them (language and ideology) and making it impossible to distinguish one from the other. Gunther Kress put this concept another way: regarding the ‘mediating function of the media’, he suggests that there are two important aspects for consideration. These are ‘the primary classifications of reality’, and ‘the modes in which these are presented’ (1983: 45). He writes:

linguistic and ideological processes do not exist as distinct phenomena, they are indistinguishable, they are one and the same in substantial terms. The selection and use of linguistic categories and processes in the making of a text are guided by the specific ideological systems which the speaker or writer brings into the process of speaking or writing. Any text is therefore the encoding of an ideology. (Kress 1983: 45, my underline)

According to Kress, essentially all text is ideological. He, as do other critical analysts, further observes that the ideological system is visible in the linguistic decision-making processes needed to construct representations. In this way, much can be learned about the ideological system through the analysis of ‘the linguistic features present in the text’ (Kress 1983: 45).

Van Dijk notes that ‘ideologies are the fundamental beliefs that form the basis of the social representations of a group’ (2006: 729). Specifically referring to political practices, he wrote that ‘discourses make ideologies observable in the sense that it is only in discourse that they may be **explicitly** expressed and formulated’ (2006: 732, emphasis in original). It may be concluded then that discourse is the main vehicle through which ‘political ideologies are acquired, expressed, learned, propagated and contested’ (2006: 732). In an article entitled ‘Politics, Ideology and Discourse’ (2006), van Dijk considers the use of ‘a cognitive interface’ (2006: 733), which is ‘a mental model of the political situation’. Among other functions, this mental model defines how participants represent aspects of a political situation in discourse. Van Dijk has called these mental models ‘contexts’ which he describes as ‘subjective participant definitions of communicative situations’ (2006: 733; 2011). Context heavily influences the linguistic selections from which political discourse is constructed at the level of ‘lexical choice, pronouns, syntactic structure, and other grammatical choices’, all of which rely on how a situation will be represented by the writer. It is within this realm of choice (during the discourse production stage) that ideologically construed characterizations become ‘textual’ at both the micro- and macro-levels. At the macro-level, choice works through what van Dijk calls ‘semantic structures and strategies of meaning’, by which he means the purposeful selection of ‘negative topics or person and action descriptions’ (van Dijk 2011: 399).

As noted earlier, a particular method of locating empirical manifestations of bias in discourse is through the analysis of transitivity and relational processes (from Halliday’s SFL, explained in Chapter 4) showing the use of pejorative evaluations, stereotyping of the Other, etc., in a systematic way. In *Media Discourse* (1995), Fairclough shares a holistic understanding of representation informed by the view that issues regarding knowledge, belief and ideologies are most widely reflected in linguistic representations. According to him, this is a view that facilitates the link of ‘the analysis of language with fundamental concerns of social analysis’ (1995: 17). He also addresses the centrality of representation in debates over ‘bias, manipulation, and ideology in the media’ (1995: 17). The reason for discourse analysts’ attention to media representations is due to the inherent capacity of discourse to contribute to the production of realities. Strategies used for this include, for example, the backgrounding or foregrounding of ‘causality, responsibility and even conspiracy’ (1995: 110), as well as the use of systematic linguistic patterns in texts to introduce bias

against an outgroup, or disperse and mystify agency of the ingroup through such strategies as nominalization or passive agent deletion.

Language is intended to do things or make things happen, but in order to accomplish its intention, it must have design – and if it has design, then it has a designer. A precursor to looking at the question of ‘design’ in terms of ideology, is the hypothesis, largely accepted among critical discourse analysts, that all discourse is composed from the ‘system of [linguistic] options’ (Barker and Galasiński 2001: 65) by which writers or speakers make choices on how they intend to construct a certain proposition. Barker and Galasiński hold that ‘representation is a process subject to regimes of production and reception that are implicated in “ideological” complexes of social formations’ (2001: 65). The influence of ideology on discourse is always an object of interest for critical analysts, because it ‘is seen as an important means of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations’ (Wodak 2002: 9). These ‘power relations’ can have major social impact in the form of imbalanced relations of power, such as those between ‘social classes, woman and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people’ (Fairclough and Wodak 1997, cited in Wodak 2002: 8). The point to be made is that ideology influences the ways in which participants, processes, and circumstances and all their attending qualities and attributes are represented in text and talk. In constructing representations in discourse, authors directly or indirectly, discreetly or overtly, describe and evaluate social actors and their relationships, as well as selecting the process types in which they are involved, the lexis used for these purposes and the syntactic arrangements that characterize them. As such, any discussion of ideology will inevitably lead to a more detailed consideration of linguistic representation because of its intrinsic association with language (discussed below in section 3.4).

Language, besides being a tool for communication, is also one of control (Hodge and Kress 1979: 6). The very forms used to deliver meaning can also distort it so that readers can be ‘both manipulated and informed, preferably manipulated while they are being informed’ (Hodge and Kress 1979: 6). Hodge and Kress also discuss an even more radical position, which is that language is a ‘systematic distortion in the service of class interests’ in that it is able to ‘project fantasy versions of reality’ (1979: 6). But Fowler points out that extreme views such as this might be more hypothetical than concrete in the sense that readers are attentive to ‘conspiracy’

theories (Fowler 1991: 41) and are practiced at exercising their critical faculties when reading texts of a political nature. However, as mentioned previously, the linguistic items that are chosen to become part of a text, including how they are arranged syntactically, are all decisions made for a reason. Whether or not conspiracy theories exist and to what degree they influence media output remains an open question; nonetheless, Fowler notes the persistent fact that ‘there are different ways of saying the same thing, and they are not random, accidental alternatives. Differences in expression carry ideological distinctions (and thus differences in representation)’ (1991: 4). This authenticates the view that the construction of politicized media representations concerning lexis, syntax, and the arrangement and selection of other linguistic features, can largely be attributed to the ideological positions to which the text producers subscribe. In contrast, Michael Billig questions the influence of ‘choice’ by pointing out that ‘on occasion speaker/writers may find it easier to not consider the range of [linguistic] options available to them, but to go along with familiar linguistic habits’ (Billig 2008: 797). This is true. But nonetheless, a writer’s decision to follow ‘familiar habits’, automatic or not, is in itself something of a choice – independent of the reason for which it was made.

Concerning ideology in language, Billig (1995: 17) writes that ‘Language plays a vital role in the operation of ideology and in the framing of ideological consciousness’, a point originally made by Vološinov in *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* (1929/1986). Also connecting language and ideology is Terry Threadgold who suggests that ‘detailed discursive analysis of the lexicogrammatical’ is essential to showing how ‘systems of ideas and beliefs, ideologies are constructed in discourse’ (1986: 17). Thompson, likewise, elaborates on this point at the beginning of *Studies in the Theory of Ideology* (1984) by remarking on the controversial and disputed meaning of ‘ideology’, and affirming that there is a definite link between theories of ideology and language (Thompson 1984: 2). The vehicle of language carries ideas, which are the building blocks of ideologies, so they ‘circulate in the social world as utterances, as expressions, as words which are spoken or inscribed. Hence to study ideology is, in some way, to study language in the social world’ (Thompson 1984: 2).

A note of caution offered by van Dijk regarding ideology in discourse, however, is that ideologies cannot be simply ‘read off’ from within a text (2011: 387). ‘We can’, he writes, ‘*explain* ideological discourse structures (as well as other ideological

practices) only *partly* in terms of underlying ideologies and only when taking into account intermediate levels of discourse production' (2011: 387, emphasis in original). Put another way, ideology is not necessarily seen directly, but in a refracted manner. Vološinov, as an earlier thinker on this matter, wrote that 'any ideological product is not only part of reality'. He observed that it also 'reflects or refracts another reality outside of itself. Everything ideological possesses *meaning*: it represents, depicts, or stands for something lying outside of itself. In other words, it is a *sign*. *Without signs there is no ideology*' (1929/1986: 9, emphasis in original). In the context of this study, Vološinov's utterance would be similar to saying that without language, there is no ideology. It is evident that Vološinov saw semiotic systems, of which language is one, as inexorably linked to ideology:

A sign does not simply exist as a part of reality – it reflects and refracts another reality. Therefore, it may distort that reality or be true to it, or may perceive it from a special point of view, and so forth. Every sign is subject to the criteria of ideological evaluation (i.e. whether it is true, false, correct, fair, good, etc.). The domain of ideology coincides with the domain of signs. They equate with one another. Wherever a sign is present, ideology is present, too. *Everything ideological possesses semiotic value*. (Vološinov 1929/1986: 10, emphasis in original)

In the consideration of these symbolic forms (i.e. a set of media 'texts' in this case), the analyst asks if the mobilization of the constructed meanings within the texts sustains, in some way, any systematically unequal relations of power, or what Thompson calls 'relations of domination' (1990: 7). In any case, it is apparent that ideological discourses are constituted by a variety of extralinguistic contextual factors, which include elements such as the overall intentions of the discourse producers, and any relevant historical or socio-political influences specific to the circumstances and participants involved.

3.3.1 A particular view of ideology and ethics

The term 'ideology', originated by Destutt de Tracy in 1796, began as a synonym for the 'science of ideas' (Kennedy 1979: 353) – a 'science' that does not exist in nature, but in the realm of humanity. As a purely human construct, the articulation of ideologies requires 'discourse' as a vehicle of instantiation. As a general concept, ideological theory 'is still in its infancy' (van Dijk 2011: 385), a point also brought out by critical scholars such as Thompson (1984, 1990), Fowler (1991), Hodge and

Kress (1979), and van Dijk (1998, 2011). Though Thompson is indeterminate about a precise definition of ideology, he identifies some of its general characteristics and urges discourse analysts to pursue the answers to questions regarding the interests it serves:

Ideology, broadly speaking, is *meaning in the service of power*. Hence the study of ideology requires us to investigate the ways in which meaning is constructed and conveyed in symbolic forms of various kinds...it calls upon us to ask whether meaning constructed and conveyed by symbolic forms serves, or does not serve, to maintain systematically asymmetrical relations of power. (Thompson 1990: 7, emphasis in original)

According to van Dijk, ideology is ‘the fundamental interpretation framework that monitors the development of knowledge and attitudes, provides coherence to such cognitions, and brings them into line with specific group goals and interests’ (1991: 36). The values which any group attaches to right and wrong, in terms of universal ethics, can come to be viewed as redundant by the elite if at any point the ‘ethics’ no longer align with the current agenda. According to China scholar Vivienne Shue, for China’s current leaders what is ‘true’ (at the moment) is based on ‘modern scientific rationalism and pragmatic empiricism’ (Shue 2004: 69), or as Deng Xiaoping put it, ‘seeking truth from facts’. Shue writes that China’s ethics are ‘no longer those of Confucian learning and Daoist cosmology’, and observes that ‘the transcendentally positive ethical value attached to the teleology of attaining modernity suffuses the scientific empiricism [...] promoted as the only allowable epistemology by the Chinese state today’ (Shue 2004: 69).

Ethics have the peculiar quality of being detachable from their theoretical anchors (usually grounded on legality, morality, religion, or culture) that have traditionally defined them. The code of ethics can be ‘repositioned’ by state ideologues so to operate under more ‘profitable’ value systems, ones which tend to coincide more accurately with elite interests. If the advancement of an ideology is hindered by universal realities of right and wrong (or true and false), they may be disengaged from these binarisms and connected to other, more expedient ones that better serve state interests. As Václav Havel wrote in *Power of the Powerless*, ideology ‘has a natural tendency to disengage itself from reality, to create a world of appearances, to become ritual’ (1985/2010: 16). This process occurs while maintaining the appearance, at least in discourse, of devotion to the values of the original ideology.

The artfulness of ideology is in making the altered value criteria, which are essentially new, appear as if they have always been based on the original doctrines from which the ideology in question was first formed. This consequentialist view, that the moral is rooted in consequences and outcomes, is contrary to Kant's position that saw morality as doing what is right, without regard to how beneficial the outcome might be for the doer (deontological ethics).

Ideology, in seeking its own political interests, much like water taking the lowest path, eventually connects to that most common of denominators – Self-interest – manifest as a competitive strain of survivalism. Essentially this means that 'right' has been re-configured to mean 'what is good for Us', and wrong has become 'what is bad for Us'. Following van Dijk's view of this, because the definitions of what *is* and *is not* beneficial to the elite can vary over time, I am of the opinion that ideology in the political realm cannot of itself be classified as either right or wrong, but rather is perceived by how effectively it can be employed for pragmatic purposes. Regarding this adaptability, though ideology may be used to 'dominate and oppress others', it may also be used to 'resist and struggle against such domination', and 'what may have been a liberating ideology yesterday may be an oppressive one today' (van Dijk 2011: 380). With this in mind, perhaps the most functional definition of ideology for the purposes of this research comes from Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999):

Ideologies are constructions of practices from particular perspectives (and in that sense 'one-sided') which 'iron out' the contradictions, dilemmas and antagonisms of practices in ways which accord with the interests and projects of domination. (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 26)

I take 'ironing out contradictions' to mean that ideologies are discourses that attempt to naturalize, excuse, rectify, or otherwise bridge the gaps and antagonisms between the discourses of power and ideology (on one hand), and the 'material realities' of the social practice they engender (on the other). Talcott Parsons wrote that 'The problem of ideology arises where there is a *discrepancy* between what is believed and what can be [established as] scientifically correct' (Parsons 1959, emphasis in original, cited in Geertz 1964). That is to say, ideology endeavors to address the lacunae between the discourse of those who produce it and the material realities it

beliefs. Addressing the gaps is essentially the state's attempt to remove impediments to the acquisition of legitimacy. In light of its 'contradictions', ideology seeks to legitimize the disparities between what is said and what is done. In order for the elite to continue the preservation of the power structure from which they currently benefit, it is in their interest to repeatedly legitimize their strategies of domination through the unceasing reproduction and dissemination of their beliefs and the attendant cultural artifacts. This happens not only through the more engaging and spectacular media such as television, film, and music, but also in the 'banal' ways (Billig 1995) of daily life. Ideology always positions those who propagate and accept it as 'right' and 'normal', and those who oppose or reject it as 'wrong' and/or 'abnormal' in some way.

This section has discussed a view of ideology and how the critical analysis of Us vs Them discourse can be categorized and comprehended through the concept of the ideological square. In the next section, I will discuss the binarisms of opposition (on which political ideology relies) and their manifestations in language as explained by the concept of *representation*. Representation (in the context of this study) offers a way of understanding the power of language in establishing and *disestablishing* particular meanings for ideological purposes.

3.4 Representation

Things acquire meaning by how they are represented – the tying together of conceptual features such as 'the stories we tell about [things], the images of them we produce, the emotions we associate with them, the ways we classify and conceptualize them, the values we place on them' (Hall 1997: 3). Cultural theorist Stuart Hall describes representation as residing principally in language, which, he writes, 'is one of the media through which thoughts, ideas and feelings are represented in a culture. Representation through language is, therefore, central to the processes by which meaning is produced' (1997: 1). Because representation is dialogic involving the sharing of encoded meanings, there is no certainty that any particular meaning will remain fixed, and it is in attempting to ascertain, secure or insist on certain meanings, explains Hall, that the notion of '*power* intervenes in *discourse*' (1997: 10, emphasis in original). Barker and Galasiński (2001: 66) write that the attempt to 'fix meanings for specific purposes' can be understood as

ideology. They also suggest that ideologies are discourses that construct and define the ‘acceptable and intelligible way’ to view the world. At the same time, often based on legalistic or moralistic norms, ideologies can exclude other ways of understanding the world as being incorrect or unacceptable. Because of the ethical codes implicit in ideologies, they are comparable ‘to a religion understood in the secular sense of a unity of faith between a conception of the world and a corresponding norm of conduct’ (Gramsci 1971, cited in Barker and Galasiński 2001: 67).

Hall’s notion of contestability of meanings leads to the consideration of a constructionist approach to discourse wherein meaning is assembled through reference to the ‘system of representation’ (Hall 1997: 21). The elements of ‘contestation’ come about because meanings are not enduring or permanent. They are constructions, not only according to linguistic convention, but also in the ideological sense, which, because of the transformational nature of political ideologies, can affect how they are represented in discourse. Transformations in how public figures are represented are often found in heavily ideologized and institutionalized media. As Gledhill writes, ‘in the process of negotiating hegemony, ideologies may shift their ground, the central consensus may be changed, and the “real” re-constructed’ (1997: 348). This explanation can best be illustrated by the textual examples below where I address how some of China’s mythical social actors are represented in the Chinese English-language media. I use several examples to demonstrate ‘transformations’ resulting from ideological change, beginning with contrasting representations of Deng Xiaoping, who as China’s ‘paramount leader’ (1978–1992) oversaw the changeover from socialism to the primary stages of a market economy. As seen in Extract 3.1 published toward the end of the Cultural Revolution (1996–1976), Deng was negatively labeled in the English language magazine *Peking Review*, as, among other things, an opponent of Mao’s ‘thought’, a ‘capitalist roader’, a ‘counterrevolutionary revisionist’, a suppressor of the masses, and the propagator of a ‘bourgeois reactionary line’:

Extract 3.1

Teng Hsiao-ping [Deng Xiaoping] has been the arch unrepentant capitalist-roader in the Party [...] he has opposed Chairman Mao, opposed Mao Tse-tung Thought and Chairman Mao’s proletarian revolutionary line [...] he worked in collaboration with Liu Shao-chi in pushing a counterrevolutionary revisionist line, he [...] suppressed the masses and pushed a bourgeois reactionary line. (A GREAT VICTORY, 1976, *Peking Review*)

In Extract 3.2 (published twenty-eight years later) as a result of the (previously discussed) transformations in ideology, he is positively represented as the father of reform and a trusted servant of the people:

Extract 3.2

Deng Xiaoping has rendered outstanding service to the Chinese people, throughout the revolution, during the development of the People's Republic. He [is] far-sighted and persevering, a man of quick understanding and decisive action [...] his courage as an innovator has earned the trust of the Chinese people. (TRIBUTE TO DENG XIAOPING ON HIS 100TH BIRTHDAY, 2004, *China Daily*)

The former negative representations of Deng, i.e. the stories told, the images constructed, and the conceptualizations created, were all reversed as ideological ‘rectifications’. The individual did not change over time, but the ideology, which influenced the way he was represented, had been radically changed. These profound ideological transformations also influenced the representations, not only of Deng Xiaoping, but also of others (see below) so that they too were altered (through discourse) so their new images would fit the ideological amendments of the *Resolution* (discussed in section 2.3). Historically, there are many examples of this mutability that can be seen by taking a diachronic approach to the analysis. Another key figure was Mao Zedong, whose earlier representation as the infallible ‘Great Helmsman’, was also made-over in the 1981 *Resolution*. It has been mentioned that this document, an attempt at reforming the historical narrative through a radical alteration of ideology, is where the Chairman’s persona was altered, and in the process, relieved of its mythical aura. This was accomplished through what the *Resolution* called a ‘re-evaluation of the historical role’. The examples below (Extracts 3.3–3.5), from the *Resolution*’s re-representation of Mao, indicate both his imperfections and his responsibility for some of China’s most misguided undertakings.

Extract 3.3

The “cultural revolution”, which lasted from May 1966 to October 1976, was responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the state and the people since the founding of the People’s Republic. It was initiated and led by Comrade Mao Zedong. (*The Resolution*, par. 19)

Extract 3.4

The history of the “cultural revolution” has proved that Comrade Mao Zedong’s principal theses for initiating this revolution conformed neither to Marxism, Leninism nor to Chinese reality. They represent an entirely erroneous appraisal of the prevailing class relations and political situation in the Party and state. (*The Resolution*, par. 20)

Extract 3.5

Chief responsibility for the grave “Left” error of the “cultural revolution”, an error comprehensive in magnitude and protracted in duration does indeed lie with Comrade Mao Zedong. (*The Resolution*, par. 22)

The admission that Mao had made ‘grave’ mistakes could easily have been considered a form of heresy (heterodoxy) just a few years before these extracts were written in 1981. The timing of the new ideological formulation was absolutely crucial to its being accepted by the masses. What was ideologically wrong needed perfect timing to become ideologically right, and vice versa (Foucault 1976).

Another iconic figure to be transformed through the ideological shift in representation was Confucius (Extract 3.6) and his traditional philosophy which were also maligned during the Cultural Revolution:

Extract 3.6

[W]orkers regard the criticism of Confucius as an important part in deepening the criticism of the ultra-Right revisionist line. [...] The doctrine of Confucianism is one of exploitation and oppression. (DEEPENING CRITICISM OF LIN PIAO THROUGH REPUDIATING CONFUCIUS 1974, *Peking Review*)

Thirty-six years later, the same magazine (now called *Beijing Review*) is supporting Confucianism as the embodiment of ‘social harmony’. The once-reviled philosophy of Confucianism has been re-packaged and is currently heralded as the moral standard of social and cultural behavior for citizens of the motherland (Extract 3.7).

Extract 3.7

The thinking of Confucius, especially his emphasis on harmonious filial and social relationships – is probably best known through *The Analects*. (GETTING TO KNOW CONFUCIUS: MODERN TAKE ON A MASTER, 2010, *Beijing Review*)

The appropriation of the formerly abhorrent Confucian discourse by Chinese state-run media is, incidentally, a theme you will find recycled through current political

discourse as the CCP struggles to instill the Confucian concept of a ‘harmonious society’ into the social order as mentioned by Gu (2001) in section 2.2 of this thesis.

The point of including these extracts (above) is to illustrate that due to ideological changes, the social character of language was profoundly affected and earlier meaning associations were not enduring. Hall observed that ‘things [of themselves] don’t *mean*: we *construct* meaning [by] using representational systems’ (1997: 25). Therefore, the language about the individuals constructs particular kinds of meaning largely dependent on the prevailing ideological view at the current historical moment. Any entity appearing in the media is obviously not the entity itself but rather the linguistic representation of it constructed according to an ideology and symbolically reproduced in the press. Discourse analyst Tony Trew wrote that ‘all perception involves theory or ideology and there are no “raw”, uninterpreted, theory-free facts’ (1979: 95). Because representations involve ‘theory’, social actors and events that are written about are placed within a context, a ‘network of causes’ (1979: 95). These networks are also called ‘systems of concepts’ and are essential for narrating occurrences and connecting events to each other by placing them in the ‘context of patterns and structures and causes’ (Trew 1979: 96) as part of the historical master narrative.

One of the main ways of viewing the link of ideology to discourse is through argumentation, which rests largely on the art of persuasion. This in turn, can be viewed as a way of ‘representing reality’ (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012: 85). In *Political Discourse Analysis* (2012), Fairclough and Fairclough suggest that ‘practical argumentation is the primary activity’ of political discourse (2012: 86). In their critique of a Tony Blair speech they analyze the use of argumentation through ‘addressing the question of *representation*’ (2012: 86, emphasis in original) as part of their critical analytical research on showing how representations can be used as premises in arguments. This connection of arguments to representation is essential, they insist, in gaining an understanding of how what is believed is related to what is actually done. In their particular analysis of Blair’s speech, they focus on ‘change’ (the noun) as an example of a nominalization that allows it to be represented as a thing, a phenomenon rather than as a process, thus negating the need to identify an agent as subject. Because it is nominalized as an entity, it may itself become an agent, i.e. the subject or doer of actions for which it is responsible, but as a disembodied force, unaccountable. Representation also plays a crucial part in

argumentation through its role in ‘persuasive definitions’ (2012: 92). This notion, as explained by Fairclough and Fairclough, can often be realized as ‘*re-definitions* of terms’ that are already understood to have been defined (2012: 93, emphasis in original). By viewing the use of persuasive definitions as arguments, they actually take on the status of claims or assertions, which makes them open to contestation. They cannot be taken as they are (pre-supposed commitments to truth) because they remain unchallenged, thus retaining their argumentative character. The hegemonic contestation over which ideology is allowed to define key terms is at the crux of the conflict over definitions. Trömel-Plötz (1981, cited in Kachru 1991: 220) wrote that ‘only the powerful can define others and can make their definitions stick. By having definitions accepted they appropriate more power’. In this struggle over which version or definition of reality shall stand, ‘*representation* is a key site’; ‘since’ as Gledhill observes, ‘the power of definition is a major source of hegemony’ (Gledhill 1997: 348).

What are being dealt with here are representations set within narratives of power and control. The narratives, in one sense, do not exercise power – but in another sense, they are about *how* power has been exercised, as types of ‘cautionary tales’ in that they describe ‘the consequences of actions, in ways that may establish and sustain relations of power’ (Thompson 1990: 62). The ways in which power was exercised in the actual events surrounding Liu and Chen become secondary to their description in the narrative, i.e. their discursive representations. This leads to the conclusion that ‘truth’ is dispensable, inasmuch as the ‘image’ (i.e. the constructed narrative) is *indispensable*. To the CCP media, the discursive image supersedes the reality. The legitimization of events depends not on what has actually occurred, but on the manner in which what has occurred is portrayed and represented in discourse. This is the ‘power’ of representation. As Hall (1997: 25) puts it, ‘it is not the material world which conveys meaning: it is the language system’. In other words, meaning depends on the ‘*symbolic function*’ of the sign (1997: 26, emphasis in original) and how signs are arranged and manipulated.

Having discussed the implications of representation theory to this study, the following section is an overview of the development of CDA and how it may be applied in the present research.

3.5 Critical Discourse Analysis

3.5.1 *A brief history of CDA*

CDA ‘began life looking out to social and political theory, seeing language not in itself, but as evidence for what is happening across a much wider network’ (Breeze 2011: 496). This view positioned it squarely as ‘a theory of language that took the social functions of language seriously’ (2011: 496). Critical discourse analysts have paid a great deal of attention to what they see as ideological representations in media discourses (Fowler, et al. 1979; Hodge and Kress 1979, 1993; Fowler 1991; Fairclough 1995 a and b; Fairclough and Fairclough 2012; van Dijk 1995, 1997a, 1998b, 2011; Oktar 2001; van Leeuwen 2008; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Wodak 2001, Wodak et al. 2009, to name only a few). As a leading figure in the field of CDA, Norman Fairclough has generally focused on the exposure of unequal power relationships in hegemonic structures. Typically, the critical approach to the analysis of discourse has been applied to investigations situated in industrialized capitalist societies and has adopted a Marxist view in which asymmetrical social forces buffet each other in an on-going cycle of domination and resistance. In an overview of CDA’s emergence, John E. Joseph follows the development of the Marxist view beginning with M. A. K. Halliday’s move ‘toward a form of text analysis based on uncovering the hidden ideologies that structure the use of language’ (Joseph 2004: 355). Incorporating both a Marxist and structuralist outlook, Halliday developed systemic-functional linguistics (SFL) which was geared toward analyzing ‘both the social and semiotic dimensions of texts’ (Joseph 2004: 355). In turn, SFL was found useful in ‘critical linguistics’ as developed by Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew at the University of East Anglia in the 1970s. Significantly, Roger Fowler, through the use of analytical tools like SFL, showed how those in power are able to use ‘systematic grammatical devices’ (Wodak 2002: 16) to establish, manipulate and naturalize social hierarchies.

In the late 1980s, Fairclough brought together SFL with critical linguistics, combining them with the theoretical views of Bourdieu, Foucault and other critical theorists to formulate a critical approach to discourse analysis. Analysts who embrace Fairclough’s methodology usually concentrate on texts and discourses ‘where social participants are most at social risk’ (Morely 2004: 23). These

discourses are described as ‘sites of inequality and domination [...] those that affect socially vulnerable lives, where opportunities and potentialities – in terms of class, race, gender, inequality and injustice socially, mentally and physically challenged groupings, for example – are jeopardized’ (Morely 2004: 23). Choosing such texts, however, can be problematic, as pointed out by Dominique Maingueneau and John O’Regan (2006), because the critical orientation of the analyst can be understood simply by noting the topic of research. Said another way, analysts choose to work on texts that align with their pre-existing views. Maingueneau discusses both ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ discourse analyses where the latter represents the analysis of texts which are not ‘autonomous’, but are understood ‘to be connected to the interests implied by social practices’ (Maingueneau and O’Regan 2006: 230). Due to its Marxist inclinations, the mission of CDA is political compared to the standard (non-critical) discourse analytical methods which are more focused on the Saussurian view of static relations and language abstracted from its broader social context. CDA’s undertaking is to capture the ‘dynamic nature of both power relations and text production’ (Joseph 2004: 356) by laying bare the hegemonic linguistic structures encoded in the text.

In the analysis of discourse, Fairclough, as do Wodak (1999, 2009), van Dijk (2011), and Thompson (1984, 1990), also notes the importance of a historical element – that of diachroneity, and ‘how different discourses combine under particular conditions to produce a new, complex discourse’ over time (Fairclough 1992a: 4). Ideological considerations, which change due to political, economic and other contextual influences, affect representation as explained in the previous section. This aspect is particularly relevant to my undertaking as I attempt to show how China’s English press represents and legitimizes its ongoing discourses against dissident voices based on a historically ‘patriotic’ or nationalist template insinuated in the fundamental code of the national narrative.

An important aspect of the ideological analysis of discourse is that of ‘evaluation’ (as in section 4.4, the ‘Appraisal system of evaluation’). Regarding this aspect of representation in discourse, van Dijk (1997a: 28) has observed that evaluations, which also follow ideological squaring (I will apply this in Chapter 6 in editorials on Chen Guangcheng), are a feature of polarization in the construction of Us vs Them discourses. The general concept is that representations may include evaluations by the writer, often in an implicit manner, in order to advance certain

favorable aspects pertaining to Us, while suppressing anything positive about the Other. Evaluations are often based on adherence to, or conformity with, values such as ‘veracity’ and ‘propriety’, which are also technical terms found in the Appraisal system of analysis (Martin and White 2008, Martin and Rose 2007) for socially accepted legal or moral standards, which I discuss more fully in the next chapter.

In sum, there are various ways to approach the critical analysis of discourse. In the above overview, I have eschewed a lengthy look at the historical advances of CDA (many authors have previously covered this) and have limited my discussion to a brief summary of its relevant developmental aspects and theoretical underpinnings. The aims of CDA for the specific purpose of this analysis aligns with that of Barker and Galasiński who write that CDA tries to ‘unravel the ideological framings of discursive practices and is firmly grounded in the analysis of the lexicogrammatical structures of language’ (2001: 25), this means dealing with the textual features of language and interpreting those linguistic structures in light of their wider ideological significance. A critical analysis of discourse, therefore, is not just about lexis or syntax and the ordering of clauses, processes, participants or circumstances as abstractions, but the interpretation of these items set within their historical and contemporary social and political contexts.

3.5.2 The role of critical discourse analysis (CDA) in this study

Language is by no means a neutral medium – it performs an active function in the sense that the linguistic choices writers (or speakers) make, actually contribute to the construction of the reality of which they are writing (Berger and Luckmann 1966). In considering the linguistic choices made by writers on how to represent their view of the world, critical discourse analysts do not only ‘attempt to describe and explain the patterns they find – such researchers also become engaged by asking questions that address issues of social justice. This is particularly the case when we consider linguistic and societal processes’ (Anthonissen 2007: 76). It is for this reason, as Ruth Wodak writes, that ‘CDA often chooses the perspective of those who suffer and critically analyzes the language use of those in power, who are responsible for the existence of inequalities [...]’ (2002: 10). The situation of dissidents in China might be considered just such a case.

Considering the variety of approaches to CDA, Bell and Garrett (1998: 18) view Fowler's critical linguistic approach, largely drawn from Halliday's SFL, as being 'the most accessible' method for analyzing media discourse (cited in Flowerdew 2012: 222). Other contributions to CDA come from a significant range of critical theorists in the social sciences (e.g. Foucault's notions of power and orders of discourse, Althusser's models of ideology and social practices, Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony, Bakhtin's notions of dialogism and heteroglossia, and Bourdieu's conceptualizations of 'symbolic capital', 'field' and 'habitus', among others, are also influential).

In emphasizing the dialectical link between society and language, Fairclough writes that discourse is not only a product of the constraints of 'social structure in the widest sense and at all levels', by which he means within a society or a given institution, as well as by classifications, and a variety of 'norms and conventions'. Besides being shaped by these factors, discourse is 'socially constitutive', meaning that it helps in creating 'all those dimensions of social structure which directly or indirectly shape and constrain it: its own norms and conventions, as well as the relations, identities and institutions which lie behind them' (Fairclough 1992: 64). The focus of CDA then, as mentioned earlier, is to investigate asymmetrical power relations in society and the roles played by language and ideology in this relationship, i.e. to 'demystify discourses by deciphering ideologies' (Wodak 2002: 10). This means making explicit the effects of naturalized discourses by repeatedly asking questions about whose interests are being served by any given text (Thompson 1990: 7).

Due to its neutral appearance in discourses (particularly in the media and government), 'power', according to Kress and van Leeuwen, has 'become more difficult to locate and to trace' (2006: 14) – which is why CDA seeks to show

how language is used to convey power and status in contemporary social interaction, and how the apparently neutral, purely informative (linguistic) texts which emerge in newspaper reporting, government publications, social science reports, and so on, realize, articulate and disseminate 'discourses' as ideological positions just as much as do texts which more explicitly editorialize or propagandize. (Kress and van Leeuwen 2006: 14)

Kress and van Leeuwen emphasize the need for an awareness of ways by which linguistic formulations of power under the guise of neutrality may be revealed in all their articulations in the press. CDA, they suggest, is an increasingly effective

approach for doing so, particularly regarding ideologically based representations which attempt to incite prejudice. Englebert posits the notion that bias is not only ‘something that discourse producers *have* and conceal, but also something they might anticipate being accused of having’ (2012: 55, emphasis in original), which adds another layer of possible enquiry, as authors attempt to foster the normalization of their position in discourse. One role of CDA is to investigate how this normalization is attempted.

The application of CDA to this particular project entails the gathering of all data from China’s English-language media on the pre-established topic. The analytical outcomes will depend on the content in the data as revealed through various analytical processes explained in Chapter 4 on methodology. The results of the analysis will then be considered for their representational strategies in terms of the social and linguistic theories explicated in this and the next chapter. The reasons for pursuing a CDA approach, as explained in Chapter 1, are related to the asymmetry of power relations based on the following hypotheses: firstly, the state controls the media, hence, what is written will be in their favor and against the dissenters; and secondly, the state, possessing unlimited resources to legitimize or delegitimize who they will, have effectively and unjustly dispossessed the dissenters, Chen and particularly Liu, of their rights and their voices. CDA provides not only a critical philosophy, but also an empirical method of analysis which is capable of extracting, categorizing, and interpreting such relations of power in discourse with explicit regard to their social and political significance.

The next section begins an overview of some principal theoretical CDA practitioners who have made significant and foundational contributions to the field and, who, due to their research orientations, are especially relevant to my theoretical approach.

3.5.3 Norman Fairclough and the analysis of media discourse

As noted, Norman Fairclough is a leading scholar in the field of CDA and has contributed to its development through publishing widely on its applications. The majority of his work has been on the discursive investigation of unequal power relationships as they are reflected in discourse and social practices. He has propagated frameworks for the critical analysis of discourses in areas such as the

media and society (Fairclough 1989, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1995a, 1995b, 2003), the commoditization of goods and services (1993, 1997), the phenomenon of globalization and neo-liberalism (2000a, 2000c, 2002, 2004, 2006), as well as more recent work on the critical analysis of political discourse (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Fairclough originally named his approach ‘critical language study’ against which he critiqued the established analytical approaches of the day (Fairclough 1992a) such as ‘conversation analysis’, and the previously noted East Anglia Group’s ‘critical linguistics’ (discussed below). Even though these accepted approaches to discourse analysis continue to have significant influence on the study of language in society, Fairclough suggests that they lack, among other things, a sufficiently ‘critical’ perspective.

It must be said that it is with some measure of trepidation that I attempt in the following paragraphs to articulate some areas of divergence in this thesis from Fairclough’s work. These observations, more contextual than theoretical, are not meant to criticize unconstructively. They are simply to draw attention to certain areas of this present study which would have greatly benefitted from Fairclough’s insights in specific areas regarding the critical analysis of the new orders of discourse (which I characterize) as emerging from non-democratic, non-Western, non-liberal contexts.

In situations where readers possess a sophisticated level of critical literacy, discourse producers are provoked to a more urbane style of writing wherein ideological content must be largely implicit in order to retain a modicum of credibility. It is in such a system that Fairclough’s work in CDA has indeed helped reveal the subliminal ideology which is often embedded in typical Western media discourses. When considering the application of CDA to the present study, this poses a question: in the non-Western historical context where problems regarding newly emerging and/or changing orders of discourse may arise, does the analysis of such discourses set within novel socio-political systems require a ‘re-thinking of CDA’ (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999)? China, which has historically governed itself by an insular set of criteria, has been lured out of its political introversion by the economic enticements of globalization. In light of this, does engaging with its emerging socio-political discourses require a reformulated approach? Fairclough (2007) has addressed the transitions in post-communist societies to some degree in a discussion of ‘globalism’ (a particular view of globalization), which involves the

process of assimilation of (European) ex-communist economies into the global neo-liberal order, a process portrayed by proponents as organic, hence ‘without responsible agents, bringing economic benefits to everyone, and spreading democracy’ (Steger 2005, cited in Fairclough 2007: 1). In a sense, tensions in this process can be located at the site where transition and assimilation into the ‘global’ order of discourse diverge from those cherished historical and cultural discourses of ancient – but newly emergent – nations, what Fairclough calls ‘path dependency’ (2007: 2). When applied to the case in question, however, adherence to the notion of ‘path dependency’ allows loopholes for the obfuscation of what appear to be Self-serving processes, such as a disregard of human rights.

Fairclough alludes to an analyst’s ‘experience’ and ‘sensitivity’ to particular orders of discourse, ‘and the need to assume a relatively well defined repertoire of discourses and genres in order to use the constructs in analysis’ (1992: 214). This, to me, signals his awareness of the nature of discourses, i.e. that they require scrutiny in order to identify and specify as far as possible, their characteristics, in terms of linguistic and ideological properties. Generalization and categorization cannot occur until the specific character of a new order of discourse has been studied. Newly formulated orders of discourse cannot be simply accepted at face value. They require analysis so that researchers gain some sort of awareness concerning their individualities. This seems especially relevant in contexts such as China’s, where ideological alignments and material support structures, (e.g. public security bureau, legal system, and state censorship apparatus) are, under constant criticism by human rights organizations both at home and abroad.

China’s emergence as a major global player has caused a recalibration of international power regarding the major paradigms of dominance (e.g. trade and commerce, economics, military relations, and other strategic areas). My question, then, is about how such monolithic changes in the international order have affected China’s orders of discourse, and vice versa. I would problematize this as, ‘have the influence of China’s emergent discourses ‘created theoretical and empirical challenges for CDA?’’ (Luke 2002: 1) – and does this necessitate a reconsideration of how to approach the analysis of discourses which do not find their origins within the Western socio-political paradigm? In considering this question, it seems evident that the field of research for the majority of CDA practitioners is influenced by the Marxist view of Western bourgeois societies implicated in the misapplication of

power relations, either social or political, for purposes of domination. Current research appears to be concentrated on manipulative discourses within capitalist industrialized societies, and has not dealt specifically and critically with the discourses found in emergent, but powerful and increasingly influential, non-Western societies.

A similar point regarding the application of CDA to the Chinese context was made by discourse analysts Paul Chilton, Tian Heilong, and Ruth Wodak (2012) in their ‘reflections’ on conceptual differences between Chinese and Western notions of the meaning of ‘criticism’. In paternalistic societies such as China’s, public criticism connotes a loss of face and is hence, an indulgence in which only the elite are permitted to partake; it is reserved for those in power to ‘punish’ those who are *not* in power. For criticism to qualify as ‘legitimate’, it must come through official channels – such as the state media. Open criticism, whatever form this may take, is only allowed from the top down – a privilege allocated only to the powerful. In the Chinese context ‘where those in dominant or influential positions, tend to convey their propositions in a rather opaque manner’ (Chilton et al. 2012: 3), CDA can contribute to the deconstruction of less-than-transparent discourses. A critical analysis is particularly relevant concerning how state-sponsored media discourse deals with topics of controversy such as allegations of corruption, cronyism, human rights situations, and the unilateral realignment of international boundaries (i.e. territorial expansion).

Another (as yet undeveloped) opportunity for research in Fairclough’s paradigm is concerning the power inherent in a wholly state-controlled media operating within an authoritarian society. He rightly discusses the notion of complicity between the media and politicians in the West, but leaves the impression that media everywhere are similar and have freedom of choice in their political orientation and lines of reportage. In the U.K., for example, a liberal media has created a situation where politicians look forward to mediatization of their speeches and use the opportunity to win public favor (Fairclough 1995a: 183). But this is not the case in China. Media restrictions in China grow ever tighter under the *wei wen* (stability maintenance) policy, which seems to indicate that a liberal media are not in the foreseeable future. Politicians (otherwise known as unelected CCP officials) have but one (public) agenda – the advancement and legitimization of the Party. There is no inter-party debate because there is only one party. In a media environment such as China’s, this

is an Orwellian scenario where all officially published discourses are, with little variation, those of the government. Because Fairclough's analytical framework is orientated toward the critical analysis of discourses in 'democratic' Western societies, his position presupposes a society wherein a free press and multi-party system are taken for granted. To reiterate, the discourses of powerful developing nations such as China, due to various social and political singularities (e.g. non-transparency, one-party system, state-controlled media, long imperial history, etc.), should be of interest to critical analysts.

From a language perspective, another point that should be mentioned is Fairclough's (1992a) reproach of 'critical linguistics' (Fowler et al, 1979; Kress and Hodge 1979) and its tendency to 'read off' ideological meanings in the text without taking in the wider linguistic macro strategies. He also points out that audiences can exercise their own discernment regarding text reception and that the 'language-ideology interface' of critical linguistics 'is too narrowly conceived' (1992a: 29). Therefore, it has the tendency to overlook features of texts 'other than grammar and vocabulary' such as overall discursive strategies, which may also 'be of ideological significance' (1992a: 29). Because of its focus on textual micro-elements, he points out that critical linguistics cannot locate all instances of ideological manifestation, particularly those at the macro-level. This is certainly the case, but I would add something to this. It is not that the method of critical linguistics is deficient, but rather the manner in which it has been applied has been too narrow and not paired with strands of a broader complementary methodology. It is precisely because of its 'narrower' function, that critical linguistics can illuminate the fine-grained examples in a text, which the broader approaches to analysis may overlook (Fairclough 1995a). But the positive attributes of critical linguistics, such as a more granular analysis, can be part of and constitutive of a multidisciplinary methodology wherein a critical linguistic analysis plays one role in an eclectic array of analytical tools. In such a role, it *informs* rather than *instructs* interpretation. Based on the concept of a critical linguistic analysis as supplementary to the investigation, I reason for the inclusion of certain functional aspects of critical linguistics in my analysis for its ability to deal with ideological manifestations in syntax and lexis through SFL. For these reasons, I follow the Faircloughian approach to CDA (Englebert 2012) in the sense of exposing inequalities through discourse analysis. However, because of the data in this study, I borrow from critical linguistics, and adjust my framework to deal

specifically with ideology and its manifestation in the lexicogrammar of *Us vs Them* discourse.

Having discussed certain areas in Fairclough's approach to CDA, one may ask what methods from Fairclough's (1995a) framework for media discourse analysis should be applied in this situation. I would say 'all' – but with an added awareness of the circumstances surrounding the production of new and emerging orders of discourse, as mentioned above.

3.5.4 Ruth Wodak and the discourse-historical approach

Ruth Wodak continues to be a prolific and influential theoretician in the area of critical discourse analysis (1989; 1995; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2005; 2006; Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Wodak and Meyer 2001; and Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart 2009), with her particular focus on contested social and political discourses such as feminism, racism, nationalism, national identity, and anti-Semitism. Wodak and co-researcher Martin Reisigl write that it is important for analysts 'to relate the discriminatory linguistic features to the social, political and historical contexts of the analyzed "discursive events"' (2001: 1), and suggest CDA specialists might engage in action 'within a political model of "deliberative democracy"' (2001: 2) based on a 'free public sphere and a strong civil society' (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 34). I could not agree more.

One of the most refreshing things about Wodak's approach is an acknowledgement that 'grand theories' do not always fit the specific problems that are under analysis. She prefers instead, to speak of 'symptomatology' (2001: 64), which is the explanation of social symptoms and their relationships to discourse 'in a more hermeneutic and interpretive way'. As such, she endorses 'conceptual pragmatism' (Mouzelis 1995) that suggests the construction of new 'conceptual tools' for analysis 'by following criteria of utility rather than truth' (1995: 9). These conceptual tools are constructed through enquiring which ones are relevant for the particular context in question. She calls for an expansion of CDA to include a wider range of data beyond a focus on mostly discursive practices; or, that CDA must become more 'multitheoretical and multimethodical, critical and self-reflective' (Wodak 2001: 64). It is in this 'site' that she reveals the discourse-historical approach as maintaining its allegiance to social critical theory, but also suggests that

it embraces other forms of critique. These are the ‘immanent critique’, which aims to uncover ‘inconsistencies, (self-) contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in a discourse; ‘socio-diagnostic critique’, a more ideologically oriented approach that incorporates the analyst’s contextual knowledge and the discourse into ‘a wider frame of social and political relations, processes and circumstances’ (Wodak 2001: 65). Finally, a third aspect: ‘prognostic critique’, which is presumably the post-analytical step of proposing guidelines for improving the social practices related to the discourse under analysis. These levels of critique are to be substantiated by the ‘principle of triangulation’ (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 65) in order to minimize the risk of bias.

In considering the wide range of data in her meticulous study of racist discourse in Austria, the gathering of records involved a team of researchers in a variety of collection processes. In her description of methods (Wodak 2001), for example, data collecting involved the daily reading of three newspapers for four months (continued afterward at regular intervals); daily radio and TV news footage including a documentary series comprising approximately fifty hours of video; ‘discussions in diverse institutional settings’ with (or at) a vigil commemorating Austrian resistance in WWII; discussions surrounding the unveiling of a controversial memorial to victims of fascism; the controversy surrounding a play on Austrian anti-Semitism; and, the filming of talks with visitors to an exhibition which was prepared from the materials, all of which was accomplished over several years of research. Though the scrupulous process of assembling the data is to be admired, this method seems out of reach for the researcher with limited resources, rendering such extensive methods difficult to replicate.

