conditioned by the grammatical context according to whether it is clausal, nominal, verbal, etc.; see Table 7.

This variation in marking would obviously be true of any treatment that recognizes dependents (cf. for example Nichols, 1986, for a survey of dependent markings). It would seem odd to object that dependents are interpreted inconsistently because they are marked in different ways in different grammatical contexts. Or rather: if we want to operate with highly generalized grammatical categories such as dependent or modifier across different grammatical contexts, we have to accept that we have abstracted away from the specific realizations.

The same is true of the semantic interpretation of these highly generalized grammatical categories. It varies from one grammatical context to another, but this is no more an example of inconsistency than is the variation in the realization of the category. Martin (1988) explores these different interpretations in detail. Contrast here subclassification in the nominal group, temporal serialization in the verbal group, and relocation of the source of modal responsibility in the verbal group complex:

nominal group:

(76) electric Chinese frying pan

verbal group:

(77) will have been going to fry

verbal group complex:

(78) John had Mary make Fred let Sue do the cooking

It should be emphasized that whether we choose to follow Halliday or to follow Huddleston's suggestion to restrict hypotaxis to binary structures is a descriptive decision. It does not affect the theory of interdependency structure nor the theory of rank.

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Table 7: Realization of dependency in different contexts
In conclusion, let's consider minimal bracketing briefly in a wider typological context. The notion of minimal bracketing as it developed in systemic theory in the 1960s avoids the problems posed by VOS languages such as Tagalog for NP VP constituency and anticipates the evaluation of the configurations created by IC analysis with respect to languages such as Walpiri (e.g., Hale, 1981). Even if the maximal bracketing of the IC tradition turned out to be the most useful model for constituency in English, it has proved quite inappropriate for many other languages, whereas Halliday's minimal bracketing model is generally applicable precisely because it does not impose constituency where there is none.

2.4 Parataxis and rank

Let's now consider an objection to rank Huddleston voices in the context of parataxis. He suggests that "rank theory, by virtue of its minimal bracketing (for the basic ranks), requires us to postulate more ellipsis than is needed in an IC approach -- and in some cases this has semantically unsatisfactory consequences". Thus, Huddleston finds it unsatisfactory to treat the following example as one with two coordinated clauses in a clause complex, the second of which has an elliptical Subject:

(79) John came into the room and sat down by the fire

He observes that in the IC model came into the room and sat down by the fire can be coordinated directly (as VPs). This obviously assumes an analysis of the clause that does not include transitivity structure, since clauses with different major process types can be coordinated with ellipsis and they would assign different participant roles to the Subject (as in He [Actor] came into the room and [Senser] heard somebody crying quietly). Consequently, the approach that coordinates VPs is problematic in a multifunctional grammar. However, Huddleston would dispense with the transitivity structure as part of the grammatical structure in any case. The coordination of VPs would presumably allow examples such as it [VP rained all day and worried me greatly] and they would presumably be characterized as problematic in the semantic representation, whose task would be to 'recover' the fact that two predications (rather than simply predicates) are coordinated.

While Huddleston doesn't think the ellipsis per se in John came into the room and sat down is problematic, although it is unnecessary according to him, he does argue that the ellipsis analysis of the following example creates semantic difficulties since the Mood element you can't cannot be reinstated in and _ not speak without changing the meaning of the example.

(80) you can't join a debating society and not speak

That is, you can't join a debating society and you can't not speak. As noted earlier (Part I), it is important to ask is if difficulties or problems are necessarily a negative feature of the model. They are not, if they point us towards special properties of the language being described. The account should bring out issues, not hide them. If we adopt an IC-style analysis with VP conjunction -- you can't (join a debating society and not speak) -- the issue disappears and the example becomes no different from the prediction you will join a debating society and not speak (where the elided Mood element can be reinstated without a change in meaning similar to the first example: you will join a debating society and you will not speak). Is this analysis to be preferred because it does not raise the issue of the difference? We would say definitely not.

Then we should ask whether the issue Huddleston points to is fundamentally related to ellipsis. It is not: from the point of view of grammatical structure, the ellipsis can easily be filled out -- the structural result is perfectly grammatical (you can't join a debating society and you can't not speak). The issue is systemic, not structural. And it is part of a cluster of examples of two-part extending paratactic clause complexes where the mood selections of the two clauses interact. Crucially, this cluster also includes examples where there is no ellipsis. The examples are
metaphors of mood and the congruent versions are enhancing hypotactic clause complexes; compare:

metaphorical

(81) Make another move and I'll shoot
(82) If you make another I'll shoot
(83) Eat the carrots or you won't get dessert
(84) If you don't eat the carrots you won't get dessert
(85) You can't join a debating society and not speak
(86) If you join a debating society you can't not speak

Note that the coordinated clauses in the metaphorical version cannot be presented independently of one another and then related cohesively. For instance, Make another move. I'll shoot misses the systemic-semantic target of the metaphorical version although it is structurally impeccable. In this respect, it is just like the cohesive version of Huddleston's example: You can't join a debating society. And you can't not speak.

2.5 Group and phrase

In Halliday's rank-based description of English, there is a rank intermediate between clause and word — group / phrase rank (or group rank, for short). It is, Halliday suggests (IFG Ch. 6), derived from above and below: phrases are reduced clauses and groups are expanded words — see Figure 7.

![Figure 7: Phrase and group as intermediate rank](image)

In respect to the ideational metafunction, a phrase is like a non-finite clause in that it has a THEME (realized by a preposition, unlike a clause) and a participant (realized by as nominal or, as in a clause) and it has no Mood element; indeed, prepositions may derive from verbs (being, concerning, etc.). However, it is unlike a clause in that it can only have one participant and no circumstances at all.

