A BRIEF NOTE ON HUDDLESTON'S REPLY TO MATTHIESSEN AND MARTIN'S RESPONSE TO HUDDLESTON'S REVIEW OF HALLIDAY'S INTRODUCTION TO FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR

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Huddleston (1991) has construed our reply to his 1988 review as an unwarranted personal attack, to our mind a disappointing response. It is of course quite natural to sympathize with Huddleston's frustration at having been read in ways he did not intend. But it is by no means clear to us by what public criteria Huddleston construes his own review of Halliday (1985a) as scholarly critique and our reply as hostile misrepresentation. Linguistics, like any discourse, offers a variety of reading positions for any text, positions which are enacted in interpersonal exchanges. As writers, we cannot unilaterally define reading positions simply by intending them. It comes as no surprise to us to find Huddleston adopting a less than sympathetic reading position as far as systemic linguistics is concerned; what is surprising is his apparent inability to recognise that there might be alternative reading positions for his review, which has proven just as offensive to many readers as our own reply has appeared to him. We will restrict ourselves here to commenting briefly on a few of the rhetorical ploys Huddleston ascribes to our position - belittling, negativity, quoting out of context and misrepresentation.

BELITTLING - One aspect of our reply to which Huddleston takes particular exception is our "frequent" use of terms like "simple" and "of course" when clarifying Halliday (1985a); on the basis of his reaction to these terms he admonishes us[1] (in a tone more paternal than collegial) to adopt a less derogatory tone:

> Matthiessen and Martin certainly give the impression of being more interested in trying to belittle the critic than in answering the criticisms. They frequently use expressions such as 'simple' or 'of course' to trigger derogatory implicatures...I do not believe that this is a fitting way to conduct a debate in an academic journal: abuse is not an acceptable substitute for reasoned argument. If Matthiessen and Martin choose to take up the issues discussed in this paper, I urge them to adopt a less emotive, more co-operative approach. (Huddleston 1991:128)

It is important to query however whether our clarifications need to be taken in this injured way. Take for example our response to Huddleston's query about adjectival groups:

> Given Halliday's recognition of the adverbial group, Huddleston finds it strange that there is no adjectival group in the grammar. The simple answer is that of course there is an adjectival group; it is a kind of nominal group, with an adjective as Head, just as the 'substantival' group is a kind of nominal group, with a 'substantive' as Head: Huddleston's puzzle is just a matter of delicacy. (Matthiessen & Martin 1991: 24)

The reason we said the answer was simple and obvious here is based on our own reading of Halliday (1985a), a reading which needless to say contrasts sharply with Huddleston's. The relevant sections of IFG are as follows - beginning with Halliday's definition of groups:

It [= the logical component; CM/JRM] comes in at this point because a group is in some sense equivalent to a WORD COMPLEX - that is, a combination of words built up on the basis of a particular logical relation. This is why it is called a GROUP (= 'group of words'). (Halliday 1985a:159)

Consider now Halliday's comments on the realisation of Attributes in relational attributive clauses:

In the case of the attributive mode, in which some qualitative attribute is assigned to a 'carrier', the meaning is 'x is a member of the class a '. So *Sarah is wise* means 'Sarah is a member of the class of wise ones'; *John is a poet* 'John is a member of the class of poets'... The Attribute is realized as a nominal group, typically (though not obligatorily) one that is indefinite; its has as Head a noun or an adjective, but not a pronoun. (Halliday 1985a:114-115)

And finally the relevant part of Halliday's diagram for word classes:

Figure 6-26 shows the classes of word that we can recognize in English groups and phrases. These are the 'parts of speech' of a functional grammar. (Halliday 1985a:191)

This grouping of adjectives and 'substantives' as different classes at the head of the nominal group is consistent with the position Halliday has held since the 1960s, as represented for example in his Bloomington grammar (presented in Halliday (1976); see the network on p. 131). It seemed to us when writing our reply that anyone reading Halliday (1985a) with a view to finding out his position on adjectival groups could deduce from passages such as these that groups of adjectives (adjectival groups) were a sub-type of groups of nouns (nominal groups). To us this seemed simple and obvious. It also seemed to us that anyone criticising Halliday (1985a) for not recognizing adjectival groups was failing to make a very straight-forward deduction and that it was perfectly reasonable to point out to readers that this misrepresentation could easily have been avoided were it not for the intrusion of competing agendas.