Another such case is concerning the research on the ‘Austria First Petition’, where analyzable data includes alehouse discussions and a ‘petition for a referendum’ (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 39). In applying such methods to the context of the investigation conducted in this thesis, ‘raw’ data of a political nature is nearly impossible to gather in restrictive societies (such as China) for various legal and political reasons related to foreign ‘guests’ asking too many questions of the wrong type (i.e. political). Also, there is no access to jailed dissidents, not to mention the current socio-political phenomenon of ‘self-censorship’¹⁷ and its spell of reticence over journalists, writers, and the population in general.

Here I must point out a distinguishing feature of this research: the discursive features of China's English state-run media are not found through such ethnographic means, but rather within the 'authorized' discourses that are officially sanctioned media texts. The formally constructed representational language of the government media is what is of interest in this study – not 'truth' as the 'man on the street' or pub would have it, but the how *the elite* would have it, i.e. the officially composed versions of 'truth' in all their cosmetic glory. The analysis of the discourses of human rights and dissent as they are represented in state English-language media and investigated in the present study requires a particular methodology. If this study included ethnographic data (e.g. from interviews, observations, surveys, film, focus groups, etc.), it would likely augment findings and make an interesting future study in and of itself – but such data would be, at best, peripheral to the immediate focus of this current research. The present study's research purpose does not broach the domain of public opinion looking for what is 'true' or what the people 'really' feel. The emphasis, rather, is on 'what is *represented* as truth' in the Chinese government's English-language media in order to construct what Leonard Lazarick (2005) calls 'China's smiling face to the world'.

As noted above, the 'principle of triangulation' is the part of Wodak's method that involves the integration of historical sources into the analysis and the broader social and political contexts in which the discourse is contained for the purpose of limiting bias. This includes looking diachronically at the discourse in question, and also involves the 'integration of social theories to be able to explain the so-called context' (Wodak 2001: 65), as well as the introduction of *topoi* as a means of grounding analysis. According to rhetorician Igor Žagar (2010), however, the integration of *topoi* in support of triangulation may be seen as somewhat unfocused because its use does not appear to be in accordance with its classical rhetorical roots. Žagar bases his view of *topoi* in CDA on the opinion that it is loosely defined, 'superficial', and should include deeper 'theoretical elaborations'. Though it appears that Reisigl and Wodak put the concept to good use, Žagar justifies his criticisms by comparing current modes of usage with the original functions of *topoi* in argumentation rhetoric and finds that the concept, as used in the discourse-historical approach, should consider adopting a more cohesive set of criteria, whether 'epistemological or methodological' (Žagar 2010: 7) in its application.

Reisigl and Wodak make a point of noting their preference for the analysis of ‘latent and allusive meaning of discourses’ (2001: 31). Although they also agree with Uta Quasthoff’s ‘general sociopsychological assumptions of the social function of prejudices as a socio-cohesive means’ of creating ingroup unity, they seek to broaden her ‘single-sentence perspective’ on discursive analysis. However, as with Fairclough’s view of critical linguistics, there is no apparent reason why the evidential aspects of a sentence or clause level analysis cannot be integrated with the macro-level discourse analysis in a complementary fashion. The present study attempts to combine aspects of the two approaches with analyses of transitivity and relational processes at the clause level, which support the analysis of discursive strategies at the macro-level. The inclusion of one level of analysis supported by the other should strengthen findings rather than weaken them. Clause level analysis based on SFL can complement a macro-level analysis particularly in relation to agency and/or relational processes, which are an effective means of locating implicit/explicit ideology through concrete linguistic evidence. Derek Layder, in commenting on the ‘macro-micro link’ in social research calls for an integration of the two with a particular focus on the ‘ligatures that bind macro and micro-phenomena together’ (1993: 69). At the micro-level, the lexicogrammar yields textual examples, which supply a reassuring measure of impartiality through concrete linguistic evidence.

Wodak’s discourse-historical approach continues its relevance to the critical analysis of biased and discriminatory discourses. The discourse-historical approach as described by Reisigl and Wodak is sound for the analytical purposes for which it is used, and with some adaptation, is appropriate for the present style of research involving historical and political discourse analysis where the methods must be tailored to the data, context, and research aims. My analytical framework, therefore, attempts to emulate Wodak’s concepts of stringency in contextual research including discursive strategies at the macro-level, but also features a lexicogrammatical analysis, which emphasizing a solely macro-level analysis might overlook. Of particular relevance to my thesis is Wodak and Reisigl’s recognition, and indeed highlighting, of the fact that ‘discursive construction of “us” and “them” [are] the basic fundaments of discourses of identity and difference’, and that ‘such discourses are salient for discourses of discrimination’ (Wodak and Reisigl 2001: 73).

3.5.5 John B. Thompson: *Ideology and depth hermeneutics*

Principally based on the work of Paul Ricoeur (1981), Thompson (1984, 1990) proposes a method for the analysis of ideology in language called ‘depth hermeneutics’, which uses a wide field of analysis for referential and interpretive purposes. Hermeneutics is the process of decoding the signifying devices and symbolic linguistic structures of a text. Originally, it was the method of translation from one language to another and stressed the process of ‘understanding’ a text before transforming it through reconstruction in the new language. Like CDA, hermeneutics involves the process of ‘shunting’ between text and context, which, as the theory has it, eventually leads to understanding. In Hans-Georg Gadamer’s words, hermeneutics is ‘an art’ – that of ‘clarifying and mediating by our own effort of interpretation what is said [...] it operates wherever what is said is not immediately intelligible’ (1964: 98). In his essay *Aesthetics and Hermeneutics* (1964), Gadamer uses the metaphor of a viewer in deep contemplation over the meaning of a work of art to illustrate the relationship between the analyst and the text. The hermeneutic process has also been described as one of ‘deciphering, which goes from manifest content and meaning to latent or hidden meaning’ (Palmer 1969: 43). This implies that a text may encode both explicit (manifest) as well as implicit (latent) meanings. In interpreting China’s politicized English discourse, it may not be, as David Linge suggests, a simple question of ‘not understanding’, nor is it a question of ‘*mis*-understanding’ (Linge 1977: xiii, emphasis in original). I would suggest that perhaps the danger is one of not understanding ‘enough’, by which I mean that reading the text superficially, as opposed to critically, will diminish a reader’s awareness to the severe nature of the social and political implications in biased political discourse.

Depth hermeneutics, as noted briefly in the first chapter, consists of three stages of analysis which are suitable for this particular study due to its emphasis on the linguistic manifestations of ideology and the social and historical networks in which the discourse has its time and place. Thompson’s inclusion of the social-historical element renders the model serviceable for the analysis of ideological ‘symbolic forms’ (1990: 293) in China’s English language media discourse, albeit with adaptation, as in the frameworks of Fairclough and Wodak, detailed above. Thompson recommends analysis by looking at the actual ‘structural features of

symbolic forms [...] and seek to establish these features as instances of particular strategies or processes of symbolic construction [which can] be linked to certain modes of operation of ideology' (1990: 293). By classifying textual processes such as 'nominalization, passivization' and others, the analyst can show how these strategies are manipulated to represent 'a transitory, historical state of affairs as if it were permanent, natural, outside of time' (1990: 293). It may then be discussed that there is some link between the found symbolic constructs and the ways in which ideologies are operationalized (1990: 293) such as, for example, the representation of historical occurrences, which are portrayed as static in time, permanent and indelible. Regarding hermeneutics, Thompson wrote that 'Gadamer among others has helped to highlight what we could call the *historicity of human experience*' (1990: 276–77, emphasis in original). What Thompson means by this is that new experiences or events are always understood in the 'residues' of past events. Such 'residues of the past' are also used to interpret the present and future; 'in seeking to understand what is new we always and necessarily build up on what is already present' (1990: 277). There is an inclination to invoke historical precedents thereby creating a sense of connection to the past, so the effect is to obscure the tumultuous present and create the assurance that there is indeed, a sense of historical continuity.

For Thompson the elucidation of ideology entails looking into the meanings constructed by symbolic forms, their social contexts and the manner in which those meanings contribute to the sustenance of power relations in any specific context. The consideration of these factors for the analysis of ideology in discourse led Thompson (1984, 1990), to formulate depth hermeneutics, which in its three phases is comprised of (i) Social analysis: 'concerned with the socio-historical conditions in which agents act'; (ii) Discursive analysis: the study of 'linguistic construction which displays an articulated structure' (viz. narratives); and (iii), Interpretation: a move beyond the analysis of discursive structures used 'to *construct* a meaning which shows how discourse serves to sustain relations of domination' (1984: 10–11, emphasis in original).

In conformity with Thompson's three stages, I addressed elements of the first phase of social analysis through the review of pertinent socio-political factors along with their historical implications and influences on the current media discourses affecting dissidents in Chapter 1. Further details of the socio-historical and political factors are discussed in Chapter 2 (and the latter part of Chapter 4), which provide

information on the Chinese English-language media sources from which the data is drawn. Central to the question of the social-historical and the application of the first phase of Thompson's framework (social analysis), are broader questions such as: Why are there dissidents in China and what do they want? What are the various non-linguistic factors that impact and influence the representation of dissidents in China's English press? What residual factors (political, social and historical) existing in China have given rise to the ways in which modern-day dissidence is portrayed in the state media? How are the interests of those in power served by reproducing such characterizations of dissent? These questions are important for a fuller understanding of the interplay between the socio-political and historical influences on the texts, their reproduction, and what is being attempted through the discursive representations they carry. In formulating their methodologies, Thompson reminds analysts that 'the social-historical world is *also* a field of force, a realm of conflict and coercion in which "meaning" may be a mask for repression' (1984: 10, emphasis in original). According to Thompson, ideology is inseparable from a '*socio-historical analysis of the forms of domination which meaning serves to sustain*' (1984: 135, emphasis in original).

The second phase of Thompson's depth hermeneutical framework is that of 'discursive analysis'. This is a reference to the actual linguistic analysis, which should embrace, as Thompson puts it, 'a view towards explicating the role of discourse in the operation of ideology' (1984: 11). Thompson's inclusion of 'the analysis of *narrative*' (as part of the second stage, i.e. discursive analysis) is of interest to the study of the legitimization of ideologically construed representations.

For ideology, in so far as it seeks to sustain relations of domination by representing them as 'legitimate', tends to assume a narrative form. Stories are told which justify the exercise of power by those who possess it, situating these individuals within a tissue of tales that recapitulate the past and anticipate the future. (Thompson 1984: 11)

Such justifying narratives can be observed in the media articles on Chen Guangcheng whose misdeeds are causal chains of events set in sequential relationships with the narrative details of his 'mob-like' behavior (see analysis in Chapter 6). The section on 'historical positioning' discussed in Chapter 2 is also set within a generic narrative of the events of the 1989 occupation of Tiananmen by students. According to Thompson, such narratives are a platform for displaying the

‘exercise of power by those who possess it’, that is to say, possessing both political power and the means to reproduce it in discourse. As mentioned above, narratives can also act as cautionary tales demonstrating power as negative consequences in the form of penalties (Thompson 1990: 62). The foregrounding of the legal results (as consequences) carries the implication that dissenters deserve what treatment they get. In such narratives, ‘stories are told which glorify those in power and seek to justify the status quo’ creating, as observed by Roland Barthes (1973), ‘a profound connection between ideology and myth’ (cited in Thompson 1984: 136). Narrative accounts are full of what Fairclough calls ‘presuppositions’, as ‘preconstructed elements in text, elements which have been constructed elsewhere in other texts’ (1995a: 107). The intertextualized and recurring theme of CCP dominance and Self-aggrandizement, apparently by fiat, is reinforced at opportune discursive moments throughout China’s English press. This situates the powerful ‘within a tissue of tales that recapitulates the past and anticipates the future’ (Thompson 1984: 11). The discursive analysis conducted in phase two of Thompson’s method is the attempt to make explicit ‘the underlying meanings and motivations behind particular linguistic realizations at the clause and phrase levels as a way of understanding how ideologies and group relations (Us/Them) are constructed through linguistic and rhetorical choices’ (Li 2006: 93). The analysis of surface features of a text, such as lexical and clause level constructions, through SFL can be ideologically revealing, as suggested by a majority of CDA practitioners. Again, this approach reverts to the definition of language as a ‘network of interlocking options’ (Halliday 1994: xiv) in which the writer’s ideological orientation can be made relatively explicit by the provision of empirical linguistic evidence derived from a close analysis.

The third phase of Thompson’s analysis of ideology through symbolic forms involves ‘interpretation’ in which he emphasizes the need for creativity in description. A formal discursive analysis may ‘mediate’ an interpretative explanation, but cannot supersede the interpretative in terms of significance. Thompson refers to a two-order analysis or ‘*split reference*’ (1984: 137, emphasis in original), which suspends over-reliance on a directly signified meaning, and, rather, acknowledges the ‘realization of a second order reference’ (1984: 137). It is within this niche of subsumed implication, and the subsequent ‘splitting [of] the referential domain’, according to Thompson, that discourse gains its ideological vitality. As ‘the terms of discourse carry out their ideological role by explicitly referring to one

thing and implicitly referring to another' (Thompson 1984: 138), the referents are entwined in such manner as to support the asymmetrical power relationship. As part of the depth hermeneutic method, the analysis of discourse rests principally on the third phase – that of interpretation, which Thompson likens to an 'unfolding' of 'the referential dimensions of discourse', which in turn 'specifies the multiple referents and shows how their entanglement serves to sustain relations of domination. Reconnecting discourse to the relations of domination, which it serves to sustain: such is the task of interpretation' (Thompson 1984: 138). Mediated by phases one and two of Thompson's framework (i.e. one, socio-historical analysis of the contexts of production; and two, discourse analysis), 'the interpretation of ideology is necessarily a form of depth hermeneutics' (1984: 138). The third (interpretive) phase as part of this research, is integrated throughout the thesis in the form of observations and comments alongside the formal linguistic aspects of the analysis, which will culminate in the final chapter of the thesis.

Thompson correctly connects language as being 'infused with forms of power' (1984: 131), and that it is in the ability '*to make meaning stick*' (1984: 132, emphasis in original) that the power resides. This is similar to Gledhill's (1997) notion of power resting in the right to 'define', which, as noted by Trömel-Plötz (1981), only those in authority have the right to do – and make their definition 'stick'. The process of analysis in this case has integrated various aspects of SFL and other mentioned theoretical approaches within a multidisciplinary framework capable of analyzing, in terms of ideology, both micro- and macro-discourse features. These analytical foci are suitable in determining ideological expression in the text and are explained in more detail in the next chapter.

3.6 Summary

This chapter has discussed the theoretical underpinnings in preparation for the data analysis and interpretation. I began this chapter with an overview of the ideological square and positive-Self/negative-Other representations, largely attributable to Teun van Dijk's clarifying research on the nature of ideology in discourse. This was followed by what I believe to be some characteristics of ideology regarding its character in discourse. My explanation of representation was illustrated with historical data from China's English media texts that clarify the point being made by

showing the flexible nature of discourse in transformation as it seeks conformity to a newly extended ideology. The significance of CDA to this research, as the overarching investigative approach, was also explained in some detail, along with a discussion of enormously productive contributions developed by Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, and John B. Thompson.

The next chapter deals with methodology. It begins with an explanation of the link between CDA and SFL, and how a hybrid framework is operationalized in my analysis.

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

The word is the fundamental object of the study of ideologies.

– Vološinov (1929/1973) *Marxism and the Philosophy Of Language*

4.1 Introduction

Having presented contextual and theoretical backgrounds to this study in Chapters 1–3, this chapter offers an account of my proposed methodology including an explanation of my use of CDA in relation to SFL. This comprises a description of analytical foci (see section 4.3) involving transitivity, agency, social actor ‘role allocation’, lexicalization, the Appraisal System of Evaluation, and the concept of overall discourse themes at the macro-level. Definitions of meta-linguistic terminology that I have used and will continue to use in the analysis are explicated. After this, there is a discussion of the data and its media sources (section 4.6), along with an account of the strategic role of ‘silence’ in the media.

The analytical process in relation to CDA can be pictured by referring to Halliday’s metaphorical procedure of ‘shunting’ between text and context (Halliday 1961, Halliday and Matthiessen 2004, cited in Flowerdew 2012: 9). Allan Luke describes the to-and-fro analytical process below:

CDA involves a principled and transparent shunting back and forth between the micro-analysis of texts using varied tools of linguistics, semiotic, and literary analysis and the macro-analysis of social formations, institutions, and power relations that these texts index and construct. (Luke 2002: 100)

This method involves a combination of approaches that draw from CDA and ‘varied tools of linguistics’, as well as historical and socio-political theories. In the process of discursive analysis the ‘shunting back and forth’ between data and context (a hermeneutic process), contributes to a synergistic exchange of

information that is central to interpretation. Concerning this combination of contextual and linguistic analysis, Luke observes that the linguistic analysis ‘cannot “do” CDA in and of itself. It requires the overlay of a social theoretic discourse for explaining and explicating the social: contexts, concomitants, contingencies and consequences of any given text of discourse’ (2002: 101). As mentioned above, this is essentially the practice of hermeneutic enquiry done critically.

To reiterate, the aim of this analysis is to show how discursive strategies (as positive-Self/negative Other) work to stigmatize political dissidents while supporting the interests of the elite. The small (but complete) corpus of articles from China’s official English-language press on the two dissidents will be critically analyzed in Chapters 5 and 6 by way of the methodology which is explained below. This will be preceded by a clarification of my research questions.

4.1.1 Stating the research questions

The major question driving the analysis is predicated on the construal of ‘Us vs Them’ discourses and ‘positive-Self/negative-Other’ representations as theorized by the ideological square. In essence, I am looking at the three inter-related elements of *language*, *ideology*, and *power*, as well as how and ‘to what purposes’ they function in this set of data. I will examine the *linguistic* (i.e. ‘how’ language works as a political tool to maintain power); the *ideological* (i.e. ‘why’, or to what ends, such representations are reproduced in China’s English press); and the aspect of *power* (i.e. ‘who’ — which individuals or institutions stand to gain from such representations). These research issues are reflected in the following table:

Inquiry		Research questions	
‘how’	→ language	→	How is language used in representations of Self and Other?
‘why’	→ ideology	→	To what ends are such representations reproduced?
‘who’	→ power	→	Which individuals or institutions benefit from such representations?

Table 4.1 Research Questions

More specifically: *how* are positive representations of the ingroup linguistically constructed? Given the social, political and historical contexts, *why* does China’s

English media deploy such representations? And, *who* stands to profit politically from such representations?

4.2 CDA and systemic functional linguistics (SFL)

In general, a preferred tool of many CDA practitioners is SFL, as explicated by Chouliaraki and Fairclough's *Discourse In Late Modernity* (1999). They begin by suggesting that SFL, in terms of linguistic theory, has the 'most to offer CDA' (1999: 140) because the manner in which SFL theorizes language resonates with the 'perspective of critical social science' (1999: 139). Analysts, some of which are discussed below, have carried out successful research on ideological aspects of biased discourses often using SFL within a CDA framework. Critical discourse analysts see Halliday's theory of lexicogrammar (SFL) as one in which language is assembled from a range of alternatives among various 'interlocking options' (Halliday 1994: xiv), or a 'system network' (Halliday 2004: 23). As mentioned above, writers have reasons not only for what they write, but also for how they write it. The grammatical structures of SFL aid in the study of the particular language choices made within the relevant range of semologic options. In a complementary fashion, CDA introduces contextual factors as part of the analytical process forming a relationship among what Wodak calls the 'three concepts' of power, history and ideology.

A fully 'critical' account of discourse [requires] theorization and description of both the social processes and structures, which give rise to the production of a text, and of the social structures and processes within which individuals or groups as social-historical subjects, create meanings in their interaction with texts (Fairclough and Kress 1993). Consequently, three concepts figure indispensably in all CDA: the concept of power; the concept of history; and the concept of ideology. (Wodak 2005: 3)

As models of applied CDA with emancipative purposes in mind, I cite the following exemplary research articles. Discourse analyst Lütfiye Oktar (2001) applied aspects of SFL to demonstrate the relationship between discourse and ideology in her study of the competing paradigms of 'secularism' and 'anti-secularism' in two Turkish newspapers. By determining transitivity patterns in clauses, she was able to find that processes of representation played a significant role in the construction of bias through positive-Self/negative-Other portrayals based

on social identity theory. In an oft-cited study, Peter Teo (2000), concerned with drawing out implicit instances of ‘new racism’, studied media coverage of Vietnamese gangs in the leading Australian newspapers. Also using CDA and SFL methods, he uncovered a variety of discursive features that revealed covert instances of stereotyping, prejudice and racial bias. In other research, Rojo and van Dijk (1997) conducted an analysis of the discourse of a politician in relation to the immigration of Africans to Europe and the legitimization of discriminatory practices. Using the CDA framework and a detailed analysis of discursive structures, they too uncovered discursive evidence of racism, xenophobia and the covert legitimization of such practices embedded in the discourse of the authorities involved. Within the chronicles of CDA, there are many, many such case studies addressing prejudiced and asymmetrical power relations. What these articles have in common is the successful utilization of a critical framework utilizing SFL for the analysis of discourse which reveals and interprets in a systematic manner the ‘underlying motivations, intentions and goals of language users along with the attitudes, perceptions and prejudices that manipulate them’ (Oktar 2001: 323). Through SFL, these researchers located manifestations of discriminatory language, and in doing so, revealed biased social practices that a surface reading might not reveal.

The relationship between CDA and SFL is a ‘historical’ one that has continued in an effective and ongoing dialogue (Matthiessen 2012). From the perspective of SFL, CDA is an ‘important strand’ of discourse analysis because it is identified as an ‘applicable and socially accountable’ approach to language analysis (Matthiessen 2012: section 3). CDA operates within what Matthiessen calls the three ‘parameters of context’ (i.e. register) of SFL, which are ‘field’, ‘tenor’ and ‘mode’. Tenor is particularly relevant to CDA because it attends to interpersonal relations and systems of power in discourse. As van Leeuwen notes, ‘There is no neat fit between sociological and linguistic categories, and if critical discourse analysis, e.g., in investigating agency, ties itself too closely to specific linguistic operations or categories, many relevant instances of agency might be overlooked’ (2008: 24), which is essentially the same notion implied by both Fairclough and Wodak regarding micro-level analysis (see sections 3.5.3 and 3.5.4 of this thesis). My intention, therefore, is to use selected principals of SFL in elucidating certain features of text in the data, all of which will be secondary to my major purpose – that of making explicit the semantics of ideology as used in China’s English press.

Having said that, I return to the concept of SFL as ‘the *theory of choice*’ (Webster 2009: 1, emphasis in original), by which is meant ‘choice’ not only in terms of linguistic options, but ‘choice’ in the sense of a preferred tool for analysts dealing with the ‘power of language’. One understanding of language in use is Halliday’s metaphor of the sciences: to ‘hold the world still...while dissecting it’. To do so, one must create a ‘world of things’. The metaphor can be applied to discourse analysis in the sense of naming the functional parts of grammar in order to classify them. By classifying the ‘things’ which constitute any particular discourse, the analyst becomes aware of the ideology that is embedded in the lexicogrammar by the way language choices are used to construe the world (Halliday, cited in Webster 2009: 4). Regarding discourse analysis, SFL can provide an index of ‘things’ labeled according to their functions (i.e. process types, systems of relations, labels for agents, circumstances, etc.) allowing the analyst to ‘de-couple the lexicogrammatical/semantic interface and to re-couple it with a different ordering’ (Webster 2009: 4). In many instances of analysis, SFL provides what Webster calls ‘the handle’ that is needed in order to understand texts as ‘intentional acts of meaning’ (2009: 8). This occurs by deactivating the separation between linguistic theory and its application (Webster 2009).

As I mentioned earlier, some of the SFL-related areas of analysis I will be discussing are transitivity, particularly as relational processes, agency, lexicalization (under Grammaticalization), and evaluation (Appraisal Theory), each of which I discuss in turn below.

4.3 Grammaticalization

4.3.1 Transitivity

Transitivity is concerned with how ideas are transmitted in language. Fowler (drawing on Halliday) emphasized the centrality of transitivity when he states that it is ‘the foundation of representation: it is the way the clause is used to analyze events and situations as being of certain types’ (1991: 71). And it is the options among the ways of saying something, the choices available that cause the writer to suppress (by elimination) some options over others, so that the choices ‘indicate our point of view’ (1991: 71). This process, according to Fowler, ‘is ideologically significant’ (1991:


71), and because of this, the role of transitivity is related to the ideational function of language. Halliday observes that

the transitivity system construes the world of experience into a manageable set of PROCESS TYPES. Each process type provides its own model or schema for construing a particular domain of experience as a figure of a particular kind (Halliday 2004: 170, capitals in original).

According to Halliday's explanation, clauses generally have three elements, which are the 'process', found in the clause's verbal group; 'participants', meaning those involved in the processes (ordinarily found in the nominal groups of the clause); and the 'circumstances' surrounding the process, typically demonstrated as adjuncts in adverbial and prepositional phrases. In the system of transitivity, there are three main types of process; these are: 'material', 'mental' and 'relational' processes (see Table 4.1). But Halliday also identifies other process categories, which he refers to as 'minor' types (1994: 171), situated between the three major ones. These are 'behavioral', 'verbal', and 'existential'. Based on Halliday and Matthiessen's explanations (2004: 170–75), I illustrate the process types in the diagram (Figure 4.1) below.

At the metaphorical borders between the processes, there may be an overlap which 'represent[s] the fact [that] the process types are fuzzy categories' (2004: 172). This 'fuzziness' introduces an element of ambiguity between the major and minor process types. According to Halliday's 'grammar of experience' (2004: 172), these are: symbolizing, thinking, seeing, doing (to) or acting, happening (being created) and having attribute. This 'fuzziness' factor is what Halliday calls 'systemic indeterminacy' (2004: 173) in which is reflected the 'world of our experience' and is known to be amorphous and unfixed. 'Thus, one and the same text may offer alternative models of what would appear to be the same domain of experience, construing for example the domain of emotion both as a process in a *mental* clause [...] and as a participant in a *relational* one' (2004: 173 emphasis in original). An example of this can be seen in the use of a word such as 'blasts' in the headline BEIJING BLASTS NOBEL PEACE PRIZE MEDDLING (9 November 2010, *People's Daily Online*). The denotative meaning of 'blasts' is semantically related to 'explodes' but in the sense used in the headline, it is a metaphor for an emotive outburst (possibly shouting?), therefore making it a verbal process. But even to classify 'blasts' as a verbal process is 'fuzzy', because the 'blasting' likely did not take place in the form

of shouted words. It is rather what Halliday calls a ‘grammatical metaphor’, which in this case, is meant to convey ‘ire’ on the part of the Actor.



Process Type	Function
MATERIAL	Refers to actions ‘out there’ where people do things and make them happen
Behavioral	Represents ‘outer’ manifestations of inner workings
MENTAL	Refers to the ‘inner’ experience and processes of consciousness
Verbal	Refers to symbolizing, saying and meaning with language
RELATIONAL	Process of relating one thing to another, identifying and classifying
Existential	Processes concerned with existence where phenomena are recognized to be, to exist or to happen

Figure 4.1 The Process Types and their functions in SFL [*major processes in capitals*] (adapted from Halliday 2004: 170–175)

Transitivity analysis ‘is concerned with syntactic variations in language use and the propositional meanings and functions of the variations.’ (Li 2006: 157). Such an analysis affords insights into how writers perceive and represent events and how, in turn, a reader’s understanding of the meaning in a text might be ‘pushed in a certain direction’ (Li 2006: 157). According to discourse analyst Li Juan, this eventually reveals how specific ideologies are constituted in the linguistic structures of a text. Transitivity analysis is, therefore,

a useful tool to explore the ways in which language constructs reality in terms of how primary and dominant social agents or actors are categorized, characterized and represented, what they do to whom and with what consequences [...] transitivity analysis allows us to see how *us* and *them* are represented and polarized in discourse. (Li 2006: 157, emphasis in original)

It is acknowledged that representation lies at the heart of transitivity (Fowler 1991: 71), particularly regarding the relational and actional process types. Because of its concern with the representation of ideas, it is part of the ideational function of language, which provides the semantic choices for evaluating, classifying or categorizing the construction of a preferred representation.

One productive way of discovering positive-Self/negative-Other representations in discourse is through the analysis of ‘relational’ processes (one of the three main process types), which are the processes that ‘serve to characterize and identify’. Identity theorist Anna De Fina (2012: 265) sees ‘identity as a process (identification) rather than as an attribute’, yielding insights into how people (or institutions) ‘attribute to each other the membership of various categories’ (2012: 267), a concept which is central to mobilizing ideological representations of positive-Self/negative-Other. For example, in the SFL concept of relational processes, this is illustrated when ‘something is said to be something else’, as in Extract 4.1. The use of ‘identifying’ relational clauses also allows the discourse producers to define social actors through the manipulation of assumption-bearing definitions, particularly regarding the characterization of in- and outgroup social actors, where they can be labeled and either positively or negatively stigmatized. (*Note: the data extracts below are not part of the formal analysis. They are to illustrate the functions of relational clauses.*)

Extract 4.1

Liu was a criminal (9 October 2010, *People's Daily Online*)

In Extract 4.1, there is a relationship arranged between two entities, 'Liu' and 'a criminal'. Halliday notes that 'there are always two inherent participants – two 'be-ers' (2004: 211) in relational clauses. This makes them the ideal tool for negative characterizations of the outgroup, or conversely, attributing positive identifiers to the ingroup, as in 'China' and 'staunch force for world peace' below (Extract 4.2):

Extract 4.2

China is a staunch force for world peace and stability (11 December 2010, *China Daily*)

These clauses can be generally divided into 'attributive' and 'identifying' relational processes. This means that 'attributive' relationals assign a quality or attribute, such as 'inevitable' in Extract 4.3:

Extract 4.3

The Nobel Peace Prize embarrassment is inevitable at present. (10 December 2010, *People's Daily Online*)

According to each process type's labeling system, participants may be represented as 'agents' who are doing a process to another participant who is designated as 'patient' (the recipient of the process done to them or on them), which are part of the practice of representing 'particular actors doing things to, with and for each other' (Jones 2013: 42). Discourse analyst Rodney Jones notes that ideological interests guide the discursive construction of processes, and the types of relationship between agents and patients. In constructing positive-Self/negative-Other representations the grammatical roles of participants may fluctuate according to which arrangement provides the most beneficial representation for Us, and which, under the circumstances, provides the least beneficial for Them according to the moves of the ideological square.

4.3.2 *Agency*

Fowler discusses ‘transformations’ as being of two general types of syntactic variation: *passivization* and *nominalization*. The topic of passivization must be discussed in terms of its restraints and affordances. By this I mean that it is inaccurate to say that it is used to ‘obscure agency’ in every case. However, it is true to say that it can be a useful one for authors who wish to use it for the purpose of backgrounding or minimizing the presence of an agent. A basic characteristic of the passive voice is that agency is obscured from the process so that ‘who’ is doing what to ‘whom’ is left ambiguous. An ideological view of passivization would suggest that it might be used to ambiguate agency to deflect responsibility and/or mystify causality, particularly in processes that make the actions of the powerful look unfair. For example, in the Xinhua headline referring to the events at Tiananmen (1989), SQUARE EVACUATED PEACEFULLY – FURTHER TESTIMONY (19 September 1989, Xinhua News Agency), the process of ‘evacuation’ is agentless. The foregrounding of ‘evacuation’ and its characterization as ‘peaceful’ creates the image of a voluntary migration of students in a process devoid of coercion.

As noted above, even though agent deletion is a common form of ideological expression, it may not be the only reason it is used. In some cases, a writer may wish to highlight the result of an action, or focus on the more important participant for reasons other than ideological. In cases where the participant to be emphasized is not the ‘doer’ or the doer is not prominent, passive constructions can be a functional stylistic alternative. In other non-ideological uses of passive constructions, agency might be ‘self-evident, irrelevant’, or simply ‘unknown’ (Fairclough 1992: 182). In the case of headlines, passivization is a common structure, allowing concision (Fowler 1991: 78).

Another form of agency representation that involves the transformation of processes into ‘things’ is nominalization, also mentioned in Chapter 3 (section 3.3 on Representation). This is when predicates are syntactically realized as nouns, which, according to Fowler, are especially prevalent in ‘official, bureaucratic and formal modes of discourse’ (Fowler 1991: 79). Nominalizations offer ‘substantial ideological opportunities’ for constructing particular representations (1991: 80), an example of which can be found below (Extract 4.4), where processes are changed into nouns making them more abstract. This also allows the writer to attach

evaluations to them. In some cases, nominalization can diminish the sense of activity by turning ‘processes into objects’ (Thompson 1984: 120), thereby allowing the deletion of modality or tense, removing participants from the action, and also opening up the possibility of eliminating agency. Billig (2008) points out that CDA practitioners criticize the use of nominalization as ‘ideological’, but paradoxically use it extensively themselves in their meta-linguistic critiques. Billig’s observation is true, but the use of nominalizations by analysts in their discussions does not detract from the fact that it can also appear in ideologically oriented discourse as a technique for deflecting the ‘blame’ (i.e. responsibility inherent in agency) away from ingroup individuals or institutions.

All of this can be illustrated in Extract 4.4, where we know who the agents are simply from the title of the article – CHINA, U.S. WRAP UP ANNUAL HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE (25 July 2012, *Global Times*). In this article, the participants are also referred to as ‘the two sides’, which ‘briefed each other’, but from then on, processes are changed into things (nouns), (e.g. ‘an exchange of views’, ‘mutual concern’, ‘cooperation’). The result of this is not agent deletion, but increased lexical density, which generates a ‘highly metaphorical discourse’, mimetic of the more complex impersonal and objective style typical of scientific and technical registers. It is a tendency in scientific discourse, ‘to treat complex actions and activities as things that can be classified and evaluated [...] making them able to be separated from the specific circumstances in which they occurred and recontextualized into other circumstances’ (Jones 2013: 43). Using such a register in politicized discourse imparts a sense of diplomatic *gravitas*, giving the impression of ‘prestige and power’ (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 657).

Extract 4.4

The two sides briefed each other on new progress made in the field of human rights [...] and had an in-depth exchange of views on issues of mutual concern, including cooperation on human rights at the United Nations, the rule of law, freedom of expression, labor rights and anti-racism, according to a press release by the Chinese delegation. (CHINA, U.S. WRAP UP ANNUAL HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE, 25 July 2012, *Global Times Web Edition*)

Nominalization can also be used to bring unrelated terms into an association through which a ‘valueless’ term may share the attributes inherent in the ‘valued’ term with which it is paired. An example of the latter can be seen in Extract 4.5 where ‘sincerity’ is coupled with ‘action’ making them seem as if they are semantic

associates. ‘Sincerity’ is a positive term associated with ethics, whereas ‘action’ (a nominalization of ‘to act’) is a largely ambiguous term that neither carries value nor stipulates in any way what course the ‘action’ might take.

Extract 4.5

Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan on May 3 called for sincerity and action from China and the United States [...] (CHINA, U.S. HOLD 4TH STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC DIALOGUE IN BEIJING, 3 May 2012, *Global Times Web Edition*)

Because of the uncertainty of authorial intention, as noted above, nominalization and passive agent deletion are two points which draw fire from critics of CDA. Neither of these tropes are definitive indicators of ideological bias, simply because there are other reasons for using them. As such, instances of nominalization and passivization must be looked at individually as they come up in the text.

4.3.3 Theo van Leeuwen and the representation of social actors

It should be noted that the English version of Chinese texts as found in the *China Daily*, *People’s Daily* or released by Xinhua News Agency cannot realistically be utilized as an index of social change in China because they are strictly vetted ‘selections’ of what the CCPPD would like international readers to know. Because of this very fact, they can be critically analyzed in terms of how certain actors are ideologically represented in discourse. When a real-life occurrence becomes a media item, the actual event is substituted or recontextualized from a range of possible semiotic elements. Van Leeuwen writes that ‘what kinds of substitution occur depends on the context into which a practice is recontextualized’ (2008: 17). In his approach to representation in discourse, van Leeuwen utilizes a ‘*socio-semantic* inventory of the ways in which social actors can be represented’ (2008: 23). Accordingly, categories of analysis can help researchers notice significant aspects of discourse that tend to be overlooked in a purely lexicogrammatical analysis, a point also made by Fairclough, van Dijk and Wodak. He suggests that such categories, as he explains them, indicate techniques of representation which enable the analyst to unpack the ideological structures of texts according to the semantic significance of the roles allocated to the various participants. In his representational diagram called the ‘Social Actor Network’ (see van Leeuwen 2008: 52, Table 2.4), van Leeuwen

depicts a system stemming from the two major categories of representation ('inclusion' and 'exclusion') with some forty-eight sub-categories. Below, illustrated by textual examples, are some of the main categories of 'social actor representation' from van Leeuwen's network. (*Note: These textual extracts are not part of the analysis, but are included as examples of the discursive practice of strategic role allocation of social actors.*)

4.3.3.1 Exclusion and inclusion

Exclusion, by default, also contains inclusion. It simply means what is left out of (or included in) the text for a purpose. Van Leeuwen discusses two methods of exclusion one of which is backgrounding, the other suppression. Suppression is the non-voicing of the social actors in the text which means they are not mentioned at all. This 'takes away at least one possible avenue of contestation' (1996a: 39). It is noticed in Extract 4.6 (below), that Tung Chee Hwa, first Chief Executive of Hong Kong (1997–2005), speaks for all of Hong Kong in mentioning the pronouns *us* and *we*. The voice of the people of Hong Kong is excluded and they are not acknowledged in any meaningful way. At the Handover in 1997, a large part of the population was uneasy over the CCP's proposed policy of assimilation called *one country, two systems*. Hong Kong citizens who are aligned with the discourses of democracy and universal suffrage remain leery of Beijing's intentions, but in Extract 4.6, Tung speaks for all Hong Kong in agreement to Beijing's program. Though there are Hong Kongers who welcome the new relationship with Beijing, the exclusion of opposing voices gives the impression that *one country, two systems* is unequivocally accepted by all Hong Kong citizens. The function of inclusion/exclusion here is to create the impression that Hong Kong is collectively delighted with the system, demonstrating subordination to Beijing's policy.

Extract 4.6

Tung noted, "The society in Hong Kong will continue to sustain its economic development, its fundamental rights of freedom and the rights that are accorded to us. We are very confident that this structure is particularly suitable for us," Tung said. (TUNG MAPS OUT HK PLAN TO ENTER WORLD MARKET, 18 September 1997, *China Daily*)

4.3.3.2 Role allocation

In terms of agency and transitivity, allocation explores who is represented as the agent and who is represented as the patient (or has a peripheral role) in any given process. In the following *China Daily* excerpt (Extract 4.7), *They* are the ‘current leadership’ and are represented as proactive, fair, and deeply concerned about the prosperity of minorities. The major categories of actor are the government leadership, and the minorities are those for whose welfare they act. The leadership’s actions are to ‘arrange’ and to ‘put’; the Goal of ‘arrange’ is ‘a lecture on the history’, the Goal of ‘put’ is ‘harmonious and prosperous development’. In this representation, the active role is given to ‘the leadership’ (the CCP) while the minorities are passive – only as acted upon – incapable of securing their own destiny.

Extract 4.7

They also arranged a lecture on the history of the relationship between minority groups in the country, as the leadership has put a harmonious and prosperous minority development high on its agenda. (SMART STUDENTS, SMART STUDIES, 19 October 2007, *China Daily*)

This foregrounds the leadership as not only powerful, but also magnanimous, perpetuating a paternalistic Confucian view, while the minorities’ role is backgrounded and reduced to that of beneficiaries. One implication of such role allocation gives the impression that they are incapable of prosperity without CCP management, a recurrent theme in Chinese media.

4.3.3.3 Genericization and specification

These are important concepts in the representation of social actors, as they are related to social class and to worldviews. By this, van Leeuwen means that the dominant or governing class, may tend to see people in a general or collectivist sense, whereas in the underclass (the masses) or world of the governed, individuals refer to each other in more specific ways. *Genericization* can be realized by the non-use of articles in the plural, and either a definite or indefinite article in the singular. Those governing are often treated as privileged, with the governed class as distant Others. The contrast is illustrated by *specification* in Extract 4.8, and genericization in 4.9:

Extract 4.8

The Party's second-generation leadership, with Deng Xiaoping at the helm, dispensed with the theory and practice of class struggle and shifted the focus on economic construction and the implementation of the reform and opening up policies. (THREE FACTORS TO REMEMBER, 19 October 2007, *China Daily*)

In Extract 4.8, as an example of specification, Deng Xiaoping is named individually as the primary 'helmsman' who is over and above the 'second generation' of leaders, giving superfluous honor to his role, when semantically speaking, the insertion of this prepositional adjunct, 'with Deng Xiaoping at the helm', carries little significance other than ideological. In Extract 4.9, the genericization is evident in the use of non-specific group words such as 'residents' and the even broader generalization of agriculture (a practice) together with 'farmers' (a human collectivity), as if there is no need to distinguish between the practice of agriculture and those who do it. Vague reference is sufficient for the nameless masses that practice agriculture.

Extract 4.9

The income gap between rural and urban residents is widening. Various policies favoring agriculture and farmers are not institutionalized yet. (AGRICULTURE FOUNDATION NEEDS STRENGTHENING, 19 October 2007, *China Daily*)

Extract 4.8 (above) displays the individualization of the elite (Deng), even when there is no semantic need to do so. Extract 4.9 shows the assimilation or genericization of 'residents' and 'farmers' as masses who need 'policies' that are 'institutionalized' in order to help them. 'Agriculture' and 'farmers' are nearly synonymous. The gist of the article is to demonstrate the Party's 'concern' without being too specific about any particular thing such as the meaning of 'various policies' and what exactly these might address.

4.3.3.4 Individualization

This has a slightly different purpose in *China Daily* texts than in a democratic press. From the data, social actors in state press discourses are individualized and 'given names' in four main areas: (i) if they are a leader or an official (Extracts 4.8, 4.12, 4.16); (ii) if they are an exemplary commoner who somehow serves the purpose of enhancing the CCP's image (Extract 4.10); (iii) if they serve some

ideological purpose such as having said some specific thing that is supportive of an official policy which is currently being promoted (Extract 4.11); or (iv), to specifically and negatively mark an individual for notoriety, i.e. an Other (a dissident or lawbreaker) as in Extract 4.12:

Extract 4.10

For local restaurateur and revolutionary paraphernalia peddler Mao Lianghui, who is known as one of the village's most successful business people, the growing influx of tourists has meant an increasing inflow of cash. (RED-HOT REVOLUTION, 17 October 2007, *China Daily*)

Extract 4.11

Though a non-CPC member, I remember quite a few of its past events. One of the major ones was around the same time 31 years ago, in 1976, its decision to remove the so-called Gang of Four, a group of individuals who had abused power and was responsible for bringing the economy to a standstill, if not near collapse. (TIME TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY, 15 October 2007, *China Daily*)

Mao Lianghui (Extract 4.10) is an ‘anybody’. S/he is simply a discursive prop in the ongoing narrative of legitimization, placed to demonstrate the efficacy of the CCP’s economic reform policies as they are adopted in the countryside. Extract 4.11 is of interest because, even though s/he is a ‘non-CPC member’, s/he acts as a surrogate voice of the state. The use of the first person voice, whose eyes see things from the government’s position, is an attempt at ‘democratizing’ the government’s voice and is recontextualized in such manner as to approximate an outside reader’s view of China’s politics. It brings the government’s economic policies down to the ‘everyman’ level so that whether or not an individual is a CCP member, ‘everyone’ should see the advantages of CCP policy. The speaker frames the Gang of Four’s biggest wrongdoings, not as crimes against humanity, nor as violations of human rights, but as crimes against the economy. This is the voice of the state through an unnamed, yet singled-out (perhaps imaginary) individual. Only such pro-government voices are allowed to speak in the media – contrary voices never see print.

The extract below (4.12) is individualization for the purpose of stigmatizing by contributing to the ‘reservoir’ of anti-dissident discourse. Again, the implication is collusion with ‘some people’. The name of the ‘chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region’ is clearly Tibetan and is mentioned as a kind of metonymy to show that

some Tibetans support Beijing. The individualization of this individual, the chairman of Tibet, appears to be strategic:

Extract 4.12

The Dalai Lama poses as a Buddhist spiritual leader, but is actually a cat's paw for some people, Qiangba Puncog, chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region, said at a separate briefing on the sidelines of the congress. (DON'T MEET DALAI LAMA, BUSH URGED, 17 October 2007, *China Daily*)

Separately and in subtly different ways, each of these extracts (4.10–12) is an example of individualization, each for a different purpose. Extract 4.12 contains two individualizations; one is to name the offending member (the Dalai Lama) as a ‘poser’ who is acting deceptively. The second, Qiangba Puncog, is a Tibetan, but at the same time, also an official who supports Beijing’s policies against the Dalai Lama. His voice is cleverly entextualized by the *China Daily* to give the impression that the Dalai Lama does not speak for Tibet. Extract 4.10 is an example of the naming of an individual, though s/he is a peasant, who is shown to benefit from the CCP’s agenda of economic development. This is a ‘non-role’, purely utilitarian, another example of a discursive prop. Extract 4.11 assumes the first-person narrative tone in an attempt at ‘conversationalization’, a ubiquitous strategy often perceived as insincere due to media overuse (Fowler 1991 cited in Fairclough 1995a: 13). Though this individual is a ‘non-CCP member’ (information which is foregrounded in the ‘theme’ position), s/he sees the pure logic of CCP policies. The effect is that anybody in his or her right mind should feel the same way. He is individualized simply because his tale legitimizes the CCP agenda.

4.3.3.5 Collectivization

This is to ‘signal agreement’ and show consensus, as in a unity of experts who condone certain beneficial results, which as to be expected, are always presented as the outcome of a government policy.