Huddleston objects that the prepositional phrase is anomalous as a unit assigned to phrase rank "because (barring the highly marked constructions where the complement is clitic) it always has a group functioning within it — and thus always involves rankshift". It is quite wrong to assume that anomaly is necessarily a drawback (as Huddleston seems to since he uses it as an argument against Halliday's interpretation); in this case, Huddleston's treatment brings out the special status of the prepositional phrase in English.
First, let's consider its ambivalence in terms of the way it functions in the transitivity structure of the clause -- the structure of the clause as a configuration of a process, participants, and circumstances. Prepositional phrases lie partly at the grey intersection between circumstances and participants; see Figure 8.

![Diagram](image)

**Fig. 8:** The intermediate status of prepositional phrases in transitivity

The prepositional phrase as a unit in a sense pushes a nominal group away from (direct) participant-hood in the transitivity structure of the clause; it participates only indirectly as the Minirange in the prepositional phrase. However, since the nominal group is a group rather than a word it is a potential element of clause structure and we can expect a tension between its rankshifted status in the prepositional phrase and its potential for functioning in the clause as a participant. As in several other cases, it is the textual metafunction that brings out tensions in the ideational grammar: in many cases, the rankshifted nominal group of the prepositional phrase can serve as a (ranking) Theme in clause in which the prepositional phrase serves. Halliday draws attention to examples such as (IFG, p. 152):

(87) the bed hadn't been slept in by anyone

We see then that the Minirange of a prepositional phrase as circumstance in a clause may function as (part of) the Theme of that clause. The problem with a thematic Minirange is that it is not a constituent of clause structure; together with the Minorprocess realized by a preposition it constitutes a prepositional phrase functioning as a circumstance in the clause. There are similar sequences of verbal group * preposition * nominal group where the preposition is part of a phrasal verb such as rely on, depend on, call for, look for, search for, put up, and take out and the nominal group is a constituent of the clause rather than of a prepositional phrase; as illustrated in Figure 9.

![Diagram](image)

**Fig. 9:** Process → verb + preposition

Here the nominal group functions as Goal in the clause and since Goal is a clause constituent it can be conflated with Theme without any problems -- see Figure 10.
Similarly, as Subject and unmarked Theme:

(88) **The keys** were looked for all night

(89) When **drinks** had been called for, and Mrs Lackersteen had usurped the place under the punkah, Flory took a chair on the outside of the group.

We thus have a case of **grammatical ambivalence**; there are two **structural interpretations** of the sequence of verbal group * preposition * nominal group, one grouping verbal group and preposition as Process and one grouping preposition and nominal group as Circumstance, as shown in Figure 11.

The version with the phrasal verb provides the other version with a model where the nominal group can be thematized as a constituent participant. That is, the Minirange in the prepositional phrase can be thematized as if it were a participant in a clause with a phrasal verb. For an example such as *We lived in this house for ten years*, one on the model of phrasal verbs with *this house* as participant and one according to the analysis with *in this house* as a circumstance:

(90) **This house** we lived in ____ for ten years

(91) **In this house** we lived for ten years

Now if we look outside English, we can see how a grammar might work without prepositional phrases (or more generally, adpositional phrases) and this again serves to highlight their **special status** in English and suggests that it is in fact quite desirable that the treatment should bring out this special status (as Halliday’s does) instead of neutralizing it. If we take English as the point of departure since English is the language whose prepositional phrase is the issue, we can describe alternative grammatical strategies as follows. (i) One the one hand, a language may ‘upgrade’ the preposition to full verb-hood. (ii) On the other hand, a language may ‘downgrade’ the preposition to the status of a function marker, related to case marking. Either alternative resolves the problem with the anomalous prepositional phrase by doing away with it. (Any given language may, of course, use a mixture of strategies.)
(i) Let's briefly consider the first alternative. Akan is a language which apparently does not have phrases. Instead, the Process of a clause can be realized by hypotactic chains of verbs - so-called serial verb constructions. Corresponding to prepositions in English, we find dependent verbs in these hypotactic chains, but there is no distinction between participants and circumstances from a realizational point of view: both are nominal groups. For instance, "Yaw swam across the river" would be "Yaw swam – cross the river" instead.

(ii) Tagalog does not really distinguish between the kind of marking given to participants and circumstances in clause structure. The following examples show the way in which participants are marked with ng and circumstances with sa, unless they are Theme, in which case they are marked with ang and the verbal affixes show which transitivity role is played by the Theme (Actor, Goods, and Direction respectively below).

(92) Nag-bigay ni lalake ng bigas sa pare.
gave man rice priest
'the man gave some rice to the priest'

(93) B-in-bigay ng lalake ang bigas sa pare.
gave man rice priest
'the rice was give to the priest by the man'

(94) B-in-igay-gan ng lalake ng bigas ang pare.
gave man rice priest
'the priest was given rice by the man'

One would predict for a system of this kind that all participants and circumstances are potential Themes, since unlike in English they are not different in status. For Tagalog and Philippine languages in general this does turn out to be the case. (Cena has referred to Tagalog as an equal opportunity employer in this regard; cf. Cena 1979) On the other hand, Halliday's approach to the English prepositional phrase predicts that while Miniranges can become Subjects under certain conditions there would be restrictions, because of their ambivalent status in clause structure.24

...-

In his summary of his criticism of the concept of rank, Huddleston writes:

In spite of the prominence that is given to rank constituency at the beginning of the book, there are a number of places where Halliday makes disclaimers about the effectiveness of constituent structures as an analytic tool [e.g. pp. 188, 202, 232]. I would contend, however, on the basis of the anomalies and inconsistencies pointed out in this section that the unsatisfactory nature of the constituent structures given in the present book stems in very large measures from their foundation in rank theory.

This is clearly not the case -- it is constituency itself rather than rank-based constituency that is limited. Huddleston needs to show that the problems identified in IFG that he refers to (pp. 188, 202, 232) would disappear in a constituency model that is not based on rank before he can claim that the problems derive from rank. However, they do not arise because of rank; and they would not disappear in a constituency model not based on rank.