Let's now turn the tables on these reading positions, and consider an example of Huddleston's (1988) approach to Halliday (1985a):

The interpretation of theme (or topic, as it is more often called) as what the clause is about is of course a familiar one - but it is surely not an interpretation that can be consistently associated in English with the initial element. I can't make any sense of the idea that *Nothing will satisfy you, You could buy a bar of chocolate like this for 6d before the War* (spoken, let us assume, to someone born after the War), *There's a fallacy in your argument* , are respectively about 'nothing', 'you' and 'there'. These are elementary and familiar types of example

> and it is symptomatic of the lack of dialogue referred to above that Halliday does not attempt to forestall objections like this. (Huddleston 1988:158)

We did, and still do find it very easy to read passages of this kind as every bit as belittling, derogatory, emotive and abusive as Huddleston finds passages such as that quoted from our reply above. We did, and still do find it odd that Huddleston would critique in these terms someone he professes to admire greatly and to whom he apparently feels deeply indebted. Huddleston has every right to argue that he had no intention of constructing Halliday as someone who is naively unaware of, or stubbornly refuses to engage with, even the most obvious objections to his work on Theme. But he has no grounds whatsoever for assuming that his review was written in such a way as to construct a unique reading position for its readers, one which would harmonize comfortably with his own view-point. There are many ways in which Huddleston could have constructed his review differently; we, like many systemicists, would have appreciated a more co-operative approach. We also find it difficult to see in what ways Huddleston's reply to our reply was constructed to facilitate negotiation:

> The patronising and overtly hostile tone of their [Matthiessen & Martin's] paper [1991:75]...It should be borne in mind although Matthiessen and Martin purport to be presenting the Systemic-Functional point of view [1991:74]...The second conclusion is that they are clearly applying a different kind of reasoning from Halliday: hence my warning at the outset that they cannot be accepted as authoritative spokespersons for the IFG theory and description of English [1991:77]...it is distressing that when I now express my disagreement with the way his theory has developed I am treated - not by him, of course, but by Matthiessen and Martin - in a manner befitting some kind of traitor [1991:124]...there are numerous places where there are gross and blatant misrepresentations[2] of what I said: I have to assume that these are not wilful but it is impossible not to believe that they stem from a consciously hostile reading of my review... [1991:129]

NEGATIVITY - Another aspect of Huddleston's apparent views on discourse, subjectivity and reading position which deserves comment here has to do with his protest against our reading of his review as 'unproductively negative' (and our attendant contextualisation of his review with pertinent quotations from Foucault). By way of defense, Huddleston argues that his review included acknowledgment of his own debt to Halliday and acknowledgment of the positive contributions contained in IFG:

> ...I have a great admiration for him [= Halliday], and acknowledged in my review 'my own deep indebtedness to [him], with respect to both his influence on my thinking in linguistics theory and the grammar of English and also to the practical help he gave in my postgraduate and postdoctoral career' (1988:140). I emphasized at the outset my view that IFG 'contains innumerable original insights and valuable observations: it has a great deal to offer anyone interested in the grammar of English' (1988:140). (Huddleston 1991:128)

It seems to us however that these comments need to be read against the rest of Huddleston's review, which is somewhere between 99% and 100% negative. How is it one might ask that someone Huddleston admires can produce such unadmirable work? Why such a wholehearted public attack? As Matthiessen & Martin point out, the things Huddleston considers IFG has to offer are "points of detail" -