Extract 4.13

According to statistics from the State Planning Commission, the foreign capital China absorbed in the four consecutive years from 1993 to 1996 ranked second highest in the world after the United States. (CONTINUING REFORM CREATES ATTRACTIVE INVESTMENT CLIMATE, 6 September 1997, *China Daily*)

The other actors from this particular article (CONTINUING REFORM CREATES ATTRACTIVE INVESTMENT CLIMATE) are all collective entities so that the article is populated with banks, corporations, and government organizations – *not* individual people – as agents of change. Such representation gives the appearance that ‘the state’ is China’s principal social actor, acts in the benefit of all, and that individuals have no real significance in such processes. As an example of collectivization, each actor in this article is an institution, viz. ‘China’, ‘the CCP’, ‘the State Planning Commission’, ‘local governments’, ‘the State’, ‘multinational corporations’, ‘General Motors’, ‘General Electric’, ‘investors’, ‘enterprises’, ‘businesses’, ‘WTO’, and the ‘People’s Bank of China’. Clearly, such business-world social actors are listed to demonstrate support of the CCP’s economic agenda.

4.3.3.6 Association and Dissociation

The purpose of this strategy shows co-operation (i.e. ‘association’) between groups who might be assembled to support (or oppose) a particular agenda and show solidarity, as in Extract 4.14.

Extract 4.14

Experts from both sides discussed areas for cooperation at the seminar, including courts, procurators, notaries and universities. (AMBASSADOR HAILS SINO-FRENCH TIES, 20 October 2007, *China Daily*)

In Extract 4.15 below, we can gauge the importance of an event by the associated groups who participated. This article was about a football match between Chinese and Japanese (lower-level) officials. The purpose of the article is to showcase the ‘friendly’ relations and to build ‘association’ between the two countries, which is in anticipation of better political and economic ties. Again, the actors are called by their professions. No articles or determiners are used:

Extract 4.15

Most are deputies to the National People’s Congress (NPC) including government officials, scientists, entrepreneurs, teachers and doctors. Participants from Japan are 23 lawmakers from the ruling Liberal, its coalition partner the New Komiteo Party, the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan, the Japanese Communist Party and the People’s New Party. (CHINA, JAPAN SWAP SUITS FOR FOOTBALL BOOTS, 15 October 2007, *China Daily*)

Such a discursive passage seems superficial, however, when considering the nature of China's involvement with Japan, which is characterized by a continuous fluctuation between hostility and rapport.

4.3.3.7 *Nomination and categorization*

Nomination is one of the commonest ways of representing a social actor as a unique individual. Van Leeuwen suggests that it is of interest to critical analysts whether individuals are nominated or categorized in articles (1996a: 52). In *China Daily*, however, the individual, though s/he may be nominated in an article, is always subordinated to the main actor: the Party. There are basically two types of nominated persons found. One type is the elite, the power holders, and/or those in some way favorable to the CCP (always formally named with full title); the other type are politically insignificant but have something ideological to contribute to the story. The article is never about the individual as the subject. Extract 4.16 is an example of nomination with an expansive label, as in this fifteen-word titular nomination of a member of the elite:

Extract 4.16

Zhao Changmao, Deputy Head of the organization section at the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, said innovative achievements in the CPC's theories should be the core part of the new training program. (CADRE TRAINING COMES INTO FOCUS, 17 October 2007, *China Daily*)

It seems that what is important is the title, however long. What lends prestige to the CCP is not the individual, but the title. In the following extract (4.17), a fully titled foreigner is nominated. He is represented as being 'grateful' to China. This nomination allows the writers to place him in the role of an outsider, who, though alien, is compliant, an attitude which fits nicely with the overall agenda of economic integration. At the same time, this foreigner's titular nomination indicates that he is an individual of high status who, as honored as he is, shows deference to China. This nourishes the sense of how the tables have turned. China, due to successful CCP policies, is represented as superordinate. In the past, China needed to be 'allowed'; now, very aware of a sense of power, it does the 'allowing', which epitomizes the process of 'role reversal' from passive 'patients' to active agents:

Extract 4.17

Philippe Tuffreau, vice-president of the National Lawyers' Association Council of France, said he was grateful that China had allowed foreign lawyers to launch businesses here and expected further cooperation. (AMBASSADOR HAILS SINO-FRENCH TIES, 20 October 2007, *China Daily*)

Most examples of nomination in the *China Daily* are formal or semi-formal (given name and surname), but never informal (given name only) although some are referred to by surname only. In the following (Extract 4.18), Chen Ailian is first referred to by her full name and then by her surname throughout the rest of the article. In portraying the generic 'rags to riches' storyline, she acts as a metonym for the whole of her generation, with the subtext being the legitimization of CCP policies.

Extract 4.18

Dressed in a branded suit with high heels to boot and driving a Rolls Royce, Chen Ailian appears to be the archetypical success story. Chen, who started as a truck driver, is chairwoman of Wanfeng Auto Holding Group. (DON'T STEREOTYPE US, SAYS PRIVATE ENTREPRENEUR, 19 October 2007, *China Daily*)

4.3.3.8 Categorization

When social actors are represented in terms of identities and functions they share with others, it is called categorization. In the extract below, Chen Ailian is portrayed as being like anyone else, though she is a wealthy entrepreneur. But she, as an individual, is only of passing interest in the story. The real story here is to publicize that her success is due to the CCP's economic policies, such as Jiang Zemin's *Three Represents*¹⁸:

Extract 4.19

'Like workers, farmers, intellectuals, cadres and soldiers, private entrepreneurs are also builders of socialism with Chinese characteristics,' she said. Private entrepreneurs used to be considered a symbol of capitalism and were long excluded from the Party. But now they are recognized for their contribution to the economy. (DON'T STEREOTYPE US SAYS PRIVATE ENTREPRENEUR, 19 October 2007, *China Daily*)

What is of importance is that the once ideologically vilified entrepreneurs (i.e. bourgeoisie) are now driving the economy.

In summary, the categories of van Leeuwen's 'social actor network' (van Leeuwen 1996a, 2008) appear to overlap and there are, no doubt, areas in which

they are similar in terms of their definitive rhetorical functions. The social actor network encompasses a wide number of inter-related linguistic systems:

[The social actor network] involves a number of distinct lexicogrammatical and discourse-level linguistic systems, transitivity, reference, the nominal group, rhetorical figures, and so on, because all of these systems are involved in the realization of representations of social actors. (van Leeuwen 2008: 53)

Suffice it to say that, as an element of discursive strategy, the portrayal of social actors is a sensitive area of representation wherein individuals, organizations, or institutions are positioned as doing and being in particular ways for particular purposes, in conformity with ideological squaring. These ‘particular ways and purposes’ are those that prove to be most profitable for the discursive legitimization of the ingroup and least profitable (or least legitimizing) for the outgroup. In the analysis of social actors, the network ‘brings together what linguists tend to keep separate’ (2008: 53). I refer to this framework throughout the next chapters, and in greater detail in section 6.5.1 regarding Chen Guangcheng.

4.3.4 Lexicalization¹⁹

Van Dijk writes that the particular words chosen to specify a concept (or an individual or group) is the ‘most widely studied form of ideological expression in discourse’ (1998: 270). ‘Lexicalization’, he writes, ‘is largely automatic given underlying mental models and the lexicon as a basis’ (2006a: 128). This does not rule out, however, the (politically) controlled use of fixed terminology of which China has a long and documented history (Ji 2012, Alvaro 2013b; and sections 1.3 and 2.7 of this thesis). ‘When overall communicative control is strict, also ideological discourse expression will become more conscious’ (van Dijk 2006a: 129), as illustrated in reproducing the Party line by calling the Nobel Peace Prize a ‘mockery’, Liu Xiaobo a ‘criminal’, or Chen Guangcheng a ‘mob organizer’. These are negative lexicalizations, which not only determine how the outgroup is characterized, but also encode the author’s ‘institutionalized’ judgment of that particular outgroup participant. Lexicalization is a discursive technique that can flexibly conform to the moves of ideological square’s positive-Self/negative-Other categories. Analyst Rodney Jones holds a similar view to van Dijk’s, and sees lexicalization as the words people choose to ‘represent reality’, to ‘stand for

different things', and 'construct systems of inclusion and exclusion that divide up the world in particular ways' (2013: 36). He refers to 'labeling and division' of social actors as '*lexicalization*' (2013: 36, emphasis in original), and I also apply the term as a means of understanding the manner of 'naming' social actors and how the specification of that thing, by means of lexis, sets it in 'specific relationships with other things' (Jones 2013: 36) as in van Dijk's concept of 'mental models' or of Gee's 'figured worlds' (Gee 2011).

Vocabulary (along with grammar, cohesion and text structure) is one of the four main headings of texts analysis (Fairclough 1992: 75). Alluding to Halliday's concept of language as a network of options, Fairclough notes that a writer/speaker makes 'choices about the design and structure of their clauses' (1992: 76). But before clauses can be constructed, words or word units (i.e. lexical items), as the basic constituents of clauses, must be chosen in order to build up the various levels of language as sentences, paragraphs, and discourses, and so on in ascending order. Fairclough writes that, in part, 'choices are a matter of vocabulary' and suggests that 'the vocabulary one is familiar with, provides sets of pre-constructed categories, and representation always involves deciding how to "place" what is being represented within these sets of categories' (1995: 109). Fairclough suggests various ways of analyzing lexis, one of which for the 'political and ideological significance' of a given term and 'how domains of experience may be "reworded" as part of social and political struggles'. Emphasis could also be put on the 'meanings' of words and how they 'come into contention within wider struggles' so that the relationships between words and their meanings 'are forms of hegemony' (1992: 77) seen, for example, in labeling Liu 'a criminal' in preference to, for example, 'a concerned citizen', or Chen Guangcheng 'a mob organizer' rather than 'a defender of the poor'. Behind these lexical choices there are designs, so that 'different perspectives on domains of experience entail different ways of wording them; [...] In a real sense, then, as one changes the wording, one also changes the meaning' (Fairclough 1992: 191).

Another aspect of lexicalization is metaphor. It is generally accepted that language is not merely superficial, and drawing on Chilton (1988), Fairclough writes that 'the militarization of discourse is also a militarization of thought and social practice' (1992: 195). Metaphor in the realm of mediatized political discourses may involve the evocation of the historical myth, or the use of a 'martial' register from the class struggle era using formulaic expressions such as 'Chinese people's

courage’, ‘resist foreign aggression’, and ‘not back down an inch’ (see Extract 4.25) as employed when constructing discursive representations of an antagonist such as Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute:

Extract 4.20

It [Japan] should not underrate Chinese people's courage and resolve to resist foreign aggression. China will not back down an inch on issues related to its sovereignty. (RISING JAPANESE MILITARISM, 20 September 2012, *China Daily*)

According to Charteris-Black (2011) using lexis related to war, like ‘battle’, ‘attack’ or ‘fight’, induces emotional responses. We get this sense of militancy in Extract 4.20 by the use of ‘courage’, ‘resist aggression’ and ‘will not back down’, which are all metaphorically battle-related terms. They are specifically effective in martialing nationalist sentiment as they ‘evoke feelings of antipathy towards an implied or named “enemy” – or “villain”’ (Charteris-Black 2011: 23). He writes that ‘myths’ can become ‘a way of articulating ideology because it relates abstract notions to our experience of reality’ (2011: 23). This not only concerns how discursive representations of social actors and political events are constructed, but also how the heroic compatriot, one who is politically correct (according to the group’s collectively held ideological beliefs), is lexicalized. It often occurs against a historical backdrop of Othering involving earlier and/or ancient rivalries with China’s historical adversaries. Here, anti-Japanese demonstrations do not ‘take place’ – they ‘erupt’ – which connotes ferocity and unpredictability, as seen in Extract 4.21.

Extract 4.21

He said Japan launched a war of aggression last century, which brought about huge sufferings to the people of China, other Asian nations and rest of the world. Recently, demonstrations erupted in China and other countries against Japan's distortion of its wartime history. (XINHUA WORLD NEWS SUMMARY, 12 April 2005, Xinhua News Agency)

The practice of linking a particular lexical item to a real-world individual or process is, in its effect, an extension of power and can be understood as a process wherein the active ‘signifier’, in a sense, rules over (i.e. determines the nature of) the passive ‘signified’.

Another aspect of lexicalization, purely political, is the use of fixed slogans (*tifa*) as mentioned in section 1.3 on ‘linguistic engineering’. In the fastidious concern for

correct representation, political terms were precisely translated into English for journalists during the ‘17th National Congress of the CCP’²⁰ to assure that there were no ‘misrepresentations’ of the CCP’s ideological beliefs.

4.4 The Appraisal System of Evaluation

Appraisal is a comparatively recent development in SFL (Droga and Humphrey 2002: 75) and is the part of the lexicogrammar which explains how phenomena are authorially evaluated, and how positions are acknowledged. Appraisal has three sub-systems (see Table 4.2), which are *Attitude* (evaluations), *Graduation* (upgrading or downgrading of evaluation), and *Engagement* (resources for constructing the authorial voice) (Christie and Derewianka 2008: 15). In communication, evaluative dimensions are used by authors to convey values, what Martin and White call ‘evaluative styles or keys of journalistic discourse’ that are constituted through ‘linguistic regularities and tendencies’ (2008: 183). They point out, for example, that authorial voice can assume ‘neutrality’ by repeated use of ‘tokens of judgment’ through which prejudice may operate on a covert ideological level rather than directly.

The Appraisal framework can be effective for the description and analysis of politicized discourse due to its focus on providing explanations for how linguistic resources have been used by authors to represent social actors in terms of their status, truthfulness, normality, legitimacy, morality, etc. Such evaluations can generate either support and sympathy *for*, or bias and animosity *against* the social actor in question.

APPRAISAL SYSTEM		
ATTITUDE	GRADUATION	ENGAGEMENT
Affect Judgment* Appreciation	Force Focus	Attribution Modality Disclaimers / Proclaimers (Monogloss / Heterogloss)

Table 4.2 The APPRAISAL SYSTEM and sub-categories (based on Martin and White 2008: 38)

From the overall Appraisal framework, the subsystem of ‘Attitude’ (explained in more detail below) is relevant to this study because of the proliferation of evaluations and assessments of ingroup/outgroup processes and social actors in the data, particularly in the commentary articles on Chen Guangcheng in Chapter 6.

4.4.1 Judgment as an evaluative category of Attitude

Christopher Hart (2010: 169) describes attitudinal evaluation as ‘a system of resources for the expression of emotive (*affect*), moral (*judgment*), and aesthetic (*appreciation*) evaluation’. The opinion-oriented articles on Chen Guangcheng in Chapter 6 contain judgmental and evaluative language reflecting the author’s stance, which, in opinion-oriented media articles is not uncustomary. In opinion pieces, writers are permitted to drift from ‘objective’ news to more subjective views as they position various actors (i.e. themselves, the social actors in the text, and readers) according to their authorial (ideological) purposes. In the process of sharing their views, they may communicate their assessments through the ‘semantic category’ of epistemic modality. This involves the authorial evaluation of a particular proposition and how it is expressed in terms of modality, mitigation, or directness thereby displaying the author’s degree of confidence in, or commitment to, the proposition. According to Hart, this is not as much to do with evaluating a representation in the text, but rather the *legitimization* of it. He writes that the role of epistemic modality ‘is not to represent’, but rather to ‘endorse representations’ by the provision of ‘external coherence to claims through epistemic commitment’ (Hart 2010: 170).

For the investigation of the opinion articles in Chapter 6, I will refer to selected aspects of the subsystem of ‘Judgment’ for the analysis of attitudinal evaluation. Initial readings of the data show the predominance of evaluative language based on Judgment, both evoked and implicit, within the category of Attitude. This mainly involves the author positioning herself/himself as the evaluator or assessor of the target according to recognized and expected legal, social and/or moral norms.

ATTITUDE			
JUDGMENT			
Social Esteem		Social Sanction	
Normality	(+ / -)	Veracity	(+ / -)
Capacity	(+ / -)	Propriety	(+ / -)
Tenacity	(+ / -)		

Table 4.3 The JUDGMENT category divided into Social Esteem and Social Sanction

Judgment is the area of evaluative language that conceptualizes values such as criticism and/or praise, condemnation and/or admiration for the actions, beliefs, qualities or character of groups or individuals in relation to social, ethical and legal norms. Table 4.3, based on Droga and Humphrey's explanation (2002: 80), is a table representing Judgment and its sub-categories as one of the three sub-systems of Attitude. As an attitudinal resource, Judgment expresses evaluations associated with social or moral character and 'is used to assess (positively or negatively) what people in [a given text] do, say or believe according to institutionalized values' (Droga and Humphrey 2002: 77). In the world of politicized discourse which operates by the ideological square, categories for the attitudinal system of Judgment can be first divided into positive and negative wherein those aligned with Us (through common memberships of, e.g. ethnicity, ideology, or nationality) are appraised positively (e.g. as heroic, innovative, truthful, sincere, etc.). The antagonists (Them) are judged to be of negative character (e.g. as traitorous, manipulative, immoral, insincere, etc.) and most often, involved in performing negative processes. The category of Judgment can be further divided into the two sub-systems of *Social Esteem* (dealing with the evaluation of personal and psychological aspects) and *Social Sanction* (dealing with the evaluation of moral and legal aspects). Social Esteem is expressed by reference to such values as *normality*, *capability* and *tenacity* (endurance). Social Sanction, often interpreted in a deontic mode, is used to evaluate legal and moral aspects of Judgment with values related to *veracity* and *propriety*, as depicted in Table 4.3. It is important to note that Judgment can be embedded at all levels of a text which includes the lexical and sentential (clausal), as well as the indirect prosodic, and discourse structural levels. In this way, Judgment can be entextualized by using a fairly wide range of grammatical

resources. This creates an intratextual cross-sectioning of analytical tools by which ‘lexicalization’, for example, can be seen both for its encoding of presupposition and stereotyping, but can also be seen as ‘evaluative’ in that the particular lexical item chosen to name a thing, also carries a socially sanctioned value.

Below are some examples of Judgment extracted from newspaper articles published by state media during the quinquennial NCCPCs (National Congresses of the Communist Party of China) in 2002 and 2007 (with the exception of Extract 4.32 from a more recent article). In the discussion below, because the Social Esteem categories for Evaluation are seldom used, I will only exemplify the Judgment category of Social Sanction and its two sub-categories of ‘veracity’ and ‘propriety’ with textual extracts, as these are the most frequently occurring strategies of Evaluation in the data on Liu and Chen. I begin with the Judgment sub-category of veracity.

4.4.1.1 Judgment: The Social Sanction sub-category of veracity

Extract 4.22 demonstrates the category of Social Sanction as positive ‘veracity’ as it is related to honesty, truthfulness and genuineness. This can be seen in the title of the article JIANG REPORT CONVEYS WARM GESTURE TO TAIWAN (12/11/02, *China Daily*), where the word ‘warm’ is the attempt to communicate sincerity to a people with whom the CCP has been at enmity for a large part of the 20th century, many of whom continue to harbor mistrust. The title of the article and the implication in Extract 4.22 (below) to ‘sincerely work’ for compatriots, along with the use of the lexical item ‘safeguard’, generally denotes ‘protection’ and gives the impression that China will ‘safeguard’ Taiwan. But this is also an encoded warning of sorts (which must be interpreted historically) because what is being safeguarded here is ‘China’s sovereignty’ and ‘territorial integrity’ – not Taiwan. This, wrapped in conciliatory language, is China’s way of sending the message that Taiwan will never be allowed independence. The attempt at invoking ‘warmth’ and ‘sincerity’ is lost in the explicit and overly wrought assurance that China’s intentions are of good will. The CCP’s non-negotiable ideology of ‘unification’, however, is always mixed, either explicitly or implicitly, with the sub-textual specter of military invasion should Taiwan not accept it.

Extract 4.22

Hu pledged that the Party will sincerely work for the well-being of compatriots on both mainland and Taiwan and for cross-Straits peace, and safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. (JIANG REPORT CONVEYS WARM GESTURE TO TAIWAN, 12 November 2002, *China Daily*)

The following extract (4.23) is another such attempt at conveying 'sincerity' and 'genuineness' to Taiwan through the heteroglossic voice of a Taiwan compatriot who is all for 'exchanges'. This individual is named and designated, which is a rhetorical strategy of having a member of the *outgroup* voice the ideology of the *ingroup* in as convincing and heartfelt a manner as possible.

Extract 4.23

"I hope the Taiwan authorities respond actively to Hu's call, which shows the utmost sincerity, and push the relationship forward through further communication and exchanges," said Lin Yifu, who was born in Taiwan and is one of the leading economists on the mainland. (PEACE PACT WITH TAIWAN PROPOSED, 16 October 2007, *China Daily*)

This is the voice of the CCP through a social actor, Lin Yifu. This appears to be an attempt at augmenting the appearance of sincerity by giving it an extra push through this individual (Lin), a member of the *outgroup*, speaking with the voice of the *ingroup*.

The Judgment sub-category of veracity also contains a negative side as a realization of the ideological square move of 'emphasizing the Other's negative aspects'. It is generally reserved for the U.S., Japan, or Chinese who have strongly challenged the CCP. For example, Extract 4.24, as two consecutive passages, shows the attempt to manipulate evaluative language regarding former President George Bush meeting the Dalai Lama.

Extract 4.24

'We express our extreme dissatisfaction and strong opposition. We solemnly demand that the U.S. side cancel the extremely wrong arrangement,' Yang told reporters on the sidelines of the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC).

The meeting will be a gross violation of the norms of international relations and it severely hurts the feelings of the Chinese people, said Yang, who is also a delegate to the Party congress. "The Chinese side has made solemn representations on this many times." (DON'T MEET DALAI LAMA, BUSH URGED, 17 October 2007, *China Daily*)

In this passage, the strong use of evaluative descriptors such as 'extreme', 'strong', 'solemnly', 'extremely', 'gross', 'severely', and 'solemn' serve to characterize the

Chinese reactions as affectatious and overdone. The excessive use of words that typically signify extreme emotion are generally used rarely and not in such a concentrated manner. This is overlexicalization. Seven such terms within two sentences is a disproportionate emphasis that borders on the hyperbolic, resulting in a dilution, rather than a strengthening of meaning.

4.4.1.2 Judgment: The Social Sanction sub-category of propriety

Extract 4.25 shows the use of moral evaluation in the area of propriety, which is related to values such as goodness, kindness, consideration, etc. The number of evaluative items in this passage (below) gives the impression that all concerns regarding care for the ‘weaker’ portions of society are being well-taken care of by the munificence of the Party. If ingroup social actors, or outgroup members for that matter, are concerned about the implementation of the new economic policies resulting in unfairness, these fears are assuaged by the revelation of ex-President Hu’s reformatory plan for resolving the issues:

Extract 4.25

The reform of the income distribution system is only one of the blueprints Hu mapped out for improving people’s livelihoods over the next five years. His report also had detailed plans for the development of education, employment, medical and old-age care, and housing. (NARROWING WEALTH GAP HIGH ON PARTY’S AGENDA, 16 October 2007, *China Daily*)

The use of the term ‘only one of the blueprints’ implies that the President is thinking about even more plans and ‘blueprints’ to help the less advantaged, implying that he possesses a high regard for the needs of the poor, the demonstration of which is a key element of persuasive political discourse based on morality. The inclusion of the list of morally relevant social concerns, i.e. ‘education’, ‘employment’, ‘housing’, ‘medical care’, etc., each of which is a major worry for the under-advantaged, hopes to demonstrate that the government is in touch and shares these concerns with the citizens under their care. The portrayal of government planning over these exigencies is the attempt to display benevolence, an ethic related to Confucian values. This is only one example of thousands of such passages that embed the implied use of morally commendable actions to construct the value of propriety on behalf of the CCP. Van Leeuwen noted that the entextualization of propriety as moral social actions serves the purpose of legitimization.

As an example of negative propriety in China's English press, we need look no further than reference to the U.S. or the West, which is typically characterized by 'unfairness', 'cruelty' or other such moral or ethical breaches:

Extract 4.26

The U.S. stance is "unfair" toward China, which has opened its doors wide to U.S. banks in accordance with various agreements between the two countries, Guo Shuqing, board chairman of China Construction Bank said. (BANKER ACCUSES U.S. OF UNFAIR PLAY, 18 October 2007, *China Daily*)

The invocation of a discourse of 'fair play' shows that the U.S. has transgressed an agreed upon standard. There are many instances of such violations of propriety by China's Others, which typically portray the violated one (usually China) as fully compliant with some set of external norms or laws (e.g. international agreements such as the *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* in Chapter 6), whereas the violator is shown to have abused or flagrantly disregarded those same conventions, thereby being unfair and hurting China's interests. This is to foreground the position of China's opponent as illegitimate because it is not following the recognized legal/moral norms. In contrast, China is legitimized because it Self-represents as scrupulously conforming to the same set of laws, rules or norms that the Other has unashamedly violated. This is a fairly predictable rhetorical strategy which is employed whenever the state-press reacts to accusations of, for example, violations of human rights. The following extract, which further illustrates this point, is from the more recent set of articles regarding Chen Guangcheng. Extract 4.27 begins with the preposition 'If', which injects a note of doubt and raises the proposition that the U.S. may habitually disregard 'international laws and the basic norms'. *If* the U.S. follows them (as it says it does), then it will have to agree with China's viewpoint, as shown below:

Extract 4.27

If the U.S. government follows international laws and the basic norms of relations among nations, it does not have the right to make any demands on the Chinese government. (U.S. VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL LAW, 7 May 2012, *China Daily*)

In sum, 'legitimization and delegitimization are in fact the overriding concerns' (van Leeuwen 2008: 65) of the Chinese English press. But, van Leeuwen points out, these two 'cannot stand on their own'. They must be represented by 'actions and

reactions [...] however reduced, generalized, and abstract this representation may be' (2008: 65). In conformity with this, the core purpose of Judgment and its sub-categories of Social Sanction and Social Esteem are for the legitimization of the ingroup as highly moral, correct, legal, just, and benevolent. According to Appraisal Theory, the converse of this, which is the delegitimization of the outgroup, is entextualized through negative evaluations by representing the outgroup as manipulative, deceitful, and/or corrupt, as conceptualized through the moves of the ideological square.

4.5 Discourse strategies in media texts

In stepping back to see the larger picture presented by the data in this study, there are manifestations of macro-discursive strategies that predominate and persist, in the shape of recurring themes and underlying orientations. Van Dijk's notion of this is similar to Thompson's '*argumentative structure*' (1984: 136, emphasis in original) which is 'supra-sentential' and acts as 'chains of reasoning' within discourses. Several discourse level strategies, as mentioned in Chapter 1, are: (i) pointing to how things used to be before the CCP came to power in 1949 by which it may lay claim to be 'making progress' on human rights; (ii) that China is different from other nations and is therefore, at its own pace and in its own way, developing a particular form of human rights; (iii) that human rights discourse is a Western plot to weaken CCP control through criticism of its internal affairs; (iv) to foreground the human rights contraventions of other nations, such as the U.S., the European Union or Japan, for example, as being hypocritical; (v) state triumphalism. Because these are used as discursive platforms to justify the CCP position, I will refer to them as legitimization strategies.

The strategy of legitimizing and delegitimizing is repeated throughout the data as manifested in a range of mutually dichotomous processes such as defending/attacking, vindicating/accusing, exalting/debasing, approving/disapproving, endorsing/dis-endorsing, honoring/dishonoring, etc. (see Table 4.4). The list can be extended to include other pairs of binary opposites, but these are the ones I have commonly encountered. The overall strategy of the discourse producers is to legitimize Self through favoring the ingroup, while simultaneously delegitimizing the outgroup through the use of both covert and overt

negative representation strategies. In the continued analysis of making explicit what the official press wishes to leave implicit, I turn to Van Dijk's discussion of 'meaning strategies' (1991: 176), which are used, in one way or another, to embellish representations of positive-Self/negative-Other. This can take the form of 'presuppositions', 'implications', 'denial', 'concealment', 'blaming the victim', setting up 'contrasts' to show Our 'good' and Their 'bad', 'inference', 'euphemisms', 'negativization', and others (1991: 176–77).

SELF (Us)	vs.	OTHER (Them)
<i>LEGITIMIZATION</i>	→	<i>DELEGITIMIZATION</i>
Defending	→	Attacking
Vindicating	→	Accusing
Exalting	→	Debasing
Approving	→	Disapproving
Endorsing	→	Dis-endorsing
Honoring	→	Dishonoring

Table 4.4 Discursive strategies for legitimizing/delegitimizing representations of Us and Them

Whichever strategies discourse producers of China's English media adopt, they are infused with a singular logic. This, as stated previously, is to legitimize the agenda of the CCP and burnish its image, while delegitimizing that of any opposition. In the data collected for this investigation I have found salient functional discursive strategies working to establish legitimacy, operating through the dichotomies listed in Table 4.4. My purpose in this section of the analysis is to identify discursive strategies in text for negative-Other/positive-Self representation by investigating how the state press has positioned the Chinese government (on the one hand), and the dissidents (on the other hand), socially, politically, and ideologically.

Before moving on to the analytical chapters, it must be stated that 'legitimization is one of the main social functions of ideologies' (van Dijk 1998: 255). One area of legitimization which the Chinese English media often reverts to can be seen as reactive – the defense of Self – an inseparable part of which includes discursively depreciating the Other, either implicitly or explicitly. Claims to legitimacy include the obligatory discursive act of paying respect to established norms and locating oneself in a favorable position within existing legal/moral conventions as explained

in the previous section (on Judgment category of Appraisal). This is done while showing the Other as outside of, or in transgression of, the norm. Given the fact that legitimization strategies are generally institutional, they are seen as political (van Dijk 1998: 256), particularly when the institution is seeking validation for its discourses.

The next section turns to an introduction of the data and its sources, all of which come from state sanctioned English-language sources of China's print media.

4.6 The data

4.6.1 Data: Collection and sources

The data comes from electronic archives held by the Factiva Database accessed online through the City University of Hong Kong library. The sources for my data are *The China Daily*, *People's Daily Online* and Xinhua News Agency, the three main state-run English-language press sources in China. To augment the small corpus of articles on Chen Guangcheng from thirteen to sixteen, I have included for reference, three articles from *Global Times Web Edition*, which is described by *Wikipedia* as a tabloid published by *People's Daily*, and is perceived as overtly nationalistic. The qualitative analysis of a 'smallish' corpus (forty-nine articles for Liu and sixteen for Chen), as noted by Ruth Breeze, may actually be the 'only way of analyzing certain types of discourse', such as that pertaining to 'a particular politician or party' (Breeze 2011: 505), or as in this case, selected individuals.

The *China Daily* (established in 1981), according to its website, is the most widespread foreign language newspaper from China. It has a reported daily circulation of well over 400,000, i.e. 280,000 domestically; 50,000 in Hong Kong-Macau, and about 100,000 overseas (Shambaugh 2013: 234). In mainland China, it is available (usually free of charge) on airlines, in better Chinese hotels and coffee shops, or any place where foreigners might congregate. Its 'mission' states that it is the 'Voice of China' or 'Window to China' and is aimed at an international readership from diplomats, policy makers, officials, 'professors, researchers and students in universities...' and so on. The *People's Daily Online* (English) was founded in January 1997 and identifies itself as one of the 'largest comprehensive internet media on the market'. Its website quotes former President Hu Jintao as

saying that it performs a ‘unique role in advocating the Party's belief, guiding public opinion and warmly serving netizens in the years since inception’. The Xinhua News Agency, originally founded in 1931 as the Red China News Agency (changing its name in 1937), is China’s official press agency. It is the nation’s largest news collection center for information and press conferences and the dissemination of official press releases and is subordinate to the CCPPD. According to *Wikipedia*, it is also responsible for ‘handling, and in some cases, censoring reports from foreign media’ due for release in China. These news outlets are of interest because their objective is to propagate the officially engineered representations of what the foreign language community is supposed to be thinking and believing about China. As vehicles for these constructed images, they are one of the main methods (along with CCTV-9, CCTV-4, CCTV-News, and a significant number of government media websites) of propagating the CCP’s ideologically construed social and political positions to international readers/viewers. The state-run English press is obliged to reproduce a markedly uncritical view of the government, in lockstep with the Party’s worldview, with the aforesaid goal of legitimizing the CCP and its policies (Zhou 2003, Kluver 1996).

4.6.2 A quantitative look at the articles

This research entails a detailed analysis of two corpora of texts on the two individual dissidents, Liu Xiaobo (Chapter 5) and Chen Guangcheng (Chapter 6). The study includes all (100%) of the articles released by the state from the above named sources at the time of this research. The study is generally qualitative in its approach, but (below) I present quantitative data comparing the numbers of articles published in the Chinese press and the Western press displayed in Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7.

A particular strategy in dealing with issues that are potential sources of embarrassment to the CCP is, systematically, to not report them at all. This can be seen, for example, in the discursive treatment not only of Liu or Chen, but in other famous activists such as, for example, the previously mentioned Wei Jinsheng (of the fifth modernization), Li Wangyang²¹, Fang Lizhi²² and Gao Yaojie²³ where China’s English-language news either reproduces the Party line or remains silent. For comparative purposes, Table 4.5 shows the quantities of articles published on

these activists under the search terms of the person's name with the designated search period of 'all dates'. Such a comparison brings to light the lack of coverage by China's English press. It shows the media's role in keeping dissident voices out of the international public's earshot, particularly if it is related to contentious domestic issues, such as the treatment of dissidents, which generates negative implications for China's constructed global image.

	Wei Jinsheng	Li Wangyang	Fang Lizhi	Gao Yaojie
China's English press				
<i>China Daily</i>	0	0	0	9
<i>People's Daily</i>	0	0	0	0
Xinhua News Agency	0	0	30	9
Total articles	0	0	30	18
Western press				
<i>The Guardian (UK)</i>	2	2	34	12
<i>New York Times (U.S.)</i>	0	6	181	17
<i>South China Morning Post (Hong Kong)</i>	15	120	206	64
Total articles	17	128	421	93

Table 4.5 Contrasting the numbers of articles on famous activists/dissidents

In terms of frequency of reportage on such controversial and divisive matters as the treatment of activists, there is a rather large discrepancy between China's English-language press and the Western press as seen in Table 4.5. From the lack of publications, it appears that China's (state-run) media seek to minimize or downplay face-threatening issues; conversely, the Western media seize the opportunity to broadcast and foreground such controversies drawing on allegations of China's 'human rights abuses'. In Table 4.6 one notices a similar trend with articles on Liu Xiaobo in that the Chinese English press published a total of forty-nine. The three Western press sources, on the other hand, have published over well over seven hundred.

Liu Xiaobo	
China's English press	
<i>China Daily</i>	11
<i>People's Daily</i>	3
Xinhua News Agency	35
Total articles	49
Western press	
<i>The Guardian (UK)</i>	138
<i>New York Times (U.S.)</i>	177
<i>South China Morning Post (Hong Kong)</i>	430
Total articles	745

Table 4.6 Contrasting the numbers of articles on Liu Xiaobo

Coverage surrounding dissidents is minimal in China's press and indicates the strategic practice what Helmut Gruber calls 'trivialization', which in this case, is enacted through omission (Gruber 1997: 150). Liu (Table 4.6) and Chen (Table 4.7) are both represented as inconsequential or as noted, 'outside the community of relevance' (Scollon 1999: 22). Based on the quantitative discrepancies, one may presume with Jaworski (1993: 6) that silence does indeed communicate something. This leads one to consider what Fairclough calls 'scale of presence' (1995a: 106) regarding a subject, which runs from 'foregrounded' to 'nonexistent' and begs the deeply ideological question: *Why the reticence?*

Chen Guangcheng	
China's English press	
<i>China Daily</i>	4
<i>People's Daily</i>	1
Xinhua News Agency	8
<i>Global Times, Web Edition</i>	3
Total articles	16
Western press	
<i>The Guardian (UK)</i>	47
<i>New York Times (U.S.)</i>	92
<i>South China Morning Post (Hong Kong)</i>	134

Table 4.7 Contrasting the numbers of articles on Chen Guangcheng

These statistics are not surprising given that China's English press is geared to interaction with a foreign audience – an audience that generally holds issues related to human rights in high regard. After all, why discuss what is embarrassing in front of those you are trying to influence? Awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, as perceived by the CCP, has revealed a vulnerable spot in China's historical narrative, which in the hands of an antagonistic foreign press, is a potential means of delegitimizing China's political image on the international stage. My point however, is not to make implications based on China's downplaying of the Liu affair or the Chen incident simply from the low number of official articles published. In fact, no conclusions can be drawn nor ideologies made explicit without conducting a detailed linguistic analysis. To be fair, if one were to consider the proliferation of articles on the case in Western media, an ideological agenda could just as easily be identified based on over-reporting.

I now turn to some further observations concerning the practice of 'silence' or reticence, as a strategic move on the part of the media.

4.6.3 Strategic media silence

In his work on trends in China's modern political discourse, Cai Bei suggests that defining the social boundaries of the *xiaokang shehui* (moderately prosperous society) is 'deeply rhetorical, since it forms attitudes and induces actions by means of selecting objects for attention/inattention, emphasis/de-emphasis, and salience/absence' (2008: 16; see also Brown 1982, Wander 1983, Hall 1985, McKerrow 1989, Entman 1991). This includes not only what is said, but also what is left out as noted by Ebert who writes that rhetorical criticism should be 'a mode of knowing that inquires into what is not said, into the silences and the suppressed or missing' (Ebert 1993, cited in Cai 2008: 16) as part of the exposition of the controlling powers behind discourse.

The practice of silence is an interesting phenomenon as written about by Jaworski in *The Power of Silence*, who suggested that ‘silence itself may be a successful carrier of a message’ (1993: 96). In his study of deletion in political discourse, van Dijk (1997a) found that information can be selectively deleted or omitted altogether for ideological reasons. Wander (1983) believes that through the contrasting of what is silenced and what is present in texts, one may gain valuable insights regarding the construction of ideological and social realities. In discussing silence, Jaworski suggests a lack of media coverage creates feelings of ‘ambiguity and ambivalence’ in the public regarding anti-government dissidents. When there is no coverage

it is easier to conceal the truth and deceive the public about what is going on when events in question are the responsibility of some unimportant or devalued individuals [...] whose status is unclear, rather than a clearly defined group with accepted rights [...]. (Jaworski 1993: 132-33)

Inevitably, dissidents are represented as troublemakers and in the case of Liu, a criminal intent on the destruction of the CCP. Thus ‘silence’ is the attempt to keep dissident voices away from scrutiny by the international media lest the human rights issue continue to surface. The Western insistence on human rights, as previously noted, is represented in China’s English media as ‘anti-China discourse’ bent on creating chaos in Chinese society. Introducing bias against an Other is far more effective when the contradiction is represented in terms of nationality or ethnicity rather than on ideology. For example, framing the discourse of human rights as ‘anti-Chinese’ or ‘anti-China’, ‘demarcates’ the opposition far more clearly than framing it as ‘anti-socialist’ or ‘anti-communist’. Portraying ‘socialism’ in the role of victim would likely rouse little sympathy among targeted readers.

In terms of procedure, the analysis of the articles will be best done in stages with the first stage being a headline analysis based on transitivity. This could be seen as an inventory of articles in the *China Daily*, *People’s Daily* and Xinhua News Agency, which will give a general ideological characterization of the discourses they contain. This is followed by a more comprehensive critical analysis of the articles. Opinion-oriented articles are characterized by evaluations and persuasive commentary. As such, they do not necessarily follow the generic structure of informational news, or factual reporting. It is well documented (Brady 2008, Shambaugh 2007) that Chinese news networks, as I have said repeatedly, are the

tongue and throat of the CCP with their highest purpose being that of Party legitimization. ‘Chinese media organizations are bestowed with an unmistakable political mission – serving as the Party/state’s voice to promote its interest, policies, and ideology’ (Zhou He 2003: 202). This mandate, which influences all official Chinese media, also carries over into China’s English press, the foreign-language mouthpiece of the CCP.

To summarize the methods and characterize for the coming case studies, I refer to the following table:

CHAP.	CASE STUDY	CATEGORY OF SOCIAL ACTOR	ANALYTICAL METHOD
5	Liu Xiaobo	Criminal (legally declared): Convicted of subversion to overthrow the state under Article 5 of the Constitution; colluding with the ‘enemy’.	Critical Discourse Analysis
6	Chen Guangcheng	Mob organizer (embarrassment to government): Convicted of disturbing the peace, instigating chaos, being of low character; dishonest; colluding with the ‘enemy’.	Critical Discourse Analysis

Table 4.8 Outline: Chapter, Case Study, Category of social actor, and Analytical Method

4.7 Summary

This chapter has discussed the methodology for the analysis which will take place in the next chapters. I have explained my intended way of using SFL in the study of transitivity and the discussion of legitimization and delegitimization as a macro-strategy that involves sub-categories of recyclable discourse strategies. I have also discussed my use of selected aspects of van Leeuwen’s social actor network, and Appraisal Theory, namely the category of Judgment and its two sub-categories, Social Sanction and Social Esteem. The next chapter (5) on Liu Xiaobo, deals not only with an investigation of corpus headlines, but also the linguistic analysis of relational processes in the texts. All of this contributes to an indication of the general ideological position of the article.

CHAPTER 5

THE ‘CRIMINAL’

The living should really shut their mouths and listen to the graves speak.

– Liu Xiaobo (2012) *June 4th Elegies*

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is a critical analysis of the discursive representations of Liu Xiaobo in China’s English-language state press. The analytical tools for this purpose have been explained in the previous chapters.



Figure 5.1 Liu Xiaobo
(*The New York Times*, 8 October 2010)

In 2008, Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波), professor of literature at China’s Peking University, together with sympathizers, released the provocative document entitled *Charter 08* timed to coincide with the 60th anniversary of the *United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948). The Charter, signed by over 300 prominent scholars and writers, was a daring and controversial document due to its call for 19 radical political reforms (Mudie 2008) in

Chinese politics and society (*see footnote 11*).

Because of its demands for democracy and the end of one-party rule, *Charter 08* was seen as highly critical of the CCP. Unsurprisingly, the dissemination of the Charter led to Liu’s eventual detention and imprisonment for 11 years on the charge of ‘inciting subversion of state power’. The ironic twist to this story is that Liu was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on the 8th of

October 2010 ‘for his long and non-violent struggle for fundamental human rights in China’ (Nobel Peace Prize 2010 - *Press Release*).

Despite strident protests from the Chinese government, the Nobel Committee defended its decision and the award ceremony went ahead with the incarcerated Liu dramatically represented by an empty chair on the Oslo podium. The awarding of the Peace Prize to an anti-CCP dissident created a face-threatening situation for the Party. In response, the state-run media decided to retaliate with a campaign of defamation to delegitimize Liu Xiaobo and the Nobel Peace Prize, as well as the discourse of human rights, predictably characterizing them as insidious political tools, a Western ‘plot’ to humiliate China and violate its sovereignty. I will look at the discursive strategies used by the state media in the representations of Liu Xiaobo, the Nobel Peace Prize Committee, the West (in general), and the Chinese government itself to the targeted foreign audience. Preceding the analysis, I present an abridged review of Liu’s activities leading to his second incarceration.

5.1.1 A brief history of Liu Xiaobo

At the moment Liu is serving his eleven-year sentence, while his wife, Liu Xia, is under 24-hour house arrest. Their crime was to demand accountability from the Chinese government. Liu is deeply committed to seeing China live up to its own Constitution, specifically *Article 35*, which states that citizens should possess the right to ‘freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration’ (Sentenced for the crime of speaking, n.d.).

Liu, a professor of literature at Beijing Normal University where he obtained his PhD. in 1988, was not a political activist in his earlier days. He was an independent intellectual who would not be aligned with political sponsors for either gain or protection – nor would he refrain from censuring those of the literary community who did. He was decidedly critical of associates among the literary community who ‘postured’ as dissenters, but in fact, avoided any confrontation with power that might endanger their livelihoods. Because of his critical and outspoken views toward fellow writers who appeared to be a little too comfortable with the state, he became known as ‘the black horse’ among contemporary Chinese literati. While a visiting professor at Columbia University in the U.S., Liu heard about the occupation of Tiananmen in the spring 1989 and decided to return to support the

cause. He became immersed in the movement but was also disapproving of certain student tactics such as ‘letting anti-democratic practices develop in a movement for democracy’ (Liu, cited in Béja et al. 2012: 20). Seeing what was going on around him, Liu was moved by the spirit of dedication in his compatriots and became convinced that he was witnessing the emergence of a new democratic-minded Chinese citizen (2012: 19). His insistence on non-violence in the struggle for democracy led to comparisons with the likes of Nelson Mandela and Mahatma Gandhi. Immediately after the evacuation of Tiananmen on June 4th, while riding his bicycle around at night looking for survivors, he was recognized by the security forces and promptly arrested. Liu was labeled a ‘black hand’, denounced, and sentenced to twenty months in Beijing’s maximum-security Qincheng Prison as a result of his active role in the square. He was released in January of 1991, but was imprisoned again from May 1995 to January 1996, and from October 1996 to October 1999. In December 2009, because of his role in authoring *Charter 08*, he was sentenced to a fourth prison term, which he is currently serving in Jinzhou Prison in China’s northeastern Liaoning Province. He is due for release in 2020.

During the Tiananmen protests of 1989, Liu had been spiritually transformed by the movement, but at the same time, was haunted by what he had witnessed there. In the midst of serving his 11-year sentence, he wrote:

The souls of June 4th have been watching me from the sky, for fourteen years. To me, a participant in the ‘89 movement, that night and that dawn pierced by bullets and crushed by tanks, the memory of lightning-like bayonets have, to this day, been engraved in my memory. (Liu, cited in Béja et al. 2012: 21)

Each year since 1989, he has commemorated the massacre in poetry and in doing so, inscribes ‘the story’ of Tiananmen that has been deleted from China’s current state-version of history. Together, Liu’s poems comprise the *June 4th Elegies*, which is a unique contribution to Chinese literature in that it is poetry blended with deeply political convictions. Journalist Paul Batchelor has described Liu’s poetry as possessing an aesthetic that has made defying government policy a form of art. It can also be described as Liu’s struggle to make ‘an absent history present’ (Batchelor 2012).

5.2 Analysis of articles on Liu Xiaobo

5.2.1 Article headline analysis

I will begin the study of the discourse on Liu with a transitivity analysis of headlines. This provides a general orientation to the articles and shows how the various actors and participants are represented and how such headlines attempt to orient the readers toward processing the texts in a preferred manner.