More generally, we have to see the problems with constituency in the context of other modes of expression and then it becomes perfectly clear that rank is not the issue: see Halliday (1979), Martin (1988), Matthiessen (1988) and Bateman (1989). The problems arise when we rely too heavily on constituency outside the functional domain where it is a reasonable model, i.e. outside the experiential metafunction. The logical, interpersonal, and textual modes of expression are different from constituency.
3. Multi-functional structure

We now turn to Huddleston's discussion of multi-functional structure. Huddleston writes that there is no principle of total accountability with respect to multi-functional structure: "it is not required that every element have a function on all three dimensions". It should be noted that this is Huddleston's application (yet again) of a principle that is not included as one of the topics of IFG. Is this the appropriate application? Surely it should be quite clear that it isn't: one of the basic points of Halliday's theory of metafunctions is the metafunctional differentiation: micro-functions such as Subject, Theme, Continuative, Actor, and New derive from the different metafunctions and some of them will conflate with functions from other metafunctions while others won't. However, the principle of total accountability applies to syntagm with respect to structure (cf. Halliday, 1966): all the classes in the syntagm are assigned to grammatical functions.

Huddleston suggests that "although there is undoubtedly much to be said for looking at the clause from ideational, interpersonal and textual perspectives, I do not believe that the above type of multi-dimensional analysis provides a satisfactory way of describing the grammatical properties of the clause." The question of what constitute grammatical properties is crucial here and so is the related question of what we expect the grammar to do for us (cf. Section I:1 above). What happens in the ensuing discussion is that Huddleston judges IFG against a conception of what grammar is that is at least as open to question as the one IFG addresses. It seems curious simply to assume that the conception Huddleston operates with is 'correct' and then to criticize IFG for not corresponding to it. It would be similarly curious to criticize GB syntax for not measuring up to the conception of grammar that IFG addresses -- for not having anything to say about text analysis or text generation, for instance. GB was not set up to address these issues so it can hardly be expected to deal with them.

First we have to recognize the conception of what grammar is. This conception will largely be a function of the reasons for 'engaging in grammar'. Halliday (1964) pointed out that the nature of our theory of syntax depends on the consumer. In the climate of the day, his idea was rejected, which was a pity, since it was an attempt to create a larger theoretical and descriptive space for linguists to operate in. If it had been accepted or at least taken seriously, a good deal of pointless polemic and posturing might have been avoided. Now, as we are moving from the 1980s to the 1990s, it is abundantly clear that he was right. Consumers for non-Chomskyan paradigms have come very sharply into focus. Just to mention two markets other than Chomskyan ones, we can note the emergence of extensive computational work on grammar and as well the development of functional accounts of grammar in its discourse setting. And the grammars offered to the three markets differ; no grammars serve all three. GB for example is concerned with the first, whereas Given's (1984) Functional Syntax addresses the third. Some span two of the concerns; for instance, GPSG and LFG try to address computational issues as well as Chomskyan ones and Systemic Functional Grammar tries to address computational issues as well as those of functional linguistics.

Huddleston does not address these issues. However, they are quite central to the evaluation of any account: we have to argue about different conceptions of what grammar is in different ways. For instance, if we are concerned with functional, text-oriented accounts of grammar we have to argue from natural text to find evidence for categories rather than introspect about them. Moreover, it is a text-oriented grammar which makes possible socially oriented explanations of language, expanding radically the universe in which the grammarian moves. Taking this further, if we conceive of linguistics as a form of social action with grammars designed as tools for intervention in political processes, we need grammars that are sensitive to social contexts -- to the ways in which people use language to live.
3.1 The function 'Theme'

The question of what counts as evidence for a grammatical category and how we can make sense of it is very central to Huddleston’s discussion of Halliday’s account of ‘Theme’. Huddleston is satisfied to reason about examples out of context. He doesn’t bring any discourse evidence to bear on the interpretation of Theme and does not argue about or refer to Halliday’s text analysis of Theme in Chapter 3 of IFG and again in Appendix 1.

Obviously work remains to be done in characterizing textual categories such as Theme. There are problems in general when we use language as its own metalanguage (Halliday, 1984 / 1988): why should we expect to find lexical glosses in any language for highly generalized categories such as Theme, Subject, and Actor? By and large, the problems have the appearance of being more addressable when we focus on the ideational metafunction. It tends to be accepted that we can set up an extra-linguistic framework of actions, states, agency, causation, and so on and use it to interpret ideational categories such as Actor and relational process. This is hardly surprising: the ideational metafunction embodies language as ‘representation’ and this representational function can be ‘turned back on itself’ when we need to use language for representing itself – for meta-representation. However, the situation is very different with the textual metafunction. It is not representational, but enabling instead; it is the metafunction that enables us to present ideational and interpersonal meaning as contextualized text. So when we try to talk about textual categories such as Theme we cannot use the textual metafunction itself; we have to fall back on the representational resources of the ideational metafunction. One common strategy here is to create a textual field of discourse metaphorically. The metaphors are often spatial, combined with some notion of movement. Popular metaphors include ‘information flow’, Chafe’s (1984) notion of ‘guide posts’ (presumably on the listener’s semiotic journey), attention as a container (in or out of attention), Grosz’s ‘focus space’, and Halliday’s ‘point of departure’ (cf. Mathesius) – cf. also topic < topos ‘place’. We need to elaborate and ‘ground’ these metaphors. There is good reason to think that if we can characterize the notion of ‘information flow’, currently popular with a number of linguists, we will be able to relate the notion of ‘point of departure’ to it. That is, once we have an account of text as movement, flow, or swell (the latter to capture the variations in prominence, see Halliday, 1985b), the suggestion that there are points of departure in this movement will be ‘grounded’. One way is to model the development of text as a shift or movement from one focus space to another in a knowledge base; cf. Grosz & Sidner (1986), Bateman & Matthiessen (1989) and Matthiessen (to appear).