> ...details that can be safely consumed without in any way challenging traditional conceptions of grammar. But it is important to make it very clear that it is precisely because of Halliday's general interpretation of grammar that it is possible to generate and make sense of points of detail of the kind Huddleston identifies, which general interpretation Huddleston goes on to reject in the

remainder of his article. Furthermore, an abundance of similar observations can be generated from Halliday's interpretation. (Matthiessen & Martin 1991: 18)

Readers sympathetic to Halliday's position are unlikely to be satisfied with lame appreciations of this kind. Our point here is that these positive acknowledgments, taken in the context of the overwhelmingly negative evaluation of Halliday's work, are unlikely to construct a reading in which Huddleston's review is taken as an invitation "to clarify a range of issues." Our own acknowledgments of our respect for Huddleston were obviously not taken by him in this way:

> Since we find Huddleston's review very disappointing, let us begin by emphasizing that we value this work in general highly and that he has made many important contributions both within and outside of systemic linguistics... (Matthiessen & Martin 1991: 5)

> Huddleston himself has produced an extremely valuable book on English syntax... (Matthiessen & Martin 1991: 10)

Nor did we expect them to be. We found Huddleston's review all the more disappointing precisely because of the respect we had for his previous work. It seemed to us that he had taken up an unfortunate option in academic discourse and we felt that it was this option rather than Huddleston's personal scholarship that should be our ultimate focus.

QUOTING OUT OF CONTEXT - Huddleston's views on intertextuality are also open to question. Towards the end of his review Huddleston makes the point that Hudson's position on Halliday's work is just as negative, if not more negative than his own. On these grounds he accuses us of quoting out of context, as follows:

> ...in what could be used as a textbook example of misleadingly selective quotation, Matthiessen & Martin pick out one 'quite positive' passage from Hudson to contrast with my 'unproductively negative' comments. This is the only reference to his review and as such gives a totally false impression of the relation between the reviews... (Huddleston 1991:128)

The point of our quotation from Hudson was not however to enlist his support. Rather we wanted to demonstrate that Huddleston's review was unproductively negative, even when compared with comparably negative critiques[3]:

> Even if Huddleston disagrees fundamentally with IFG, it seems to us that his comments are often unproductively negative. For instance, consider Huddleston's comments on IFG's coverage:

>> Halliday's Introduction to Functional Grammar is the most comprehensive account of English that has yet appeared within the framework of his theory of grammar. It is nevertheless quite selective and uneven in its coverage, for example...

> ...This assessment can be contrasted with Hudson's (1986:794) quite positive comments[4]:

>> The coverage [of IFG] is unusual -- [Halliday] tends to continue his analysis at the points where other linguists give up in despair, such as intonation, topicalization, adverbials, and the fuzzy area where sentence structure fades into discourse structure. ...IFG is a challenging book — it challenges those of us who are outsiders to see if we can produce anything as impressive in its scope and internal consistency. (Matthiessen and Martin 1991: 13-14)

It seems to us that the reason Huddleston reads our quotation as an attempt to mislead readers about Hudson's views stems from the highly polemical position he adopts in his review. As Foucault comments, polemics "...defines alliances, recruits partisans, unites interests or opinions, represents a party; it establishes the other as an enemy, an upholder of opposed interests, against which one must fight until the moment this enemy is defeated or either surrenders or disappears" (Foucault in Rabinow 1984: 383). For us, Huddleston's enlistment of Hudson in defense of his critique substantiates our reading of Huddleston's review as polemical. Recurrent negative evaluations such as the following are also instructive:

> quite selective and uneven in its coverage; casually dismissive remarks such as one finds in the footnote on p. 76; simply to be a further artefact of the total accountability requirement; our puzzlement is increased; adding further confusion to the distinction; it is difficult to see that this innovation has anything to commend it; I can't make any sense of the idea; these are elementary and familiar types of example; the extremely disconcerting practice; I cannot make any sense of the idea; it is impossible to make any sense of the idea; some higher-level constituents as bizarre as those noted for the textual dimension; stretched the concept of identification to the point where it is no longer intuitively graspable [all from Huddleston 1988]