In this section, it is not my intention to give a detailed review of academic literature on ‘headlines’, but a brief synopsis of their functions would be in order. It is safe to assume that headlines ‘have the highest readership’ among newspaper readers and will always be looked at, if only fleetingly, before the article is read (Mårdh 1980: 11). This implies that headlines will have impact whether or not the reader goes on to finish the article. The fronting of more important information in news reports has been labeled ‘relevance structuring’ (van Dijk 1988: 11). What is ‘relevant’ and how ‘relevance’ is defined, however, is a crucial question in itself. For example, in an informational article on a traffic accident, people and events may be objectively or even sympathetically portrayed. In a political article, however, what is relevant to the advancement of the ruling ideology might be considered more important. Again, what is significant is not the event in itself, but the *representation of the event* and how it is constructed for readers. Develotte and Rechniewski (n.d.) suggest that the ‘impact of headlines on the reader is likely to be all the stronger because certain *linguistic* features of titles make them particularly memorable and effective’ (emphasis in original). Michael Halliday called this type of abridged language ‘economy grammar’ (1967) due to its concision. The ‘economy grammar’ of headlines, ‘subjectively defines’ the most pertinent information of the news article. At the same time, they convey the ‘underlying semantic macro-structure’, or main message, of the article (van Dijk 1988: 189). I mentioned earlier that headlines are the first point of contact between the writers of newspapers and their readers and carry the highest probability of being read, often even before it is in the reader’s hands. It is therefore important for writers to condense the newspaper’s core beliefs as succinctly as possible into the headlines. Though headlines are not the main part of my investigation, the analysis of transitivity in headlines can indicate the ideological orientation of the articles.

In Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 below, I attempt to identify the participants/actors and the processes attributed to them by the *China Daily*, the *People's Daily Online* and Xinhua News Agency. For each individual headline, I identify the participants' semantic role as well as the process type embedded in the verbal group according to Halliday's suggested method of SFL.

5.2.1.1 *China Daily* headlines

In order to conduct an analysis of transitivity patterns, I gathered the headlines from the data set that mentions Liu Xiaobo. This constitutes the full number of articles published on Liu published by the mentioned sources. The bulk of the articles went to press around the time of Liu being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in November 2010, although in the Xinhua News Agency corpus, some articles date back to the earlier Tiananmen crackdown of 1989. The first such headline analysis is carried out on the *China Daily* (ten articles) where I attempt to classify participants' roles and processes as they are represented by nominal and verbal groups. In ideological terms, the participants in the headlines are basically of two camps, the first being the 'Nobel Peace Prize' and 'Liu' its recipient (synonymous with 'the West') negatively portrayed; and the second is 'China', positively portrayed as both legally sanctioned actor, and sympathetic victim. In the following tables, the use of the square brackets in the Process column indicates ellipsis of the auxiliary verb (i.e. it is not physically in the text). I have written out the full word 'elliptical' in Table 5.1, but in the following tables, the symbol '[...]' (in the Process column) will indicate the ellipticization of the head constituent/s of the verbal group (i.e. the auxiliary) if they are encountered.

No.	Date	Participant	Process	Participant/ Circumstance
1.	11/10/10	Part of the plot {Actor}	[is] to contain {Material (elliptical)}	China
2.	29/10/10	West {Actor/Sayer}	[is] flawed {Relational (elliptical)}	on human rights
3.	01/11/10	Prize winner {Carrier}	is {Relational}	anti-China
4.	01/11/10	Nobel Peace Prize {Carrier}	[is] not {Relational (elliptical)}	international community voice
5.	08/11/10	[It] {Carrier}	[is] not {Relational (elliptical)}	a noble way of involving China
6.	08/12/10	Many {Actor}	stay away {Material}	from ceremony

7.	11/12/10	Peace Prize {Carrier}	[is] {Relational (elliptical)}	a political farce
8.	13/12/10	Sino-U.S. ties {Carrier}	[are] not {Relational (elliptical)}	a zero-sum game
9.	13/12/10	Peace Prize {Behaver}	ignores {Mental}	its ideals
10.	14/12/10	Peace Prize {Carrier}	[is] {Relational (elliptical)}	a mockery of its ideals

Table 5.1 Transitivity patterns in *China Daily* headlines on Liu

It can be seen in Table 5.1 that of the ten *China Daily* headlines listed, all the actors in the subject position are either the Nobel Peace Prize ('Prize' or 'Peace Prize'), or an entity that the *China Daily* would like us to associate with the Prize (i.e. 'West'; 'Prize winner'; and, 'Sino-U.S. ties'). These nominal groups are thus the dominant Actors in the processes represented in the headlines. For example, processes in which these participants are involved are those that portray efforts to restrain or suppress China in some way. Processes such as 'to contain', in the first headline, represent 'the West' as plotters scheming to control China. Liu is implicated in this 'plot' because he is recipient of the Prize.

Most media coverage from abroad represents Liu as the victim of repression; but to the Chinese government, due to the internal legal process, he is officially 'a criminal', with China as his victim. As mentioned earlier, the legal status of Liu's criminality minimizes the need for bias to be entirely covert. To combat the negative implications of Western news media that portray Liu as a victim of repression (which reflects badly on China), China's official media must attempt to neutralize, discredit or delegitimize it. Therefore, processes in the headlines in which the participant is semantically related to the Peace Prize are negatively represented. This is undertaken by lexicalization in using terms such as 'flawed' (headline 2), 'stay away' (headline 6), 'ignores' (headline 9), or '[is] not' (headlines 4, 5, 8). Each headline encodes at least one derogatory referent among either the processes as verbal groups, or the participants as nominal groups. These are exemplified in the negative associations encoded in 'plot' (headline 1), 'anti-China' (headline 3), 'political farce' (headline 7), 'a zero-sum game' (headline 8), and 'a mockery' (headline 10).

In each *China Daily* headline related to Liu Xiaobo, China is represented as the non-aggressive recipient or the innocent victim of the Western conspiracy to

dishonor and disgrace China by awarding the prestigious Nobel Peace Prize to one of its dissident sons. With its image on the line, the only recourse for the state media is to delegitimize the Prize. Consistent with the discourse strategy of positive-Self/negative-Other representation, this is attempted through counter-representations, not only of the Committee behind the Prize, but also Liu (its recipient), the Chairman of the Nobel Committee (Thorbjorn Jagland), the ‘West’ in general, and indeed, the Nobel Peace Prize itself.

5.2.1.2 *People’s Daily Online headlines*

In contrast to the *China Daily*, the *People’s Daily Online* headlines have one instance of agency wherein ‘Beijing’ is in the subject position as Actor in a somewhat aggressive metaphorical verbal process where it ‘blasts’ the Prize. This transitivity pattern is consistent with the latter third of Xinhua headlines (Table 5.3, headlines 18–34), which represent China in agentive verbal and material roles, as explained below. Other than the one instance of representing China as agent in an assertive process, the *People’s Daily Online* (Table 5.2) is more restrained than the *China Daily* in two particular ways. Firstly, it circulated only three press releases on the topic of Liu Xiaobo and the Nobel Prize compared to the *China Daily’s* ten articles; and secondly, as mentioned above, it presents ‘Beijing’ (headline 1) in the assertive subject position rather than placing a referent of China in the role of ‘victim’ as Goal.

No.	Date	Participant	Process	Participant/ Circumstance
1.	09/10/10	Beijing {Actor}	blasts {Material / (metaphorical) Behavioral}	Nobel Peace Prize meddling
2.	18/10/10	Nobel Peace Prize {Behaver}	goes astray {Behavioral}	politically
3.	10/12/10	Nobel Peace Prize {Carrier}	facing {Relational}	great embarrassment

Table 5.2 Transitivity patterns in *People’s Daily Online* headlines on Liu

As in the *China Daily*, the *People’s Daily* headlines each contain at least one negative encoding regarding the Other. If the negative encoding is not found in the process, it can be found in either the Participants or Circumstance; the point is that

in all thirteen headlines examined from these two sources (*China Daily* and *People's Daily Online*), each contains at least one negative reference in relation to the Nobel Prize and/or Liu Xiaobo, which is consistent with the discourse strategies of the ideological square. For example, the first headline uses 'meddling' as a descriptor for the Nobel Peace Prize, attaching the negative implication that awarding it to Liu was an intrusion into China's internal affairs. The second headline invokes the negative process of 'going astray' to imply that the Prize has wandered from its original purpose. The third headline suggests that 'great embarrassment' will befall the Nobel legacy if the prize is awarded to Liu.

5.2.1.3 Xinhua News Agency headlines

One of the principal things noticeable about Table 5.3 (below) is that the first two press releases are dated in 1989 and the third and fourth in 1991. These are dates temporally closer to the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen incident, which has not ceased to be an issue of controversy. Xinhua is the only official government source to have published press releases (in English) from this earlier period as the search turned up no references to Liu Xiaobo before 2010 in either the *China Daily* or *People's Daily Online*. After Xinhua's first batch of four releases, there is a ten-year gap (beginning with headline 5) till the next articles that were published from 2009–2011. Xinhua News Agency was the only one of the English language news sources in China to mention Liu's actual sentencing to 11 years imprisonment at the time when it actually happened in December 2009. They also published three times on his appeal against the sentence in February 2010 (which was subsequently rejected). Of the nine press releases issued around the sentencing in December 2009, six of them contain a mere one to four lines, making them sufficiently brief so as to bear no significant information other than that he was sentenced. The stories of Liu at that time were limited to the bare minimum. Of the three releases concerning his February 2010 appeal, two contain one line while only the third could be considered a full article. Consistent with the notion of suppressing information that might portray the outgroup as victims (thereby raising 'sympathy' capital among readers), this shows the attempt to trivialize this particular dissident issue.

No.	Date	Participant	Process	Participant
1.	25/07/89	University lecturer {Goal}	[...] detained {Material}	in Beijing
2.	19/09/89	Square {Goal}	[...] evacuated {Material}	peacefully – further testimony
3.	27/01/91	Another group of offenders {Actor}	[...] involved {Material}	in anti-government riots in Beijing
4.	03/04/91	Adjudication of criminals involved in anti-government riots {Carrier}	[...] {Relational}	basically completed – Chinese judge
5.	24/06/09	Liu Xiaobo {Goal}	[...] arrested {Material}	for alleged agitation aimed at subversion of government
6.	25/12/09	Liu Xiaobo {Recipient}	[...] sentenced {Material/Verbal}	to 11 years in prison
7.	11/02/10	Beijing court {Actor}	upholds {Material}	Liu's initial sentence
8.	08/10/10	Liu Xiaobo's Nobel Peace Prize {Actor}	could harm {Material}	China-Norway ties: FM spokesman
9.	13/10/10	[It] {subject pronoun/place holder}	[...] {Relational}	Big Mistake {Attribute} to award Nobel Peace Prize to noncontributory to peace: Norwegian professor {Carrier}
10.	14/10/10	A prize that {Actor}	goes {Material}	against Nobel's ideas
11.	14/10/10	Western governments {Behaver}	have {Behavioral}	"no right to interfere" in China's affairs: FM spokesman
12.	15/10/10	Liu Xiaobo's Nobel {Actor}	comes {Material}	amid western countries' push for values: Chinese scholar
13.	15/10/10	Nobel Peace Prize {Actor}	no longer respects {Behavioral/Mental}	Nobel's peace will:
14.	17/10/10	A peace prize that {Actor}	ignores {Behavioral/Mental}	Norwegian professor true human rights
15.	17/10/10	Liu Xiaobo's Nobel win {Receiver}	criticized {Verbal}	development as harming prize's spirit
16.	17/10/10	Xinhua Insight: Foreign disputes {Actor}	highlight {Material}	complicated situations facing China's future development
17.	29/10/10	Why {Carrier}	was {Relational}	Jagland wrong?
18.	29/10/10	China's judicial sovereignty {Behaver}	brooks {Behavioral}	no interference: court spokesperson
19.	05/11/10	Some foreign media {Senser}	misunderstand {Mental}	Liu Xiaobo's case:
20.	10/11/10	UAE {Sayer}	says {Verbal}	criminal law expert Nobel Peace Prize Committee's decision
21.	30/11/10	Ethnic Chinese in Norway {Actor}	hand {Material}	politically motivated protest letter to Norwegian Nobel Committee
22.	02/12/10	China {Sayer}	says {Verbal}	ties with Norway affected by Nobel Committee's decision to award peace prize to
23.	08/12/10	What {Carrier}	is {Relational}	Chinese criminal behind "enshrining" Liu

24.	09/12/10	China {Sayer}	expresses {Verbal/Behavioral}	Xiaobo? firm opposition to U.S. resolution on Liu Xiaobo
25.	09/12/10	Norwegian lawyer {Sayer}	lambastes {Verbal/Behavioral}	Nobel Committee for promoting controversy, ill will
26.	10/12/10	Nobel Peace Prize {Actor}	has fallen {Material/Relational (metaphorical)}	into disrepute: Norwegian commentator
27.	10/12/10	Xinhua Insight: Awarding Nobel peace prize to Liu {Senser}	ignores {Mental}	China's true human rights progress: scholar
28.	10/12/10	The clichés of	(Verbiage)	Nobel Committee Chairman {Sayer}
29.	11/12/10	China {Actor/Sayer}	hits back {Material/Verbal (metaphorical)}	at some western politicians' support for Nobel Peace Prize
30.	11/12/10	Justice {Actor}	will prevail {Material}	
31.	11/12/10	Overseas Chinese in Norway {Actor}	protest {Material}	against Nobel Committee's wrong decision
32.	11/12/10	Decision of Norway Nobel Committee {Senser}	does not represent {Relational (symbolizing)}	wish of majority of people
33.	10/03/11	Verdict on Liu Xiaobo {Actor}	has {Relational}	sufficient legal, factual grounds: legislator
34.	13/12/11	China {Sayer}	warns {verbal}	U.S. to stop interfering in internal affairs

Table 5.3 Transitivity patterns in Xinhua News Agency headlines on Liu

The thirty-four articles in Table 5.3 can be roughly divided into three general orientations or purposes. The early period (headlines 1–4) consists of the four articles chronologically closer to the Tiananmen protests as mentioned above. These articles, although they allude to Liu as one of a list of perpetrators, deal mainly with ‘incident’ and only refer to Liu specifically (as ‘University lecturer’) in one headline (headline 1). The second group (headlines 5–17) consists of twelve articles and deals with the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to Liu. In these headlines, Liu is more widely represented in the subject position by being directly mentioned five times. But he is also implicated indirectly, by association with the forces trying to discredit China, such as ‘Peace Prize’, ‘Western governments’ ‘Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel’ and so on. In these headlines, Xinhua is attempting to covertly discredit the Nobel Peace Prize and Liu through emphasizing their involvement in negative material and behavioral processes (see discussion below). The third set of headlines (18–34) shows more assertive manifestations of positive-Self/negative-Other presentation. In these headlines, China and/or its referents are represented in dominant agentive

positions in which they are involved in what appear to be forceful (mainly) metaphorical processes, which ‘say’, ‘express’, ‘lambaste’, ‘hit back’, ‘protest’, and ‘warn’ the Nobel Committee for awarding the Prize to Liu.

5.2.2 Discussion of headline transitivity structures

Passive structures can be utilized in order to construct more favorable representations by obscuring agency (‘passive agent deletion’ van Leeuwen 2008: 23). As noted above, passivization may not have ideological intentions (see section 4.3.2). In this case, however, passivization is used to mystify the questionable acts of China’s security apparatus, as shown in Table 5.3, headlines 1, 2, 5, 6 and 15. Here, courses of events ‘happen to’ Liu Xiaobo and other protesters, i.e. they are ‘detained’ (headline 1), ‘evacuated’ (headline 2), ‘arrested’ (headline 5), ‘sentenced’ (headline 6), and ‘criticized’ (headline 15). The first headline uses the passive voice which suppresses the agency of ‘who’ detained the lecturer, and headline 3 does the same, which also raises the question of ‘who’ had the square evacuated (or ‘who’ ordered the army to clear the square). In addition, headlines 5 and 6 (Table 5.3) both contain transitivity patterns that veil the question of ‘who’ is responsible for the arrest and sentencing of Liu. Headline 15 is another agentless process, as we read that Liu’s win is ‘criticized’ – but again – by whom? Each of these processes occurs without the explicit mention of agency, which is likely because revealing agency in these headlines reflects negatively on the government’s desired image, particularly in the sensitive area regarding human rights and abuse of power. In these agentless official headlines, it is seen that by representing the Other in passive roles and negative processes, they are delegitimized as if by ‘natural’ causes, as shown by the list of processes on the right side below:

(25/07/1989)	‘University lecturer’	→	‘detained’	[headline 1]
(24/06/2009)	‘Liu Xiaobo’	→	‘arrested’	[headline 5]
(25/12/2009)	‘Liu Xiaobo’	→	‘sentenced’	[headline 6]
(17/10/2010)	‘Liu’s Xiaobo’s Nobel win’	→	‘criticized’ (‘as harming’)	[headline 15]

In headlines where the Nobel Peace Prize (or its semantic relation) is mentioned in the agentive position, the actions it is associated with are represented in negative processes, such as in the verbal groups listed below on the right:

(08/10/2010)	'Liu Xiaobo's Nobel Peace Prize'	→	'could harm'	[headline 8]
(14/10/2010)	'a prize that'	→	'goes against'	[headline 10]
(14/10/2010)	'Western governments'	→	'have no right'	[headline 11]
(15/10/2010)	'Nobel Peace Prize'	→	'no longer respects'	[headline 13]
(17/10/2010)	'A peace prize that'	→	'ignores'	[headline 14]
(05/11/2010)	'some foreign media'	→	'misunderstand'	[headline 19]
(10/12/2010)	'Nobel Peace Prize'	→	'has fallen'	[headline 26]

At the chronological middle of the range of articles starting on 29 October 2010 (Table 5.3, headlines 18–34), Xinhua takes up a more aggressive stance and puts China and Chinese actors (and supporters) in the agentive role involved in more forceful processes. Presumably, this is meant to represent China in an assertive role as Actor and Sayer whose voice and actions are depicted in material and verbal processes, which are decidedly more confident. With one exception (headline 7, 11 February 2010, which puts 'Beijing court' in agentive subject position), from 29 October 2010 to the last article on 13 December 2011, China's actors are represented by Xinhua as engaged in relatively more forceful processes as shown below (with the active process shown on the right side of the page):

(29/10/2010)	'China's judicial sovereignty'	→	'brooks' ('no interference')	[headline 18]
(10/11/2010)	'UAE' [in support of China]	→	'says'	[headline 20]
(30/11/2010)	'Ethnic Chinese in Norway'	→	'hand' ('protest letter')	[headline 21]
(02/12/2010)	'China'	→	'says'	[headline 22]
(09/12/2010)	'China'	→	'expresses'	[headline 24]
(09/12/2010)	'Norwegian lawyer'	→	'lambastes'	[headline 25]
(11/12/2010)	'China'	→	'hits back'	[headline 29]
(11/12/2010)	'Justice'	→	'will prevail'	[headline 30]
(11/12/2010)	'Overseas Chinese in Norway'	→	'protest'	[headline 31]
(13/12/2011)	'China'	→	'warns'	[headline 34]

It seems, therefore, that when the Chinese English-language press wishes to hide agency or involvement of government representatives in a process which might be negatively construed by foreign readers, passivization is an option which serves to protect its image by not appearing as perpetrators of repressive processes. By bringing in the opinions of a 'Norwegian lawyer', the 'UAE' and 'overseas/ethnic Chinese in Norway' the agentive roles are somewhat dispersed or distributed, involving some of the international community to show that China is neither secluded, nor is it the only entity disapproving of awarding the Prize to Liu. This attempts to align China's interests with an international element through de-isolation.

Paul Chilton reminds us of the ‘embedding of propositions within a prepositional phrase adjunct’ (2004: 56), which can reveal the ideological orientation in representations as seen in headline 4 (Table 5.3). Here, adding the prepositional phrase adjunct ‘of criminals involved in anti-government riots’ to ‘adjudication’ embeds the proposition that the ‘criminals’ are the causes of social chaos and thus being promptly and decisively dealt with. Headline 5 (Table 5.3) also contains the prepositional adjunct ‘for alleged agitation aimed at subversion of government’, which encodes the sinister notion of a planned conspiracy.

The general orientations of the headlines, as essentialized stories in themselves, convey the important ideological propositions as contained in the articles. The analysis has shown that the headlines reflect the ideological view held by China’s English-language press regarding Liu Xiaobo. With the general orientation of the articles having been made explicit through the headline analysis, we now proceed to the analysis of relational processes involving social actors in the articles.

5.3 Processes of relation and attribution

In a discussion of relational processes in the Liu articles, one of the first encounters is with the process of creating a representation of the Nobel Committee as mistakenly awarding the Prize to Liu as reported in the *China Daily*. In this particular case, the text reads (relational process underlined):

Extract 5.1

Confucius once said that when something was called by the wrong name it was the result of a failure of understanding and an inability to perceive reality. This is exactly the case with the Norwegian Nobel Committee, which awarded this year's Peace Prize to the criminal Liu Xiaobo. (PEACE PRIZE MOCKERY OF ITS IDEALS, 14 December 2010, *China Daily*)

The relational process to which I am referring follows the syntactic structure *X serves to define the identity of Y*, as in ‘This is exactly the case with the Norwegian Nobel Committee’. ‘This’ anaphorically refers to the misnaming of Liu as stated in the preceding sentence, and is based on the Confucian tenet of *zhengming* (see section 2.8). The passage is saying that the Nobel Committee ‘failed’ due to its ‘inability to perceive reality’ and ended up awarding the prize to a ‘criminal’. The writers imply that this case is ‘exactly’ the same as the transgression of the

Confucian theory of calling a thing by the wrong name. In other words, the *China Daily* has appropriated a Confucian view, which has led them to judge the awarding of the Prize to Liu Xiaobo as an error.

The following example in Extract 5.2 also consists of two sentences and shows a similar pattern to the example above, in that the second sentence, in a relational process, includes an anaphoric reference to the definition contained in the first sentence. This structure allows expansive description as it makes use of an elaborated hypothetical construction to describe negative consequences that ‘might’ occur if the population listened to and acted on the proposals in *Charter 08*. The hypothetical situation encoded in the first sentence is anaphorically referred to by the pronominal ‘That’ (of the second sentence) in the relational process and placed in the theme position. ‘That’ has now become ‘given’ information (i.e. old information), the imaginary situation described by the preceding sentence. The rheme (i.e. new information) is now encoded, as ‘the last thing Chinese people want’. The scenario conjectured in the first sentence uses the modality of possibility (shown by the use of ‘would throw’, ‘would not only interrupt’, ‘would sap’, ‘may even cause’), but then, rather than keeping with the hypothetical, switches to a modality of certitude by the use of ‘is’ in the second sentence. From the suggestion of a possibility to the assertion of a ‘reality’ is the implicit attempt to drive in an ideological ‘nail’.

Extract 5.2

However, the way proposed by Liu Xiaobo would throw this country into chaos, which would not only interrupt its economic growth and social development, it would sap the country's will and desire for further development and may even cause it to collapse. That is the last thing Chinese people want. (PEACE PRIZE MOCKERY OF ITS IDEALS, 14 December 2010, *China Daily*)

Another relational process (Extract 5.3), intended to cast doubt on the intentions of the Nobel Committee is the following passage. Again, the authors of this *China Daily* article assume the ethical high ground by positioning themselves as morally superior, while portraying (by extension) the Other (the Nobel Committee) as ethically inferior.

Extract 5.3

Are the gentlemen of the Nobel Committee really being faithful to the will of Alfred Nobel? The answer is no. (PEACE PRIZE IGNORES ITS IDEALS, 13 December 2010, *China Daily*)

In an attempt to cast the fog of doubt around the awarding of the Prize to Liu, the authors attempt to construct a discourse of negativity surrounding the award. In Extract 5.3 above, the strategy of posing a rhetorical question, then supplying the ‘correct’ answer, is performed through the use of an identifying relational process, i.e. ‘The answer is no’. This serves to decouple the activities of the Nobel Committee of today from the ‘virtuous’ origins intended by its historical founder, suggesting they no longer have ‘historical positioning’ (section 2.9). The authors (*China Daily*) thereby claim to know the *real* ‘will of Alfred Nobel’. This allows them to be categorized as ethically correct, hence irreproachable regarding Nobel’s ‘will’. In comparison, the Other (the Nobel Committee), having lost its moral way, has been severed from the righteous cause of Nobel’s original objectives. For the purposes of negative-Other representation, the ‘targets’, Liu Xiaobo and the Nobel Committee, are discursively disconnected from the authentic Nobel legacy. These extracts show the syntactic strategy of delegitimizing the Other through a relational process based on a type of historical positioning.

In addition to negative portrayals of the Other, there are instances in the data of relational processes used for ‘positive’-Self representation, some examples of which are shared below.

Extract 5.4

as some problems will remain for a long time, including ideological differences and territorial issues, the main aim of Hu's visit is to seek consensus and build a "damage control" mechanism to ensure that occasional disputes will not escalate [...]. (SINO-U.S. TIES NOT A ‘ZERO-SUM GAME’, 13 December 2010, *China Daily*)

The relational process in Extract 5.4 is the underlined portion, which portrays then-President Hu Jintao’s visit to the U.S. as having the ‘main aim’ of seeking ‘consensus’. His mission is identified with lexis of reason and harmony (i.e. ‘seek consensus’, ‘damage control mechanism’, ‘to ensure’ disputes ‘will not escalate’). Generally, ideological readings of such articles represent Chinese officials as active agents of conciliation and good will against a background of U.S. intransigence. As positive-Self representation, President Hu is shown as following a balanced, reasonable course of action by going to the U.S. for the ‘main aim’ of creating a harmonious relationship. The macro-level picture shows China urging the U.S. to be

more accommodating and to let go of ‘cold war’ notions such as insistence on human rights. The article positions various Chinese officials as coaxing the U.S. and ‘urging’ them to ‘respect’ China. The ideological effect construes China as instructor/teacher, while the U.S., a baleful understudy, is bigoted and narrow-minded. The result is a one-dimensional, positive-Self representation of China with the ideological by-product of negative inference toward the Other. Self-aggrandizement is also evident in the excerpt below.

Extract 5.5

China is a staunch force for world peace and stability. The contribution it has made to world peace and development is significant. (PEACE PRIZE A POLITICAL FARCE, 11 December 2010, *China Daily*)

Extract 5.5 shows two relational processes both of which positively portray China:

China	→	is	→	a staunch force...
The contribution...	→	is	→	significant

Affirmative representations like these conform to the moves of the ideological square. While both represent China in the manner it would like to be perceived, the second ascribes to itself the attribute of ‘significance’ for its contribution to ‘world peace and development’. Virtually every representation of the Peace Prize (in relation to it being awarded to Liu), the Nobel Committee and/or the U.S., is negative (the moves are to ‘emphasize’ negative information about Them, and ‘repress’ positive information about Them).

5.3.1 Relational processes in the *People’s Daily Online*

In the *People’s Daily Online* articles (Table 5.4, below), the relational processes classify Liu in various negative associations. He is identified, blatantly, as ‘a criminal’ (clause 1), as ‘an offender held in custody’ for the serious crime of ‘subversion of state power’ (clause 7), and as someone who is ‘definitely not a peace fighter’ (clause 8). There is also the attempt to censure his fame as an advocate of democracy through dis-creditation and the discursive disassociation of Liu from the cause of civil liberties by simply stating that his cause is ‘not a matter of free speech and human rights’ (clause 10), which again, is Gruber’s (1997) concept of

‘trivialization’ of the individual and his cause. According to the ‘monothetic’ reservoir (Berger and Luckmann 1966:87), or ‘stock of knowledge’ (Aho 1994: 30–1) described in some detail in section 2.5.1, Liu is also ‘piggy-backed’ with the Dalai Lama (clause 6). In this way, deprecation is managed by association with another ‘destructive’ character, someone who has already been negatively represented for many years as a ‘splittist’ and one of the only two ‘Chinese national[s] to win the [Nobel] award’ (clause 3), which further solidifies the association between Liu and the Lama. Chinese media has relentlessly generated negative press on the Dalai Lama over the past few decades and merely linking Liu Xiaobo to the Dalai Lama discursively saves a great deal of rhetorical work in that the linkage between the two creates a synonymy representing Liu as being of the same ilk. In addition to the above, the Nobel Peace Prize and the Committee are shown in relational processes to have been ‘led astray politically’ (clause 5), and have been in ‘flagrant defiance’ (clause 9) of China’s judicial system. The division of social actors into Us and Them is epitomized by the conflicting discourses of human rights (and the presupposition of negative values) on the one hand, and the discourse of sovereignty (associated with Us) symbolizing positive values, on the other.

No.	Participant	Process	Participant / Circumstance
1.	[..] Liu	was	a criminal
2.	this	was	the wish of Alfred Nobel
3.	Liu	is	the second Chinese national to win the award
4.	what Liu advocated	is	something that Chinese people do not care about
5.	the Nobel Peace Prize	is	an award that has been led astray politically
6.	the former [Dalai Lama]	is	a separatist bent on undermining ethnic unity
7.	the latter [Liu Xiaobo]	is	an offender held in custody for inciting the subversion of state power
8.	he [Liu Xiaobo]	is	definitely not a peace fighter
9.	which [Nobel Committee’s decision]	is	"flagrant defiance" and "gross interference" in China's judicial system
10.	The issue of Liu Xiaobo	is	not a matter of free speech and human rights
11.	Liu Xiaobo and Hu Jia [dissidents]	are	currently in prison
12.	What Liu has done	is	contrary to the purpose
13.	they [Nobel Committee]	are	absolutely wrong

14.	the Nobel Committee's decision	is	tantamount to overt support for criminal activities
15.	the Nobel Peace Prize embarrassment	is	inevitable at present

Table 5.4 Relational processes from *People's Daily Online* articles on Liu

The *People's Daily Online* represents Liu and his ideological associates (the Dalai Lama and the Nobel Committee) in subject position, which draws attention to these social actors through foregrounding their activities. There are virtually no Chinese actors of the ideological ingroup in the thematic subject position. This strategy syntactically foregrounds Liu and his associates, so that they are represented as the cause of any conflict between China and the Nobel Committee, which, in this particular case, stands as a surrogate for 'the West' as exemplified in other extracts. Liu and his associates are therefore associated with processes related to crime (clause 1); irrelevance (that 'Chinese don't care about', clause 4); being led politically astray (clause 5); undermining unity (clause 6); defiance and interference in China's affairs (clause 9). A negative redefinition of the meaning of 'freedom of speech' and 'human rights' is attempted (clause 10) with the covert intention of somehow breaking the association of these democratic values from any connection to Liu's cause. In ideological terms, these may be construed as biased exemplifications in the attempt to reinforce positive-Self/negative-Other representation. These processes reveal what sorts of qualities are ascribed or imputed to the Carriers Liu and the Nobel Committee by the *People's Daily Online*. Liu and/or the Nobel Committee are consistently placed in the theme position, which positions them both conceptually and grammatically, for attribution. Linking Liu and the Committee with such associations as 'currently in prison' (clause 11), 'contrary to purpose' (clause 12), 'absolutely wrong' (clause 13), are obviously 'complex value judgments' (Hodge and Kress 1993: 112), all of which are pejorative. What is marked about these attributions presented in Table 5.4 is that they contain no forms of mitigation, and project a modality of certitude rather than moderation. The absoluteness of the attributions is such that it grants no room for negotiation by the reader. The Us vs the Other demarcations represented by the use of evaluative language such as 'contrary' (clause 12), 'absolutely wrong' (clause 13) and 'inevitable' [embarrassment] (clause 15) do not offer the possibility of scale. Because there is no middle ground in the representation of these attributions, the

reader finds difficulty in negotiating an ideological acceptance of the message. Clause 14, in particular, is equating the decision of awarding the Prize to Liu as ‘support for criminal activities’, which, by using the term ‘tantamount’, offers the notion that the Nobel Committee’s actions are synonymous with those of criminals which intensifies and reinforces the Us/Them ‘demarcation’. The Identified-Identifier and Carrier-Attribute structure in these relational processes allows the *People’s Daily Online* to introduce disparaging appraisals, hence a negative bias, into their representation of both Liu and the Nobel Committee.

5.3.2 Relational processes in the ‘China Daily’

Below, Table 5.5 displays some of the main identifying relational processes as found in the *China Daily* articles on Liu. The data show the representation of the ideological differences between the various participants in the processes. It can be seen in the table that relational processes are used to construct a worldview that is represented in the language of opposing forces: China (and ‘the Chinese people’) vs Liu Xiaobo (the Nobel Peace Prize, the U.S., and ultimately, ‘the West’) (clause 35). This can also be reformulated as a conflict between two opposing ideologies: ‘nominal’ socialism vs capitalism; alternatively, these contradictory worldviews might be seen as the struggle between opposing orders of discourse, i.e. the struggle between two competing definitions of human rights (clause 34), and two competing definitions of sovereignty (clause 17). Here we have a world portrayed in terms of a ‘strongly demarcated’ polarization. On one hand there is China, self-portrayed as a ‘staunch force for world peace and stability’ (clause 21). The Other – a coalition of Liu and ‘democracy’ (clause 16); the Nobel Committee (clauses 19, 38); the West (clause 41), and Jagland the head of the Nobel Committee (clause 33) – as the opposition. It is a constructed view of reality where China, as a ‘staunch force for world peace’ (clause 21), is locked in a righteous dispute with an Other that is plotting (clause 38), and dreaming (Clause 20), ‘that China would fall apart and take to the Western path’ (clause 20).

No.	Participant	Process	Participant/Circumstance
16.	That [Liu Xiaobo's democracy]	is	the last thing Chinese people want
17.	sovereignty	has always been	the prerequisite of human rights
18.	this year's choice [of Prize winner]	is	a "political decision"
19.	the Nobel Committee	is	still day-dreaming
20.	Their dream	was	that China would fall apart and take to the Western path
21.	China	is	a staunch force for world peace and stability
22.	to most Chinese people Liu	is	simply a criminal
23.	It	is	the duty of citizens to safeguard the unity of the country
24.	It	is	also the duty of citizens to safeguard the security, honor and interests of the motherland.
25.	A harmonious and stable society	is	the fundamental requirement to protect Chinese people's human rights
26.	There	is	no consensus among the international community that "human rights are superior to sovereignty"
27.	the sovereignty of a state	is	the very foundation for its people to enjoy rights
28.	liberty	is	the right to do what the law permits
29.	there	is	no absolute freedom in the world
30.	As made clear by media in Pakistan and Russia, the decision this year	is	another political means of handling a non-Western country.
31.	Liu's attitude	is	the same as that of Western people who once branded China as the "sick man of East Asia"
32.	"Your life will become more meaningful if you have a certain amount of money"	is	his mantra
33.	Jagland's contention	is	a fallacy
34.	war in Iraq has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and	is	obviously a violation of human rights
35.	it	is	the West
36.	that	is	once again trying to interfere in domestic issues.
37.	Liu's award	is	a provocation to China
38.	the Nobel Peace Prize broadens the suspicion that there	is	a Western plot to contain a rising China
39.	The Norwegian Nobel Committee obviously	is	not such an authority
40.	the Norwegian Nobel Committee alone	is	not the only one on the decline
41.	The West-advocated 'human rights diplomacy'	face	a similar fate

Table 5.5 Relational processes from *China Daily* articles on Liu (part I)

An additional salient feature of Table 5.5 is that several items attempt to define or *re-define* key terms. This brings to mind the point made earlier regarding the crucial importance of the ‘*re-definitions* of terms’ in political arguments (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012: 93, emphasis in original), as well as Gledhill’s (1997) and Trömel-Plötz’s (1981) notion of hegemony resting in the power to permanently define terms. One of the definitions put forth by the *China Daily* articles is: ‘sovereignty’ as ‘the prerequisite of human rights’ (clause 17) as well as it being the ‘foundation for its people to enjoy rights’ (clause 27). Because the main argument against sovereignty is the discourse of human rights (Robertson 1999, Donnelly 2003, Laughland 2008), the case for human rights is framed as exceptional and isolated: ‘there is no consensus among the international community that “human rights are superior to sovereignty”’ (clause 26). This appears to be the discursive attempt to portray China as belonging to an imagined majority of nations that values sovereignty over human rights (the sovereignty vs human rights issue, as it appears in the data, is discussed in more detail in section 5.4.1 below).

China rhetorically classifies itself as ‘a staunch force for world peace’ (clause 21) whose citizens have the ‘duty’ of ‘safeguarding’ not only ‘the unity of the country’ (clause 23), but also ‘the security, honor and interests of the motherland’ (clause 24). As the Chairman of the Nobel Committee, Thorbjørn Jagland’s ‘contention’ is characterized as – ‘a fallacy’ (clause 33), while the Nobel Committee he leads is involved in ‘day-dreaming’ (clause 19). Liu’s award is defined as ‘a provocation to China’ (clause 37), while the choice of Liu as awardee of the Peace Prize is ‘a political decision’ (clause 18), which again alludes to ‘a Western plot’ (clause 38) to ‘contain a rising China’. When re-formulated to isolate its perlocutionary objective, it infers that the Chairman and his Committee deliberately plotted to shame China. The structure in this relational process, again, is ideologically formulated to represent Us (China) as virtuous, while the dishonorable intention of the Other (the Nobel Committee) was to embarrass China. Paradoxically, this relational process demonstrates that the implicit ideological intent embedded in the text is to covertly humiliate the Nobel Committee. Clause 39 (‘not such an authority’) and clauses 40 and 41 use a negative relational process (i.e. ‘not such an authority’; and, ‘*not* the only one’), rather than an affirmative relational in delegitimizing the Nobel committee. Below, I look at clauses 40 and 41 in more detail:

40. the Norwegian Nobel Committee alone is not the only one on the decline.

This delegitimization presented in clauses 40 and 41 is a more complicated representation using both forms of endophoric reference (i.e. anaphoric and cataphoric):

41. The West-advocated 'human rights diplomacy' faces a similar fate.

In clause 40, 'not the only one on the decline' requires the reader to look ahead in cataphoric reference to clause 41 to understand who the other 'one' is (i.e. 'The West-advocated human rights diplomacy'). The 'similar fate' mentioned at the end of clause 41 is revealed in anaphoric reference to the prepositional adjunct 'on the decline' in clause 40. (*Note: Due to length, Table 5.5 is divided into two tables. Part two (below) is labeled as Table 5.6*)

No.	Participant	Process	Participant/Circumstance
42.	It [Dalai Lama's Peace Prize]	is	really hard to understand
43.	social democracy	is	greater than anyone in this country could imagine three decades ago
44.	it	is	wrong to claim
45.	the latter [Human Rights]	is	superior to the former [Sovereignty]
46.	As	is	universally acknowledged [national sovereignty was established ever since the Treaty of Westphalia]
47.	This [that China would benefit from colonial rule]	is	absurd
48.	Liu's call to "change the regime" and "set up a federal republic of China"	was	inflammatory
49.	the Nobel Committee	is	biased
50.	its claim [Nobel Committee's] for "universal values"	is	false
51.	The contribution it [China] has made to world peace and development	is	significant
52.	For the just cause, support	is	abundant
53.	It	is	unfair to point a finger at Chinese law
54.	It [the Nobel Peace Prize award to Liu]	is	far from representative
55.	U.S.' failure to recognize this	was	unbelievable

Table 5.6 Relational Processes from *China Daily* articles on Liu (part 2)

In Table 5.6 we see the continued rhetoric of polarization in the discursive construction of a world divided by ideology. In clauses where the participants in subject position are nominal groups that pertain to the Other, the associations are consistently negative and further reflect the delegitimizing ‘rhetoric of subversion’ (Fisher 1970), explained in Chapter 2 (2.5.2). ‘Liu Xiaobo’, ‘the Nobel Committee’ and its ‘Peace Prize’, ‘the West’, etc. are represented as ‘really hard to understand’ (clause 42); ‘wrong to claim’ (clause 44); ‘absurd’ (clause 47); ‘inflammatory’ (clause 48); ‘biased’ (clause 49); ‘false’ (clause 50); ‘unfair to point a finger’ (clause 53); ‘far from representative’ (clause 54); and ‘unbelievable’ (clause 55). When the Carrier/Token is a nominal group concerning Us, its attributes are positive: e.g. ‘greater than anyone in this country could imagine’ (clause 43); ‘superior to the former’ (clause 45); ‘universally acknowledged’ (clause 46); ‘significant’ (clause 51); and receives ‘abundant’ (support) (clause 52). It is evident that judgments associated with the Other, its actions, and its participants are negatively represented; ‘Us’ on the other hand, is consistently and positively portrayed as unimpeachable.

Examples of discursive polarization in the articles appear to be realized through the ideological construction of definitions. As explained in section 4.2.1, relational processes are a linguistic structure suited for the purpose of assigning classifications and characteristics which make the participant distinguishable due to its ideologically determined definition. The political authority to create discourses allows discursive space for the ideological construction of meanings and ultimately, manipulations of reality. As noted, the result is a polarization of ideologies, portrayed by *China Daily* as a clash of worldviews over competing definitions of human rights and sovereignty.

This analysis of relational processes in these extracts from China’s English-language press shows that the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010 to Liu is construed as an indignity by the Chinese government. The analysis of discursive strategies used by the Chinese newspapers in defining, characterizing, classifying, judging and identifying social actors and their processes offers empirical linguistic evidence that reveals the discursive strategies used to construct a particular political worldview and indicate its ideological orientation. Indeed, one need not be a discourse analyst to ‘sense’ the general bias, both implicit and explicit in official Chinese media. The delegitimization of ‘the West’ is at times, blatant and continues intertextually, to be a work-across-the-media, a discourse not limited to any one time

and place. It has been recycled in various forms throughout China's media since the founding of the PRC with greater or less intensity depending on the order of discourse prevailing at the time. This order of discourse has contributed to the construction of a reservoir of presupposition or 'shared beliefs' (van Dijk 1998: 30–1) established on an anti-Other worldview. According to van Dijk's explanation, this means that because such beliefs have a '*general* or *abstract* nature' (1998: 31, emphasis in original), they perform the automated function of filling in knowledge gaps so that what is learned about the particular becomes stereotypical – i.e. generalized and applicable to all, thus establishing a pre-assembled, easily transferrable 'mental model' (van Dijk 1998: 79). Metaphorically, the feeding of any dissident's name into the established negative-Other reservoir of discourse associates it with pre-existing suppositions and thereby adds to it the weight of previous ideological assumptions with a minimum of rhetorical investment as illustrated in section 5.3.1. With the reservoir of presupposition already established and the process of demarcating Us/Them boundaries conventionalized, the democratic aspirations of any political dissident can be easily discredited by simply associating it with the 'foreign'.

From the linguistic data above, one could hypothesize that at the heart of the representations produced by China's English-language press concerning Liu Xiaobo and affiliates is the discursive act of *legitimization/delegitimization*. Legitimization is accomplished by pursuing the discursive strategies of the ideological square: i.e., delegitimize the Other by portraying the processes they are involved in and attributes they possess as negative (and/or destructive to China) – and foregrounding them. At the same time, legitimize Us by portraying the processes *we* are involved in, and the attributes *we* possess as positive – and foregrounding them.

5.4 The discourse macro-strategies of legitimization/delegitimization

In this final part of the analysis of the articles on Liu Xiaobo, I will examine three of the prominent macro-strategies that are realized in discourse. In Chapter 4, I discussed the discursive strategy of legitimization/delegitimization (see Table 4.4) as the dominant themes in China's English press, and that it is 'one of the main social functions of ideologies' (van Dijk 1998: 255). As with the analysis of headlines in this chapter on Liu (sections 5.2.1–5.2.2), followed by relational process (sections

5.3–5.3.2), it is appropriate to step back from a fine-grained linguistic analysis to look at the broader level of analysis that focuses on macro-strategies. By this I mean those strategies that are entextualized as general themes, as underlying arguments that seem to provide the logic that ‘drives’ the discourse, and are responsible for guiding the configuration of language in the text. Though the macro-strategies themselves are not necessarily articulated verbatim, they may be formulated at a metadiscourse level as overarching themes.

Van Dijk (2011: 312) stresses the centrality of language – if not explicitly, then implicitly – in the construction of political legitimacy. Among the techniques listed by van Dijk for this purpose are ‘boasting about performance’ (I use the term ‘triumphalism’), as the politically ubiquitous strategy of ‘positive Self-presentation’ (sic), which appears often in this analysis. The counterpart to this, ‘negative-Other presentation’, also emerges frequently in the data. Techniques for the purpose of delegitimizing the Other are crucial to the process of Self-legitimization and involve methods such as ‘blaming, accusing, insulting, etc.’ (van Dijk 2011: 312) as seen in Table 4.4. Below, are some examples of various discursive techniques used to ‘legitimize’ and favorably position the ingroup, while at the same time, ‘delegitimize’ the outgroup.

‘Legitimacy’ is an abstract quality to be achieved, whereas ‘legitimation’,²⁴ (or legitimization) is the ‘observable activity’ of making claims, what I would call the pursuit and acquisition of legitimacy as symbolic capital. As Rodney Barker notes, ‘what characterizes government is *not the possession* of legitimacy, but the *activity* of legitimation’ (2000: 9, my emphasis). Below are examples from China’s English-language press that demonstrate not so much the ‘possession’ of legitimacy, but the struggle, through discourse, to achieve it. Regarding the Liu Xiaobo case, the data show that the pursuit of legitimization involves the operationalization of three essential macro-strategies: (i) delegitimizing the Nobel Peace Prize and those associated with it; (ii) claiming ‘violation of sovereignty’; and (iii), asserting ‘Chinese characteristics’ as justification for the state of human rights in China.

In sections 5.4.1–5.4.3 below, I illustrate these discursive macro-strategies with textual extracts.

5.4.1 Delegitimizing the Nobel Peace Prize and those associated

The first order of delegitimization is to convey the notion that the current Nobel Committee has lost its way and, by awarding the Prize to Liu, has gone against its ‘original principles’ and thus has become hypocritical with neither legal nor moral under-pinning. The following extracts (5.6–5.8) from the article PEACE PRIZE MOCKERY OF ITS IDEALS (14 December 2010, *China Daily*) demonstrate this.