Huddleston suggests that “it is not clear that ‘point of departure’ or ‘starting point’ can sustain an interpretation that is independent of syntactic sequence -- that the theme is the point of departure for the message in a more significant sense than that of being the first element.” We would suggest that it can be, along the lines just indicated. Ironically, it seems that it is the iconicity of the realization of Theme in English that creates problems for the linguist at this point (a problem which would not arise in a language like Tagalog, where Theme is marked by a particle rather than position, and tends to appear last in the clause, unless marked). Huddleston goes on to suggest that if we can’t use the notion of point of departure, we are left with “the meaning of Theme as what the clause is about”. It is this meaning that he focuses on in the remainder of his critique of Halliday’s notion of Theme. But ‘aboutness’ is most closely associated with the topicality subtype of thematicity, i.e. with ideational Themes. It is important to note Halliday’s caution here (IFG, p. 39):

Some grammarians have used the terms Topic and Comment instead of Theme and Rheme. But the Topic-Comment terminology carries rather different connotations. The label ‘Topic’ usually refers to only one particular kind of Theme [ideational or topical theme, CM & JRMI]; and it tends to be used as a cover term for two concepts that are functionally distinct, one being that of Theme and the other being that of Given.

Huddleston continues: "The interpretation of theme (or topic, as it is more often called) as what the clause is about is of course a familiar one -- but it is surely not an interpretation that can be consistently associated in English with the initial element." As the quotation from IFG shows,
Halliday explicitly warns us against equating theme with topic, but this does not prevent Huddleston from doing just that.

In general, there are thus two fundamental problems with Huddleston's critique of Halliday's analysis of Theme. (i) He tries to make sense of Theme without discussing how it is contextualized in natural text. (ii) He narrows the notion of theme to the notion of topic -- 'aboutness'.

Let's start with topical themes. Huddleston writes:

I can't make any sense of the idea that Nothing will satisfy you, You could buy a bar of chocolate like this for 6d before the war (spoken, let us assume, to someone born after the War), There's a fallacy in your argument, are respectively about nothing', 'you' and 'there'.

It is important to clarify here that Huddleston is challenging the following proportionalities:

(i)  Nothing will satisfy you
(ii) You won't be satisfied by anything
(iii) Fosters will satisfy you
(iv) You will be satisfied by Fosters

Let's consider negative themes first. Pursuing a textual orientation of this kind is a time and space consuming process. An exhaustive sample of clauses with negative themes from just seventy pages of R.K. Narayan's Malgudi Days produced fifteen examples -- far too many to be considered here in context. We will focus on just two.

The first point to note is that negative Themes participate in a text's thematic progression (e.g., Danes, 1974; Fries, 1981) in the same way that other Themes do. In the following example, the rhetorical question sets up a context in which progression through negative themes is quite appropriate (in Huddleston's terms, we might argue that the 'topic' centres precisely on absence):
(107) Why could it not go on forever, endlessly, till the universe itself cooled off and perished, when by any standard he could be proved to have led a life of pure effort? No one was hurt by his activity and money-making, and not many people could be said to have died of taking his stuff; ... (Narayan, Malgudi Days, p. 125)

Indeed, this thematic progression might well have been extended:

(108) ... not a soul had ever complained; and certainly nothing could come of it in a court of law.

Huddleston doesn't make explicit his objection to negative themes. Would he really suggest that thematic progression is realized differently in the preceding text from the following agnate constructed example?

(109) It simply could not go on forever. Many friends had been hurt by his activity and money making and one of his family had died of taking his stuff. The whole town had complained about it; and a number of cases were pending in various courts of law.

Halliday predicts that first position as a realization of Theme is the key to understanding thematic progression in both texts and this seems the more natural explanation of the similarities and differences between the two.

The point is that the thematic status of negative elements can be clearly motivated in relation to context. They contrast with positive themes such as somebody..., everybody..., and something.... In the following passage the theme is whoever might stop or question the narrator — negated in two cases and questioned in one:

(110) The Swamiji became indignant. 'I have done it in hundreds of places already and nobody questioned me about it. Nobody can stop me from doing what I like — it's my master's order to demonstrate the power of the Yoga to the people of this country, and who can question me?' (Narayan, Malgudi Days, p. 84)

In the first example, nobody means total negation of the set of people in the hundreds of places mentioned in the previous clause — it contrasts with e.g. somebody, everybody, and only one person; the second example switches from a simple past to a modal clause and nobody generalizes across any place. The set negated by nobody, nothing, etc. can in fact often be inferred from the previous text and this is one reason for thematizing it; for example:

(111) It was an obliging community there at Kabir Lane and nobody minded this obstruction. (Narayan, Malgudi Days, p. 114)

(112) Someone told him, 'She has only fainted. Nothing has happened to her. Don't make a fuss.' They carried her out and laid her in the passage. (Narayan, Malgudi Days, p. 135)

These examples illustrate another type of thematic progression: the material from which we can infer the sets being negated has already been introduced thematically (community; only fainted).

One thing that is special about negative Themes is that they thematize the polarity of the clause as well as a participant or circumstance. In the examples cited above, the Themes are also Subjects. When this is not the case, the closeness of the Finite and polarity is still maintained through the ordering 'negative' ^ Finite, which leads to Finite preceding Subject (as in Nowhere would you get a better offer). But there is nothing textually mysterious about this and nothing that brings into question the thematic status of the negative element. It is simply a reflection of the relationship between finiteness and polarity within the interpersonal metafunction.
RESPONSE TO HUDDLESTON

e examples of thematic negative elements given above can be contrasted with rhematic
stances. In the example below, the Theme of the two clauses is 'Velan'. The second clause
states the first clause, with nothing more of life as the negative version of contentment.