Huddleston himself takes issue with a reading of this kind, emphatically rejecting the suggestion that his review falls into the genre described by Foucault (Huddleston 1991: 127-128). In contrast he constructs himself as someone genuinely saddened by our failure to properly conduct a debate:

> There was an excellent opportunity to clarify a range of issues where Systemic-Functional Grammar is unfathomable to outsiders and to justify IFG theory and description in the face of the reasoned arguments that have been levelled against it. That opportunity, unhappily, has been missed. (Huddleston 1991:128)

But what kind of "excellent opportunity" has Huddleston in fact constructed for systemic linguists here? Are linguists who find systemic grammar unfathomable more likely to be persuaded by Huddleston or by us, whatever we say? Are there really transcendent criteria with reference to which we might conduct the debate and resolve issues? Why should systemic linguists have to "justify IFG theory"? In what sense are we guilty until proven innocent? Why are reasoned arguments "levelled against" systemic grammar rather than addressed to it? What kind of military campaign are we really in? For us, the fact that grammaticalisations of this kind are encoding polemical discourse is quite transparent. For us, Foucault's characterisation of the discourse is more than apt:

> polemics sets itself the task of determining the intangible point of dogma, the fundamental and necessary principle that the adversary has neglected, ignored, or transgressed...polemics allows for no possibility of an equal discussion: it examines a case; it isn't dealing with an interlocutor, it is processing a suspect; it collects the proofs of his guilt, designates the infraction he has committed, and pronounces the verdict and sentences him... the polemicist tells the truth in the form of his judgement and by virtue of the authority he has conferred on himself. (Foucault in Rabinow 1984: 383)

MISREPRESENTATION - Huddleston is also very concerned in his reply to clarify what he terms the "gross" and "blatant" misrepresentations of his review, and which he claims stem from a "consciously hostile reading" of his article. One example of a "gross" misrepresentation is the following comment by Matthiessen and Martin on Huddleston's reading of Theme as Topic:

> It is important to note Halliday's caution here:

> Some grammarians have used the terms Topic and Comment instead of Theme and Rheme. But the Topic-Comment terminology carries rather different connotations. The label 'Topic' usually refers to only one particular type of Theme [ideational or topical theme, CM & JRM]; and it tends to be used as a cover term for two concepts that are functionally distinct, one being that of Theme and the other being that of Given.

> Huddleston continues: "The interpretation of theme (or topic, as it is more often called) as what the clause is about is of course a familiar one - but it is surely not an interpretation that can be consistently associated in English with the initial element." As the quotation from IFG shows, Halliday explicitly warns us against equating theme with topic, but this does not prevent Huddleston from doing just that. (Matthiessen & Martin 1991: 42-43)

The quotation is based on our reading of the following of Huddleston's comments. Note the way in which Theme is explicitly elaborated as Topic - "theme (or topic, as it is more often called)", an elaboration Huddleston (1991) dismisses as "a terminological aside." In addition Huddleston introduces the prosodic component of the utterance in connection with his analysis of the distribution of information in question-answer pairs; we mistakenly assumed that intonation played a role in Huddleston's interpretation of topic in *What's the new boss like? - She's O.K.* We see no compelling reason for Huddleston to be surprised that we read his discourse in this way; there is certainly nothing here to justify his claim that our misreading was driven by conscious hostility:

> The interpretation of theme (or topic, as it is more often called) as what the clause is about is of course a familiar one - but it is surely not an interpretation that can be consistently associated in English with the initial element...Those who take the view that examples like (19c = *my wife couldn't stand the dog*) do not encode the theme (at least in the verbal, as opposed to prosodic, component of the utterance) often support it by showing that they have different thematic interpretations depending on what explicit or implicit questions they answer...One very counter-intuitive consequence of Halliday's analysis is that natural question answer pairs more often than not involve a change of Theme. Thus in the exchange [A] *What's the new boss like?* [B] *She seems O.K.* the answer will be analysed as being about the new boss, but the question won't - it's Theme is *what.* (Huddleston 1988:158-159)

Huddleston contrasts "gross" and "blatant" misrepresentations of this kind with his own "reasonable" interpretations of Halliday (1985a). We wonder however how far Huddleston's distinction between gross misrepresentation and reasonable interpretation can be maintained - with respect for example to an issue like Theme. First a review of Halliday (1985a).