Extract 5.6

To be true to its name, the Nobel Peace Prize should have been awarded to someone who has been making, or has made, outstanding contributions to world peace. (PEACE PRIZE MOCKERY OF ITS IDEALS, 14 December 2010, *China Daily*)

Extract 5.7

However, the Norwegian Nobel Committee again awarded the prize to someone opposed to its original principles. (PEACE PRIZE MOCKERY OF ITS IDEALS, 14 December 2010, *China Daily*)

Extract 5.8

By awarding Liu the Nobel Peace Prize, the Norwegian Nobel Committee has not just tarnished its own reputation and demonstrated its hypocrisy, (PEACE PRIZE MOCKERY OF ITS IDEALS, 14 December 2010, *China Daily*)

This strategy in these excerpts focuses on the contraventions of the Other and characterizes them as unethical. By insisting on awarding Liu the Prize, the Committee has ‘demonstrated hypocrisy’ (Extract 5.8), portraying it, and its choice of Liu, as illegitimate. In Extract 5.7, this is shown by the *China Daily’s* observation that the Committee has made the same mistake twice (‘again’, Extract 5.7), the first time by awarding the Prize to the Dalai Lama. Similar to the overall functional strategy of what van Dijk calls ‘*apparent concession*’ (1995: 27), the use of the contrastive conjunction ‘however’ (Extract 5.7) serves to diverge from the preceding sentence (Extract 5.6) where a contrived sympathy with the Nobel Prize objective of ‘world peace’ is insinuated. Van Dijk suggests that generally speaking, ‘elite ideologies will de-emphasize social inequality by semantic strategies that aim to legitimate, justify, naturalize, rationalize, authorize, universalize, or deny injustice, to transfer it to other groups’ (1995: 27).

In the extract below (5.9), we find the commonly encountered practice in ideological discourse of citing supposedly impartial outsiders who ostensibly hold the same views as the author, again for the purpose of legitimization. This, as

previously noted, de-isolates the ‘Us’ position, uniting it with a wider consensus appears to be the attempt to claim legitimacy through alignment. The nominal group ‘Many intellectuals’ (Extract 5.9), however, is meaningless without a point of quantitative reference. The intention is that there are persons of academic status who agree with China on this issue. In fact ‘more than 100 countries and NGOs’ cited as opposing the Nobel Committee’s choice, though one may wonder what ‘countries’ and ‘NGOs’ have in common to be numbered together. By putting such images in words there is an attempt to discursively conjure strength and legitimacy by invoking the impression that the anti-Liu position is widespread, again invoking the notion of ‘majority’ as a means of legitimization. In terms of ideology, by including overtly negative views on Liu’s award (e.g. rendering ‘no service to the ideals of the prize’, and adding ‘no glory to the prize’) there is little attempt to approximate an objective norm of theoretical neutrality (see Figure 3.1).

Extract 5.9

Many intellectuals, some from Western countries, have criticized the Nobel Committee granting a peace prize to a criminal who has rendered no service to the ideals of the prize; more than 100 countries and NGOs have also expressed their opposition, emphasizing this year's award will add no glory to the prize. (PEACE PRIZE IGNORES ITS IDEALS, 13 December 2010, *China Daily*)

Reminding the reader that Liu is ‘a criminal’ (Extract 5.10, below) that has ‘acted against’ peace, that his Prize is ‘a farce’ and a ‘political tool’ is clearly an attempt through lexicalization, to undermine the legitimacy of this individual and the awarding Committee. In terms of polarization theory, this is again a ‘rhetoric of subversion’, where those who hold the ‘field’ (currently the state media) attempt to dispossess the ‘heterodox’ challengers not only of their voices, but also of any symbolic capital they might have gained in the eyes of a watching world. Subversive rhetoric, as ‘anti-*ethos* rhetoric’ (Fisher 1970: 138), is evident in these extracts as the authors utilize negative lexicalization (‘criminal’, ‘farce’, ‘tool’) and relational processes (‘the ceremony have now become not only a farce, but also a political tool’) to erode Liu’s credibility and the Nobel Committee’s ethical legitimacy by linking them unequivocally to negative identities, attributes and processes.

Extract 5.10

By granting the Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, the Nobel Committee has forgotten its own principles and assumed the role of defending a criminal who acted against the peace and

prosperity of his country. The prize and the ceremony have now become not only a farce, but also a political tool. (PEACE PRIZE IGNORES ITS IDEALS, 13 December 2010, *China Daily*)

In investigating the representations of Liu, we see a shift from an emphasis on character to an emphasis on the processes in which he is involved. The majority of discursive choices are made to show Liu as an active, negative force, who is seditious and destabilizing to society. These processes are, for example, ‘inciting’, ‘overthrow’, ‘organizing and inducing others’ in Extract 5.11. In Extract 5.12, much as in 5.11, he is involved in processes which ‘incite people’, to ‘subvert state power’ and to ‘overthrow’ the government.

Extract 5.11

They need to know that Liu was sentenced to jail because he was inciting others to subvert State power and overthrow the socialist system, organizing and inducing others to support his aims. (PEACE PRIZE MOCKERY OF ITS IDEALS, 14 December 2010, *China Daily*)

Extract 5.12

Gao said Liu clearly meant to incite people to subvert legitimate State power and overthrow the government. (MANY STAY AWAY FROM CEREMONY, 11 December 2010, *China Daily*)

The negative-Other representations do not end with Liu portrayed as ‘simply a criminal’ involved in the process of ‘plotting to overthrow’ (Extract 5.13, below). The discursive strategies used to portray Liu and his activities are very political in nature and, as stated, touch not only upon his moral character but also on his political activities. Extract 5.13 again plays on the theme of hypocrisy with the intention of delegitimizing the Nobel Committee. According to this *China Daily* article, it is suggested that the Committee has mislabeled Liu in calling him a ‘fighter’, when ‘to most Chinese people’ he is ‘simply a criminal’ involved in a conspiracy to depose the CCP. This misnaming of Liu by the Nobel Committee is again construed as a contravention of the Confucian tenet of *zhengming*, where a person must act in accordance with its name or societal chaos will follow. Extract 5.13 uses the semantic strategy of ‘disclaiming’ or what van Dijk calls ‘*apparent denial*’ (1995: 27, emphasis in original), by first stating what is promoted by the Other (i.e. ‘Jagland and Lundestad called Liu a "fighter"’); then, (in this case) by the contrastive function of ‘but’, the antithesis (i.e. what is believed by Us, our ideology)

is introduced in the clause, ‘to most Chinese people Liu is simply a criminal’, as a definitive relational process.

Extract 5.13

Jagland and Lundestad called Liu a "fighter", but to most Chinese people Liu is simply a criminal plotting to overthrow the State. (NOT A NOBLE WAY OF INVOLVING CHINA, 8 December, 2010, *China Daily*)

Delegitimization strategies reinforce the notion that only the state can correctly interpret the perfidious nature of Liu’s activities in promoting ‘anti-China Western forces’, as exemplified in Extract 5.14. The suggestion that a dissident is associated with foreign government, particularly Western, carries the assumption of treason. The ‘reservoir’ of presupposition is activated to construe the West as being historically ‘anti-China’ (as is also seen in Chapter 6 on Chen Guangcheng). The state-run media, when discussing dissidents in general, employs a similar ‘strong demarcation’ of the enemy (Dittmer 1987, and section 2.6 of this thesis).

Extract 5.14

To ensure his income, Liu has made unremitting efforts to work for the anti-China Western forces, reviling the government and the socialist system. (PRIZE WINNER IS ANTI-CHINA, 1 November 2010, *China Daily*)

Extract 5.15

From the mid-1990s, Liu began to work for a company subsidized by a foundation in the U.S. with a CIA background. (PRIZE WINNER IS ANTI-CHINA, 1 November 2010, *China Daily*)

Above, Extract 5.14 advances the allegation that Liu is working against the Chinese government ‘to ensure his income’, indicating that he is on the payroll of anti-Chinese forces, again conveying the proposition that Liu is indeed traitorous, as also emphasized in Extract 5.15 where Liu’s ‘CIA’ implications are foregrounded as new information. The inference that he is paid for his betrayal of the motherland casts him in an irredeemably negative role, that of the historical villain (i.e. ‘the collaborator’).

5.4.2 Claiming violation of sovereignty

Regarding sovereignty, in the data I repeatedly encountered the recontextualization of China’s position as explained in Chapter 1, which is that

sovereignty is seen to trump all other criteria as the fundamental prerequisite for human rights. Unsurprisingly, there are many invocations and claims that refer to sovereignty as the ultimate legitimizing criteria. Conversely, Western political scholars (Robertson 1999, Donnelly 2003, Laughland 2008) have viewed sovereignty as the primary *obstacle* to cooperation on human rights at the international level as discussed previously (see section 1.8). The claim of sovereignty is another strategy of legitimization and delegitimization in the discourse on Liu in which China is defending its position. This is a form of justifying the proposition that Western nations are ‘infringing upon’ China with their values regarding human rights and by doing so, ‘show disrespect’ to the Chinese people (Extracts 5.16 and 5.17).

Extract 5.16

but also infringed upon the sovereignty of China and showed disrespect to its people. (PEACE PRIZE MOCKERY OF ITS IDEALS, 14 December 2010, *China Daily*)

Extract 5.17

But the Western world is forcing its ideas of human rights on China. (PEACE PRIZE IGNORES ITS IDEALS, 13 December 2010, *China Daily*)

The West has ‘infringed’, ‘showed disrespect’ and is ‘forcing its ideas’ on China. These transitivity structures tend to portray China as the passive victim of an aggressive antagonist. Extract 5.18 (below) reiterates the same message of encroachment upon sovereignty. The overall strategy is to delegitimize any enquiry into China’s human rights situation and delegitimize the argument that human rights should be ‘universal’ and should prevail over sovereignty, as if there were no precedents for such an argument. A sense of ‘indignity’ is activated through portraying the West as ‘armed’ with ideology, thinking it is ‘entitled to infringe’,

and ‘using the excuse’ in a negative presentation as belligerent intruders, while simultaneously attempting to construct the Self-image of innocence. The nation is represented as being trespassed against, forced, and disrespected, under ‘the excuse of human rights’, which is the reinforcement of the same allegation in an earlier

article (Extract 5.18), that was released about six weeks before Extracts 5.16 and 5.17.

Extract 5.18

So they, armed with a Cold War ideology, thought they were entitled to infringe upon China's sovereignty using the excuse of human rights. (COMMENTARY: WHY WAS JAGLAND WRONG? 29 October 2010, Xinhua News Agency)

After the attempt to delegitimize the bearers of the 'human rights' discourse (i.e. the West), the next move appears to be the direct legitimization of 'sovereignty' over human rights. It is portrayed as incontestably legitimate by claiming that it historically pre-dates the concept of human rights (from the Treaty of Westphalia, 1648). This follows the logic of the ideological square in that the legitimization of the one results in the *delegitimization* of the other. So in the following extracts, while stepping away from attacking the *proponents* of human rights to attacking the *ideology* of human rights, the discourse of sovereignty is elevated above all (Extracts 5.19–5.21), but with no particular rhetorical strategy other than attempted irony (as sarcasm) to support this assertion.

Extract 5.19

As is universally acknowledged, national sovereignty was established ever since the Treaty of Westphalia (PEACE PRIZE IGNORES ITS IDEALS, 13 December 2010, *China Daily*)

Extract 5.20

Sovereignty is always the prerequisite of human rights and it is wrong to claim the latter is superior to the former (PEACE PRIZE IGNORES ITS IDEALS, 13 December 2010, *China Daily*)

Extract 5.21

defending Liu Xiaobo by replaying the obsolete Western tune, 'human rights stand superior to state sovereignty' (WEST FLAWED ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 29 October 2010, *China Daily*)

5.4.3 Declaring 'Chinese characteristics'

The following extracts seem to point to a strategy whereby there is an exchange in which the notions of 'progress' and 'economic development' are substituted for human rights. The fact that economic development has been exceptional is put forth as an alternative to human rights, as if its presence cancels out the need for the other. The phrase 'with Chinese characteristics' is ambiguous, as discussed in Chapter 2,

and may be suffixed to government programs or policies for which a theoretical justification has not yet been found, as seen in Extracts 5.22 and 5.23 below. In Liu's case, it is 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' portrayed as the ideological touchstone that legitimizes the aversion to engage in any discourse of reform on human rights. It is interesting that Habermas, as mentioned in section 1.7, wrote of the '*indivisibility* of all categories of human rights', and apprises readers of nations that offer 'economic' rights but ignore the issue of 'human' rights (2010: 468, emphasis in original):

Extract 5.22

this political farce will in no way shake the resolve and confidence of the Chinese people to follow the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. (MANY STAY AWAY FROM CEREMONY, 11 December 2010, *China Daily*)

Extract 5.23

striving to build a harmonious world order and to pursue the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics; China has become the world's second largest economy to date. (NOBEL PEACE PRIZE FACING GREAT EMBARRASSMENT, 10 December 2010, *People's Daily Online*)

Extract 5.24 (below) is an inclusion in the Liu Xiaobo articles which concedes 'devotion to improving' human rights – but only that particular strain of 'human rights' that does not overstep the guarded boundaries of power. Again, the invocation of 'Chinese characteristics' provides license to 'stylize' the issue of rights so that it is impotent and incapable of delivering democracy. It thus fits conveniently into the dominant order of discourse

Extract 5.24

Human rights experts, at home and abroad, have recognized China's devotion to improving and protecting human rights in a way that is consistent with Chinese characteristics. (AWARDING NOBEL PEACE PRIZE TO LIU IGNORES CHINA'S TRUE HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS: SCHOLAR, 10 December 2010, Xinhua News Agency)

There are other discursive strategies used to legitimize and delegitimize through positive-Self/negative-Other presentation, such as the claim of a 'plot' hatched by Western nations to destabilize and force certain values on China.

Extract 5.25

Like it or not, the Nobel Peace Prize broadens the suspicion that there is a Western plot to contain a rising China. (PART OF THE PLOT TO CONTAIN CHINA, 11 October 2010, *China Daily*)

There may be truth to the allegation that the West is insistent about the implementation of human rights in China, but the political aspects surrounding this question are open to debate. It has been noted that the state-run news services as government mouthpieces, portray the world in terms of a binary Us vs Them dichotomy which inevitably leads to a polarized worldview. Such a view facilitates defensiveness and the visualization of conspiracies (see section 2.5.1), where those in power, as noted by Boulding, tend to ‘see treachery where there is none’ (1956: 101).

5.5 Summary

In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate the nature of bias in positive-Self/negative-Other representations as found in China’s main English-language newspapers surrounding the controversial Liu Xiaobo. The state media’s strategy is based on a simplistic formula: the more Liu is made to look like a criminal, the less blame goes toward the state for repressing him. It is in the state’s interest to portray him as ‘a criminal’ and that is what these articles are about. In this case, because saving face is important to governments (and this case is no different), a reflexive strategy of ‘counter-accusation’ was decided upon. Blame is liberally and caustically extended to the Chairman, the ‘Nobel Committee’, the Nobel Prize, human rights discourse, and ‘the West’ in its entirety. This is a strategy that is less-than-ideal if the objective is to exude ‘soft power’ by communicating a sense of Confucian benevolence. Reducing the Liu controversy to terms of conflict and conspiracy, then going a step further by encoding this proposition into international media discourse, seems misguided. Nonetheless, the discourses analyzed in this chapter are entirely consistent with Group Relations schema and the four moves of the ideological square, where representations of positive-ingroup and negative-outgroup become a ‘site of hegemonic struggle’ (Matu and Lubbe 2007: 405).

As a final comment on this chapter: a notable feature of the state media anti-Liu articles is that they lack empirical confirmation to support allegations of, for example, being on the payroll of Western governments. Bank account numbers of transfers, dates of such transactions, times, names of banks or individuals,

encounters, etc., are not mentioned, which gives one the impression that the articles are, in effect, defensive reactions acted out through mediatized political discourse. Because the articles cite no pragmatic verifications as confirmation of Liu's crimes, the discourse overall appears to arise from ideological passion and pretext supported by allusion and innuendo rather than evidence.

CHAPTER 6

THE ‘MOB ORGANIZER’

The very ink with which all history is written is merely fluid prejudice...

-- Mark Twain (1897) *Following the Equator*

6.1 Introduction

This chapter is a critical analysis of the articles published in China’s state-controlled English press reporting on Chen Guangcheng (陈光诚) and his actions. For purposes of contextualization, I begin with an overview of Chen’s rise from relative obscurity in the Chinese countryside to international accolade as a globally recognized campaigner for human rights. While Chen’s efforts to defend the rural poor earned him the respect of human rights groups worldwide, it also incited the wrath of local government and eventually set him on a collision course with the central authorities in Beijing.



Figure 6.1 Chen Guangcheng in his trademark sunglasses. (2005, STR/AFP/Getty Images)

In 2006, the name Chen Guangcheng was listed on *Time Magazine’s* index of the ‘100 men and women whose power, talent or moral example is transforming our world’ (Beech, 2006). Despite his humble beginnings as ‘the barefoot lawyer’, Chen’s name was in *Time’s* category of ‘Heroes and Pioneers’ alongside the likes of Al Gore, Bono, Ralph Lauren and other celebrities. In a report on the Chinese names included in the *Time 100*, Shanghai newspaper *Dongfang Zaobao* (东方早报) wrote that the list included ‘Premier Wen Jiabao, Taiwanese movie director Li Ang, Chinese tycoon

Huang Guangyu, reporter-turned-environmentalist Ma Jun, and *other* Chinese’ (emphasis added). The unidentified ‘other Chinese’, according to reporter Zhang Yaojie (2006: 35), was, in fact, Chen Guangcheng. In discursively omitting all but the faintest trace of Chen, the *Dongfang Zaobao* article reflects the overall ‘reduced’ or ‘trivialized’ approach given to dissident issues across the spectrum of Chinese government media.

6.1.1 A brief history of Chen Guangcheng

Chen became globally known in mid-2012 due to his extraordinary escape from the small army of guards surrounding his family home in the countryside of Shandong Province. Subjected to house arrest, Chen feigned illness for a number of days in the effort to lull his captors into complacency. Under the cover of darkness, he was able to elude detection and audaciously fled from his closely watched house in rural Dongshigu Village of Shandong Province – no small feat for a blind man. With the help of other activists, he made it to Beijing on the cusp of an important economic conference between China and the U.S., where he was allowed entrance to the American Embassy. When news of his escape and the subsequent granting of sanctuary became known, it was strongly condemned in China’s English press on the grounds that it went against China’s laws, was interference ‘in the domestic affairs of China’, and a clear contravention of diplomatic norms (Xinhua News Agency, 2 May 2012). From his escape at Dongshigu until his departure for the U.S., twenty-eight days would pass. After undisclosed diplomatic negotiation between China and the U.S. preceding the highly anticipated *Fourth China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue*, Chen and his family were granted passports and left China for the U.S. on May 19th 2012.

International news agencies found the tale of a blind man able to outsmart his captors irresistible. As remarkable as this may be, the untold reasons for Chen’s eminence are the less visible qualities of tenacity and determination to carry forward the struggle for human rights in the face of monolithic power. Chen has no license to practice in the legal profession, but through knowledge gained from auditing law classes he was able to advise villagers in defending their rights. A major success for Chen came in 1997 when an inequitable land management scheme (‘the two-field system’), which had been unlawfully implemented by village officials, was

terminated through the courts. Chen mounted numerous other challenges to local injustices, but by doing so, he inevitably aroused the animosity of officials and police in the surrounding areas and eventually, the Beijing government. In spite of threats and intimidation, Chen and his wife, Yuan Weijing (袁伟静), continued fighting abuses that eventually led to a life of persecution and harassment. In September of 2005, as retribution for having filed a class-action suit against authorities for the illegal practice of forced abortions, Chen was placed under house arrest until March 2006. He was tried and incarcerated for four years and three months on August 24th of this same year on charges of ‘willfully damaging property and organizing a mob to disturb traffic’ (Xinhua News Agency, 24 August 2006). Chen’s situation was to become more complex, when, on being released after serving the full sentence, he and his family were again placed under house arrest in September 2010 for a further nineteen months. This was the setting from which Chen launched his escape, culminating in his bid for asylum at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing that catapulted him into the world’s spotlight. After a year at New York University, at present, Chen is a visiting fellow at the Witherspoon Institute, a conservative Catholic think-tank. For his work in defending the poor and illiterate from abuses, Chen has received various awards over the years. The most recent is the *Tom Lantos Human Rights Prize*, which was awarded to him in Washington DC for ‘his tireless work promoting human rights and the rule of law in China’ (Lantos Foundation Media Release 2012).

For reference, Table 6.1 is a chronological view of the significant events in Chen’s life as a dissident.

Date		Event
	1996	• Chen successfully petitions Beijing authorities for exemption from taxes on the grounds of being disabled.
	1997	• Chen angers local officials by petitioning Beijing to end the illegal ‘two-field system’ of land usage which was unfair to peasants.
	2000	• Chen forces the closure of a paper mill by organizing local villagers to successfully petition against mill’s toxic pollution of the Meng River.
Jun	2005	• Chen files lawsuit (unsuccessfully) against local officials of the family planning commission for the illegal practice of forced abortions.
Sep	2005	• Chen placed under house arrest by local officials.
Mar	2006	• Without his family knowing, Chen is ‘disappeared’ from his home for three months.
Aug	2006	• Chen sentenced to 4 years, 3 months for ‘damaging property and organizing a mob to disturb traffic’.
Nov	2006	• Chen’s appeal rejected by Yinan County court.

Jan	2007	• Linyi Intermediate Court rejects Chen's final appeal.
Sep	2010	• Chen released from prison but he and wife remain under house arrest a further 19 months.
Apr	2012	• Chen escapes from Dongshigu Village, and is reportedly in a secure location in Beijing.
Apr	2012	• Within 24 hours, associates report that Chen is at the American embassy in Beijing.
May	2012	• Chen leaves the U.S. embassy for medical treatment ahead of a visit to China by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for the Fourth China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue.
May	2012	• Chen telephones a U.S. Congressional meeting to appeal for assistance in leaving the country. He is offered a fellowship at New York University.
May	2012	• In a second call to Congress he accuses local authorities of persecuting his family.
May	2012	• Chen, his wife and two children leave China for the U.S.
Jan	2013	• Chen awarded 'Tom Lantos Human Rights Prize' in Washington DC.

Table 6.1 Chronology of events regarding Chen Guangcheng

6.2 Overview of the articles in China's English-language press on Chen Guangcheng

The mention of Chen Guangcheng as the 'other Chinese' on the *Time 100* list by the *Dongfang Zaobao* is a case in point regarding the ideological aspects of media silence (Jaworski 1993). By 'silence' in this case, I do not mean the absolute blackout of a controversial topic, but rather what Helmut Gruber calls 'trivialization' often enacted rhetorically 'through irony and devaluation' (Gruber 1997: 150). As can be seen in the discursive treatment of Chen (below), trivialization can take the form of demeaning or belittling the cause, or it can be seen in the practice of 'restriction', creating the impression that the dissident's cause is nonsensical, hence not worthy of discussion. This curbs circulation of the dissident's message by restricting the number of articles published, which is in essence, media censorship. These features illustrate the ambiguous manner in which the press deals with sensitive diplomatic issues like Chen's as explained in Chapter 5 regarding Liu Xiaobo.

The post-Mao term 'reform' may apply to China's socio-economic realm, but now, more than ever concerning the control of media discourse, 'ideological indoctrination remains firmly in place' (Guo and Huang 2002: 217). Particularly in cases of sensitive political implication, silence on the part of the media should not be interpreted as liberalization or relinquishing the attempt to 'channel' public

perceptions. It can in fact, be seen as the reverse – the attempt to exercise power through ambiguity (Jaworski 1993). As with Liu Xiaobo, the intent is to represent Chen and associates as ‘unimportant or devalued individuals’ whose voices should be ignored (1993: 132). The coverage surrounding Chen, as with Liu, is minimal in China’s press indicating again the strategic practice of trivialization. Chen is thus represented as inconsequential and ‘outside the community of relevance’ (Scollon 1999: 22). Based on the quantitative discrepancy in the number of articles in China’s English press vis-à-vis the Western press, we see once again the practice of silence (Jaworski 1993: 96) to suppress news of an event construed as embarrassing to the government. But to summarize the comparison (as seen in Table 4.7), three major Western newspapers (*The Guardian*, *The New York Times*, and the *South China Morning Post*) published 273 articles on Chen, whereas the three major Chinese English-language news sources (*China Daily*, *People’s Daily Online*, and Xinhua News Agency) published less than 20.

Ironically, rather than laying controversy to rest, the perception of media reticence adds fuel to the notion that something is being concealed. The impression is that the matter is evaded due to its potential to diminish the constructed image of the ‘harmonious society’ that the CCP wishes to project. Just as with the analysis of texts surrounding Liu Xiaobo, the discourse of defamation regarding Chen is realized in China’s English press by rhetorical maneuvering and strategically deploying a stock repertoire of discursive strategies (i.e. stereo-typing, Othering, victimhood, enmification through association with ‘the West’, delegitimization of his cause, minimization (trivialization) of his significance, the struggle over the definition of ‘human rights’, and the violation of China’s sovereignty by external forces, etc.). Also, as in the Liu articles, the linguistic realizations of these above-mentioned discursive strategies are entextualized through practices such as the manipulation of lexis, syntax, rhetoric, and representations of agency through backgrounding/foregrounding, focusing/de-focusing, mystification, nominalization, passivization and so on (van Dijk 1997a: 33–6). This also includes the ideological use of evaluation (Martin and White 2008; Martin and Rose 2003) throughout the articles.

Indeed, Chen’s treatment, both physical and discursive, reflects a new assertiveness toward citizens, who, based on legal sources, engage in ‘rightful resistance’ (O’Brien and Li 2006). This indicates a new social phenomenon, i.e. that

the law has become a ‘rallying point for aggrieved people, and lawyers have become organizers of an emerging social movement’ (Béja et al. 2012: 9). But because the legal system has failed in its purpose of governance and providing ‘remedies for citizens seeking justice – both [the legal system and citizens] are giving up on law and resorting to extralegal and illegal measures to settle the score’ (Béja et al. 2012: 9).

Because Chen’s actions were not overtly anti-CCP in the same sense that a political challenge might be, the representations of Chen Guangcheng in China’s state-controlled English press involved contradictory reactions on the state’s part. Chen did not promote political subversion or a radical change of government, as did Liu Xiaobo, but rather contested abusive civil policies. In sum, he was an embarrassment to the CCP. Prosecuting a man for defending illiterate farmers against exploitation by corrupt officials, or legally assisting mothers who resisted forced late-term abortions hardly seems censurable, at least in the eyes of the world where this drama played out. This posed a dilemma for state propagandists who struggled with how to represent a dissident that was not involved in a clear-cut case of subversion, one whose name is not easy to blacken. Thus the politics of the ‘Chen affair’ are more sensitive than in Liu’s case due to the obvious moral and international implications for China’s image. Criminalization of Chen could not be enacted without the government losing moral high ground, both domestically and internationally. The lights were on and the world’s attention was fixed. Chen’s accusers would appear unethical by harassing a man who was poor, blind and a defender of the underdog. His sympathetic qualities (i.e. disabled, self-taught, a challenger of corrupt bureaucracy, persecuted in defense of the disadvantaged, etc.) coincide with the Western model of justice and integrity – the classic David vs Goliath story. These apparent virtues contributed to a growing sense of admiration for Chen in the Western press. In China’s press, to the contrary, he was represented as a destructive ‘mob organizer’, who is a cunning, sly, and calculating liar.

6.3 Context of the Chen articles

The articles concerning Chen can be divided into two chronological groupings in which the first group represents him as a ‘threat to society’ (‘mob organizer’). The second group portrays him as the scheming manipulator who managed to deceive

the U.S. government and everybody else in the world (except for the Chinese government) as to his ‘true’ intentions:

Extract 6.1

Chen's smartly timed plea for U.S. protection has served him well. He has got the attention he wanted, and is asking for more. But at the same time he is holding one of the world's most important relation-ships hostage... (5 May 2012, *China Daily*)

Extract 6.2

So, if protection is what Chen feels he needs, that could be the place to go, should his long-time lawyering enable him to sweet talk his new friends [i.e. the U.S.]. (5 May 2012, *China Daily*)

The separation of the articles into these two distinct time periods is represented in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. The first five press releases (Period One, Table 6.2) were published over a five-month period from August 2006 to January 2007, when Chen came on the political scene as something of an agitator. In these Period One headlines, Chen is not even named; he is simply labeled ‘mob organizer’ (e.g. ‘Mob organizer sentenced to imprisonment by local court’, Xinhua News Agency, 24 August 2006). Bias is overtly expressed and the ideological orientation of the articles is generally explicit, even though there are also examples of covert bias in mystifying the role of the local authorities other than as victims. Overt bias can be expressed because the sentence is ‘legal’, and as mentioned earlier, merely insinuating guilt is no longer necessary, as due to the court’s decision, it has attained the status of fact.

After a gap of about five years accounted for by Chen’s imprisonment, the second batch of articles comprised of eleven titles (Period Two, Table 6.3) begins with an abrupt press release by Xinhua stating that Chen left the U.S. Embassy ‘of his own volition’ (CHINA DEMANDS U.S. APOLOGY ON CHEN GUANGCHENG ENTERING U.S. EMBASSY, 2 May 2012, Xinhua News Agency). The press release did not mention his dramatic (and embarrassing) escape from house arrest. Covering the three-month period from May to July of 2012, Period Two is decidedly more ‘political’ in nature because it is constructed in reaction to events at the diplomatic level, which raised the stakes by subjecting the incident to the scrutiny of the entire world. By this second batch of articles, sensing the futility of pursuing an all-out criminalization of Chen in their English language media, the state press opted for the now familiar ‘reticent’

approach, publishing little or nothing in English. In fact, the *Global Times Web Edition* (an added source, mentioned above) published an article entitled CHINA AND AMERICA BOTH WIN OVER CHEN INCIDENT (6 May 2012) in an effort to generate positive face and inject a sense of diplomatic closure to the episode. The government's discourse of indignation over violated sovereignty became a double-edged sword in that the extended complaining also generated greater international interest in Chen's case, exposing the vulnerable underbelly of China's human rights practices to unwanted attention. Thereafter no further articles were published.

This study has gathered all available articles mentioning Chen Guangcheng from the *Factiva* database just as those in the chapter on Liu Xiaobo, through accessing the *China Daily*, the *People's Daily Online* and Xinhua News Agency within the designated timeframe of 'all dates'. The exception is that I have added one article from the *Global Times Web Edition* (mentioned above). Another difference from the previous chapter (on Liu) is that the Chen articles are tabled by their dates of publication, rather than by the news outlets in which they appeared. The chronological order also reflects the narrative sequence of events as they unfolded.

According to Gruber (1997: 150), previous studies of biased language in media communications have shown that discursive analyses are most usefully dealt with by categorizing articles into one of two broad genres: 'fact-oriented texts' (e.g. regular news reports), or 'opinion-oriented texts' such as editorials and commentaries. The article from Period One is a 'fact-oriented' press release entitled MOB ORGANIZER SENTENCED TO IMPRISONMENT BY LOCAL COURT (24 August 2006, Xinhua News Agency). The second part of the investigation of the Chen articles involves the three 'opinion-oriented' commentaries from Period Two. These opinion articles were written over a period of three days by the same author, identified as a senior writer with the *China Daily*. In the analysis below, I will first examine the full set of headlines from the two time periods. Following this, I will approach the 'fact-oriented' article representative of Period One, and in the second part of this chapter, the three 'opinion-oriented' articles from Period Two. These selected articles embody the full range of rhetorical strategies employed by the state-run English press in its representations of Chen. Before continuing I should clarify that the Period One articles offer little in terms of text. They are mere press releases from which I have chosen the longest one for analysis, as will be explained below in section 6.5.

6.4 Analysis of articles on Chen Guangcheng

6.4.1 Analysis of Period One headlines

The most salient feature of the Period One headlines, as mentioned above, is that in each headline Chen is designated as ‘mob organizer’. It is also noticeable that the first three press releases in this period (headlines 1–3) each contain the same title and were disseminated on the same day (24 August 2006), but vary due to length and depth of coverage (press release 1 is 59 words long; release 2 is 306 words; and release 3 is 475 words), the longest (entitled UPDATE-2: MOB ORGANIZER SENTENCED TO IMPRISONMENT BY LOCAL COURT) will be analyzed later in this chapter. In Table 6.2, I have underlined each occurrence of ‘mob organizer’.

No.	Date	Participant	Process	Participant
1.	24 Aug 06	<u>Mob organizer</u> {Goal}	sentenced {Material/Verbal}	to imprisonment by local court (XH)
2.	24 Aug 06	Update-1: <u>Mob organizer</u> {Goal}	sentenced {Material/Verbal}	to imprisonment by local court (XH)
3.	24 Aug 06	Update-2: <u>Mob organizer</u> {Goal}	sentenced {Material/Verbal}	to imprisonment by local court (XH)
4.	01 Dec 06	Chinese court {Actor}	upholds {Material/Verbal}	jail sentence for <u>mob organizer</u> (XH)
5.	12 Jan 07	Chinese court {Actor}	rejects {Material/Verbal}	blind <u>mob organizer's</u> appeal (XH)

Table 6.2 Period One (08/2006–01/2007) Transitivity patterns in headlines on Chen

It is evident that in headlines 1–3, Chen functions as Goal although he, as ‘mob organizer’, is thematized. In the passive construction of these first three headlines, the agency of ‘who’ or what institution sentenced him to prison is not entirely excluded as it is found in the prepositional adjunct ‘by local court’. Concerning the rhetorical practice of ‘exclusion’, van Leeuwen makes a distinction between *back-grounding* and *suppression*, the difference being that back-grounding is a *partial*

defocusing of the participant responsible for the action, whereas suppression is a form of omission. In the headline ‘Mob organizer sentenced to imprisonment by local court’ (headlines 1–3), the ‘local court’ as actors, could easily have been omitted as is the case in what van Leeuwen calls a ‘classic realization’ of passive agent deletion (2008: 29). Complete suppression in this instance, would leave out the adjunct ‘by local court’, thus reading ‘Mob organizer sentenced to imprisonment’. The prepositional adjunct ‘by local court’, however, is not omitted, but is rather *defocused* as the agent of the process of sentencing. Van Dijk describes such structures where ‘passive sentences will focus on objects (e.g. victims) of such actions and defocus responsible agency by *putting agents last* in prepositional phrases’ (1997a: 34, my emphasis). This instantiates the syntactic strategy of placing ‘more or less emphasis, focus or prominence on specific words, phrases or clauses’, which in this case, is the de-focusing of the ‘local court’ as the agent responsible for sentencing Chen. Van Dijk has pointed out that de-focusing indirectly contributes ‘to corresponding semantic stress on specific meanings, as a function of the political interests and allegiances of the speaker/writer’ (Fowler et al. 1979, Kress and Hodge 1993, cited in van Dijk 1997a: 34). The positioning of ‘mob organizer’ as theme of headlines 1, 2 and 3 presents it as ‘new’ information, and the Agent is shifted to the end of the clause, which is the more prominent position where the ‘new’ information is usually found. The reversal of positions in the information structure classifies the theme as ‘marked’, which, as Fairclough notes concerning thematization, ‘can give insight into assumptions and strategies which may at no point be made explicit’ (1992: 184).

On consideration of syntactic/lexical choice, the positioning of this adjunct ‘by local court’ performs an extra-linguistic function that serves to legitimize through exploiting the presupposed meaning inherent in the word ‘court’. The word summons images of that which is undeniably lawful, therefore indisputably legitimate. In actual practice however, the decisions of (any) ‘court’ may be entirely prejudicial and arbitrary, particularly in cases where legal institutions are not independent, and are accountable to the ruling party rather than to the law. The practice of strategic word choice or ‘lexicalization’ (Jones 2013: 6) can be described as the act of naming a phenomenon in order to associate it ‘with a particular ideology or the interests of a particular group’ (Jones 2013: 6). Viewed in these terms, ‘court’ takes on implicit authority due to its fixity in the legitimized

institutional order and as such, its authority is understood and ‘taken for granted’ (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 82). Chen’s designation as ‘mob organizer’, through the same process of lexicalization, carries with it the association of chaos and disruption. This sub-textually links it into the master narrative of Chinese history with its tradition of denouncing the Other who would challenge the *status quo* as those who must be shunned by the ingroup, i.e. ‘strongly demarcated’ as inimical, as elaborated in Chapter 2 (2.6). An important aspect of a metaphorical representation such as ‘mob organizer’ is its power to distort perception, and, in the political context according to van Dijk, such metaphors can facilitate ‘attacks on political opponents’ (2008: 24).

In Table 6.2, headlines 4 and 5 appear in their unmarked forms with the nominal group ‘Chinese court’ in thematic position as actor in both instances. In headline 4, Chen is positioned within the prepositional adjunct of ‘for mob organizer’ but he is not in the participant role of Goal. That is filled by the nominal group ‘jail sentence’, acting as Goal of the process ‘upholds’. In headline 5, the Goal of the material process ‘rejects’, is ‘mob organizer’s appeal’ where Chen’s grammatical role is that of the possessive determiner of ‘appeal’ (as in ‘mob organizer’s appeal’). In both headlines, the lack of power conceded to the ‘mob organizer’ represents Chen as impotent and immobilized before the power and authority of the court. The participants in these five headlines remain unnamed, which renders them faceless and impersonal. In a sense, one would expect the individual being tried to be in the Goal function for the process of being passively ‘sentenced’ (as in headlines 1–3). The active role played by the ‘Chinese court’ in headlines 4 and 5 invokes legitimate authority to engage in the weighty and imposing legal processes of both ‘upholding’ Chen’s sentence and subsequently ‘rejecting’ his appeal. The agentive role assigned to the ‘Chinese courts’ is indicative of authority and, not surprisingly, demonstrates the power relations between these two social actors (the courts and the mob organizer) as asymmetrical, one of dominance and subjugation.

The next section moves on to a discussion of transitivity patterns in the eleven headlines from the more recent set of articles comprising Period Two (Table 6.3).

6.4.2 Analysis of Period Two headlines

The second batch of articles in Table 6.3 (below) consists of the full number of articles and press releases, all of which appeared during a brief period in the spring and early summer of 2012 in China's English press. These headlines pertain to the incident of Chen's seeking asylum at the American Embassy and the intense diplomatic standoff that was precipitated just before a major China-U.S. economic conference involving top diplomats of both countries. Nine articles (headlines 6–14) were published between 2nd of May and the 19th of May with the bulk of them (headlines 6–13) published within the first five days of the impasse between the U.S. Embassy and the Chinese government. The last three articles resulted from having reached some sort of mutual agreement between these two. China's English press, in attempting to frame the discourse as a victory of sorts, steers clear of any allusion to the perception that there may have been capitulation to the U.S. In keeping with past discursive behavior, a customary scolding of the U.S. for 'violation of sovereignty' and flouting international law was incorporated into the article (U.S. VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL LAW, headline 13). Because China suffered what some might consider embarrassment over the issue in question by allowing Chen and family to leave, the final articles in Table 6.3 reflect a less aggressive, more conciliatory posture. These emphasize the legality, according to China's civil law, of Chen's departure and that China, after all, did not lose face. This discursive face-saving strategy represents Chen's exit as that of a normal citizen following normal regulations. It is thus constructed as a licit win-win scenario for both nations.

No.	Date	Participant	Process	Participant/ Circumstance
6.	02 May 12	China {Sayer}	demands {Verbal}	U.S. apology on Chen Guangcheng's entering U.S. embassy (XH)
7.	02 May 12	U.S. {Receiver}	urged {Verbal}	Stop misleading Chen Guangcheng comments (XH)
8.	03 May 12	China, U.S. {Actors}	hold {Material}	4 th strategic and economic dialogue in Beijing (GT)
9.	04 May 12	One leaf {Identified}	is not {Negative Relational, identifying}	the whole forest (CD)
10.	04 May 12	Chen Guangcheng {Reported}	reported {Verbal}	to hope to study abroad (XH)
11.	05 May 12	One-man show {Carrier}	(is) {Relational, attributive}	just a distraction (CD)
12.	06 May 12	China and America both	win {Material}	over Chen incident (GT)

		{Actor}		
13.	07 May 12	U.S. {Actor}	violates {Material}	international law (CD)
14.	19 May 12	Chen Guangcheng {Actor}	applies {Material}	for U.S. study (XH)
15.	15 Jun 12	(the writer) {Senser}	conveying {Mental/Verbal}	China's true story (CD)
16.	25 Jul 12	U.S., China {Actors}	wrap up {Material}	annual human rights dialogue (GT)

Table 6.3 Period Two (05/2012–06/2012) Transitivity patterns in headlines on Chen

Among these headlines, two are passive constructions (headlines 7 and 10) engendering the question ‘by who’? Headline 7 locates the U.S. as the Receiver of a verbal process (‘urged’), but this is omitted until the end of the sentence as ‘U.S. urged’ (STOP MISLEADING CHEN GUANGCHENG COMMENTS, U.S. URGED, headline 7). The verb ‘Stop’ as theme is unmarked in the imperative, but the inclusion of the residual adjunct ‘U.S. urged’ classifies it as reported speech, which begs the question: to whom, then, is this headline addressed? The headline might be understood as ‘display rhetoric’ in the sense that the writer/speaker is not so much directing the utterance to the Receiver (the U.S.), but rather to third-party observers (readers).

Other headlines in Table 6.3 can be largely seen as unmarked in terms of transitivity. Headlines 6 and 13 both display more aggressive processes where China ‘demands’, and the U.S. ‘violates’. The similar tone of headlines 8, 12, and 16 are a departure from the norm in the sense that they combine the two adversaries (China and the U.S.) as partners in a shared thematic position who are engaged in constructive processes such as: ‘holding’ dialogues (headline 8); both ‘winning’ (headline 12); and ‘wrapping up’ a human rights discussion (headline 16). These processes tend to give the preceding diplomatic antagonisms a new air – one of collaboration and even teamwork. The representation of the Chen affair in these less contentious terms saves face and frames China’s position as more politically legitimate. The editorial, ONE-MAN SHOW JUST A DISTRACTION (5 May 2012, *China Daily*), assumes an affected *sotto-voce* as if China and the U.S. are partners that should collaboratively marginalize Chen, again excluding him from relevance (Scollon 1999: 22) by representing him and his ‘human rights discourse’ as a nuisance to their mutual and more important business of economic cooperation.

Headlines 9, 11 and 15 project a different picture than the others. Although they are ideologically and thematically congruent with the overall goals of the other articles, they adopt an ‘editorial’ style by including a more overt type of persuasion.

In general, the use of a vernacular argumentative style as a type of ‘conversationalization’ has acquired a diminished believability nowadays and is largely seen as having ‘the aura of insincerity’ (Fowler 1991 cited in Fairclough 1995a: 13). These headlines signal a departure from the factual to a commentary-style orientation by the use of metaphors, which as mentioned earlier, can have the effect of distorting meaning. This is seen in the use of ‘One leaf’ as a negative metaphor for Chen (headline 9), and ‘One-man show’ as a metaphor for Chen’s actions (headline 11). These headlines also use relational processes (e.g. ‘...is not the whole forest’, and, ‘...[is] just a distraction’), which have the ideological function of attributing a quality or definition. As stated earlier, the investigation of relational processes is useful to critical discourse analysis as it is a way of revealing the covert attribution of values to the participant as seen in the analysis of media discourse on Liu Xiaobo in the preceding chapter. Although these ‘editorial’ style headlines raise the reader’s expectation of a more reflective and hopefully less ideological stance, the critical analysis of the text itself reveals continued conformity to the pro-government (anti-Chen) bias embedded in the customary Us/Them discourse structure.

Having discussed the transitivity structures and their ideological orientations in the headlines for the two periods, I will now move to the analysis of the texts themselves beginning with an article from Period One.

6.5 Period One: Introduction to the analysis of Mob Organizer articles

The longest of the Xinhua News Agency press releases in Period One is MOB ORGANIZER SENTENCED TO IMPRISONMENT BY LOCAL COURT (24 August 2006). It is best suited for analysis because it subsumes the content of all the other Period One press releases and is the broadest of the articles in terms of depth, word count (475 words) and detail of narrative, thus more likely to yield comprehensive findings.

As to be expected, the social actors involved can be generally divided into the basic dichotomy of Us *vs* Them. Participants represented are (Us) the ‘Local Authorities’ and ultimately the government, and (Them) ‘Chen and/or his associates’, respectively. There is also a third category, which I classify as ‘Neutral’ (‘the affected’) as shown in Table 6.4 below. The binary ingroup/outgroup oppositions are default ways of seeing the Other and historically, as explained in Chapter 2, find

their realization by classifying the Other into a variety of inimical categories. In the following analysis, I will identify and compare representations of the various participants as they conform to either one or the other of these broader in/out group categories. The analysis illustrates how individuals and collectivities related to the ingroup are represented as generally blameless. Alternatively, social actors affiliated with the outgroup are considered troublemakers, villains, and in Chen's case (in the Period Two articles), a conniver and disrupter of state-to-state relations. By analyzing the portrayal of the various social actors involved in the Chen Guangcheng case, we may see how the state-run media constructs representations of the Other as an act of discursive vindication in order to delegitimize them for having caused a loss of face before the wider world.

In accordance with my broader research questions, I seek to answer the following questions: What differences exist in the representations of the two broad groups (ingroup/outgroup) of social actors involved in discourses surrounding the Chen case? And, does bias and/or prejudice, either implicit or explicit, exist in the article? If it does, how is it constructed and reproduced linguistically? Whose interests are served by such representations? The discursive analysis of the manner in which Chen is represented by the Chinese press is ideologically revealing, particularly when constantly bearing in mind the reference to the fact that the media's paramount task is to legitimize the CCP (Zhou He 2003).