(113) Velan was perfectly contended and happy. He demanded nothing more of life.
(Narayan, Malgudi Days, p. 104)

Similarly, in the following example, the 'news' of the second clause is the absence of anyone to
comfort the child.

(114) Raju almost sobbed at the thought of the disappointed child -- the motherless boy.
There was no one to comfort him. (Narayan, Malgudi Days, p. 120)

This discussion and exemplification of negative themes in context has been very brief and needs
further elaboration. But the general point is clear: while the arguments implicit in IFG all
require extensive textual documentation, the book would have been several orders of magnitude
ger if it had included arguments of this kind (cf. Halliday’s discussion in his Foreword p. x of
why IFG is a short introduction). The topic of negative themes is just a small one among a myriad
of other topics. So while it takes very little space to display a decontextualized example such as
nothing will satisfy you and then claim that it is evidence against Halliday’s account of
theme, it takes rather more space to show that the claim has no basis. The general point is
arguably this: if Huddleston had gone through say twenty examples of negative Themes in
running natural text, the issue would never have arisen.

In the case of existential clauses, it would seem that Huddleston’s objection should have been
retailed by the work outside systemic linguistics on the presentative use of clauses of this
type. From a textual point of view, they are used presentatively, i.e. to introduce some piece of
information, such as a new character in a story, which is often picked up referentially and
thematically in the subsequent discourse. For instance:

(115) Sometimes if it was closing he waited on the roadside for the General Manager to come
down, and saluted him as he got into his car. There was a lot of time all around him, an
immense sea of leisure. In this state he made a new discovery about himself, he could
make fascinating models out of clay and wood dust. (Narayan, Malgudi Days, p. 32)

The structure of an existential clause is entirely motivated textually: it is organized to bring out
the complementarity of the two kinds of textual prominence Halliday has identified -- cf.
Halliday (1985: 316). The Theme is one of the elements that realizes the feature ‘existential’; it
sets up as the point of departure that an Existent will be presented. The new information comes
within the Rheme as the Existent. Once the existential clause has introduced a discourse
participant as Existent, this participant can be picked up as Theme in a subsequent relative
clause; this is an instance of thematic progression from Rheme to Theme:

(116) There was also a Beaver, that paced on the deck,
Or __ would sit making lace in the bow:
And __ had often (the Bellman said) saved them from wreck,
Though none of the sailors knew how.
(Lewis Carroll, The Hunting of the Snark)

The Existent may be a metaphorical representation of a process, abstracted from any specific
participants:

(117) The Swamiji picked himself up. There was a lot of commotion. The Swamiji became
indignant. (Narayan, Malgudi Days, p. 84)

(118) ... They are going to build small houses by the score without leaving space even for a
blade of grass. There was much bustle and activity, much coming and going, and Velan
retired to his old hut. (Narayan, Malgudi Days, p. 106)
Huddleston also discusses thematic markers such as as for and as to. If they can be used to announce the Theme explicitly, as Halliday suggests, Huddleston points out that "we are then entitled to ask why we can’t announce the alleged Theme of [Nothing will satisfy you, You could buy a bar of chocolate like this for 6d before the War, There’s a fallacy in your argument] explicitly too: as for nothing, it will satisfy you; as for you, you could buy a bar of chocolate like this for 6d before the War, "as for there, it’s a fallacy in your argument." We are indeed entitled to ask why, as we are in numerous other cases, all of which fall outside the scope of a short introduction to functional grammar. Presumably Huddleston’s account shows why the examples don’t work so we are entitled to ask what the account is. Unfortunately, he doesn’t present it. Until he does it is hard to see why his examples with as for should provide arguments against the thematic status of nothing, you, and there in the earlier set of examples (Nothing will satisfy you, and so on). It would probably be generally accepted that the thirty rupees is thematic in the following example (since it would be an instance of topicalization):

(119) The thirty rupees he bundled into a knot at the end of his turban and wrapped this again round his head. (Narayan, Malgudi Days, p. 119)

Why don’t we find examples such as As for the thirty rupees he bundled them into a knot at the end of his turban very often? It is not that they are ungrammatical or implausible; they just seem to be much rarer than examples where the thematic referent marked by as for is picked up in the Subject. But Huddleston would presumably not take this as an argument against the thematic status of the thirty rupees in the original version of the example. Similarly, the thematic status of not a single thing in the following constructed example would presumably not be questioned –

(120) Yesterday’s market was disappointing. Not a single thing did I find to buy.

and yet, it is not possible to introduce it by means of as for:

(121) As for not a single thing I found it to buy
(122) As for not a single thing I didn’t find it to buy

Would this be an argument against treating it as thematic in the original example? It is hard to see why it should be – just as hard as it is to see why Huddleston’s as for nothing it will satisfy you is evidence that nothing isn’t thematic in nothing will satisfy you.

The general point is that the possibility of using as for is not a ‘test’ of thematic status; rather, as for can be used as an explicit thematic marker under certain conditions. To explore the restrictions on as for, we would have to discuss its use at greater length and this will have to wait for another context. Here we will just make a few brief observations concerning the conditions under which the thematic marking by as for is an option (and this unfortunately involves setting aside discussion of as for as a Circumstance of matter, an experiential function which can be used to underline a Theme - see IFG 142):

(1) The Theme marked as for has to relate to the ideational structure of a clause (thus we do not find as for fortunately/ however he escaped the journalists ) and the relationship is cohesive – typically through reference (As for pickles, they can be made with fruits like mangoes, peaches or limes as well as the more familiar vegetables. ) but sometimes through lexical cohesion (As for English, I have only some unpublished data, sent me by the late Dr. Herdan, based on a count he carried out in certain English novels ). Since the relationship is cohesive, the reference item does not have to serve a transitivity role in the structure of the clause itself; it may occur somewhere within the units realizing such a role (As for the projection principle, for most of the ensuing discussion it suffices to have clearly in mind the intuitive idea it is intended to express ) or even a clause projected by the clause with the as for Theme (As for his debate strategy, Reagan said that it was ‘just to tell the truth’).