> As a general guide, the Theme can be identified as that element which comes in first position in the clause. We have already indicated that this is not how the category of Theme is defined. (Halliday 1985a:39)

> The Theme is the element which serves as the point of departure of the message; it is that with which the clause is concerned. (Halliday 1985a:38)

In his reply to Matthiessen and Martin, Huddleston argues that his interpretation of Halliday's Theme in terms of 'what the clause is about' is justified, giving three reasons:

> There are three very good reasons for focussing on the relation between 'aboutness' and Theme. In the first place, the concept...is one commonly invoked in the non-systemic literature...Secondly, it is reasonable to regard the topical Theme as the prototypical or most readily graspable kind of Theme...Thirdly, the concept of what the clause is about or concerned with plays a highly prominent role in Halliday's explanation of Theme. (Huddleston 1991:98)

The third of these justifications he attempts to substantiate by quoting from Halliday. The relevant lexicalisations from these quotations are reproduced below, under the headings of 'aboutness' and 'point of departure' (Huddleston 1991: 98-99). Note that Halliday studiously avoids the term topic, and carefully elaborates circumstances of matter (*concerned with... , about...*) as 'point of departure' or 'starting point' in definitions (as above); aboutness is only realised on its own in glosses of the meaning of Theme in particular examples (where the glosses render the textual meaning ideationally, using a circumstance of matter to do so). Note as well that it is more than a little generous to align nominal and verbal realisations of 'concern' under the heading 'aboutness' (Huddleston's apparent reading); notions of 'selectivity' and 'attentiveness' are also involved (cf. *it's a concern I have with what he's saying; it concerns me that he argues in this way; I'm not concerned with that particular problem here*).

'ABOUTNESS'	'POINT OF DEPARTURE'
the concern of the message	
a message concerning the tea pot	
the concern of the message	
the concern of the message	
what the message is concerned with =	the point of departure...
that with which the clause is concerned=	the point of departure of the message
what the clause is going to be about =	the starting-point for the message
"I'll tell you about a halfpenny"	
"I'll tell you about the smallest English coin"	
"...tell you about the duke's gift to my aunt"	
"...tell you something about the duke"	

Huddleston does note that something more than aboutness, point of departure, figures prominently in Halliday's definition of Theme. This part of the definition he dismisses, quoting again from his original review, and moving on to dismiss Matthiessen and Martin's suggestion that point of departure can be given an interpretation independent of syntactic sequence by drawing on contemporary work on information flow (referring at that point in their discussion to work by Chafe, Grosz, Sidner and Bateman among others). Without pausing to address this literature, Huddleston comments that this is a matter for future research[5], not present understanding:

> The concept of 'point of departure' or 'starting-point' also figures prominently; I focussed on the idea of what the clause is about, concerned with, on the grounds that it is not clear that these other concepts 'can sustain an interpretation that is independent of syntactic sequence'...Note that in talking of this concept of 'point of departure' Matthiessen & Martin write: 'There is good reason to think that if we can characterise the notion of "information flow", currently popular with a number of linguists, we will be able to relate the notion of "point of departure" to it.' But this is a matter of future research, not current understanding; as things presently stand we have not been given a clear account of what 'point of departure' means that is independent of syntactic sequence, and - in the light of the above three points - it is perfectly reasonable to examine the relation between Halliday's Theme and the concept of what the message is about or concerned with. (Huddleston 1991:99)

On the basis of this dismissal Huddleston argues that it is "perfectly reasonable" to investigate whether or not first position in the clause is used to realise what the message is concerned with or about. Re-running his 1988 arguments against the equation of first position and aboutness he re-establishes his own position - that except for circumstances of matter, English does not grammaticalise the notion of topic (which he takes to be a critique of Halliday's work on Theme):