Van Leeuwen observes that in many cases agency can be obscured when an 'utterance is bound up with the official status or role' of the Sayer. This can be found, for example, in this 'Mob Organizer' article where 'a document', which appears to possess overriding authority, is repeatedly referenced. A degree removed from this document is 'the court', which remains unmentioned other than once, and is another power orchestrating discourses (van Leeuwen 2008: 24–25). Van Leeuwen refers to this as 'utterance automization', where the Sayer (the 'court') is deleted in place of 'what' is said (the 'document') making it a type of metonymy. The court, as Actor, remains anonymous and distant through exclusion by utterance automization. A step removed from the goings on, it deals with participants remotely and clinically through 'the document', which is designated as Actor/Sayer eleven times as in Extracts 6.3 and 6.4.

Extract 6.3

The document says Chen was upset with workers...
 (MOB ORGANIZER SENTENCED TO IMPRISONMENT BY LOCAL COURT, 24 August 2006, Xinhua News Agency)

Extract 6.4

The court document says Chen Guanghe and Chen Guangdong also instigated other villagers...
 (MOB ORGANIZER SENTENCED TO IMPRISONMENT BY LOCAL COURT, 24 August 2006, Xinhua News Agency)

In examining the ‘Mob organizer’ article from Period One, we see the writer explicitly attributing to Chen, the practice of instigating social chaos and disruption. Conceptually, this seems to be at one end of a dichotomous opposition in contrast to the stability and social order represented by the government’s notion of the ‘harmonious society’, thereby evoking the self-legitimizing ‘stability’ discourse (Sandby-Thomas 2011). Each end of the metaphorical pole has its own set of social actors which can be arranged as participants in processes that both legitimize and delegitimize, respectively.

6.5.1 Representation of social actors in the Mob Organizer articles

In the articles published by China’s English press on the events surrounding Chen Guangcheng, a variety of social actors present in the articles are identified. For this analysis, I will categorize these social actors in order to discuss how they are represented. This could include inanimate actors, like ‘the document’, as well as animate actors such as local authorities. As stated previously, the social actors involved in the representation of Chen’s activities involve a cast of participants which can be broadly separated into the categories: ‘Local Authorities’, ‘Neutral (the affected)’, and ‘Chen and associates’. These are the groupings that in this case, construe the ideological categories of Us and Them, as shown in Table 6.4.

Local Authorities (Us)	Neutrals [the affected] (Us)	Chen & associates (Them)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ‘The People’s Court of Yinan County’ (1) ▪ ‘public court’ (1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ workers ▪ traffic in Yinghou Village... 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chen Guangcheng (4) ▪ a/the mob (7)

▪ a/the 'document' (11)	▪ vehicles	▪ Chen [Guangcheng] (6)
▪ 'it' (2)	▪ traffic	▪ his wife Li Weijing (1)
▪ 'the village committee' (2)	▪ 290 vehicles	▪ and others (1)
▪ 'police' (5)	▪ an ambulance carrying a pregnant woman to hospital	▪ Chen Guangyu (5)
▪ 'the government' (4)		▪ Chen Guanghe (2)
▪ officials (1)		▪ Chen Guangdong (2)
		▪ Chen Gengjiang (1)
		▪ other individuals (1)
		▪ other villagers (1)
		▪ they (2)
		▪ he (2)
		▪ a group of people (1)
		▪ they (2)
		▪ Chen Guangjun (2)
		▪ Yuan Weijing (1)
		▪ Chen's rights (1)
		▪ his two lawyers (1)

Table 6.4 Social actors in the article: MOB ORGANIZER SENTENCED TO IMPRISONMENT BY LOCAL COURT

Table 6.4 displays the actors in the article and the number of times they are involved in processes. The Local Authorities column has eight actors mentioned twenty-six times, and the Chen column has nineteen actors mentioned forty-three times. This in itself is not particularly telling, but what *are* significant to this critical analysis are the *types* of process in which they are involved. This will be further explained in the section on processes below, but suffice it to say that virtually every process in which Local Authorities participate is a passive process except for the sentencing of Chen by the People's Court and the police's intransitive 'arrival'. 'The document' plays the agentive role of Sayer in all other active processes involving the Local Authorities group, and as might be expected, these processes are not material, but verbal. The upshot is that the representation of the authorities is limited to verbal processes making their actions appear, in a sense, more restrained. Chen's actions on the other hand, are material, giving the impression of aggression.

The discourse attempts to generate an image of impartiality and legitimacy, but the lack of even one individual actor (rather than as collectivities) from the ingroup, and the absence of non-verbal material processes on the part of the Local Authorities makes their representation overly 'sanitized', too innocent, causing a lack of

credibility. The ‘Neutrals’ (the affected) column can be considered indirectly linked to the Local Authorities in that they share in the textual victimization and are represented as co-victims with the Local Authorities. The affected, through no fault of their own, share in the suffering and ‘collateral damage’ caused by Chen and his group. These might be found in the linguistic roles of either Agent or Patient and are not restricted to a role in a particular grammatical pattern. In other words, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, the focusing on sociological rather than linguistic categories necessitates freedom to ‘range over a variety of linguistic and rhetorical phenomena, finding its unity in the concept of “social actor” [...]’ (van Leeuwen 2008: 25).

The way in which neutral ‘third party’ social actors are functionalized is of interest because their textual purpose is to emphasize the anarchic nature of Chen’s activities. They are like props, ‘treated as objects’ (van Leeuwen 2008: 33), i.e. things that are human-connected (i.e. properties, vehicles, etc.) that form metonymies of the general public who might also be negatively impacted by Chen and associates’ chaotic actions. In this category of Neutrals, ‘the affected’ are portrayed as victims who are inert, hence void of intention. They are ‘the People’, viz. poverty-relief ‘workers’, ‘traffic’, ‘cars’, ‘vehicles’, ‘a pregnant woman’ and others whose innocent and orderly lives have been disrupted by Chen’s indiscriminate anarchy as shown in the following table.

Participant /process		Neutrals (the affected)	Circumstances
Chen <u>was upset</u> with	→	<u>workers</u>	who were sent...
they <u>interrupted</u>	→	<u>traffic</u>	in Yingzhou village...
the mob <u>smashed</u>	→	<u>the windows of three cars</u>	
Chen Guangcheng <u>stood in</u> <u>the middle of the road to</u> <u>stop</u>	→	<u>vehicles</u>	
the mob <u>stopped</u> the	→	<u>traffic</u>	for three hours...
and [the mob] <u>delayed</u> more than including	→	<u>290 vehicles</u>	
	→	<u>an ambulance</u>	
carrying	→	<u>a pregnant woman</u>	to hospital...

Table 6.5 Neutral social actors affected by Chen’s actions
(MOB ORGANIZER SENTENCED TO IMPRISONMENT BY LOCAL COURT, 24 August 2006, Xinhua News Agency)

Of interest regarding the portrayal of social actors is the use of nomination. In Table 6.5, for example, the only human participants fully named are Chen Guangcheng, his wife, and his assorted family members, totaling nine nominations. This is van Leeuwen's (2008: 40) concept of naming those of 'elite' status for legitimization – but as a reversal, in the sense that it draws attention to nominated characters – not to exploit their reputation for purposes of justification, but to make them notorious. They become 'elite' in a negative manner for the purpose of *delegitimization*. This seems to operate through foregrounding and back-grounding where Chen's entourage are all nominated whereas government actors are in collectivities and unnamed (but for their social role) except for the court itself which is referred to in its full honorific title (i.e. 'The People's Court of Yinan County, in east China's Shandong Province'). The 'People's Court' and the 'police' are in agentive roles only one time each, while other mentions of the Local Authorities are in passive roles as victims of Chen's 'mob' with the exception of 'the document', which, as mentioned, engages in active verbal processes eleven times. Chen, his family members and/or associates carry out all other active processes in the article. It is to be noted that the foregrounding of Chen and associates' activities involves them in twenty-eight material processes, all of which are damaging and unruly (see Table 6.6). Overall, this serves two purposes: the obvious attempt to criminalize Chen, and secondly, the less noticeable but ideologically effective strategy of covert 'passivization' of the powerful. Passivization allows Local Authorities to be perceived as *victims* of 'the mob' rather than the initial cause. Chen and associates are represented as *the cause rather than the effect*; as perpetrators rather than victims. This strategy covers the suppressive actions of the Local Authorities with a shroud of innocence, allowing the perpetrators to be grammatically (and speciously) represented as the docile victims of Chen's aggressive processes.

Extract 6.5

Using clubs and stones, the mob smashed the windows of three cars from the police station and the town government, overturned the cars in roadside ditches, and beat police officers from the Police Bureau of the county. (MOB ORGANIZER SENTENCED TO IMPRISONMENT BY LOCAL COURT, 24 August 2006, Xinhua News Agency)

Lexical choices for representing Chen's group are those of either direct nomination, or as a collectivity (i.e. a disorganized group of peasants such as 'other

individuals', 'other villagers', 'a group of people', and 'the mob'). In the case of these examples, the group references are a type of identification called 'classification', where social actors are identified by their class rather than by what they do. Van Leeuwen explains that 'In the case of classification, social actors are referred to in terms of the major categories by means of which a given society or institution differentiates between classes of people' (2008: 42).

The ingroup/outgroup contrast in ideological representations becomes even more explicit through an analysis of the *processes* in which each of the opposing parties is engaged, as shown in the section below.

6.5.2 Processes in the Mob Organizer articles

Regarding processes in the 'mob organizer' text, several things become salient. As noted, 'the document', as principal actor for the ingroup, metaphorically 'speaks' for the court and local authorities. Each reference to Chen or his associates is narrated in the document, which was presented to Xinhua by the court, and is, in turn, represented as the main source of authorial information in the articles. The information is designated as 'reported' and is a double recontextualization of events, thus relieving the news agency of responsibility for the 'truth' of the story, what Caldas-Coulthard calls 'averral' (1994: 299). Xinhua is merely passing on received information or, what 'the document' describes as having taken place. Variations include 'the court document says...', 'according to the document...', 'it goes on to say...', 'it goes on that...', and in the negative formulation 'the court document does not indicate...' Besides 'the document', which metaphorically engages in purely verbal processes, the only other social actors of the ingroup involved in an active (but innocent) material process are:

- (i) 'The People's Court':

Extract 6.6

The People's Court of Yinan County, in east China's Shandong Province, Thursday sentenced Chen Guangcheng to four years and three months in prison...

(ii) The ‘court’ (in the passive process of providing Xinhua News Agency with the document):

Extract 6.7

Xinhua was provided with a document by the court that provided only the following details of the proceedings.

(iii) The ‘police’ (in the non-aggressive intransitive process of simply ‘arriving’ to perform the role of coaxing Chen to stop):

Extract 6.8

It [the document] goes on that police arrived to reopen the road, and to try to persuade Chen Guangcheng to desist from leading the mob and stopping the traffic. Chen refused to comply and continued to direct the mob to block vehicles.

The police ‘arrived to reopen the road’ (Extract 6.8) in order ‘to try and persuade Chen Guangcheng to desist from leading the mob’. In this instance, the police are the agents of reasonable, non-destructive processes. However, the ideological intent of the police simply having ‘arrived’ becomes apparent when juxtaposed with Chen’s activities of ‘leading the mob’, ‘stopping the traffic’, refusing ‘to comply’, and continuing ‘to direct the mob to block vehicles’. The discursive creation of this powerful contrastive dynamic, allows Chen’s actions to be perceived as irrational in stark contrast to those of the police.

In the attempt to ‘persuade Chen’, the police appear gracious. In most instances, the police, the authorities or their material possessions participate as Goals or Patients, who are on the receiving end of aggressive and destructive actions performed by Chen and his associates. Chen and his group are foregrounded as Actors in irresponsible processes, not only toward the authorities, but also toward the innocent Neutrals or third parties (innocent bystanders, e.g. ‘traffic’, ‘vehicles’, ‘an ambulance’, ‘a pregnant mother’), which maximizes the randomness and irrationality of Chen’s actions. Table 6.6 (below) lists the twenty-eight destructive material processes (e.g. chasing, smashing, beating, overturning, etc.) engaged in by Chen and his entourage.


Participants	Processes	Participants/Circumstances
Chen Guangcheng (and/or associates)	→ was upset	→ with workers sent to carry out...
↓	→ rushed	→ to the office
↓	→ damaged	→ doors and windows
↓	→ instigated	→ [associates]
↓	→ smash	→ cars
↓	→ instigated	→ other villagers
↓	→ damage	→ government cars
↓	→ chased	→ [officials from the town government]
↓	→ beat	→ officials from the town government
↓	→ smashed	→ the windows of three cars from the Police
↓	→ overturned	→ cars in roadside ditches
↓	→ beat	→ police officers from the Police Bureau
↓	→ attacked	→ the office of the village committee
↓	→ damaged	→ things in the office
↓	→ organized	→ a group of people
↓	→ interrupted	→ traffic
↓	→ stood	→ in the middle of the road
↓	→ stop	→ vehicles
↓	→ directed	→ the mob
↓	→ yell out	→ [to the mob]
↓	→ stop	→ traffic
↓	→ leading	→ the mob
↓	→ refused	→ [police persuasion]
↓	→ direct	→ the mob
↓	→ block	→ vehicles
↓	→ stopped	→ traffic
↓	→ delayed	→ more than 290 vehicles
↓	→ “	→ an ambulance carrying a pregnant woman
his two lawyers	→ expressed	→ their views in full

Table 6.6 Chen's processes (MOB ORGANIZER SENTENCED TO IMPRISONMENT BY LOCAL COURT, Xinhua 24/08/2006)

The sheer number of destructive material processes attributed to Chen and his associates may be interpreted on several levels. Taken at face value, the preferred reading is that Chen and his group are dangerous – not just to authorities (e.g. ‘beat police officers from the Police Bureau’; ‘chased and beat officials from the town government’, etc.), but also indiscriminately threatening to the population at large (e.g. ‘stood in the middle of the road to stop vehicles’; ‘overturned cars in roadside ditches’; delaying ‘an ambulance’, etc.). The objective is to create the assumption that Chen may likely be a sociopath, definitely dangerous, and possibly mad. If the list of processes in Table 6.6 is taken together, it constructs the representation of an individual that is simply uncontrollable. The surface reading covertly advances the

image of the authorities and the court as even-tempered and fair (e.g. ‘Chen’s rights were protected’; ‘his two lawyers expressed their views in full’). Due to their forbearance, the local authorities, including police, were ‘chased’, ‘beaten’ and ‘attacked’. Fowler and Kress coined the expression ‘overlexicalization’ for ‘a large number of synonymous or near-synonymous terms’ that because of their marked density indicate ‘peculiarities in the ideology of the group’ (1979: 211). In the same way, a text over-populated by the attribution of negative material processes, signals ideological bias as manifest in the density, similarity and ideological nature of processes attributed to Chen. The media report of incidents such as in the ‘mob organizer’ article, affords multiple instances for lexical and syntactic choices to be made on the part of the text producer. These choices, which unequivocally and persistently derogate the outgroup tend to reveal more about the ideological bias of the writer (or institution behind the writer) than the individual or group that is being represented in the text. Van Dijk has noted that the construction of discourses about the Other ‘may be relatively *overcomplete*’ (1998: 268, emphasis in original), which he rightly identifies as a practice used when the oversupply of information ‘negatively reflects back on outgroups (or positively on ourselves)’ (1998: 269).

Figure 6.2 Distribution of processes (by percent) in
‘Mob organizer sentenced to imprisonment by local court’
(24/08/2006, Xinhua News Agency)



As seen in Figure 6.2 (above), the majority of destructive material processes attributed to Chen and/or associates along with the marked lack of material processes from the Local Authorities (including 'the document') indicates ideologically biased representations, which is to say, the foregrounding of negative processes assigned to the Them, while back-grounding or minimizing our own.

In summary of the Period One analysis, of the total number of processes in the article, 63% (destructive material activities) are attributed to Chen and associates, whereas only 37%, most of which are verbal processes, are attributed to Local Authorities. Chen's activities, represented as aggressive material processes, create the overall impression that the Local Authorities are in the habit of operating in a restrained and reasonable manner. Chen, by contrast, is engaged in processes that are damaging, anti-social, and chaotic.

6.6 *Period Two: Analysis of articles*

6.6.1 *Opinion-oriented articles*

Commentaries or editorial style articles are of particular interest because they transcend simple reportage by including subjective authorial views, which often interpret news events. Commentators have an obligation to push the ideological agenda of the institution to which they belong, trying to move the reader in various ways, 'to commune with us strategically' (Martin and Rose 2003: 61). And, as with all PRC state-media, the legitimization of the CCP is the central mandate. Whatever other purpose China's media may pursue through textual reproduction, the ultimate function of its discourse is to support the CCP view of the issue at hand. For the purpose of a concise description of the function of ideology in discourse, we can turn to the model of positive-Self/negative-Other representation (van Dijk 2006: 125). Opinion or commentary style articles can typically influence reader-judgment through embedding ideological views in the text. Van Dijk suggests that editorials are under-analyzed as a genre, but are important due to their ability to contribute to forming opinions and the expressing ideologies (van Dijk 1996).

In opinion-oriented articles it is expected that the author move from the experiential realm of 'facts' to the more ideational realm through sharing of subjective impressions often based on authorial judgment. The three commentary

style articles from Period Two are full of what appears to be judgmental and evaluative language. Ideologically biased rhetoric as was encountered in the analysis of the Period One data on Chen, continues unabated in the Period Two articles, but with a somewhat different orientation than Period One. During the five-year gap between the two periods the changing political situation between the protagonists (i.e. Chen, China, and the U.S.) had altered and had unexpectedly taken a crucial diplomatic turn through Chen's miraculous escape and subsequent appearance at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing in May of 2012.

The role of the editorial (what Gruber called 'opinion-oriented' articles, 1997: 150) in the state-sponsored English press does not differ significantly from that of the other articles on Chen. In the Period Two articles (analyzed below), Chen, five years later, is still an outgroup actor. Here, however, he is portrayed as having usurped a disproportionately influential role in the diplomatic realm – an unexpected variable with potential to upset the delicate China-U.S. dialogue which was set to take place (3–4 May 2012). Chen, who should have still been out of sight (i.e. under house arrest) not only showed up in Beijing, but somehow managed to find protection in the U.S. Embassy on the eve of the Dialogue. This unforeseen 'wildcard' and Chen's troublesome 'human rights' talk had the potential to disrupt this high-level event by calling unwanted attention to the on-going abuse of rights while the international press was in town. As a counter-strategy, the state press decided to revert to the familiar *argumentum ad hominem* fallacy of condemning Chen as dishonest and insignificant; the U.S. action (of having accepted Chen) is portrayed as illegal by highlighting it as a contravention of the international standards encoded in the *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*.

By employing the logic of the *argumentum ad hominem* fallacy in its discourse about Chen, the editorials suggest that if Chen is represented as disingenuous, then what he says is also disingenuous. The article portrays Chen's 'human rights' discourse as a sham and therefore irrelevant to the China-U.S. dialogue. The processes attributed to him are consequently depicted as incongruent with 'real' human rights activism. As in the Period One article analyzed above (i.e. MOB ORGANIZER SENTENCED TO IMPRISONMENT BY LOCAL COURT, 2006, Xinhua News Agency), Chen is still portrayed as 'aggressive', but here he is represented more as a manipulator of the Machiavellian sort, shown by the attribution of less material and

deceptive actions involving mental, behavioral and verbal process types of a duplicitous nature, such as 'long-time lawyering', and 'sweet-talking'.

For the analysis of these three opinion articles, I will refer to the persuading functions of certain rhetorical strategies such as irony and metaphor, as well as some selected aspects of Appraisal Theory. Metaphors are an effective means of constructing persuasive arguments due to their ability in describing and conceptualizing social realities (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Simply put, the rhetorical use of metaphors facilitates understanding by juxtaposing a familiar domain of reality with an unfamiliar domain by which comprehension or persuasion is enhanced. They can be strategically placed to 'steer attention, conceptualize issues and sustain and create common-sense meaning' (Van Teeffelen 1994: 401). Some (but not all) of the metaphors in the Chinese English media's Chen-discourse have a transcultural aspect, as they seem to represent concepts from the realm of CCP ideation.

The approach in this part of the data will take the analysis article-by-article rather than by categories of function.

6.6.2 Evaluative language in opinion-oriented articles

Besides some occasions of metaphor, a preliminary reading shows reliance on evaluative language based on Judgment both explicit (inscribed) and implicit (evoked) within the Appraisal system category of Attitude. Appraisal, as stated earlier, is a fairly new area in SFL (Droga and Humphrey 2002: 75). It is a system for indexing the lexical and grammatical elements dealing with the evaluation of phenomena in discourse. Martin and White point out, for example, that authorial voice can assume the façade of neutrality, such as in the simple 'sharing of opinion', which facilitates its operation on a covert ideological level (Martin and White 2008: 183). In this analysis, it is seen that the Attitudinal criteria of Judgment is the most widely used throughout the three commentaries of the Period Two texts in the categories of 'Social Sanction' (legal and moral norms) and 'Social Esteem' (related to standards of normality, capacity and tenacity) involving both positive evaluations (of Us) and negative evaluations (of Them). The Appraisal framework lends itself to the critical analysis of opinion-oriented articles due to its focus on providing

descriptive analyses of linguistic resources used for evaluations, and the adoption of stances, which advance either support *for* the ingroup, or bias *against* the outgroup.

White suggests the usefulness of Appraisal theory for exploring how writers

pass judgments on people generally, other writers/speakers and their utterances, material objects, happenings and states of affairs and thereby form alliances with those who share these views and distance themselves from those who don't. As well, it explores how the expression of such attitudes and judgments is, in many instances, carefully managed so as to take into account the ever-present possibility of challenge or contradiction from those who hold differing views. (White n.d.)

In the context of media genres such as 'comment, opinion and editorials', what Martin and White call the 'commentator voice' (the voice of endorsement/dis-endorsement) is 'primarily concerned with assessment of **social sanction**' (2008: 170, emphasis in original), as well as social esteem. This involves the author positioning her/himself as evaluator of the target with the function of making judgmental assessments of Us and the Other on the degree of adherence (or lack of adherence) to above-mentioned established legal and moral criteria. With the understanding that Judgment in discourse is exercised through the evaluation of the target's actions and character, positive-Self/negative-Other references can be found in textual Judgment-bearing items.

6.6.2.1 *Opinion-oriented article one*

'ONE LEAF IS NOT THE WHOLE FOREST'

4 May 2012, *China Daily* (See Appendix 2: *Appraisal Analysis 1*)

This commentary was written on the first day of Chen's appearance at the American Embassy on 27 April 2012. Chronologically it is the first of the three opinion-oriented articles chosen for analysis. This article foregrounds negative-Other representation through criticizing the American view of China's human rights situation as being 'complicated' due to its 'ideology-dominated thinking'. The extended use of negative-Other Judgment by the author, principally in the areas of social sanction and social esteem in attempting to portray as immoral and illicit, the character and actions of Chen and the U.S. In this editorial the U.S. is criticized through the Judgment category of negative Social Sanction, i.e. acting with impropriety. This is seen in the excerpt, 'Some in the United States have a Cold War mentality and turn a blind eye to what China has achieved', which reproaches the

U.S. for a lack of decorum in ignoring China's human rights achievements. The notion that there have been achievements is presupposed, but not articulated. In other words, there are no concrete examples to support the claim that China has 'achieved' some unspecified milestone 'in its protection of human rights'. This clause uses a positive-Self representation on the basis of Social Esteem in the area of positive 'capacity' or ability. It is a type of Self-regard, which is implicitly embedded in 'what China has achieved in its protection of human rights'. This type of persistent positive-Self representation is repeated at various places throughout the article as 'tokens' of judgment (as implications) rather than encoded in direct lexical items.

Further examples of positive-Self presentation in the article are shown in the strategic choices of constructive process types, such as in the following extract:

[China] has created special organizations so people can voice their complaints, is improving its mechanism that prevents government officials from abusing their powers, and is implementing more administrative and legal measures.

In this passage, 'China' self-evaluates as engaged in positive, generative processes such as 'creating', 'improving' and 'implementing' human rights related programs and commending itself for such achievements. Regrettably, to the rest of the world, and most unfortunately for the dissidents themselves, these 'achievements' remain invisible. Other examples of self-aggrandizement are in the area of Social Sanction for its 'tenacity' in positively self-characterizing as doggedly persistent as in the extract, 'the human rights situation in the country has seen much progress over the past decades' and 'the country is determinedly progressing its human rights'.

Emphasizing negative-Other attributes, this article criticizes the U.S. in the area of Social Sanction for its negative 'veracity' as 'those who wag their tongues about China's human rights conditions', which metaphorically implies that the U.S. is distorting the 'real' situation. This is followed by social censure through criticism for impropriety shown by 'some' Westerners who support Chen, as in the excerpt:

it is not fair for some Westerners to champion a particular case such as Chen's in order to attack China's overall human rights conditions.

Use of the descriptor 'overall' evokes the unintended impression that if one looked closer, one would find exceptions in *particular* cases (as opposed to 'overall').

Negative-Other representation is also realized through prosodic inference where the Appraisal is implied and dispersed across a larger piece of text as tokens 'forming a prosody of attitude' rather than being limited to a single words or phrases. Martin and White describe this as establishing the

tone or mood of a passage of discourse, as choices resonate with one another from one moment to another as a text unfolds. The pattern of choices is thus 'prosodic'. They form a prosody of attitude running through the text that swells and diminishes, in the manner of a musical prosody. (Martin and White 2008: 59)

Let us examine, for example, the following metaphor:

The Chinese saying that a leaf before the eye blocks the view of a mountain describes the situation that occurs when some Americans look at human rights issues in China.

The evaluation in this (above) extract is neither inscribed nor explicit but rather implicitly bundled in a negative metaphor. Disapprobation is grounded in the attitudinal category of Judgment on the basis of Social Sanction negatively constructed as 'impropriety' (as inferred by the leaf metaphor), which subliminally suggests that 'Americans' are willfully entertaining a 'blocked view' of China's human rights situation. The implication is that the Americans and the West are prejudiced in their view of China's human rights record, not because they value Liu Xiaobo's and Chen Guangcheng's struggles for justice, but because they are 'anti-China'. The oft-mentioned 'anti-China' discourse is supported by the continuous recycling of the state-sanctioned 'victimhood' subtext (i.e. that Western powers have always colluded against China and continue to entertain conspiratorial designs).

In this commentary, most instances of evaluative language are reactive and/or defensive and take place in the semantic area related to attitudinal Judgment. Authorial opinions here rely on the invoking of moral and legal norms of Social Sanction and Social Esteem as criteria for judging. Judgments concerning the Other (the U.S. and Chen) are unequivocally negative, characterizing them as ignorant of China's progress, prejudiced against China, and lacking in honesty, integrity or any other positive attributes. Positive-Self representation, on the other hand, shows China ('Us') as 'trying' hard and 'achieving' much, as demonstrated its fastidious concern, at least in discourse, for moral and legal correctness.

6.6.2.2 *Opinion-oriented article two*

‘ONE-MAN SHOW JUST A DISTRACTION’

5 May 2012, *China Daily* (See Appendix 2: Appraisal Analysis 2)

This second article challenges the notion of ‘dissident’ (in the context of China) and, in effect, attempts to ridicule the validity of this label being applied to Chen Guangcheng. All of this is similar to the disavowal of legitimacy by connecting with a historical precedent that would grant validity (see section 2.9 on Historical Positioning). In a sense it is a challenge to the definition of ‘dissident’. It adopts the repetitive use of irony (as sarcasm) in attempting to delegitimize Chen, showing that he is not a dissident of the ‘righteous’ type, and attacks him on the level of his character (*argumentum ad hominem*) by ascribing to him the attributes of a conniving schemer that has managed to dupe the U.S. with perfectly calculated timing, into diplomatically sheltering him. In this diplomatic situation brought to the world’s attention, China’s position is potentially embarrassing. In order to block or forestall questions (such as, ‘Why would a Chinese citizen run to the U.S. Embassy for protection?’), Chen’s persona is rhetorically delegitimized, which provides the opportunity for the writer to ascribe negative attributes to him. This includes characterizing him, by tokens of judgment, as a manipulator.

Chen Guangcheng and those who are trying to pressure China with him are taking advantage of each other for their own purposes.

The association of Chen with a ‘righteous’ cause such as human rights (which, in the Western view, confers a heroic legitimacy) must be denigrated in the attempt to sever any connection between Chen Guangcheng and the legitimate struggle for human rights.

Actually few would have heard of him until a couple of days ago. The paper’s report identifying Chen as ‘one of China’s most prominent dissidents’, therefore, will no doubt come as an enlightening revelation to most people here. But it will not be that big a surprise.

He is therefore shown to be acting out of selfish (not humanitarian) interests, resulting in the attempted delegitimization of his integrity. Derogating Chen’s cause,

not only delegitimizes Chen – it has the double-function of validating the government position by default, such as illustrated in the ideological square. If Chen's cause gains legitimacy it creates embarrassment to the CCP. In such cases, where the possibility of abuses have been proven to be more than simply anecdotal, blame can be discursively pushed downward by the hierarchy to expendable lower-level authorities. Perry Link notes that it is a standard device for those at the top to ascribe social problems to the misconduct of lower-level bureaucrats. This approach, he writes, is a 'standard tactic' to send out the message, 'here at the top we hear you, and sympathize; don't worry that there is anything wrong with our system as a whole' (Link 2012). In this way, a 'wrong' is not categorically denied; it is, rather, deflected away from the sacrosanctity of central government figures. Having done so, central authorities may also gain a measure of legitimacy by joining in on the disapproval of aberrant lower level local CCP officials as part of the 'campaign against corruption'. This strategy allows them to display a 'concern' for human rights abuses at no cost to themselves, but at the expense of expendable lower-ranking officials. There is some cost in terms of CCP reputation, but it is a bearable cost, as the higher officials are left unscathed while providing a semblance of legitimacy. For example,

In reality, Chen's stories, even if all true, reveal little more than abusive policy implementation at the hand of some grassroots officials.

In the above extract, the use of 'In reality', suggests that until now what we have read is, perhaps, *not* 'in reality', but in Chen's fabrications. The author is bringing us back to the 'real world' – away from Chen's 'imaginings' of abuse by officials. Doubt is also cast over 'Chen's stories' by the use of '*even if all true*' (my emphasis), which introduces the suggestion that perhaps they may not be 'all true'. This is trivializing and downplaying the significance of Chen as a dissident by casting aspersions on his claims by writing that his 'stories' may not be true, and even if they are true, they 'reveal little'. Attributing his motives to the baser incentive of self-interest attempts to influence reader opinion to see Chen's case as disingenuous.

The article closes by stressing the importance of China's economic neo-liberal aspirations in which the forthcoming China-U.S. economic dialogue is crucial. Discursive trivialization of Chen is the attempt to pre-empt the 'human rights' issue

by deflating its relevance before the U.S. can use it to leverage greater bargaining power on the eve of the *China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue* which would soon take place (Beijing, 3–4 May 2012). All told, the ONE-MAN SHOW JUST A DISTRACTION ARTICLE seems to invite the perception that the state-run media had the assignment of belittling Chen's claim to true dissent. At the heart of the matter is a major political struggle for China; the discourse of human rights (personified in this instance by Chen), could in no way, shape, or form be allowed to acquire political capital (i.e. legitimacy) that might tarnish China's image. The article posits a rhetorical question regarding Chen's significance followed by the metaphorical inference that he is a 'spoiler':

But is it appropriate to let one person's story dictate the course of the ties between two countries? Neither country will benefit if decision-makers from the two countries let the dramatic one-man show distract and derail their efforts to anchor their volatile state-to-state relations.

As in the preceding opinion piece ONE LEAF IS NOT THE WHOLE FOREST, the author relies heavily on Appraisal and the covert use of Judgment based on Social Sanction in the area of negative 'veracity', which in this case is the casting of doubt on the use of the term 'dissident' (extract below) to describe Chen. Firstly, the term 'dissident' is put in scare quotes signifying that the author is distancing himself from it. This is followed by the delegitimization of the legal advice Chen offered to exploited peasants, as in the use of the phrase that they were 'allegedly victimized', which introduces an element of doubt to the notion that the state 'Family Planning Association' actually forcefully aborted peasant women.

By 'dissident', it referred to Chen Guangcheng, a blind man from East China's Shandong province who provided legal advice to those allegedly victimized by improper enforcement of family planning policies, though few in this country would address him that way.

The clause, 'Few would address him that way' (i.e. as a dissident), portrays Chen's activism as unrecognized and unknown by the vast majority of China's 1.3 billion people. This allusion is further developed in the next sentence (below) where Chen is again trivialized by the use of an ironic trope (underlined) suggesting that his prominence as a dissident would be a 'revelation' to most Chinese people. Again, this covertly suggests that Chen's struggle for human rights is unimportant to the majority of mainland Chinese, as the article mentions that 'few would have heard of

him'. But this logic miscarries when one realizes that 'few Chinese' know about Chen, not because they do not care about human rights, but because of the government's assiduous control in keeping his story out of all forms of media. The Propaganda Department's practice of journalistic 'silence' on controversial topics is a method of controlling the spread of inflammatory ideas. The author's allusion to the supposed ignorance of China's population regarding Chen ('few would have heard of him until a couple of days ago') is largely due to the fact that the public have only been allowed a trickle of information, if any.

The majority of evaluations in this opinion-oriented piece are related to the Appraisal category of Attitude in the area of Judgment, which as explained earlier is based on legal and moral norms related to social values of endorsement ('sanction') and honor ('esteem'). They are delivered in the ironic tone of sarcasm. The article continues the negative-Other representation by a second use of scare quotes on the word 'dissidents', which is shown in the following extract:

Chinese 'dissidents' who have become Western heroes have rocketed to prominence from oblivion, only to fall back into obscurity when they were no longer of any use to the West.

The metaphorical processes of 'have rocketed' and 'only to fall back into obscurity' are antithetical and with the contrast, imply that what goes up must come down. In other words, though the U.S. welcoming of dissidents may begin with praise it will surely end in oblivion. This is negative evaluation based on the Social Sanction criteria of impropriety, suggesting that though Chen may initially get a grand welcome his prominence will fade away once he is no longer a useful political pawn. Put yet another way, his current acclaim is unmerited because he is not what he says he is. This positions the writer of the editorial as 'prescient' due to his astute worldview informed by the correctness of CCP ideology. Writers, however, are not prescient no matter to what degree they believe their institution's ideology, and this use of language is an unsubstantiated assertion intended to add to the construction of a negative-Chen presentation. A further example of irony is the use of metaphor as in 'Chen has managed to hide himself under American wings', which again is a cynical reference to Chen having 'manipulated' the Americans. Other references to Chen's seeking of protection at the U.S. Embassy are ironic, bordering on the sarcastic, use of lexis.

Chen's smartly timed plea for U.S. protection has served him well. He has got [sic] the attention he wanted, and is asking for more.

This insinuates that Chen has calculated his synchronized pleas for protection at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing for maximum impact that would coincide with the all-important *China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue*. Here, he is represented as a manipulator through the Appraisal category of Judgment, and is socially sanctioned under negative veracity – which represents Chen as devious. His uninvited appearance in Beijing on the eve of the Strategic Dialogue is also discursively portrayed as

a tricky sideline issue for high officials from both countries who were on a tight schedule comparing notes.

This not only attempts to marginalize Chen in conformity to the previous strategy of representing his cause as trivial, but at the same time represents his cause as ‘tricky’, based on an implied lack of ‘veracity’. Overall, it is suggested that Chen is as ignoble as his cause is false; he is therefore undeserving of acknowledgment from either government, and should thus, be ignored.

6.6.2.3 *Opinion-oriented article three:*

‘U.S. VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL LAW’

7 May 2012, *China Daily* (See Appendix 2: *Appraisal Analysis 3*)

This third commentary differs from the other two mainly because it re-contextualizes other voices as direct quotations, which the other articles do not (except for a few selected words in scare quotes, i.e. ‘dissident’ (2x) and ‘crisis’). Reported speech is always ‘a reduction’ of the original event (Caldas-Coulthard 1994: 297), and the complexity of the selection process necessary for setting up re-contextualizations of voice ‘increases as the form of speech presentation becomes progressively more indirect’ (Roeh and Nir 1990: 227). Due to the heteroglossic element, there are shifts in register as well as the inclusion of numerous ‘voices’ (Bakhtin 1981) the article appears to be somewhat inconsistent and fluctuating in tone, which lends it a certain marked prosodic quality. It appears to be a patchwork of registers making it linguistically heterogeneous. These range from the (i)

condemnatory; (ii) to the conciliatory; (iii) to the self-congratulatory (triumphalist), as exemplified below:

(i) Condemnatory: strongly-worded social sanction of the U.S.

It [the U.S.] has broken international laws and Chinese laws and interfered in China's internal affairs.

(ii) Conciliatory: attempting mitigation with a more felicitous tone of mutual benefit

Certainly the outside world is eager for China and the U.S. to construct a win-win cooperative partnership of mutual respect and mutual benefit and wanted the two countries to use the dialogue to chart a path of harmonious coexistence.

(iii) Self-congratulatory: state-triumphalist discourse

Over the past three decades China's economy has developed rapidly and its society has made great progress.

This ebb and flow between the different registers gives the text an inconsistent quality, which creates a sense of fragmentation, as evidenced by the shifts among orders of discourse. This is also seen in the last eight sentences, nearly a third of the article, which is a seemingly unprovoked departure from criticism of the U.S., to launch into a Self-interested digression of triumphalism that is reminiscent of the ‘denunciation register’ so often used in the Cultural Revolution (Table 6.7). As mentioned earlier, defensive rhetorical strategies remain in the discursive ‘toolbox’ as a default mechanism for dealing with sensitive issues regarding loss of face or embarrassment (i.e. when offended – strike back). This is clearly a case of what Fairclough calls drawing upon a ‘plurality of genres’ (1992b: 195) in textual construction, where the text is ‘linguistically heterogeneous’ and contains what he calls ‘contradictory stylistic and semantic values’ (1992b: 195). This alludes to intertextuality and its role in hybridizing various orders of discourse.

With regard to the ‘complementary moves’ of the ideological square strategy of positive Self-representation, the table below (based on van Dijk’s ‘sample analysis’, 2011: 399) demonstrates some of the passages:

Us, <i>China Daily</i> (CCP)	Positive Self-representation
1 It took Western countries hundreds of years to get to this stage	• <i>We are an inherently capable people</i> → <i>We are ahead of the West</i>
2 So it is unavoidable that China is facing the same problems that occurred in Western countries	• <i>We have some problems but you had them too</i> → <i>We are no less capable</i>

during their development.	
3 If people choose to turn a blind eye to China's development and irresponsibly criticize China, or even interfere in China's internal affairs, they are actually hindering China's development and we have to question their intentions.	than you
4 China is a country under the rule of law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We have an agenda for development because We are good → if you criticize Us or interfere with it, your intentions cannot be good and upright
5 The legal rights of any citizen are protected by its Constitution and laws	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We have laws → We are no different from democratic nations • We have a constitution and laws that protect citizens
6 Writing human rights protection into the Constitution, carrying out the National Human Rights Action Plan and amending the Criminal Procedure Law are important milestones that testify to China's progress in human rights.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We protect human rights → See the evidence → We have an Action Plan and make amendments → This proves that We are moral and not aberrant concerning human rights
7 China has reiterated many times that every citizen has the obligation to abide by the Constitution and laws.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We said We have laws → Our Constitution says so
8 No matter who breaks the law, the Chinese authorities will investigate and bring those responsible to justice.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We have a code of law that applies to all → If human rights activists break the law they will go to jail (which is why Chen and other dissidents were/are in jail)
9 No outside interference is acceptable in this process.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We are sovereign so do not interfere → We know how to handle 'Human rights' cases

Table 6.7 Positive Self-representation

Besides incongruity of register within the discourse, there are instances of markedness at the textual level. A large proportion of this article is reported speech, which begs a critical analysis of sources to see from where the evaluations emanate, whose voices are being recontextualized and for what purpose. Of the 736 words in the text approximately 31% are directly quoted. One source is a government representative, 'Spokesman Liu Weimin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' and the other, a document entitled the *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*. The main thrust of the article is an argument constructed to represent U.S. actions regarding Chen as having been illegal, but as noted above, there are inconsistencies in register. In general, the article is populated by 'tokens' of judgment, where, according to the Judgment category of Social Sanction, the U.S. is negatively characterized as having acted unethically and without propriety for violating established legal norms. The U.S. view of things, in contrast, is that helping Chen at the Embassy was justified 'on humanitarian grounds' (Levin 2012). However, in line with suppressing the voice of the Other, there is no trace of the U.S. position in

the *China Daily* article so any 'dialogic alternative' (Martin and White 2008: 103) must be found external to the article.

Regarding reporting verbs, the article contains the following examples:

Participant		Reporting verb
Spokesman Liu Weimin [...]	→	has made it clear
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations expressly	→	stipulates
As Liu Weimin	→	stressed
It also	→	states
Liu Weimin	→	stressed
China	→	has reiterated

Table 6.8 External voices and reporting verbs

Discourse analyst Lily Chen classifies reporting verbs into categories such as Declaratives, Authoritatives, Exhortatives, Accusatives, Informatives and Predictives. According to Chen's description of these classifications, the reporting verbs in this article would fall into the category of Authoritatives. She defines these as having 'the effect of making the speaker seem powerful, authoritative or influential' (2007: 484), which is the desired effect, as the *China Daily* article attempts to augment the importance and gravity of the Sayer. A social actor who 'has made it clear' or 'stressed' a point, is plainly represented as someone in authority. In her study of verbal process in *China Daily* articles, Chen found that 70% of the Sayers associated were 'connected to the [Chinese] government in some way' (2008: 488). In the article currently under analysis the quotations from the *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Conventions* are introduced by the reporting verbs 'stipulate' and 'states'. These are verbal processes that reflect a type of authority and legality regarding the contents of the *Convention* as shown in the following excerpt:

The *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* expressly stipulates: 'Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State'.

The *Convention* is represented as an ultimate authority that cannot be transgressed. The representation of the *Vienna Convention* as the definitive document on correct diplomatic behavior facilitates the characterization of those who do *not* follow it as acting unlawfully. By invoking the supremacy of such documents as inviolable,

those who do not abide by it or act in accordance with it are ‘heretics’ (Marcuse, 1964; Berger and Luckmann 1966). This is an inversion of the U.S. accusations against China for contravention of the *Declaration of Human Rights*. The tit-for-tat dialogues instantiate the Other’s negative activities, and in this particular case, are based on allegations of negative propriety regarding the transgression of the legal norms in the *Convention*.

Martin and White view such authoritative endorsements of external voices as dialogically contractive in that they ‘close down space for dialogic alternatives’ (2008: 103). In other words they are assertive to the degree that opposing voices will have no logical rhetorical space, similar to Marcuse’s notion of ‘closure the universe of discourse’ (1964). They also note that the introduction of such external voices operates on an ideological level so that attitudes are not directly attributed to the author, creating the impression that Judgment has been deferred. Consequently, the commentary appears to be more objective, thus closer to van Dijk’s notion of journalistic neutrality (1989: 205). For example, the extract below is formulated so that the scolding of the U.S. for assisting Chen carries a more imposing diplomatic tone when coming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than the *China Daily*:

As Liu Weimin stressed: ‘It should be pointed out that the U.S. Embassy in China took Chen Guangcheng, a Chinese citizen, into the Embassy via abnormal means, with which China expresses strong dissatisfaction.’

Martin and White also discuss ‘dialogistic positioning’, which refers to the Bhaktinian phenomenon of a ‘heteroglossic backdrop of other voices and alternative viewpoints’ (2008: 99), and includes how the writer engages with external voices, or how the ‘textual voice positions itself with respect to other voices and other positions’ (Martin and White 2008: 2). One of the principle means of this is ‘monoglossic assertions’ (2008: 100), which, as mentioned earlier, is when the proposition presented by the writer is one that has no ‘dialogistic alternatives, which need to be recognized, or engaged with’ (2008: 99) as the writer’s position is assertive to the degree that it precludes entertaining other views, such as in the extract below, an apodictic assertion:

No country can act as a human rights savior for the 7 billion people worldwide.

Another aspect of attributing authority to the direct quotations in the article is *institutionalization*. The voices come from organizations that outweigh the journalist's own voice in terms of authority and are therefore regarded as a more reliable source of legitimacy for carrying the article's pro-government discourse.

Though the three articles selected from Period Two have slightly different orientations in their rhetorical strategies, they all end up in the same ideological place, which is the casting of Chen, his associates and his discourse of human rights, as well as the U.S., in a generally negative mold. Simultaneously, China, the CCP, and its point of view and attitudes are represented as correct, all of which is attempted through the four moves of the ideological square. Judgments in the first two opinion articles are unmediated, which is to say authorially-sourced, whereas a number of the values of Judgment in the third article, as we have just seen, are mediated through the heteroglossic attribution of external institutional voices lending authority and legitimacy to the utterances. The author however, is the source in the majority of evaluations, which is the mark of what Martin and White call the 'commentator voice' (2008: 174). This is where the author, in editorial style articles, may use a full range of judgment resources for evaluation of the target with few to no restrictions. This accounts for the large number of both implicit and explicit evaluations on the basis of the Judgment categories of Social Sanction and Social Esteem in all three articles.

6.7 Summary

In this chapter I have studied in some detail the linguistic properties used in the discursive strategies for representations of Chen Guangcheng in the state-run Chinese English press. Firstly, adopting the methodology of transitivity analysis, I studied the headlines of all sixteen articles, which when divided into two chronological periods, revealed differences in style between the two periods. This was mainly due to political vicissitudes and showed that in Period One, Chen is criminalized and characterized as 'mob organizer' and a troublemaker. An analysis of processes in which Chen and his associates were involved, showed a disproportionately skewed number of destructive material processes attributed to Chen and the outgroup, whereas the ingroup social actors ('Local Authorities' and 'Neutrals') were portrayed as Chen's victims, and through passivization, were

partially hidden behind a veil of virtue and represented as taking part in unassuming and immaterial processes.

The Period Two articles have a different orientation due to the diplomatic context engendered by Chen's escape to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, which raised the stakes considerably. From this second group of articles, three opinion-oriented pieces were selected for analysis. These demonstrate a defensive posture written in the 'commentator voice', which allowed an expanded range of evaluations generally based on the analytical categories of Social Sanction and Social Esteem. These are entextualized as transgressions of moral and legal boundaries by the outgroup (i.e. Chen and the U.S.), while simultaneously attempting to establish the image that China holds scrupulous regard for the selfsame norms which the U.S. has transgressed.