(2) The Theme marked by as for imposes givenness; it cannot be New. The givenness is typically contrastive within a given set and in expository writing (as opposed to say narratives) this is
RESPONSE TO HUDDLESTON

Almost always reflected in the rhetorical organization: the as for Theme introduces elaboration of some aspect of a general statement made earlier in the text and this elaboration is usually the second or later in a series of elaborations. (This principle is thus just a special case of what Fries (1981) has shown concerning the relationship between theme selection and the method of development of a text.)

(3) Since as for has this kind of specifying function, it cannot mark generalized Themes (thus we would not find as for people, they always complain unless perhaps some kind of context had been built up where people constituted a class that had already been introduced).

We can now return to Huddleston's particular examples to make some additional observations.

(1) With speaking of or about, nothing is perfectly fine as long as it is not picked up referentially:

(123) Speaking of nothing, have you paid the phone bill yet?

The point is that explicitly marked Themes of this kind serve a textual function, but they have no functional values in the interpersonal and ideational layers in the structure of the clause. So if their referents enter into the structures of these other metafunctions, they have to be specified pronominally. Now, if the negative polarity has the proposition as its domain, as it does in Nothing will satisfy you, it is part of the interpersonal structure and has to be represented as such (as it is in e.g. the Subject or Finite) but speaking of nothing is not part of the interpersonal structure. It has a textual value only (as Theme). Speaking of nothing, it will satisfy you does not work as a thematic variant of Nothing will satisfy you since the polarity is not specified within the interpersonal structure and since nothing cannot be picked up referentially.

(2) The marker as for works perfectly well with ordinary addressee you as opposed to the generalized you.

(124) You and Henry have very different personalities. Henry is slow and deliberate. He tends to plan things well in advance and consult with everybody who might be affected. He will only start projects if there is a very definite purpose. Sometimes that can be a disadvantage. ... As for you, you always act on impulse. ...

(3) The subject there in an existential clause does not serve a function in the transitivity structure of a clause and it is non-referential so it cannot be announced as a referent by as for (which is what as for does) and then be picked up later by means of reference. Compare the following examples of a non-given Theme:

(125) A coward he is not
(126) ?: As for a coward he isn't it / one

Turning from constructions with as for, we can move on to Theme in question-answer pairs. Huddleston writes: "One very counterintuitive consequence of Halliday's analysis is that natural question-answer pairs more often than not involve a change of theme." It would be interesting to know the framework that generates the intuition which Halliday's analysis runs counter to: without such a framework, it is hard to know what to do with an appeal to intuition as an argument against Halliday's analysis. Thematic progression from question to answer will often be different from the progression from one statement to another (as in The new boss has arrived. She seems O.K.). Is it the difference in progression from question to answer as opposed to the progression from one statement to another that is counterintuitive? Would the analysis be more intuitively plausible if it treated question-answer pairs in such a way that they came out like pairs of statements? Furthermore, is the property of being counterintuitive to one or more of us necessarily bad? New interpretations will often be counterintuitive precisely because they require us to abandon the partially submerged folk-linguistic framework that generated old intuitions. In any case, surely the body of discourse-based work on Theme has demonstrated that with Theme it is important to reason about discourse patterns rather than intuitions.
Huddleston continues: "Thus in the exchange <A> What's the new boss like? <B> She seems O.K. the answer will be analysed as being about the new boss, but the question won't -- its Theme is what. From the point of view of the Theme-Rheme structures of the two clauses, the progression from clause 1 to clause 2 is Theme1 to Rheme2 and Rheme1 to Theme2, as shown in Figure 12.

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Theme} & \text{Rheme} \\
\hline
\text{What's the new boss like?} & \\
\hline
\text{She seems O.K.} & \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

**Fig. 12: Textual progression from question to answer**

That is, in clause 1, the Theme is the piece of information the speaker assumes the listener can supply, i.e. information that is recoverable for the listener although it isn't for the speaker, and the Rheme is the rest, including a new participant: the new boss. In clause 2, the answer, the Theme is this participant introduced by the questioner and the Rheme is the answer. The switch in Theme is thus entirely motivated. Notice also that the second clause allows the answer to be presented as news. In other words, Huddleston at this point seems to be confusing thematicity with newsworthiness (Halliday's distinction of Theme-Rheme and Given-New). Fries (1981) demonstrates that Halliday's caution against confusing the two is fundamental to an understanding of the text-forming resources of the English clause.

Leaving topical Themes, let's now turn to interpersonal Themes. One problem Huddleston finds with interpersonal Theme is illustrated by his example wouldn't the best idea be to join the group? where the interpersonal part of the Theme is wouldn't and the ideational part is the best idea. Halliday's point is that wouldn't is thematic as Finite, i.e. from an interpersonal point of view. But Huddleston seems to have missed this point entirely (cf. for example the thematic analyses on p. 48 of IFG; see also p. 56) for he complains that isn't the best idea to join the group "would have a completely different textual structure, for here isn't constitutes the whole of the Process and hence would be topical Theme". In fact, the two examples would have the same thematic structure, as shown in Figure 13.