> My account is that topic is not systematically encoded in English (except in certain marked constructions, such as those with *as for*), so that an example like *My wife couldn't stand the dog* could be used with either my "my wife" or "the dog" as topic - depending on context... (Huddleston 1991:100)

Now let's query from an alternative reading position whether or not Huddleston's refusal to address the issue of information flow and point of departure is "perfectly reasonable". In their reply to Huddleston, Matthiessen and Martin draw Huddleston's attention to the importance of information flow and the interpretation of Theme as point of departure at several points (and illustrate what they mean with respect to a number of texts) - for example:

> Halliday predicts that first position as a realization of Theme is the key to understanding thematic progression in both texts and this seems the more natural explanation of the similarities and differences between the two...These examples illustrate another kind of thematic progression...What is critical is that Theme has to be understood through its contribution to the development of discourse not through the experiential semantics of lexical items such as 'about'. For example, thematic progression may be interpersonal as well as experiential... (Matthiessen & Martin 1991: 42-49)

As they point out, their interpretation of thematic progression is based on Fries (1981/1983) (who is in turn developing earlier work by Halliday and linguists of the Prague School). Fries introduces the term "method of development" to name the kind of information flow coded through first position in the English clause, exemplifying his discussion with a wide range of texts:

> (a) the lexical material placed initially within each sentence of a paragraph (i.e. the themes of each sentence of a paragraph) indicates the point of departure of the message expressed by that sentence, and (b) the information contained within the themes of all of the sentences of a paragraph creates the **method of development** of that paragraph. (Fries 1983:135)

Fries's work was developed by Martin for Tagalog in a 1983 article edited by Huddleston for the *Australian Journal of Linguistics*. The following quotation is relevant to Huddleston's queries about the kinds of definition used by linguists for so-called Topic in Tagalog[6]. Martin exemplifies the usefulness of the notions of point of departure and method of development for the analysis of one Tagalog text and for deconstruction of the then topical debates about the presence of a Subject in Philippine languages.

> ...[the system of focus in Tagalog] participates in the realisation of the system of theme in the sense outlined by Halliday 1967-8 and Fries 1983. The Topic assigned by focus represents the unmarked point of departure in a Tagalog clause - the speaker's angle on what he is talking about. In Schachter and Otanes' terms, the Topic 'expresses the focus of attention in the sentence' (1972:60). The Topic thus participates in what Fries refers to as a text's method of development...On the other hand focus also participates in the identification of participants in a text...Both of these discourse functions have been noted by Philippinists. Bloomfield's definition of Topic as the 'definite, known object underlying the predication as starting-point of discourse'[7] (1917:$93) clearly reflects this dual function...in Fries's terms, text (17)'s method of development, as reflected in this thematic pattern, is the hero of the fable...the horse remains the centre of attention in the fable...what text (17)'s method of development is showing here is the importance of participants in narrative... (Martin 1983: 54-60)

Halliday (1985a) draws on this research in his exemplifications of the way in which Theme analysis can be used to interpret text. The relevant quotations are as follows:

> The thematic organization of the clauses (and clause complexes, where relevant) expresses, and so reveals, the method of development of the text...Paragraph by paragraph the development proceeds as follows: ...[Halliday exemplifies the development - CM/JRM] This is the thematic line, from which we know where the text is going... (Halliday 1985a:67 - 'Thematic interpretation of a text.')

> From this display we can see clearly what has been called the 'method of development' of the text. The whole of the first clause is thematic in the discourse: it is the 'topic sentence' of the 'paragraph', to use the terminology of composition theory...Thus the thematic progression is: job - silver - customers - Anne - customers. (Halliday 1985a:367 - 'Appendix I.')