Concerning political issues, discourses engendered by the tension between competing versions of the same reality (regarding Chen Guangcheng) have offered the opportunity to analyze how ideological viewpoints are articulated as writers 'present themselves as recognizing, answering, ignoring, challenging, rejecting, fending off, anticipating or accommodating actual or potential interlocutors and the value positions they represent' (Martin and White 2008: 2). After analysis, it is my corroborated view that the English-language press in China, both implicitly and explicitly, encodes ideologically oriented attitudes by reproduction of positive-Self/negative-Other representation in its discourses.

CHAPTER 7

COMMENTARY AND CONCLUSION

It is embarrassing to imprison people for words...there can be no honor in causing honest men to suffer, stripped of their rights for simply saying what they believe.

-- Saul (2013) *The PEN Report: Creativity and Constraint in Today's China*

7.1 Introduction

The aim of this study has been to investigate the language of ideology, both in structure and content, as it is used by China's English-language press in the representation of its modern-day dissenters. This final chapter presents an overview of the concepts I have discussed throughout the thesis, and also reviews the results arising from the critical analysis of the data. In keeping with the critical discourse analysis in this thesis, the chapter also reviews the ways in which layers of meaning are embedded in text, and the ways in which the ideology of the writer(s) guides the construction of the text that the individual eventually reads. In this process, language and ideology are inseparable, and as Kress (1983: 45) alluded, 'all texts are products of ideology'. The theme of this study has been to understand how English is used in the representation of dissidents as delegitimized social actors in China's state press, which paradoxically strives to uphold the official discourses of the 'harmonious' and 'moderately prosperous society', while simultaneously operating under the panoptic²⁵ policy of 'stability maintenance' (*wei wen*). Because of the ideological

nature of the subject matter, my methodology has involved an exploration of the relationship between the representations of dissent and the social and political themes associated with them.

Laying the groundwork for this analysis has involved three general stages: (i) dealing with the empirical contexts in Chapters 1 and 2; (ii) a theoretical discussion of relevant analytical frameworks and their linguistic models in Chapters 3 and 4; and, (iii) the critical analyses of data in Chapters 5 and 6. I have also drawn strongly on contextual resources in order to apply Thompson's depth hermeneutics to this research project. In this concluding chapter, my intention is to bring together the various threads running through this thesis by means of an extended commentary on the research findings (section 7.3), as well as the consideration of various directions for further possible research, including a brief discussion of the present study's limitations (sections 7.4.1–4.2). Finally, I share some philosophical views regarding China's international media agenda and its implications, which I arrived at through a meta-reflection on the data and the state media's current ideological direction (sections 7.5–7.7). Such considerations have allowed me to formulate an opinion on where China's English media appear to be going and how they intend to get there.

Due to the rather limited set of rhetorical strategies relied upon by China's English press, one might need not be a discourse analyst to answer some of these questions at the instinctual level. However, arranging findings in tables and extracting elements of texts from within the data are ways of bringing otherwise less conspicuous aspects of language to the fore and making explicit the patterns of ideological content. This method helps reveal the deliberate and systematic choosing of linguistic features (register, lexical items, sentence patterns, agency manipulation, attributes, attitudes, identities, characteristics, discourse strategies, etc.) of the individual or institution being represented, and also makes explicit the ideological position of those who produce the discourse. A critical approach to the analysis of official mediatized political discourse thus has the potential to provide a process, hopefully antidotal in nature, of hermeneutic investigation through a systematic approach to examining layers of meaning and their linguistic structures. In this particular study, CDA provides a method of social scientific research for the linguistic analysis of discursive objects, which either implicitly or explicitly, convey the asymmetry in power relations in the media's coverage of dissent in China.

7.2 Revisiting the research questions

I have set out to explore three basic questions in this research. The analytical approach, due to its focus on social and political issues such as inequality in power relations, has posed this standard CDA query: ‘Whose interests are served by these texts?’ A set of contiguous questions are related to the three elements of language, ideology, and power. Concerning language, I look at ‘how’ it works as a political tool; in terms of ideology, I explore ‘why’ such discourse is reproduced in China’s English press; and finally, associated with power, I explore ‘who’ is benefitting (or suffering) from the reproduction of such discourse. These questions are illustrated in the following table, which was first presented in Chapter 4 as Table 4.1.

Inquiry		General Research Questions		
‘how’	→	language	→	How is language used in representations of Self and Other?
‘why’	→	ideology	→	To what ends are such representations reproduced?
‘who’	→	power	→	Which individuals or institutions benefit from such representations?

These questions have been answered in some detail across this thesis, but at this point it may be useful to recapitulate and provide a summary of earlier findings.

The use of language in representations of Self and Other

Following the Hallidayan approach to language as a network of options, in Chapter 3, I described the ideological square and its four discursive moves. To reiterate, these are (i) emphasize positive information about us; (ii) emphasize negative information about them; (iii) repress negative information about us; and (iv) repress positive information about them. The moves of the square posit ways of understanding the general orientations of ideological meta-discourse ranging in various degrees of intensity from the abstract position of ‘theoretical neutrality’ to the explicit manifestation of overt bias. I have attempted to show how the state press discursively activates the moves of the ideological square for its political purposes, and found that in accordance with the ideological square, all ingroup actors (Us) were positively represented. They were generally characterized as possessing

qualities like blamelessness, innocence, and uprightness as expected of those who follow ‘correct’ procedures in accordance with globally accepted legal, moral and political norms. Opposing discourses and their proponents have been characterized as being of low character, traitorous, dishonest, illegal and/or immoral. The outgroup and its members have also been discursively represented as hostile to China. This strategy can be seen generally throughout the articles, and specifically in representations of the Nobel Peace Prize, along with its Chairman and Committee as ‘corrupt’ (i.e. a Western plot to defame China), the U.S. as perfidious (i.e. plotting to ‘contain’ China), and Liu and Chen along with their human rights activism, as ‘anti-China’ (i.e. in collusion with external ‘enemies’).

With SFL as a general analytical resource, I have looked at various areas of how language has been manipulated to construct such representations of the in- and outgroups. For example, transitivity patterns of agency, participants and processes; ‘social actors’ and their discursive role allocations; ‘representation’ as a range of choices in a network of linguistic possibilities; and, ‘Appraisal Theory’ as a way of understanding the use of language in evaluation, identification, and attribution. All of these linguistically strategic aspects of rhetoric and discourse production, as found in the data, have been subsumed to their ultimate purpose: the legitimization of the CCP, as an overarching discourse macro-strategy.

The political ends of ideological representations

This investigation here is about ideology and the issue of ‘why’ such discourses exist. Generally, the discourses of negativization aimed at an Other are mounted as direct defensive measures against those who have posed any sort of threat to the Party’s monopolistic worldview. In sum, ideological representation is a means of legitimization. Approached as an ideological issue, the analysis deals with the abstract notions of bias, stereotyping, and negative presuppositions of the Other as supported by systems of belief. I have answered this question of ideology by looking at its manifestations in discourse, i.e. how language is used to covertly/overtly disseminate ideological views for the purpose of accruing political capital for the ingroup, while diminishing that of the outgroup. By embedding a system of ethics in its discourse, ideology can be seen to legitimize, not only the status of the powerful, but also the methods used to achieve it. From the analysis of the data in Chapters 5 and 6, the accrual of political capital is attempted through a

discourse of legitimization of Self and delegitimization of the Other. Dichotomies based on positive-Self/negative-Other representations are enacted in the discourses for the ingroup (i.e. the government and anything and anyone ideologically aligned with it) are: to ‘defend’, ‘vindicate’, ‘exalt’, ‘approve’, ‘honor’, ‘endorse’, etc., as means of legitimization. The binary opposites of these processes, which are reserved for the outgroup (i.e. Liu, Chen and their associates both domestic and foreign), are: to ‘attack’, ‘accuse’, ‘debase’, ‘disapprove’, ‘dis-endorse’, ‘trivialize’, ‘ignore’ and ‘dishonor’, and are for the purpose of de-legitimization.

The beneficiaries of particular forms of representation

This issue could be reformulated as ‘whose interests are served by such discourse?’ The answer to this is amply clear. In conducting a close textual analysis of the data, the findings corroborate the view that Us vs Them discourses of China’s official English press serve to legitimize the interests of the state – who hold legal and ideological control, in terms of content and distribution, over the media – while simultaneously marginalizing and/or criminalizing designated individuals and outgroups and their *ethos*, i.e. dissidents and activists such as Liu, Chen, and numerous others.

I have approached the data, comprised entirely of the state-sponsored articles, not as autonomous and separate entities, but as a web of intricately connected and coordinated sites, which introduce, reproduce and maintain the hegemonic interests of the ruling party. Because ideological intent, as noted, cannot be read off from any given text, I have set out to excavate from within the texts, selected linguistic features from their embedded positions, grouped and categorized them according to their functions, and then critically interpreted them as to their latent (or overt) meanings. In this process, a multidisciplinary analytical framework has been instrumental in understanding the nature of official discourse, both in its minutiae and in its larger thematic strategies, all of which have been deployed in the practice of building and consolidating the state’s hegemonic designs over the voices of dissent.

Fairclough observed that ‘detailed textual analysis will *always strengthen* discourse analysis’ (1992b: 194, my emphasis). In their brief paper on CDA, Maingueneau and O’regan (2006) point to ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ versions of discourse

analysis. The strong being that of ‘fully assuming the purpose of discourse analysis, trying to systematically connect text structures [...] with social practices and places’ (Maingueneau and O’regan 2006: 230). The weak version consists of simply describing discursive structures in the text. In choosing the ‘strong’ way, they write, ‘discourse analysts, whether they like it or not, are powerfully critical’ (2006: 230). My intention has not only been to conduct discourse analysis, but to do so ‘powerfully’ – by which I mean memorably, and to the furthest extent possible, with a positive and emancipatory social outcome.

7.3 Commentary: An overview of concepts and processes

This section begins a commentary on the main points brought out in this thesis with my critical comments and observations included. In the first couple of chapters, I was mainly concerned with establishing a social context for the study. Chapter 1, which dealt with the Chinese people’s on-going struggle for ‘dignity’ and its centrality to the discourse of human rights, also necessitated an overview of the various polemic discourses contributing to the controversies in modern Chinese society. Through the overall practice of ‘linguistic engineering’ and the use of history as a resource for constructing narratives sympathetic to the state, we can see how discourse is used for positioning a particular version of events. The forces of neo-Maoism vs the forces of democracy were physically manifest during factional confrontations at social flashpoints such as the *Nanfang Zhoumou* (*Southern Weekend*) protests in Guangzhou and other similar standoffs. China’s laws on subversion have attracted criticism for their pliability in application, so in order to defend its position, Beijing has fostered a homegrown ‘discourse of rights’ which alludes to an assortment of various peripheral rights. Conspicuously absent, however, is the one kind that matters most. Some minor rights, which were previously denied the populace, are granted as long as demands for democracy (and the international version of human rights) are dropped. The governing and the governed, each look the other way in a social compact, which He Qinglian (2013) calls the ‘bread contract’ between the ruler and the people. This involves the granting of some ‘rights’ (non-political) in exchange for popular acquiescence.

‘Dissent’ and the pursuit of dignity are set against a backdrop of competing discourses (Lee 2003) that have been characterized as a struggle among the

dominant (CCP ideology), the residual (Confucian ethics), and the emergent (neoliberalism) orders of discourse. These three discourses struggle, not only among themselves, but also with what could be called a ‘fourth order of discourse’ – the beggarly discourse of dissent. Meanwhile, China’s media, with the dissemination of ‘soft power’ (Kurlantzick 2006, 2007; Nye 2004), have endeavored to construct persuasive images of the harmonious society for projection to a wider world. For all its costly attempts at accruing international social capital, however, China’s soft power comes up short. The social capital deficit, as Shambaugh puts it, is due to the government, which, he suggests should just get ‘out of [the people’s] way’. He recognizes that ‘China has an enormously talented society – just let it speak for itself’ (Shambaugh 2013: 267).

The central task of critically analyzing the data was further contextualized in Chapter 2 with explanations of key concepts through the more historical aspects of the use of political language in China as it was used to ‘divide the world’ into friends and enemies. This chapter dealt further with the ‘changing orders of discourse’ that surrounded the transition from Maoism to marketism. I showed how this ideological reversal was legitimized (Kluver 1996) through the reformulation of key elements of the national narrative in 1981 by the *Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China*, so that heterodoxy was transformed into a new orthodoxy. The question of polarization by ‘strongly demarcating’ the enemy through labeling was used aggressively during the class struggle era, as exemplified in Lowell Dittmer’s (1987) polemical symbol structure (Figure 2.1). Mao was instrumental in pejoratively identifying those perceived as class enemies, which was reflected in his famous, ‘who are our friends, and who are our enemies?’ question, that opened his speech on the *Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society* (1926/1971) many years ago. This polarizing worldview still lingers in the Chinese English-language media’s repertoire of discursive strategies for dealing with antagonistic social actors, be they individuals or nations, who pose a challenge to the CCP’s worldview. As Daniel Fried (2013) writes, China ‘is still addicted to the language of binarism, distinction and representation of fixed Others’ (2103). Nationalist sentiment has been encouraged as both citizens and the state set out to define and redefine ‘Chineseness’ in a variety of forms. National ‘achievement’, for which all credit is claimed by the

CCP, offers citizens the opportunity to collectively bask in refracted glory, but this is only accessible in exchange for costly demands on loyalty (Freeden 1998).

The importance of discourse to the CCP's agenda of legitimization can be seen in the manipulation of relations between the outgroup and legendary historical events. Because these historical occurrences have achieved a type of mythical standing, when they are connected to a cause that is at odds with official policy, such a link has the capacity to validate them. This discourse strategy of 'historical positioning' can result in the connecting and disconnecting of events and participants, which, according to Kluver (1996), is essential for legitimizing Chinese political actors and their agendas. This was illustrated in the state's English language coverage of the 1989 Tiananmen clampdown as the overall discourse strategy for preventing the students from gaining legitimacy. Students were cut off from forming a parallel relationship to the hallowed May 4th Movement of 1919. This tactic of 'discursive severance' (or dissolution) is also how both Liu and Chen were denied the legitimacy that would have been granted to them through association with their ethical motives, such as Liu's human rights activism or Chen's *pro bono* legal work. The strategy of rhetorically connecting dissenters to major 'criminals' or 'enemies of the state', such as the Dalai Lama, for example, is another delegitimization technique. Relating any individual to the Dalai Lama automatically activates the reservoir of presupposition and classifies those linked, as 'wolves in sheep's clothing', or 'splittists' who are 'anti-China', etc. Much of this polarization work is attempted through the rhetorical strategy of subversion (section 2.5.2) whereby anti-ethos discourses are circulated to weaken and delegitimize the Other's ideology, making it and them 'consubstantial with Satanic attributes and intentions' (Fisher 1970: 138). The practice of 'strongly demarcating' the enemy, though perhaps not exactly 'Satanic', nonetheless survives to this day in various forms and guises.

In Chapter 3, I have attempted to establish a multidisciplinary framework based on the 'ideological square' and 'representation theory' (Hall 1997), the interpretive frameworks through which my research findings are interpreted. In the explanation of the latter, I argue that any given representation in discourse due to ideological flux is imbued with instability. This may cause meaning to oscillate in order to accommodate elite interests, particularly as they change over time and are found to be no longer effective for retaining political control. I have demonstrated how language, as a central manifestation of ideology, can be used to construct (media)

representations in such a way as to alter and advance the belief system of those in power and promote their interests, while covertly repressing the voices of those in opposition. The Hallidayan notion that language is constituted by various choices (e.g. in terms of grammar, lexis, semantics, etc.) is considered in light of its ideological intention. As a way of perceiving the strategic use of discourse, positive-Self and negative-Other representation in terms of the ideological square (van Dijk 1998b, 2011; Oktar 2001; Machin and Mayr 2012), was introduced as a way of conceptualizing ideological representations embedded in biased discourses. CDA, as an analytical tool, was discussed theoretically for its strategic ability to make explicit such ideological orientations as discrimination and bias, either for or against. I situate my research methods within the work of well-known critical discourse analysts such as van Dijk, Fairclough, Wodak, van Leeuwen, and Thompson, and in so doing endeavor to form a way of analytically looking at emerging non-Western political discourses.

Chapter 4 discussed the fusion of methodologies for this study, the definitions of particular technical terms, and a review of the data sources. In the process of analysis, the grammatical theory of Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) as a specific set of analytical concepts (some of which have been applied here) has been instrumental in providing categories and ways of looking at ideological structures in text. But, because SFL does not cover all facets needed for analysis, the research has inevitably involved some ‘eclecticism as well as pragmatism’ (Wodak 2006: 7), resulting in an integration of theory and method that has, I believe, been ‘adequate for an understanding and explanation of the object under investigation’ (Wodak 2006: 7). The fourth chapter also included an explanation of the relationship between CDA and SFL as being ‘fruitful’ (Mathiessen 2012). In this chapter I clarified certain features of SFL such as process types, agency, lexicalization and other analytical aspects to be used in analysis. As part of SFL, Appraisal Theory (operationalized in Chapter 6) was found appropriate for the study of evaluative language, as shown in the analyses of ‘opinion-oriented’ articles on Chen. Strategic functions of meta-discourses for the purpose of legitimization and delegitimization of Self and Other were hypothesized. The analytical functions of these elements were instrumental to this study through their ability to identify macro-linguistic patterns and how they are repetitively manipulated in discourse. This was followed by a quantitative comparison between the amounts of coverage in the Western press

vis-à-vis China's press on dissidents, revealing a significant discrepancy in the amount of information disseminated. The comparison lays bare the state-media practice of silencing through the trivialization and suppression of information regarding the voices of dissent. According to the depth hermeneutics framework, this fourth chapter has established a bridge from Thompson's first phase (social analysis) to the second phase (discursive analysis) beginning in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5 (published as Alvaro 2013a) began with a review of dissident author and 2010 Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo's political undertakings and a case study of the state's press release headlines on his activities in light of the above-mentioned theories. A detailed linguistic study of the data written about him was critically analyzed beginning with a transitivity analysis of processes in article headlines, which produced a general indication of the ideological stance of the state media apparatus. This was followed by the more detailed explication of relational processes using SFL, which revealed the use of negative-Other/positive-Self discourses throughout. The principle discursive macro-strategy for delegitimizing Liu was 'violation of sovereignty'; besides this, there was a tendency to justify China's particularism by attaching 'with Chinese characteristics' to 'socialism'. These strategies served to frame Liu's 'criminalization' as warranted.

Chapter 6 is a case study of the coverage on the blind 'barefoot lawyer', Chen Guangcheng. After a brief historical view of his legal work in defending farmers against exploitation and forced abortions under the 'one child' policy, a transitivity analysis of headlines was carried out, much as in the analysis of headlines on Liu Xiaobo. The articles were divided into two chronological periods (one earlier and one latter) where an article from Period One was analyzed in terms of how social actors are represented with particular focus on positive-Self/negative-Other representation. Three opinion-oriented commentaries from Period two were analyzed according to an analytical model adapted from the Appraisal Theory sub-category of Judgment as well as the attribution of voices to external sources which can facilitate the journalist's ideological position through heteroglossic variation. The commentaries are shown to contain the use of evaluations of social actors and the processes in which they are involved by following the ideological square representations of Us vs Them. The ingroup is portrayed as non-aggressive, restrained and reasonable, whereas the outgroup (Chen and his associates), is delegitimized by showing it to be engaged in unlawful and chaotic processes.

7.4 The contribution of this thesis to critical discourse analysis

Critical investigations of discourses of control within Western societies have undoubtedly been instrumental in revealing the inequitable nature of domination by the powerful in these developed nations. Exclusive focus on such discourses, however, can distract from the study of politicized discourses in other areas of the world. There are situations in the developing world where institutionalized violations of individual rights occur under the banner of legality and shielded by claims to ‘sovereignty’, but are actually in retribution for having challenged or exposed the power monopolies of the elite. Nations have developed their own particular ways and means of telling their narratives to a global audience, and for this purpose, the state fosters its own compliant ‘mouthpiece media’ (e.g. in China’s case this includes *China Daily*, *People’s Daily Online*, *Global Times*, *Beijing Review*, CCTV-9, etc.). These media are now attempting to carve a niche in a crowded global mediasphere (Brady 2009, 2012), and in so doing, act as vehicles of naturalization for orders of discourse that legitimize social and political practices on behalf of the state. In Gramscian terms, this could be described as the attempt to advance a particular ideology to where it is accepted by the masses – not only domestically, but also globally. At a certain point in the push to establish terrain, it attains the ‘*hegemony* of common sense’, and is no longer questioned (van Dijk 2011: 380, emphasis in the original) as it once was. It is therefore important for CDA practitioners to be aware of ways in which state-owned media, in any context, represent matters such as human rights, national sovereignty, and contentious ethnic and territorial issues. Given the lack of transparency and the frequency of conflicting accounts surrounding the status of human rights in China for example, the discourses that attempt to legitimize such pro-government agendas warrant attention from analysts just as they do in Western societies.

International relations scholar Rex Li (2009: 3) writes that China’s re-emergence ‘as a great power is arguably the single most important development in the post-Cold War world’. It seems reasonable for the CDA community, therefore, to consider China’s mediatized political discourse as equally important, particularly in light of its tendency to avoid transparency. Recently, Ruth Wodak, along with collaborators Paul Chilton and Tian Heilong, as editors of the volume, *Discourse*

and Socio-political Transformations in Contemporary China (2012) call for researchers to shift their attention to China's socio-political discourses due to its emerging global role. Hong Kong discourse analyst Doreen D. Wu (2008) also points towards the current transformations of China's cultural discourses as compelling sites in need of further analytical research in this age of globalization. As Wu puts it:

We need to understand what [China] says, how it says it, and how its current discourses are connected with its past and furthermore are connected and reconstructed with those of other cultures it encounters in this age of accelerated globalization. (Wu 2008: 2)

In light of all this, I have reasoned for an expansion of the CDA vision to focus not only on the discourses of asymmetrical power relations in developed industrialized societies of the West, but to also engage with the discourses of nations classified as 'developing', where practices concerning human rights are legitimized, not on universal codes, but on indigenous norms and values. Such tenets come across as ambiguous and are based not on the preeminent rights of the individual, but on those of the state, often resulting in unjust legal outcomes. Taking into consideration the (above) socio-political and cultural contexts in which China's English media discourses are produced, it can be seen that the dynamics of analyzing them diverge somewhat from the usual subjects of CDA that are situated within the social and political complexities of industrialized nations. I reiterate my position that the West has had their share of such imbalances and unfair practices. These social and political anomalies have attracted the interest of critical discourse analysts who are free to investigate them. Illegalities, inequalities and inconsistencies are exposed, debated and/or argued about – openly – in public forums where voices and opinions are heard and rectifications, often anti-government, occur. Democratic governments do not relish being exposed, but they are constrained by their own ideologies to allow the post-exposure process to take its course, whatever the consequences.

If developing nations are aspiring to advance their international status, then this comes with a price tag – *transparency*. The cost of transparency is exceedingly high because it involves losing an array of divergent political voices over which there is limited or no control. Transparency is an often embarrassing commodity which is intensely disliked by the powerful because it allows unseemly activities, which they

would prefer to remain hidden, to be exposed and vulnerable to criticism. Critical discourse analysis is a potentially powerful yet relatively gentle way of acquainting the reluctant elites to accept the inevitability of transparency. In the Chinese context, the level of international status to which China aspires is impossible to attain without applying more widely accepted standards to its political culture – i.e. transparency and its handmaiden, accountability – CDA can play a role in this process.

7.4.1 Identifying possibilities for further research

In the process of this research, I have become aware of other areas of research-inspiring interest. Within the media community in China, there are wide varieties of opinion among journalists. Some news outlets, such as the *Southern Weekend*, constantly push the boundaries of censorship. Topics of future interest could be to conduct ethnographic research (e.g. interviews, reporting processes, Party line influence, censorship, etc.) across the range of newspaper reporters, from the English-language papers such as the nationalistic *Global Times*, to the banal *China Daily*, but also including and the more expository Chinese-language outliers such as *Southern Weekend*. A second possibility for future research, purely text-related, would be a marking of the trajectory of China's rise, not in the world at large, but in the confined geography of Hong Kong's media. It is noticeable that over the years, journalism in the English language on China stories in the Hong Kong media is being transformed in several ways, some of which are 'physical' (i.e. more prominent positioning within the newspaper, page space, and the size and frequency of China-centric stories); 'ideological' (i.e. the 'slant' toward greater mainland assertiveness in Hong Kong's media); and 'linguistic' (i.e. how is the Hong Kong-mainland interface discursively represented? How are the voices of individuals from these two distinct but integrated groups represented in Hong Kong's media now as compared, for example, to 1992, 1997, 2002, etc.?). 'Human Rights Watch' world review for 2014 reports that 'freedoms of the press and assembly have been increasingly under threat since Hong Kong returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997', adding that 'Hong Kong has witnessed slow erosion of the rule of law in recent years'. To what degree has this 'erosion of the rule of law' impacted Hong Kong's media discourses?

Another topic of interest, one that requires ethnographic work, would be the influence of ‘self-censorship’ on journalism and the media in general on the mainland. Admittedly, a research agenda on this topic (due to its sensitive nature) would be more difficult to strategize, but examining the growing effects of self-censorship which seems noticeable even among Hong Kong journalists would be telling, as China is no longer holding back on punitive measures against journalists who report on it negatively (e.g. questions such as: to what degree has China’s journalistic hegemony and threat of retribution influenced journalists in adjacent territories such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Macau, and even Taiwan?). Finally, what are the affects and influences of China’s English media on those for whom it is intended – its foreign readers – particularly those resident in China. What opinions, if any, do they hold on the *China Daily*, for example? Access to English-speaking foreigners in China is fairly uncomplicated and information regarding their habits and opinions on *China Daily* or CCTV could be carried out in any combination of ways such as focus groups, personal interviews, and online surveys through various mailing lists of students, teachers, examiners, etc. living there. This could include a look at foreign readerships by nationality, as there may be correlations between China’s targeted soft power efforts with Africans, for example, as opposed to Europeans, North Americans or other Asian ethnicities.

7.4.2 Some limitations of this study

I have tried to show the use of ideological language in China’s English-language press by means of critically analyzing its discourse. This position, to be sure, has its difficulties. The identification of ‘orders of discourse’ for example, as noted by Fairclough (1992b: 214), ‘is obviously and interpretative exercise which depends on the analyst’s experience [...] and sensitivity’ which puts interpretation firmly in the hands of the analyst. This is also influenced by ‘the analyst’s interpretative and strategic biases’ (Fairclough 1992b: 214), which again, alludes to Lincoln and Guba’s (2013) observation that realistically, ‘subjectivity management’ is the researcher’s only practicable mindset. I am reminded, as mentioned in section 1.2, that ‘resistance to claims of objectivity’ seems to flourish around the critical study ideology (Geertz 1964). All of this is complicated further by what Fairclough calls ‘the slipperiness of constructs such as genres and discourse’. The inherent

difficulties in keeping the sometimes ‘fuzzy’ or difficult to define areas of linguistic analysis apart can lead to overlaps among some of the different concepts such as, for example, ‘agency’ and the ‘social actor network’, or Halliday’s divisions of process type.

Another limitation I am constrained to mention is the existing range of studies on media discourses in authoritarian contexts such as those that cover Fascism in Italy (Schjerve 1998), propaganda in Soviet Russia (Young 1991), Pinochet’s Chile (Sorensen 2009), or Nazi Germany (Gellately 2001), for example. Such studies are in some ways relatable, but at the same time, focusing on the Chinese press alone seems to produce a sufficiently robust context in and of itself without the added layers of information that seem only indirectly related to the purposes at hand – the analysis of the Chinese English-language media and its coverage of dissidents.

Comparing and contrasting foreign media equivalents on ideological grounds is an area that offers further insights, but I felt that this has been the oft-used method and would contribute little in terms of innovation for this particular study, which is a point I discussed earlier in this thesis (see section 1.10).

In addition to these limitations, in this study I opted for a somewhat unconventional approach in the review of literature. This is because each of the chapters (from 1–3) has its own fairly extensive review of literature specific to the topic in these chapters. This means I have included a range of literature reviews on various prominent aspects of this thesis, including the literature directly associated with Chinese media (section 1.10).

I am sure there are more limitations, but these are the immediate ones that come to mind.

7.5 Reflections on China’s ‘mediatized political discourse’ and its implications

There are many things to be admired in China, but the state media’s treatment of dissidents and their causes is not one of them. When all is said and done, it is the actions of a government that calls attention to the discourse *about* its actions. There must be a correlation between the discourse about the actions and the actions themselves. In other words, what is done in the material world draws attention to how it is represented in the discursive world (and vice versa), so that what is written creates interest in what is done. Equally true, what is done points to what is written.

In this present research, state-media articles that were written about these dissidents were collected in order to investigate how those in power discursively legitimize their treatment. The texts are the ‘official evidence’, the ‘authorized record’, available to anyone who is interested in formulating an understanding of the government’s position on the criminalization of dissidents. This is why such great care is taken by the state discourse producers to construct meanings that are non-damaging to its image – and – as I wrote in section 3.4, ‘to the CCP media, the discursive image supersedes the reality’. In other words, the discursive representation outweighs the actual event in terms of ideological value. The analysis of narrative from an ideological viewpoint shows ‘how structures of signification are mobilized to legitimate the sectional interests of hegemonic groups’ (Giddens 1979: 191). Discourses that oppose or offer alternative versions of events are pushed out of the mediasphere. Counter-discourses, having no means of reproduction other than ‘guerilla’ tactics such as word-of-mouth or sporadic and cynical Internet postings (i.e. Žižek’s notion of *kynicism*), are driven from the field to the extreme peripheries. But there, ironically, they also find the means to flourish.

As Gramsci (1971) pointed out, when subordinate (but loyal) groups (such as the pro-government neo-Maoist protesters at the *Southern Weekend* incident in Guangzhou) take up the voice of the ruling elite, hegemony has proven to be most effective. Thompson calls this ‘*universalization*’ (Thompson 1990: 61, emphasis in original), i.e. an attempt to establish legitimacy through claiming the interests of some (the elite) are those of all. The incident was an example of a situation where minor social actors appeared to back the cause of the powerful. The perception of a ‘bottom up’ (Mumby 1987: 123) pattern of support for government discourses goes far in legitimizing them. By demonstrating that the political commitments of lower-order social actors are the same as those of the elite forges a kind of ideological sanction. The elite have successfully packaged their interests to appear as those of the entire social order from rich to poor. Hegemony is ‘the ability of one class to articulate the interests of other social groups as its own’ (Mouffe 1981: 183), producing consensus rather than contestation. Setting this in a wider perspective, hegemonic diffusion can be discerned in the constant reproduction of legitimizing discourses, not only for controversial political issues, but also in the struggle toward a consensual acceptance of the CCP worldview on almost everything. This is

embedded in and naturalized through cultural exports (e.g. China's English-language media) aimed at the wider world under the rubric of soft power.

7.5.1 China in the mediasphere: Competition and control

Having conducted a critical analysis of the representation of dissidents, I feel it is appropriate at this stage to locate the analysis within the wider field of relations among the many and varied discourses which circulate in the global mediasphere. Because the mediasphere is so saturated with persuasive voices, consumers learn to be discerning in what is selected for viewing, listening or reading. In the competition for such finite space, presence in the mediasphere is a disputed commodity. Domination in the field seems largely determined by how loud, repetitive, or well positioned any particular voice may be. This is also related to financial resources invested, the medium of transmission, and the quality of information. Competition for 'floor space' in the mediasphere is not a new phenomenon, and I mention it here as a way of making a greater point: there have been important documented developments regarding China's concerted and explicit agenda to gain control of a major slice of this global arena. State-backed media has a competitive program for globalization, which, because it is the Chinese state, also means it is about power and ideology even when it appears to be about culture. In a recent interview, Rowan Callick, author of *Party Time: Who Runs China and How* (2013), stated that the CCP is 'a jealous party, reluctant to share space, to operate in genuine partnership with individuals or organizations it does not control' (Callick 2013). This is indeed an interesting point as it was also picked up by political analyst Christopher Ford (2013a and b) who discussed what he believes to be China's strategic goal of controlling all discourse relating to China no matter from where or from whom it originates. At one particular forum, Ford (2013a) relates how official Chinese delegates stressed that 'beneficial' relationships with China were impossible unless the Other accepted China's version of world and historical events, particularly regarding Japan and the U.S. He concluded his article by describing China's ambition as 'conceptual imperialism, [which] at least in aspiration, suggests that it is a Chinese strategic objective to control the world's discourse *about China*' (Ford 2013a, emphasis in original).

According to Ford, there is an intensive endeavor at controlling discourse *about China from China*, which can be seen in its demands for Western media to ban or restrict issues that are perceived as damaging to China's image (Ford 2013a). Besides attempting to regulate perceptions through the delegitimization of human rights prizes awarded to citizens whose views that are not those of the government (e.g. as in this study), there have also been displays of angry government rhetoric against foreign statesmen who show recognition of Chinese dissenters such as the Dalai Lama (GEORGE W BUSH TO MEET DALAI LAMA IN PUBLIC, 29 September 2007, *The Telegraph*, by Richard Spencer). Ford also cites, for example, John Garnaut's article on China's 'indignant reaction' to a recent Australian National University publication entitled 'Red Rising Red Eclipse' (CHINA SEES RED OVER UNI PAPER, 4 January 2013, *Sydney Morning Herald*); boycotting the screening of films that portray counter-narratives to China's official storyline as at the 2009 Melbourne Film Festival (CHINESE ENTRIES BOYCOTT FILM FESTIVAL, 22 July 2009, *ABC News*); stories in western media that expose corruption in China's elite government circles as in David Barboza's now infamous article on the Wen family's assets (BILLIONS IN HIDDEN RICHES FOR FAMILY OF CHINESE LEADER, 25 October 2012, *New York Times*); and an article by Bennet Hall on China demanding that a small-town wall mural in the U.S. expressing sympathy for Tibetan and Taiwanese independence be removed (MURAL DRAWS FIRE FROM CHINA, 8 September 2012, *Corvallis Gazette-Times*). In each of these cases the Chinese government, through agents, 'leaned on' local officials in these other countries to intervene on its behalf in suppressing these incidents and silencing those involved. In a sense, China is attempting to use political influence to overturn external discourses that are incongruent with the image it is trying to construct. As Ford puts it, 'the emerging Chinese superpower hungers to *control other peoples' narrative of China*' (Ford 2013a, emphasis in original). Media coverage from overseas; independent university publications; films about China and its dissidents; and even a wall painting in another continent are all 'targets' for demands because they relate to negative images of China. The state has assumed for itself 'a proprietary interest not only in how the rest of the world *acts* toward China, but also in how it *depicts and understands* China' (Ford 2013a, emphasis in original).

Other retaliatory actions have also been highlighted by long-time China scholar Perry Link (2013) who writes of Chinese 'blacklists' of journalists and academics

who now cannot obtain Chinese visas because of their expository work on sensitive issues related, for example, to human rights, Tibetan or Taiwanese independence, or other political topics. Link, himself boycotted, writes: ‘Giving clear punishment for unclear reasons will cause any person, whether directly involved or merely and observer, to be cautious and to censor what one says on politically sensitive topics’ (Link 2013), which raises the issue of self-censorship for fear of retribution. Link’s (2013) article, *THE LONG SHADOW OF CHINESE BLACKLISTS ON AMERICAN ACADEME*, has much to say about this phenomenon.

The desire to construct a positive image is natural, even admirable, and is pursued not only by nations, but also by groups and individuals. The enhancement of a positive image, otherwise known as ‘gaining face’, however, is an abstraction that cannot be acquired through the Self-effort alone – and even less so through demands or political pressure. To illustrate this point, which I see to be the underlying proposition of China’s media discourse, I briefly draw on a concept from the sociolinguistic field of ‘pragmatics’. The concept of ‘face’ is well established in Asian culture and in fact, Irving Goffman, in *Interaction Ritual* (1967), referred to the concept as having Chinese origins. What China wants or is motivated to achieve through its media discourse is the deeply felt need for approbation and recognition, which ‘involves claims on the evaluations of others’ (Helen Spencer-Oatey 2007: 642). This, I suggest, is perhaps why we see a tendency in the official English media to remind the world at large, as often as possible, of China’s inherent worth. This strategy, however, is susceptible to what Scollon and Scollon (1995) call the ‘paradox of face’. The more one strives to gain it, the less it is accorded. It cannot be demanded or bought. Due to its inherent dynamics, face cannot be declared ‘unilaterally’, and in this sense it is different from other related psychological constructs such as self-confidence, ego, hubris, etc., each of which ‘can be claimed without regard to the other’s perspective’ (Lim 1994: 210). This situates the acquisition of face as a ‘dyadic phenomenon’ (Spencer-Oatey 2007: 643), which in this case, appears related to legitimization. The enhancement of face, as desired by the Party, relies at one level on the approbation of its people, and at another level, on the wider world. But it will remain elusive, abstract, and unrealized until it is consolidated in the Other. As a definitive marker of respect, Perry Link shares how Nobel Prizes are particularly ‘coveted in China – even more, in general, than they are elsewhere’ (2012), which he suggests, serves to emphasize the sense of

insecurity that surrounds it. He conjectures that ‘like Olympic gold medals, [Nobel Prizes] are viewed as signs of the world’s respect – which, over recent centuries, many Chinese have felt to be less than it ought to be’ (Link 2012). Attempting to establish a sense of respect in the Other is the state media’s discursive meta-purpose with the *ultimum effectio* of CCP legitimization.

7.6 Expanding concepts: The Chinese media’s drive toward primacy

As reflected in its discursive practices, the CCP sees itself at the forefront of China’s heroic struggle against the Other, which has historically been construed in terms of an ‘outside’ (Agnost 1997, cited in Ford 2010: 218). In this regard, Shih Chi-yu wrote:

Constantly searching for an ‘Other’ to prove, through contradiction, what one was or was not, composed a typical modern Chinese political drama. This Other could be either internal, such as feudalist, counterrevolutionary, compradors, or defectors, or external, such as anti-Chinese, imperialist, or Japanese militarist. (Shih 2003, cited in Ford 2010: 218)

The discourse of ‘China’s rejuvenation’ is very much on the minds of its rulers and is entextualized in media discourse in a number of ways under the rubric of the ‘China Model’ as an overall narrative. Semantic equivalents of this resurgence, as pointed out by Ford, are ‘China in ascendance,’ ‘the China path,’ ‘the China experience,’ ‘the China pace,’ as well as the often-heard phrase, the ‘China miracle’, and President Xi’s recently coined ‘China Dream’ – all of which comprise a ‘discourse of [Chinese] greatness’ (Ford 2013b). Ford believes that in spite of the official discourse of a non-hegemonic ‘peaceful rise’ and ‘win-win’ results for all, ‘the agenda is very much about power’. He sees China as seeking to influence and optimize its discourses so as to continue, by ‘organizing and prioritizing issues and policies’ according to how effective they are in sustaining its push for primacy and ‘national rejuvenation’ (Ford 2013b). The upshot, according to Ford, is to gain ‘discourse control’ of the whole global society as a main constituent of China’s projected ‘return’ (Ford 2013b).

The notion of the China Model is embodied in the exemplar, the ‘harmonious society’, and is being extended from the domestic paradigm and applied to the world at large as something of a universal model. Despite the rhetoric, however, the notion

of harmony remains elusive. This again brings to mind the notion of soft power and how, as Joseph Nye puts it, ‘what China seems not to appreciate is that using culture and narrative to create soft power is not easy when they are inconsistent with domestic realities’ (Nye 2012, cited in Shambaugh 2013: 267). This classic paradox is evident in the treatment of dissidents – the ‘domestic reality’ that belies the rhetoric of a harmonious world. David Shambaugh writes that influence through soft power cannot be bought – ‘it is earned’ (2013: 267). In contrast to the notion of face mentioned above (as with soft power), the ego, hubris and national pride rest in one’s own psyche and are constructed from within. The acquisition of face, on the contrary, can only be ‘granted’ by the Other. The dynamic is such that there is no individual way to attain it.

Liu Xiaobo and Chen Guangcheng, are in a sense, symbolic, and by no means the only human rights activists to be persecuted for speaking out. They are representative of a long list of dissident voices calling for transformation through transparency. Voicing concern over increasing repression, columnist Xiao Shu recently wrote about the newly-formed moderate ‘New Citizens’ Movement’ which describes itself as a ‘constructive opposition’ through seeking a middle road (CHINA’S VEIL OF CIVIL RIGHTS OPPRESSION, 26 November 2013, *New York Times*). In spite of its conciliatory agenda, the government has perceived this party as a threat because they orchestrated calls for ‘public officials to disclose their assets’ (Human Rights Watch, *World Report* 2014: 320). According to Xiao, the group’s leaders (Xu Zhiyong, Guo Feixiong and entrepreneur Wang Gongquan), along with some twenty members were arrested. Their trial took place in January 2014, and Xu Zhiyong, ‘one of the most prominent rights advocates on the mainland’ (Yu 2014), was sentenced to four years for what one reporter calls his role in the ‘social justice and transparency movement’ (Branigan 2014). In the spirit of Wei Jinsheng, Fang Lizhi, Li Wangyang, Liu Xiaobo, Chen Guangcheng and many others, these activists, like those before them (and undoubtedly those who will follow) remain unbowed. ‘For all their moderation, they do not lack courage or tenaciousness, and no amount of brutality will make them give up their pursuit of a civilized society as both an end and a means’ (Xiao 2013).

Transparency, which works hand in hand with accountability, is increasingly required of governing institutions by the public – and therein rests true legitimacy. Having achieved power, to allow oneself to be made vulnerable *by choice* resonates

with the populace by demonstrating a level of strength and confidence that is unachievable through intimidation. In doggedly resisting calls for transparency, the elite have once again mistaken haughtiness for dignity (Hu 2011).

7.7 Conclusion

Returning to the centrality of language and its political role in the media as a vehicle of ideology, I conclude that China's English language media are extremely important to the ruling party and its agenda. This is mainly due to the fluidity of language to create worlds, ideas, and realities that serve the interests of those in power. The use of language by official media is a means of disseminating an ideological worldview aimed at maintaining and extending power by legitimizing the narrative of past, present, and future actions, while allowing as little transparency as possible.

Murray Edelman notes that 'language often evokes a belief that particular groups are evil or harmful even though the language of history, analysis, and science suggest that they are scapegoats rather than enemies' (Edelman 1985: 11). Language indeed has the power to evoke a 'political world' that legitimizes persecution through the crucial linguistic function of maintaining the established inequalities that benefit the elite through discourses that trivialize, denigrate, or otherwise silence dissent. But language also has the power to respond to such injustice by dislodging the familiar rhetorical patterns of discrimination from the discourses in which they are embedded. Once shaken loose from where they nest, ideologically biased discourse can be seen for what it is. Dislocating it from its discursive setting casts it in another light where it can be reconsidered, categorized and interpreted without the camouflage afforded by surrounding text. The critical analysis of discourse allows the researcher to decode the value allocations that have been attributed to the various actors and their actions in the discourse, leading to an understanding of the ideological sub-structure within the discourse. It is in this sense that '*the analysis of ideology*', as noted by Thompson, is connected to '*the critique of domination*' (Thompson 1984: 142, emphasis in original). Awareness, raised through critical analysis, contributes to preventing any particular discourse of domination from achieving naturalization and the attainment of hegemonic status.

From the perspective of the powerful, expertise in constructing mediatized political discourses means possessing the ability to legitimize policies through a discourse of ethics in order to facilitate that which is expedient to the Party. Incessantly extolling the state's 'goodness' is the attempt to put itself beyond reproach – to outdistance criticism by bolstering self-praise. It is, to quote renowned dissident Fang Lizhi (1990), to endeavor 'to carry on their activities beyond the reach of world opinion and exempt [themselves] from effective scrutiny'. It goes without saying that a highly dreaded circumstance for those in power is one of vulnerability – simply because it may lead to an even more dreaded state – 'exposure' (this indeed brings to mind a certain emperor and his invisible clothing). By this I mean that any situation where the lacunae that exist between official discourses and official actions become evident, it will inevitably lead to criticism. As noted, the job of official ideology is to address these 'gaps' and discrepancies between the state's ethical proposition and the material realities, so that actions *appear* to be based on the ethics propounded in the ideology. Perhaps this is just another way of saying what Chouliaraki and Fairclough wrote regarding ideologies and their role in 'ironing out [...] contradictions, dilemmas and antagonisms' inherent to governance, so that these two are in accord 'with the interests and projects of domination' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 26). Since it is agreed that there is a unity between language and social realities, it is certain that language is 'entwined in social power in a number of ways' (Wodak 2003: 15). The language of the state media, as part of China's projection of power, is compelling because as Wodak writes, 'language indexes power, expresses power, is involved where there is contention over and a challenge to power' (2003: 15). No matter what governments say, or how rightly they say it, what remains apparent is the inability to obtain desired outcomes by doing what is 'right'. At the level of governments, it seems axiomatic that doing what is right impedes the acquisition of what is desired. It is equally dangerous for politicians to pursue what is desired without a discourse (i.e. an ideology) to legitimize that pursuit.

In closing, I offer a final metaphor. The discourse of China's official English press is not unlike the Zen koan of 'one hand clapping', i.e. the writer writes, but the reader does not read. The enigmatic nature of discourse, to précis Edelman, is that official discourses of the state are 'affirmations waiting to be ignored' (1985: 17). 'Waiting to be ignored' is an accurate assessment of contrived political discourses.

Audiences, having listened for years, know exactly what is coming next. This study has substantiated what I sensed was the case after first arriving in China some fifteen years ago, i.e. that China's mediatized political discourse retains relevance simply because it has the power to do so. In optimizing the conditions for its survival, it has done away with even the slightest contender to its control. There is nothing but cynicism and irony left to confront it. Official state discourses maintain significance because they have articulated a culture of intimidation. The citizenry, having lived for generations under a rhetoric of menace, are fully aware of the implications; they simply acquiesce. Such discourse stands as a result of its power alone – and by no means because of its virtue. As Orwell put it (and I paraphrase), governments cannot be safe until there are no words left to express dissent.