To re-iterate, it is Finite that is selected as Theme -- Process is not selected as Theme (contrast the thematic Process in he said he would run and run he did). Since Finite is co-extensive with Process, the latter will also be initial in the clause, but only due to its role as Finite. Consequently, it does not constitute the topical part of the Theme.
### A RESPONSE TO HUDDLESTON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Rheme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>interpersonal</td>
<td>topical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finite</td>
<td>Subject</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| wouldn’t | the best idea | be to join the group |
| isn’t   | the best idea | to join the group    |

Fig. 13: Thematic structure in two relational clauses

Huddleston writes that he “cannot make any sense of the idea that and perhaps he " is a thematic constituent "indicating what the clause is about" in and perhaps he ‘s right. Part of the problem is doubtless that Huddleston insists on the notion of aboutness since he cannot make sense of point of departure and tries to understand Theme entirely through this circumstantial notion. But as noted above, the notion of aboutness is an experiential one, derived from circumstances of Matter in transitivity. So it’s scarcely surprising that it proves difficult to apply to Interpersonal meaning, more difficult than Halliday’s notion of Theme.

What is critical is that Theme has to be understood through its contribution to the development of discourse not through the experiential semantics of lexical items such as ‘about’. For example, thematic progression may be interpersonal as well as experiential. In the following example, a series of rhetorical questions is used to amplify the ideological position of the editors of the Australian conservation journal Habitat:

> (127) So it's still relevant to conservation when we consider: What will killing 3 million kangaroos a year do for us as human beings? What sort of Australians can shrug off that kind of brutality? And what are the implications for the rest of nature, for the bush, for the land, for other animals, for other human beings, when our prime wildlife is killed on this scale? In the end we are talking about our own perception of ourselves as Australians. Our nationhood, our identity, our national pride and self respect. Our humanity.

Consider as well the following example where the narration of a sequence of actual occurrences is broken.

> (128) Raju almost sobbed at the thought of the disappointed child – the motherless boy. There was no one to comfort him. *Perhaps this ruffian would beat him if he cried too long.* (Narayan, Malgudi Days, p. 120)

The italicized example is contextualized interpersonally as well as ideationally by means of Theme. The interpersonal part of the Theme is *perhaps*. It sets up as the context for this clause its modality: that is, what follows is only a possibility, not an actual development of the plot. The ideational part of the Theme is *this ruffian* which is anaphoric to preceding text. Both parts of the Theme contextualize the clause but from different angles – interpersonally in terms of modality and ideationally in terms of a topical participant. This is to be expected: given that a clause is simultaneously textual, interpersonal, and ideational any or all of these metafunctions can contribute thematic information. Now, the notion of ‘topic’ or ‘what x is about’ may only be applicable to the ideational part of the Theme, but this restriction tells us something concerning these glosses not about Theme in English.
3.2 The interpersonal functions

Halliday’s interpretation of Subject in English departs sharply from the traditional notion and more recent notions and, predictably, Huddleston objects. Huddleston doesn’t say in this section how he would characterize Subject but then in Section 4.1 he seems to suggest that the properties that define Subject include verb agreement, case, and position in declarative and interrogative clauses. But such a definition in terms of recognition criteria does not explain anything about Subject, which is of course why a good deal of work has been done recently to get at the functional character of Subject – e.g. Schachter (1976; 1977), Li & Thompson (1976), Tomlin (1983), and Thompson (1987). There are a number of observations we have to deal with in an account of Subject; for example

(i) why is the combination of Subject + Finite used to realize mood selections?

(ii) why is this combination picked up in the tag questions, as the mood tag?

(iii) why does agreement characterize these two combinations, Mood and Moodtag, in particular?

(iv) why does ellipsis operate in terms of the combination of Subject + Finite (i.e., Mood) vs. the rest of the clause (i.e., Residue)?

(v) why do modulations orient towards Subject in particular rather than Complements, or Adjuncts; and rather than ideationally construed elements? (Contrast for instance you should be guided by your parents and your parents should guide you.)

(vi) similarly, why do certain interpersonal adjuncts orient towards Subject? (For instance: wisely, he was guided by his parents.)

(vii) why is Subject related to the selection of polarity value the way it is?

Recent studies have tended to move in on Subject in written monologue in terms of the textual metafunction: subject-status is interpreted in terms of topicality (a line of investigation that was, of course, pioneered by V. Mathesius and other Prague School linguists). This accounts for Subject in its role as unmarked Theme. The problem is that the thematic account leaves unanswered questions such as those listed above. The alternative Halliday offers is to move in on Subject in spoken dialogue in terms of the interpersonal metafunction: subject-status is interpreted in terms of modal responsibility. Huddleston does not seem to recognize the significance of Halliday’s dialogic-interpersonal angle on Subject as a complement to the recent monologic-textual angle. Halliday’s interpretation of Subject does in fact put us in a position to account for questions such as those listed above. Let’s now turn to Mood and Residue.

Huddleston suggests that the analysis of Mood and Residue “leads to some higher level constituents as bizarre as those noted for the textual dimension. Thus in probably she just hasn’t seen it yet the Mood element is probably she just hasn’t ... yet (p. 92 [should be p. 82, CM & JRM]). Even if we grant for the sake of argument that there is some significant connection between Subject, tense, modal, auxiliaries and these various Mood Adjuncts, it doesn’t follow that this provides justification for lumping them together into a single grammatical constituent.” It is instructive to see what happens if the example is part of an exchange between two speakers and the second speaker disagrees:

(129) A: Probably she just hasn’t seen it yet.
    B: She has ____.

The second speaker disagrees through the Mood element: she has is offered as an alternative to the first speaker’s Mood element -- probably she just hasn’t ... yet -- and the Residue -- seen it -- is elided since it remains the same. If Halliday’s analysis is bizarre (and we don’t see why it is),
It is motivated by the desire to account for English dialogue. We can't just reject an as bizarre or counterintuitive without addressing the phenomena it was developed to. The same dialogic principles apply to the following imaginary exchange:

A: Probably she hasn't seen it yet.
B: Nor heard of it.

A general point is that Halliday's interpersonal functions reflect proportionalities which are to discourse patterns; as noted above, they're not simply labels for word and phrase classes.