In rejecting the notion of point of departure Huddleston (1988) fails to address any of this research[8]. In his 1991 reply to Matthiessen and Martin, in spite of the fact that they explicitly draw his attention to this work and provide additional exemplifications of their own, Huddleston again refuses to engage in any way with questions of Theme and method of development as developed in this literature. On these grounds we would question the idea that Huddleston's reading of Halliday's Theme as topic is in any way "reasonable". Quite the contrary, by 1991 Huddleston's position strikes us as a defensive misappropriation of another scholar's work and a clear refusal to negotiate with systemic linguistics on the issue of first position in the English clause and thematic progression in text.

IN CONCLUSION - It goes without saying that Huddleston made the first move in this debate by writing a review so publicly discrediting that we had no choice but to reply. In this Huddleston was acting on his own, without provocation; as far as we are aware there are no systemic critiques of any of Huddleston's own publications. As far as we know this is because systemicists respect Huddleston's work and his right to pursue it whether they agree with it or not and have seen no reason to marshal their disagreements in an all out public attack.

Huddleston's totally negative reply to our reply once again forces our hand. Uncomfortably, his reaction places us in the position of either adding insult to injury by means of a careful point by point rebuttal of his reply or of changing tack and attempting to establish negotiable ground on selected issues. Without meaning to imply that we respect this positioning, that we accept any of Huddleston's criticisms or that we sympathise in general terms with his reading of our text, we have chosen the latter course - in the hope that something more productive might eventually emerge from the exchange. For reasons of space, and in order to distance the negotiation somewhat from acrimonious debate, this discussion will be held over for future publication. In the meantime, we would like to quote again from Foucault, who is here addressing questions of truth and power:

> ...I would like to advance a few "propositions" - which are not hard assertions, but are simply put forward for future essays and tests:

> - By "truth" is meant an ensemble of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and functioning of statements.
> - "Truth" is linked by a circular relation to systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which redirect it. A "regime" of truth.
> - This "regime" is not merely ideological or superstructural; it has been a condition of the formation and development of capitalism. And it's the same regime which, subject to certain modifications, operates in most of the socialist countries (I leave open here the question of China, which I do not know sufficiently well).
> - The essential political problem for the intellectual is not that of criticising the ideological content to which science is linked, or to bring it about that his scientific practice should be accompanied by a correct ideology. But of knowing

that it is possible to constitute a new politics of truth. The problem is not one of changing people's "consciousness" or what's in their heads; but the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth.
- It's not a question of emancipating truth from every system of power - which would be a chimera, because truth is already itself power - but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony (social, economic and cultural) within which it operates at the present time.

The political question, in short, is not error, illusion, alienated consciousness or ideology; it is truth itself. (Foucault 1985: 57)

Footnotes

[1] It is interesting to consider what kind of tenor relationship Huddleston is constructing here and to ask whether his reply is intended as an example of the approach he'd like us to adopt.

[2] Huddleston foregrounds his concern with the wilfulness of these misrepresentations by itemising them prosodically throughout his review (labelling them *Misrepresentation* 1-14 as they arise).

[3] The respective lengths of the two critiques is also instructive; Hudson takes 24 pages to review two systemic volumes, Halliday (1985a) and Butler (1985), whereas Huddleston devotes 37 pages to a critique of Halliday alone.

[4] We felt in fact that the force of Hudson's positive assessment of the **coverage** of IFG was all the stronger precisely because his overall review was quite negative.

[5] Huddleston's future in fact began for many researchers in the 1970s, particularly in the field of computational linguistics; for current understandings we are indebted to Grosz, Sidner, Hendrix, McCoy, Cheng and Sowa among others. We will hold over a review of this literature for future publication.

[6] See also Martin 1990 on the complementarity of topical and interpersonal Theme in Tagalog.

[7] Cf. Huddleston. "I question, however, whether this concept of point of departure is one that would naturally be used in describing Tagalog; if it were used, would it not itself be explained by reference to the concept of what the message is (primarily) about?"

[8] Huddleston also ignores the exemplification in Halliday (1985b); further exemplification is found in Halliday (in press a, in press b).

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