ENDNOTES

- 1 The concept of the 'harmonious society' (和谐社会) was propagated as Hu Jintao's overall vision for the transformation of Chinese society as proposed at the National People's Congress in 2005. President Hu summed up the concept as emphasizing the development of 'democracy, the rule of law, justice, sincerity, amity and vitality' (Chan 2005). China expert John Delury (2008), however, makes a case for the CCP's erroneous interpretation of 'harmony' and harmonious society by conflating 'traditional Chinese culture, European socialism, Marxism-Leninism, and Chinese communism'. He suggests that the state-sponsored portrayal of 'harmony' as a 'generic picture of sages ancient and modern, Eastern and Western, all agreeing that everyone should get along with each other', is basically flawed as it ignores the subtleties and contradictions inherent in the classical significance of the term making its use by the CCP 'superficial and selective' (Delury 2008). He suggests that China's classical sources 'reveal the deep roots in the strategic ambiguity' of the concept of social harmony as it is used in CCP discourse today. What stands out in the CCP's theoretical interpretation of the Confucian theory of the harmonious society is the logic that when harmony is achieved, there is equality and abundance, and with abundance – no dissent. In Confucian times, however, there were courtiers critical of those who defined harmony as simply the lack of dissent, as 'harmony' also implies *compromise* or *concord*. Delury cites a historical chronicle from the Confucian era which records an incident wherein a courtier chided the king for misconstruing one of his councilor's state of being in 'harmony' with the king's desires, as subservience. According to Delury, the assumption that 'harmony' means the absence of dissent is only partially true as the classical meaning of harmony is tolerance of, and openness to, differences. The chronicles record that 'The good minister is like a chef who combines flavors to make a well-balanced dish, or a composer who harmonizes notes and instruments to create a lovely melody. Who eats soup made by adding water to water? Who listens to musicians all playing the same strings on a single instrument? What kind of ruler wants to silence dissenting views?' (Delury 2008).
- 2 'Closing the universe of discourse' is a chapter in Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), which explains how authorized discourses attempt to control the implications of language and fix definitions to represent only the officially prescribed meaning. In describing his idea of a closed discursive universe, Marcuse wrote that 'Here, the functionalization of language expresses an abridgement of meaning which has a political connotation. The names of things are not only "indicative of their manner of functioning," but their (actual) manner of functioning also defines and "closes" the meaning of the thing, excluding other manners of functioning. The noun governs the sentence in an authoritarian and totalitarian fashion, and the sentence becomes a declaration to be accepted – it repels demonstration, qualification, negation of its codified and declared meaning. At the nodal points of the universe of public discourse, self-validating, analytical propositions appear which function like magic-ritual formulas. Hammered and re-hammered into the recipient's mind, they produce the effect of enclosing it within the circle of the conditions prescribed by the formula'. (Marcuse 1964: 87).
- 3 Re-education camps were officially terminated in December of 2013. In spite of the closure, activists charge that the change is purely cosmetic as, under other policies, authorities can still detain people for long periods without trial. Amnesty International said that closing the re-education camps was purely ornamental because of the continued existence of 'black jails' and other such facilities. 'Re-education through labor began in 1957 as a speedy way to handle petty offenders. But the system, which allows a police panel to issue sentences of up to four years without trial, soon became rife with abuse. State media have cited the development of China's legal system has now made the camps superfluous with their historical mission having come to an end. A U.N. report published in 2009 estimated that 190,000 people were being held in labor camps' (CHINA EASES ONE-CHILD POLICY, ABOLISHES 'RE-EDUCATION CAMPS', 2013, *Japan Times*. Retrieved on 29 December 2013 at <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/28/asia-pacific/china-eases-one-child-policy-abolishes-re-education-labor-camps/#.Ut-fmGSwrEU>).
- 4 Regarding the Confucianization of rights, based on the principles of benevolent government which are founded on the Mencian theory of The People as the Basis of the State, Weatherly notes that in 'safe-guarding the material welfare of his people, [the emperor] would create a popular basis of support which could be collectively utilized' (1999: 9). This further instantiates the Chinese approach to the granting of rights as a means of enhancing state power. This view

- had direct influence on the Qing era reformulations that the state should be the main beneficiary of any endowment of political rights to the people.
- 5 The 'categorical imperative' was first posited by Immanuel Kant and is based on deontological ethical theory, i.e. that there are universal absolutes regarding ethics and morality. As such, it is in direct contrast to Bentham's utilitarianism which stated that the consequences justified the means of a course of action. Kant believed that moral laws are based on reason and that all men would eventually come to the same conclusion when faced with moral questions, which to him meant that they would in due course come into accord with the categorical imperative. In other words, Kant's theory looks at the individual, his intentions and his choices regardless of the actual outcome of the choices. Aryeh Neier, former Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, links the categorical imperative to the concept of 'dignity' in that 'each person is to be treated as an end in himself or herself' (Neier 2013: 61).
 - 6 This refers to the opening address at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on 21 September 1949, entitled THE CHINESE PEOPLE HAVE STOOD UP! The English translation of Mao's exact words were 'Fellow Delegates, we are all convinced that our work will go down in the history of mankind, demonstrating that the Chinese people, comprising one quarter of humanity, have now stood up'. This is generally taken to symbolize the beginning of the new China. (Retrieved on 29 December 2013 at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_01.htm).
 - 7 *Article 105*. 'Whoever organizes, plots, or acts to subvert the political power of the state and overthrow the socialist system, the ringleaders or those whose crimes are grave are to be sentenced to life imprisonment, or not less than 10 years of fixed-term imprisonment; active participants are to be sentenced from not less than three years to not more than 10 years of fixed-term imprisonment; other participants are to be sentenced to not more than three years of fixed-term imprisonment, criminal detention, control or deprivation of political rights'. (From the *PRC Criminal Law*, Part II, Chapter 1: Crimes of Endangering National Security. Retrieved on 6 January 2014 at https://www.fas.org/irp/world/china/docs/prc_cc_970314_2_1.htm).
 - 8 Concerning Mao and Xin, journalist Francis Yin (2011) recently wrote: 'Veteran economist Mao Yushi (茅于軾) and retired colonel Xin Ziling (辛子陵) both recently published articles saying the Party should abandon *Mao Zedong Thought*, which has been one of China's "guiding ideologies". They said that Mao Zedong was morally corrupt and should be held responsible for the deaths of tens of millions of Chinese people. In response, a pro-Mao website *Utopia* [Wyzxsx.com] has launched a movement calling for supporters to sign a petition demanding the prosecution of Mao Yushi and Xin Ziling. According to the website, *Wuyouzhixiang*, tens of thousands of people have signed the pushing for a "people's prosecution". Mao Yushi has also received threats by telephone and post'. (Yin, Francis 2011, 'We must criticize Mao Zedong to promote political reform, say Chinese scholar', *Journalism and Media Studies*, the University of Hong Kong. Retrieved on 26 May 2013 at <http://coveringchina.org/2011/05/27/we-must-criticize-mao-zedong-to-promote-political-reform-says-chinese-scholar/>).
 - 9 The 'stability maintenance' policy is widely understood as a euphemism for government control. 'The National People's Congress (NPC) in March placed ever-greater emphasis on maintaining stability (*weichi wending*, often shortened to *weiwen* 维稳). The shift was one of relative emphasis. Stability is a repeated theme in contemporary ideology. Formulations like that of the Fourth Plenum of the 17th National Party Congress, that 'development is the highest priority task, and stability the highest priority responsibility,' are common. In February [2011], President Hu Jintao addressed the Central Party School on the related theme of 'social management', a higher-level abstraction within which the mechanisms of *weiwen* are now packed. Despite its reference to improving redistributive social security measures, there was a close relation between this policy statement and external events". (Kelly, David (2011) Stability and social governance in China. *East Asia Forum*, 13 September 2011. Retrieved on 22 January 2014 at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/09/13/stability-and-social-governance-in-china/>).
 - 10 Wei Jinsheng's (魏京生) call for a 'fifth modernization' in a 'big character' poster was displayed on Beijing's 'Democracy Wall' on 5 December 1978. Alongside Deng Xiaoping's official policy of 'four modernizations' (agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology), Wei called for 'Democracy'. In his provocative essay, 'The Fifth Modernization' (第五个现代化), Wei asked Chinese to open their eyes to the injustices around them. His treatise was inflammatory and defiant of the CCP in that he compared those who oppose democracy as intransigent reactionaries. He wrote, 'Why are all reactionaries in contemporary history united under a common banner against democracy? The answer is that democracy provides everything for their enemy - the masses of people - but nothing for them - the oppressors - to oppose the

people with. The biggest reactionary is always the biggest opponent of democracy. As clearly shown in the history [...] the strongest opponent of democracy has been the biggest and most dangerous enemy of social peace and prosperity.' (Excerpt from Wei Jinsheng's 'Fifth Modernization'. Retrieved on 31 July 2013 at <http://www.weijsinsheng.org/doc/en/THE%20FIFTH%20MODERNIZATION.html>).

- 11 *Charter 08* is an extremely controversial manifesto because if it seen as a direct challenge to the CCP due to its demands for nineteen changes in the current state of Chinese governance. These are: 'Amending the Constitution', 'Separation of power', 'Legislative democracy', an 'independent judiciary', 'Public control of public servants', the 'guarantee of human rights', 'Election of public officials', 'Abolition of *hukou* system', 'Freedom of association', 'Freedom of assembly', 'Freedom of expression', 'Freedom of religion', 'Civic education', 'Free markets and protection of private property, including privatizing state enterprises and land', 'Financial and tax reforms', 'Social security', 'Protection of the environment', 'a Federated republic', and 'Truth in reconciliation'. Unsurprisingly, it was the Charter that eventually led to Liu's detention and imprisonment.
- 12 Lu Xun (鲁迅, 1881–1936), recognized as the father of modern Chinese literature, was greatly admired by Mao Zedong. He was a leading figure in the May 4th Movement of 1919 and never actually joined the CCP though he held leftist views. Lu's writing was self-reflective, unorthodox, and critical. Author Julia Lovell wrote that 'anyone wanting to get a sense of the despair that gripped [China] for large parts of the 20th century, and which still lurks behind the country's resurgent façade should probably start with the short stories of one of [China's] founding modernist authors: Lu Xun.' (Lovell 2010). Lu foregrounded the incongruities in Chinese culture and strongly advocated the abandonment of Confucian social norms and the literary classics on the grounds that they were backward and harmful to a 'new' China. He promoted the embracing of the vernacular. Lovell suggests that Lu Xun is the Chinese equivalent of 'Dickens and Joyce rolled into one; a mercilessly acute observer of the era he lived through; and a remake of language and form' (Lovell 2010). In sum, championed by Mao, the writings of Lu had a profound influence on Chinese literature during the 20th Century. As a proponent of the anti-traditionalism of the May 4th Movement, Lu used violent metaphors to describe effective writing as 'a javelin or dagger, piercing into the soul of humanity and the dark side of society' (Lu Xing 2004: 94). Though considered unsophisticated by the literati of the day, Lu's writing had 'artistic merit' and became the model for Mao's talks at Yen'an in 1942, forming the basis for a more radical linguistic style based on peasant vernacular, which was to be used extensively during the Cultural Revolution by authors and playwrights and still influences Chinese literature today.
- 13 Essentially, the 'Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art' (延安文艺座谈会) was a three-week conference held at the 'Lu Xun Academy of Fine Arts' in Yan'an, Shaanxi Province in May of 1942 in which Mao directed authors, artists and playwrights to reformulate their artistic output to conform to their audience – Chinese workers, soldiers and peasants. The purpose was that art should serve the revolution, which he characterized as a war fought on the 'fronts of the pen and of the gun' (Mao 1942); this included 'bringing intellectuals to heel' (Tam 2009: 2546) in serving the CCP's cause. At the Forum, Mao advocated adopting 'the rich, lively language of the masses which he described as the 'mass style' wherein the 'thoughts and feelings of our writers and artists should be fused with those of the masses' by learning, speaking and writing in their language. However, the lasting significance of the Yan'an Forum, according to Tam King-fai (2009: 2547), is that the CCP became the 'sole arbiter of what was right and wrong in all spheres of society [...], no alternative bases from which its authority could be challenged existed'.
- 14 In a string of bold assertions regarding China and 'genocide', Wang Chen-chih (2002) writes that the propaganda of the post-1949 CCP 'paved the way for the destruction of class enemies. The content of the propaganda defined the enemy and justified the radical measures to be taken against it' (2002: xxii). He also remarks on the significance of the link between 'language' and the 'elimination of enemies': 'In China, the government legitimized mass murder as an attempt to complete the revolution. A policy of domestic genocide was made viable by the construction of a new language; words were used effectively to support the killing [...]' (Wang Cheng-chih 2002: xxii). Counterrevolutionaries were prime enemies in the earlier days of the PRC and were violently suppressed in a large-scale campaign (*zhenfan* 镇反). *Zhenfan*, instigated by Mao's pronouncement, was officially called the 'Directive on Suppression of Counterrevolutionary Activities', and was also known as the 'double-ten directive' (Yang Kuisong 2008: 105). According to Yang Kuisong, Mao ordered executions by quota, which 'reflected his own

- subjective deduction about how to differentiate the ‘enemy’ from ‘us’ (2008: 109). From official documents in the archives of the Shanghai Municipality (‘Shanghai municipal committee’s *zhenfan* plan’, 15 March 1951, document A1/23/124/24), Yang discovered that in Shanghai alone (a haven for bourgeoisie and intellectuals), it was agreed that ‘in addition to the 1,068 arrests and some 100 executions already made, another 10,000 would be arrested’. According to Yang (2008), targets were set for 3,000 of these to be executed, 4,000 imprisoned and 3,000 ‘controlled’ (Yang 2008: 110), so that execution of counterrevolutionaries by quota in the name of *zhenfan* was replicated in many cities around China in the early 1950s.
- 15 Liang Qichao (梁启超) (1873–1929) was called by Lin Yutang ‘the greatest personality in the history of Chinese Journalism’ (Wikipedia). He is cited as being particularly influential for his early recognition of the role of the press as a powerful method for the dissemination of political ideas, which incidentally was crucial to the rise of nationalism in China. Zhang Zhidong no doubt had someone like Liang in mind when he wrote that ‘after 1895, literary men of patriotic spirit began to publish journals [...] as a result, gentry from the most obscure pockets of the realm, and isolated peasants learned for the first time that there was a China. Ignorant, petty officials and the whole multitude of would-be scholars learned for the first time that there were “current affairs”’ (Xu 2001: 105). Because of his political criticism of the Qing Dynasty, he had to live in Japan where he was allowed to write and speak freely. There, he published the *New Citizen Journal*, which had an increasingly wide readership. His thesis of ‘new citizenship’ was ground-breaking in that it was the opposite of the ‘state-first’ Confucian view – it emphasized the individual over the state. He wrote: ‘The citizenry (*guomin*) is an assemblage of individual persons. The claims of the state (*guoquan*) are composed of the rights (*quanli*) of individuals. Therefore, the thoughts, feelings, and actions of a citizenry will never be obtainable without the thoughts, feelings, and actions of each individual member. That the people (*min*) is strong means that the state is strong; that the people is weak means that state is weak; that the people is rich means that the state is rich; that the people is poor means that the state is poor; that the people possesses rights means that the state possesses rights; and that the people is without shame means that the state is without shame’ (cited in Lee, Man-Yee Karen 2012: 211).
 - 16 *Danwei* published a list of nations that have been cited in *People’s Daily* as having ‘hurt the feelings of the Chinese people’ up until 2008. (Martinsen, Joel, 2008, ‘Mapping the hurt feelings of the Chinese people’. *Danwei*, 11 December 2008. Retrieved on 31 December 2012 at: http://www.danwei.org/foreign_affairs/a_map_of_hurt_feelings.php).
 - 17 Regarding self-censorship, in the 2013 *PEN Report* on China, noted contemporary author Murong Xuecun (慕容雪村) wrote that ‘each and every media worker must assume the responsibility of a “speech censorship officer”, who must make sure that every article that leaves his hand is harmless, free of being reactionary, free of pornography, free of sounding gloomy and decadent, and free of having any negative impact, or they will be responsible for some extremely serious consequences later’. He sums up the propaganda department’s strategy for controlling the media in eight words: ‘Don’t kill them. Let them live in fear’ (Murong Xuecun 2013: 32).
 - 18 The *Three Represents* (三个代表) is Jiang Zemin’s signature ideology and was written into China’s Constitution at the 16th Party Congress in 2002 and added as an amendment on 14 March in 2004 (see Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. Retrieved on 2 February 2014 at <http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html>). This policy is known for lifting restrictions on entrepreneurs joining the CCP based on the principle of adapting to modern times ‘under the new conditions of historic significance’. Essentially, it opened Party membership to ‘the founders and technicians of private technology firms, administrative technicians employed at foreign-funded firms, the self-employed, entrepreneurs, professional agents, and professional freelancers’. (Jiang, Zemin (2006) “Zai qingzhu zhongguo gongchandang chengli bashi zhounian daihui shang de jianghua” [Speech at gathering celebrating the eightieth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party] in *Jiang Zemin Wenxian* (Jiang Zemin’s Documents), Vol. 3. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe). As with the *Resolution* of 1981, the *Three Represents* was presented as growing out of existing doctrine and ‘proceeding from the perspective of the law of historical development and the need to advance with the times [...]’. (News of the Communist party of China in the *People’s Daily*. Retrieved on 2 February 2014 at <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.html>).
 - 19 Lexical items that are semantically alike or *cosynonyms* such as ‘convicted criminal’ (Xinhua News Agency, 17/10/2010), ‘imprisoned criminal’ (8/12/2010, Xinhua News Agency), and ‘criminal sentenced’ (12/02/2010, Xinhua News Agency). The term ‘criminal’ appears 78 times in the 57 articles on Liu Xiaobo; though not always in direct reference, it is used in discussing his

- case. In terms of frequency, it is ranked as the 68th most frequent word out of 4,448 tokens in the articles placing it within the top 15% of most used words in the collected data.
- 20 17th National Congress of the CCP erected a virtual ‘press center’ for journalists, both domestic and foreign who were reporting on the Congress in English, to ensure that there was no ‘misrepresentations’ of the CCP’s ideological beliefs (see <http://english.cpcnews.cn/92460/index.html>). The 18th NCCCCP (2012) was similar in erecting a ‘press center’ web page. (Retrieved on 21 January 2014 at <http://english.cpcnews.cn/index.html>). Such websites are for constructed for ‘guiding’ foreign journalists, through correct linguistic formulation, into the designated ideological representations of whatever CCP strategies or policies are being made public.
 - 21 Li Wangyang (李旺阳, 1950–2012) was a Tiananmen protestor and dissident labor activist who spent 21 of his last 23 years in prison on the charge of ‘counterrevolutionary propaganda, incitement and subversion’ (Wikipedia). Li died under suspicious circumstances on 6 June 2012 at the Daxiang Hospital in Shaoyang, China where he went for treatment after completing his 21 year sentence. A government autopsy initially declared Li’s cause of death to be ‘suicide’ by hanging which was revised to ‘accidental death’ after a government investigation. This result, however, was strongly contested by supporters, family and an independent investigator, Australian Professor Stephen Cordner, who ‘found that the Chinese investigations [into cause of death] did not meet the basic standards, making it impossible for outside experts to review and reach a definitive decision’ (Who Killed Li Wangyang? *Wall Street Journal* 2012). The government’s attribution of Li’s death to suicide was widely ridiculed and prompted other known activists to pre-emptively issue public declarations stating that they would never commit suicide. In a *Wall Street Journal* (2012) report, it is suggested that Li’s death conforms to a familiar scenario concerning the corruption of Chinese police over the obfuscation of evidence: ‘Mr. Li’s case fits this pattern. As the Hong Kong newspaper *Ming Pao* wrote in an editorial, the Hunan investigations drew conclusions without releasing evidence to support them. The [government] probes have persuaded no one but the gullible that the police claim of suicide is credible. As Chinese demand their civil liberties, the movement to hold Li Wangyang’s killers accountable will only grow stronger’ (Who Killed Li Wangyang?, *WSJ*, 30 August 2012).
 - 22 Fang Lizhi (方励之, 1936–2012) was a renowned astrophysicist and Tiananmen instigator, who lived and worked in exile in the U.S. until his death of natural causes in 2012. Fang was expelled from the CCP (twice) due to his pro-democracy views. Though Fang and his wife did not participate in the demonstrations of 1989, they were instrumental in the starting the protests and feared government reprisal, which prompted them to seek and find refuge at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing the day after the protests (5 June 1989). While there, Fang wrote *The Chinese Amnesia* (1990) a well-known article on the CCP’s use of the ‘technique of forgetting history’, which is a way of making sure that succeeding generations have no knowledge of previous insurrections. ‘Human rights violations’, he wrote, ‘are banned not only from discussion within China, but also even banned from being remembered’. Fang concludes his essay by writing that after world opinion was shocked by government actions at Tiananmen Square in 1989, China can no longer hide its ‘nefarious record of human rights violations’ (1990).
 - 23 Gao Yaojie (高耀潔, 1927–present) is an octogenarian gynecologist and committed HIV/AIDS activist. She is the whistle-blower, who in 1996, woke up the world to the AIDS epidemic in Henan Province, China, due to the unregulated trade in contaminated blood from government-run blood banks. Though not overtly political, she is an embarrassment to the government, and has been targeted for harassment, which has seen her put under house arrest, threatened by local officials and silenced as a result. Having received threats of retribution, and due to fears for her life, she secretly left China in 2009 and now lives in New York City. Gao has been the recipient of numerous awards for her AIDS activism including the ‘Jonathan Mann Award’ 2001; the ‘Ramon Magasaysay Award’, 2003; ‘Ten People who Touched China’, 2003; the ‘Vital Voices Global Partnership’ Award (founded by Hilary Clinton) in 2007; and, the ‘Heinz R. Pagels Human Rights of Scientists Award’, 2007.
 - 24 Authors use the verbs ‘legitimize’ and ‘legitimate’ interchangeably. This also applies to their respective nominalizations, i.e. ‘legitimization’ and ‘legitimation’. As a personal preference, I will use the verb ‘legitimize’, and the noun ‘legitimization’.
 - 25 The *panopticon*, a style of prison designed by Jeremy Bentham, is described by Foucault (1995) as the ‘general operation of power in modern societies’ (Chambers 2008: 23). Bentham’s physical plan is that of a watchtower, designed for optimal surveillance, surrounded by prison cells where the guard can see into each cell without the prisoner knowing if s/he was being watched. Clare Chambers (2008) explains that Foucault saw this as a situation where prisoners

would eventually become 'self-policing'. In such a situation, 'there does not need to be a guard present, enforcing compliance, because the prisoners become their own guards' (Chambers 2008: 23). The real thrust of power in societies thus regulated, explains Chambers, is when power is no longer oppressive, but has been transformed into accepted and internalized habits which have become normalized across society. My intended use here is that the panopticon stands as metaphor for the ultimate surveillance society. This includes the preparation of a society made receptive to the dos and don'ts of censorship, which in China's case, occurs first under state tutelage, and then eventually graduates to the acceptance of voluntary self-censorship.

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APPENDIX I

CCP-Constructed Enemy Labels from *People's Daily (Renmin Ribao)*
(Adapted from Wang Cheng-chih 2002: 84–87)

Enemies

Unaffiliated adversaries

Enemy of the Chinese people
Public enemy of the people
hidden enemy
major enemy
class enemy
enemy troops
enemy plane
enemy ship

Imperialists

imperialist
imperialist bandit
imperialist executioner
imperialist lackey
imperialist warmonger
imperialist church school
American imperialist
American invader
American imperialist bandit
American imperialist warmonger
US-UK imperialist
Japanese imperialist
Japanese militarist force

Feudalists

feudal landlord
feudal landlord class
feudal land-owning system
feudal society
feudal clannish thought
feudal marriage system
feudal social traditions
feudal secret societies
feudal superstitious
organization

Bureaucrat capitalists

capitalism
foreign capitalist invasion force
opportunists
capitalist class
lawless capitalists
bureaucratic capitalist class
bourgeois corrupt thought
bourgeois monopolist/burglar bloc
bureaucratic capitalist enterprises
KMT 4 big families

Counterrevolutionaries

reactionaries
reactionary religious force
reactionary police system
reactionary secret societies
reactionary secret agent organization
reactionary civil organization
feudal comprador reactionary thought
reactionary landlord
internal/external reactionary forces
KMT reactionaries
KMT reactionary troops
KMT counter-revolutionary war criminals
KMT reactionary remnants
KMT anti-people group
KMT bureaucratic regime
counterrevolutionary
counterrevolutionary remnant
counterrevolutionary sabotage
bandits
remnant bandit troops
brigand forces
ruffian
hooligan
collaborator
bad element
lawbreaker
conspirator

APPENDIX 2

(Opinion-oriented article one: Thesis section 6.6.2.1)

Appraisal Analysis 1

‘ONE LEAF IS NOT THE WHOLE FOREST’, 4 May 2012, *China Daily*

Text	Appraisal analysis	Evaluation Target (+/-)
What makes the Chen Guangcheng case ¹ complicated is nothing but the ² ideology-dominated thinking of some people in the United States.	¹ Appreciation/composition (-). [criticism of Chen's case] ² Appreciation/composition (-). [criticism of US ideology]	¹ Chen (indirect) {-} ² US {-}
Human rights ³ abuses take place everywhere almost everyday. No country can act as a human rights ⁴ savior for the 7 billion people worldwide.	³ Judgment/social sanction/propriety (-). [indirect criticism of US] ⁴ Judgment/social sanction/ironic propriety (-). [criticism for playing the role of 'human rights savior']	³ Human rights abuses {-} ⁴ US {-}
Some in the United States have a Cold War mentality and ⁵ turn a blind eye to what ⁶ China has achieved in its protection of human rights and they ⁷ spare no opportunity to speak ill of the human rights conditions in this country.	⁵ Judgment/social sanction/propriety (-). [condemnation for ignoring 'what China has achieved'] ⁶ Judgment/social esteem/capacity (+). [self-commendation for achievements in 'protection of human rights'] ⁷ Judgment/social sanction/propriety (-). [censure for speaking ill of China's human rights conditions...]	⁵ US {-} ⁶ China {+} ⁷ US {-}
The Chinese saying that a leaf before the eye blocks the view of a mountain describes the situation that occurs when some Americans look at human rights issues in China.	[implicit <i>prosodic</i> negative appraisal of US 'blindness' to 'human rights issues in China']	US {-}
Some Chinese citizens, who may have grievances with local government officials or are discontented with the reality in this country, take advantage of this ⁸ limited viewpoint to seek support from people in the US and other Western countries.	⁸ Judgment/social esteem/normality (-). [criticism for taking advantage of 'this limited viewpoint']	⁸ Chen [indirect as 'Some Chinese citizens'] {-}
Some seek to attach the label of political dissident or activist on themselves to attract the attention and concern of the United States or other Western powers, which in turn use them to ⁹ smear the reputation of China.	⁹ Judgment/social sanction/veracity (-). [condemnation for smearing 'the reputation of China']	⁹ 'US or other Western powers' {-}
Chen Guangcheng and those who are trying to pressure China with him are ¹⁰ taking advantage of each other for their own purposes.	¹⁰ Judgment/social sanction/veracity (-). [criticism for 'taking advantage of each other']	¹⁰ Chen and US {-}
Chen can hardly deny the fact that ¹¹ the Chinese government has been doing its best to address the grievances ordinary Chinese people harbor against local governments and officials. It has ¹² created special organizations so people can voice their complaints, is ¹³ improving its mechanism that prevents government officials from	¹¹ Judgment/social sanction propriety (+). [self-commendation for addressing grievances] ¹² Judgment/social sanction/ propriety (+). [self-commendation for creating special organizations] ¹³ Judgment/social sanction/ propriety (+). [self-commendation for	¹¹ China {+} ¹² China {+} ¹³ China {+}
		¹⁴ China {+}

abusing their powers, and is ¹⁴ **implementing** more administrative and legal measures ¹⁵ **to ensure they show enough concern** for the rights and interests of citizens.

improving its mechanism]

¹⁴ **Judgment**/social sanction/ propriety (+). [*self-commendation for implementing administrative and legal measures*]

¹⁵ **Judgment**/social sanction/ veracity (+). [*self-commendation for ensuring officials show enough concern*]

¹⁵ China {+}

Even the ¹⁶ **China critics** should acknowledge that the human rights situation in the country ¹⁷ **has seen much progress** over the past decades

¹⁶ **Judgment**/social sanction/ propriety (-). [*condemnation for criticizing China*]

¹⁷ **Judgment**/social esteem/ tenacity (+). [*self-admiration for human rights progress*]

¹⁶ China critics, {i.e. US and others} (indirect) {-}

¹⁷ China {+}

Chen's discontent and dispute with some local government officials ¹⁸ **hardly** reflects the overall situation in China.

¹⁸ **Judgment**/social esteem/tenacity (-). [*Criticism for inaccurate view about China's human rights situation*]

¹⁸ Chen {-}

Diversified as opinions are about the way China should further advance both economic and political reforms, most people agree that social instability is the last thing they want when there is the opportunity for China to catch up with developed countries

Those who ¹⁹ **wag their tongues** about China's human rights conditions should also realize that in a country of nearly 1.4 billion people it is natural that there will be disagreements, disputes or even conflicts between local residents and local officials.

¹⁹ **Judgment**/social sanction/veracity (-). [*criticism for disparaging China*]

¹⁹ US and other (indirect)

²⁰ **It is not fair for some Westerners to champion a particular case such as Chen's** in order to attack China's overall human rights conditions, especially as the country is ²¹ **determinedly progressing** its human rights.

²⁰ **Judgment**/social sanction/ propriety (-). [*invoking 'fairness'. Condemnation for championing Chen's cause*]

²¹ **Judgment**/social esteem/ tenacity (+). [*self-commendation for 'determinedly progressing'*]

²⁰ 'Some Westerners' [i.e. US -indirect] {-}

²¹ China {+}

And it is ²² **improper** for the US embassy in China to act in a way that supports, or gives the impression that it supports, those who have made up their mind to vent their grievances against local officials in an extreme manner. Any such words and actions are not part of its diplomatic mission,

²² **Judgment**/social sanction/ propriety (-). [*criticism for supporting dissidents who vent grievances 'in an extreme manner'*]

²² US {-}

²³ **go against the principles of international law**, and will impair relations between the two countries.

²³ **Judgment**/social sanction/ propriety (-). [*criticism for transgressing 'principles of international law'*]

²³ US {-}

The fourth round of the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue began on Thursday in Beijing. However the Chen case develops, it should not cast a ²⁴ **shadow** over these ²⁵ **important talks** that are charting the development paths for the world's largest developed country and the largest developing nation.

²⁴ **Appreciation**/reaction (-). [*criticism for negatively affecting the US-China talks; suggesting that Chen's influence should be seen as immaterial*]

²⁵ **Appreciation**/valuation (+). [*admiration for the importance of these talks*]

²⁴ Chen's case {-}

²⁵ China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue {+}

(Opinion-oriented article two: Thesis section 6.6.2.2)

Appraisal Analysis 2

‘ONE-MAN SHOW JUST A DISTRACTION’, 5 May 2012, *China Daily*

Text	Appraisal analysis	Evaluation Target (+/-)
“Dissident's plea for protection from China deepens crisis,” declared a headline in the <i>New York Times</i> .	No Appraisal	NYT headline
By ¹ "dissident", it referred to Chen Guangcheng, a blind man from East China's Shandong province who provided legal advice to those ² allegedly victimized by improper enforcement of family planning policies, though ³ few in this country would address him that way .	¹ “dissident” scare quotes = ironic reference ² Judgment /social sanction/veracity(-) [criticism for referring to ‘allegedly victimized’ peasants] ³ Authorial reporting of a hypothetical verbal occurrence	¹ Chen {-} ² Chen [and peasants] {-} ³ Chen {-}
Actually few would have heard of him until a couple of days ago. The paper's report identifying Chen as ⁴ "one of China's most prominent dissidents", therefore, will no doubt come as an ⁵ enlightening revelation to most people here.	⁴ Appreciation /reaction(-) [ironic praise, i.e. criticism of Chen's designation as ‘prominent dissident’] ⁵ ironic reference to Chen	⁴ Chen {-} ⁵ Chen {-}
But it will ⁶ not be that big a surprise.	⁶ Appreciation /reaction(-) [ironic criticism that news about Chen's prominence will not surprise people in China who are used to such scenarios]	⁶ Chen {-}
After all, most of the ⁷ Chinese “dissidents” who have become Western heroes have ⁸ rocketed to prominence from oblivion, only to fall back into obscurity when they were no longer of any use to the West.	⁷ Chinese “dissident” scare quotes = irony ⁸ Judgment /social sanction/propriety (-) [criticism by ironic metaphorical process ‘have rocketed’ and ‘only to fall back’ suggests that Chen's acclaim is unmerited]	⁷ Chen [and Chinese dissidents] {-} ⁸ Chen [and Chinese dissidents] {-}
Although they are yet to complete the very last step on their agenda - visiting the United States and getting US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Barack Obama personally involved - Chen and his helpers have been quite ⁹ successful in internationalizing him.	⁹ Judgment /social sanction/veracity (-) [criticism which ironically suggests that Chen's ‘agenda’ to manipulate international opinion has been successful]	⁹ Chen [and his helpers] {-}
No matter how true his stories are, ¹⁰ Chen has managed to hide himself under American wings and become what the New York Times called a “crisis” during the ¹¹ all-important Strategic and Economic Dialogue between his country and the US in Beijing.	¹⁰ Judgment /social sanction/veracity (-) [ironic metaphorical criticism of Chen's ability to inappropriately influence American protection] ¹¹ Appreciation /valuation(+) [positive endorsement of the ‘Dialogue’ which is central to China's reform agenda]	¹⁰ Chen {-} ¹¹ Strategic and Economic Dialogue {+}
Chen's ¹² smartly timed plea for US protection has served him well. He has got the attention he wanted, and is asking for more .	¹² Judgment /social sanction/veracity(-) [irony: criticism of Chen again on the suggestion of manipulation through the timing of his plea. The representation of Chen as controlling and dishonest]	¹² Chen {-}
But at the same time he is holding one of the ¹³ world's most important relationships hostage as he has become a ¹⁴ tricky	¹³ Appreciation /valuation(+). [a repeated positive appraisal of the Dialogue as important]	¹³ Strategic and Economic Dialogue {+}

sideline issue for high officials from both countries who were on a tight schedule comparing notes on the big picture of bilateral ties

Meanwhile, he has become a ¹⁵ **political tool** on the campaign trail in the US.

Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney is already using Chen to attack Obama, ¹⁶ **blatantly accusing** the Obama administration of failing to reach beyond US soil to protect a non-American.

So, if protection is what Chen feels he needs, that could be the place to go, should his ¹⁷ **long-time lawyering** enable him to ¹⁸ **sweet talk his new friends**.

In reality, Chen's stories, ¹⁹ **even if all true**, reveal little more than abusive policy implementation at the hands of some grassroots officials.

Something Beijing has been ²⁰ **determinedly striving** to address, a ²¹ **challenging task** considering the vast extent of the world's most populous country.

By resorting to American "protection", Chen has successfully ²² **blown a minor complaint completely out of proportion** and made it prominent between decision-makers in both capitals, especially at a time when Clinton was shaking hands with Chinese leaders. Human rights are ²³ **no small matter**.

And any ²⁴ **verifiable allegations**, including any of Chen's, deserve proper redress.

But is it appropriate to ²⁵ **let one person's story dictate** the course of the ties between two countries?

Neither country will benefit if decision-makers from the two countries let the ²⁶ **dramatic one-man show** distract and derail their efforts to anchor their ²⁷ **volatile state-to-state relations**.

¹⁴ **Judgment**/social sanction/veracity (-). [*Chen's case is repeatedly characterized as manipulative and trivialized as a 'tricky sideline issue'*]

¹⁴ Chen {-}

¹⁵ **Judgment**/social sanction/veracity (-). [*Referring to Chen as a 'political tool' is an ironic use of metaphor in a relational process. The writer is portraying Chen as both manipulator and manipulated by the US political system*]

¹⁵ Chen {-}

¹⁶ **Judgment**/social sanction/propriety(-). [*'Accusing' is a negative verbal process and this is intended to show that Chen, the manipulator, is even causing division abroad as he becomes the 'manipulated'. 'Blatantly' intensifies the 'process of accusation' as overt, and therefore an impropriety*]

¹⁶ US
[Mitt Romney]{-}

¹⁷⁻¹⁸ **Judgment**/social sanction/veracity(-). [*these are ironic metaphors used to criticize Chen and the US as manipulative and mutually exploitative, thus negatively judged as dishonest and/or deceitful*]

¹⁷ Chen {-}

¹⁸ US
[new friends] {-}

¹⁹ **Judgment**/social sanction/veracity (-). [*hypothetically suggesting that Chen's stories are false, and were they true, they would have little importance*]

¹⁹ Chen {-}

²⁰⁻²¹ **Judgment**/social esteem/tenacity (+). [*self-admiration for addressing the abuses of minor officials. But one wonders why Beijing is putting emphasis on this when the preceding sentence trivializes the issue as 'little more...'*]

²⁰ China {+}

²¹ China {+}

²² **Judgment**/social sanction/veracity and propriety(-). [*criticizing Chen (and US) by implication for exaggerating the importance of Chen's case*]

²² Chen [and US – (complaint)] {-}

²³ **Appreciation**/valuation(+). [*cautious acknowledgement of 'human rights' as important – but to what ends? This attempts to separate Chen's case from the 'true' human rights concerns.*]

²³ Human rights {+}

²⁴ **Judgment**/social sanction/veracity (-). [*criticism that Chen's allegations may not be truthful*]

²⁴ Chen [his 'allegations'] {-}

²⁵ **Appreciation**/valuation(-). [*deeming Chen's case as insignificant or trivial*]

²⁵ Chen [indirect: 'one person's story'] {-}

²⁶ **Appreciation**/composition(-). [*criticism of Chen's efforts over his case*]

²⁶ Chen
['one-man show'] {-}

²⁷ **Judgment**/social esteem/normality (-). [*criticism of Chen over his undue influence on the US-China relationship*]

²⁷ China-US
relations {-}

(Opinion-oriented article three: Thesis section 6.6.2.3)

Appraisal Analysis 3

‘U.S. VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL LAW’, 7 May 2012, *China Daily*

Text	Appraisal analysis	Evaluation Target (+/-)
There has been much ¹ speculation and rumor since Chinese citizen Chen Guangcheng entered the US Embassy in China.	¹ Judgment /social sanction/veracity (-). [implying manipulation or distortion of truth]	¹ Chen and US (indirectly) {-}
Some Western media have made ² improper comments and have suggested that the United States put forward certain requirements to China about Chen; that China made this and that agreement.	² Judgment /social sanction/ propriety (-). [Western media reproached for suggesting the US requires things from China]	² Western media {-}
This is ³ absurd . Chen is a Chinese citizen. ⁴ If the US government follows international laws and the basic norms of relations among nations, it ⁵ does not have the right to make any demands on the Chinese government.	³ Appreciation /(-)valuation. [based on its social irrationality] ⁴ Judgment /social esteem/(-) veracity. [US integrity put into question] ⁵ Legal Judgment /social sanction/ (-) propriety. [condemnation based on US not having legal authority in this matter]	³ Western media {-} ⁴ US {-} ⁵ US {-}
In fact, the US government has realized ⁶ it was at fault and dispatched officials to talk with the Chinese government. Spokesman Liu Weimin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made it clear that this issue can be quickly solved: "The US has expressed the ⁷ importance it attaches to China's demands and concerns, and promised to take necessary measures to prevent similar incidents.	⁶ Judgment /social sanction/(-) propriety. [Based on Vienna Convention, China suggests that US made wrong call to take in Chen] ⁷ Appreciation /self-valuation (+). [China here, positions itself as offended by US and discursively represents the US as attentive to China's reaction]	⁶ US {-} ⁷ China {+} [taking a superordinate position in that the US admits (to China) its 'wrongdoing']
The ⁸ US side should reflect upon its policies and actions, and take concrete actions to maintain the larger interests of China-US relations."	⁸ Judgment /social sanction/propriety (-). [US paternally castigated and urged to 'reflect' on its diplomatic blunders]	⁸ US {-}
Some people with ⁹ ulterior motives have tried their best to ¹⁰ play up this incident to destroy Sino-US relations, but the fourth China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue was held as scheduled, with Chinese Vice-Premier Wang Qishan and State Councilor Dai Bingguo, special representatives of Chinese President Hu Jintao, and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, special representatives of US President Barack Obama, co-chairing the dialogue.	⁹ Judgment /social sanction/(-) propriety. [based on the idea that there is a scheme or plot to derail China's strategic goals] ¹⁰ Judgment /social sanction/propriety(-). [Chen and some in US evaluated as exaggerating for the purpose of influencing negotiations]	⁹ 'some people' [i.e. Chen and some in the US] {-} ¹⁰ 'some people' [i.e. Chen and some in the US] {-}

Certainly the outside world is eager for China and the US to construct a ¹¹ **win-win cooperative partnership of mutual respect and mutual benefit** and wanted the two countries to use the dialogue to chart a path **of harmonious coexistence**.

¹² **Healthy ties** between the world's largest developed country and the largest developing country are of **such significance** that they will **not be held hostage** by a single incident.

But no matter ¹³ **how hard the US tries to justify itself**, it is an inescapable truth that the US government has **made a mistake**.

¹⁴ It has **broken** international laws and Chinese laws and **interfered** in China's internal affairs. For this, the US **owes an apology** to China.

As Liu Weimin stressed: "It should be pointed out that the US Embassy in China took Chen Guangcheng, a Chinese citizen, into the Embassy via ¹⁵ **abnormal means**, with which ¹⁶ China expresses **strong dissatisfaction**."

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations ¹⁷ **expressly stipulates**: "Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State." It also states: "The premises of the mission must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of the mission as laid down in the present Convention or by other rules of general international law or by any special agreements in force between the sending and the receiving State."

Liu Weimin stressed: "The US Embassy in China has the obligation to observe relevant international laws and Chinese laws and ¹⁸ **should not engage in activities irrelevant to its duties**."

China can never accept the US move to ¹⁹ **interfere** in China's internal affairs, and has **demand the US side apologize** for that, probe into the incident thoroughly, **deal** with those responsible, and **promise** to prevent similar incidents."

Over the past three decades China's economy has ²⁰ **developed rapidly** and

¹¹ **Judgment/social sanction/propriety(+)**. [*positive evaluation because it is advantageous for China at this stage to play up the Economic Relationship. The 'human rights' issue is lost in the construction of 'good will' – this is only if it fits into China's long-term agenda*]

¹² **Judgment/social esteem/(+) capacity**. [*positive self-evaluation of what the world would be like if the US would just listen to China. This also encodes a backhanded suggestion to ignore Chen and the 'human rights' distraction*]

¹³ **Judgment/social sanction/(-) veracity**. [*US is in error – ideological square – emphasize THEIR bad*]

¹⁴ **Judgment/social sanction/ (-) legal and moral combination of negative veracity and propriety**. [*US has transgressed legal and moral laws = broken laws/interfered in China's affairs/owes and apology*]

¹⁵ **Judgment/social esteem/normality (-)**. [*US actions were not according to established norms*]

¹⁶ **Judgment/social sanction/veracity (+)**. [*China's response is based on acting in accord with established norms*]

¹⁷ **Judgment/social sanction/veracity (+)**. [*The Vienna Convention is invoked as the ultimate in diplomatic fairness to show two things: (1) how bad the US is for transgressing it; and, (2) by implication, how virtuous China is in following it*].

[*Direct citation of 'Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations'*]

¹⁸ **Judgment/social sanction/propriety (-)**. [*US breaking of diplomatic legal code*]

¹⁹ **Judgment/social sanction/propriety (-)**. [*China castigating US in paternalistic tone; representing US as in subordinate position*]

²⁰ **Judgment/social esteem/tenacity (+)**.

¹¹ US and China relationship {+} [the US is evaluated as 'good' if it is in partnership with China and working to China's plan]

¹² US-China economic relationship {+}

¹³ US {-} [indirect criticism]

¹⁴ US {-}

¹⁵ US {-}

¹⁶ China {+}

¹⁷ US {-} [indirect reference]

¹⁸ US {-}

¹⁹ US {-}

²⁰ China {+}

its society has **made great progress**.

[Self-evaluation of China as highly capable]

²¹ It took **Western countries hundreds of years** to get to this stage.

²¹ **Judgment**/social esteem/capacity (-).
[negative judgment of Western countries shows China's capability]

²¹ Western countries {-} [less capable than China].
China {+} [indirect inference]

So it is ²² **unavoidable that China is facing the same problems** that occurred in Western countries during their development.

²² **Judgment**/social esteem/capacity (+).
[China excuses 'late' development. Indirect positive inference that China is equal]

²² China {+}

²³ **China is a country under the rule of law**.

²³ **Judgment**/social esteem/capacity (+).
[Unexpected Self-aggrandizement]

²³ China {+}

²⁴ **The legal rights of any citizen are protected by** its Constitution and laws.

²⁴ **Judgment**/social sanction/propriety (+).
[Inference of positive-Self evaluation]

²⁴ China {+}

Writing human rights protection into the Constitution, carrying out the National Human Rights Action Plan and amending the Criminal Procedure Law are ²⁵ **important milestones that testify to China's progress in human rights**.

²⁵ **Judgment**/social sanction/propriety (+).
[Self-evaluation as just and concerned over human rights]

²⁵ China {+}

China has reiterated many times that every citizen has the ²⁶ **obligation to abide** by the Constitution and laws. No matter who breaks the law, the ²⁷ **Chinese authorities will investigate** and bring those responsible to justice.

²⁶ **Judgment**/social sanction/propriety (+).
[Self-evaluation as legal by scrupulously following the law]
²⁷ **Judgment**/social esteem/tenacity (+).
[Self-evaluation as tireless in the pursuit of justice]

²⁶ China {+}
²⁷ China {+}

No outside interference is acceptable in this process.

No appraisal