Grammaticalization

Proxional functions in clause structure

Central issue in this section is whether transitivity functions such as Actor, Goal, Senser, and addesses are grammatical or semantic. This issue has to be approached from both (i) the view of how transitivity fits into the model of language in context as a whole (the of levels) and as well (ii) with respect to whether or not covert categories should be sized in grammar. The first point is not discussed at all by Huddleston, but is a critical one by functional linguistic model, or for that matter any model which seeks to integrate descriptions with those on other levels.

Grammaticalization and levels

Halliday's basic strategy has always been to make the level of grammar do as much work as possible. Textual, interpersonal, and ideational meaning are integrated at this level as simultaneous metafunctional layers rather than taken as the basis for stratification as in models sized around levels of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Note that one immediate advantage of this approach is that it forces linguists to attend explicitly to the ways in which textual, interpersonal, and ideational meanings are mapped onto each other. This is not a strong point for discussions with those on other levels.

It's important as much as possible into the grammar then opens up the level of semantics to deal with a number of important questions which are simply not raised in models of the exporting kind. It is Halliday's approach to grammar which has in fact led to consideration of semantic motifs, (b) grammatical metaphor, and (c) discourse semantics.

Semantic motifs - appendix 3 of IFG, for example, deals with the semantics of cause and the in which its realization is distributed throughout the grammatical system. Other motifs which Halliday deals with in detail include elaboration, extension, and enhancement (p. 306-51), modality and modulation (p. 332-40), projection (p. 248-51), and temporality (p. 182). Halliday's approach, in other words, lays the foundation for research into semantic relations at a level of abstraction much deeper than has been traditionally conceived. In fact, he enables for the first time in English a Whorfian perspective on meaning and culture and sets the stage for semantic as opposed to structurally based typological research (see Martin, 1983).

Grammatical metaphor - considerations of the distribution of meaning across various grammatical systems is further enhanced by Halliday's discussion of grammatical metaphor. Appendix 3, for example, illustrates the way in which ideational metaphor can be used to extend the resources of the grammar for coding the semantics of causation. Alongside cohesion (e.g., therefore), parataxis (e.g., so), hypotaxis (e.g., because), circumstantiality (e.g., because), and agency, Halliday considers examples such as her ignorance of the rules caused her
death, in which an identifying circumstantial process, caused, relates two process nominalizations. Halliday's approach to stratification allows us to interpret examples such as these as making meaning on two levels -- grammatically as a Token-Value structure and semantically as something more akin to the clause complex realization she died because she never knew.

(c) Discourse semantics -- finally, Halliday's enriched grammar makes way for a discourse-oriented semantics which takes the text rather than the clause as its basic unit (see Halliday, 1981; Halliday & Hasan, 1976). For an introduction to the textual basis of semantic structure, see Ventola (1987).

In summary, a richer grammar makes possible a richer interpretation of semantics and this in turn makes it possible for the semantics to interface more effectively with contextual considerations on higher levels (see Halliday, 1973; 1978). It is no accident, in other words, given systemic linguists' interest in question of register, genre, and ideology that they have developed the extravagant model of grammar exemplified in IFG. Interestingly enough, although developed with a view to the social interpretation of language and culture, Halliday's approach has proved invaluable in natural language processing, including text generation, where the interfacing tends to take place within frameworks conceived in cognitive terms (see Winograd, 1983; Patten, 1988; Matthiessen, 1987; Bateman, 1988).

(ii) Grammaticalization and cryptogrammar

Our response to Huddleston's criticism of grammaticalization needs to be broken down into three points. (1) First, there is the question of the cryptotypes themselves. For example, Halliday's criteria for distinguishing material and mental processes are arguments for recognizing material and mental clause cryptotypes in the grammar. (2) This leads to the second point, viz. the question of how these cryptotypes are to be labelled. Huddleston admits only the possibility of verb features, whereas Halliday operates in terms of clause features and structural micro-functions. The function of labelling of different kinds is obviously related to the question of implementing the grammar for different purposes, for example text generation or text analysis. (3) Finally, there is the question of whether micro-functional labelling is necessary to make grammatical generalizations that cannot be captured in other ways. Each of these points will be reviewed below.

(1) Cryptotypes

In effect, Huddleston argues that material and mental cryptotypes do not exist in the grammar of English by surveying Halliday's criteria for distinguishing material and mental processes, rejecting them, and then seeming to assume that this leads to the automatic conclusion that the ideational micro-functions are semantic rather than grammatical. In fact however, Halliday's criteria are not arguments for the placement of ideational micro-functions at the lexicogrammatical stratum (this we considered above); rather, they are exactly what he says they are, i.e. criteria for differentiating material and mental processes in the grammar.

(i) Halliday's first criterion is that in a mental clause there is always one participant that is endowed with consciousness. As he takes pains to emphasize, this does not mean that this participant is restricted to humans or any other category:

But any object, animate or not, can be treated as conscious; and since mental process clauses have this property, that only something that is being credited with consciousness can function in them as the one who feels, thinks or perceives, one only has to put something in that role in order to turn it into a conscious being, for example the empty house was longing for the children to return. Simply by putting the empty house in this grammatical environment, as something that felt a longing, we cause it to be understood as endowed with consciousness. This explains the anomalous
character of clauses such as it really likes me, it knows what it thinks, where there is a tension between it and the meaning of the verb. Not that such clauses are ungrammatical; far from it. (Our bold italics, CM & JRM)

Huddleston’s objection to the first criterion has to be read in the context of what Halliday actually writes: he seems to have missed the passage above. He quotes from the an earlier part of Halliday’s presentation (IFG, p. 108): “Expressed in grammatical terms, the participant that engaged in the mental process is one that is referred to pronominally as he or she, not as it.”

Huddleston continues right away: “But examples like it can’t see us are surely not remotely grammatical.” Whose position is Huddleston arguing against? Surely it cannot be Halliday’s. The passage above shows Halliday explicitly points out that examples such as it really likes are not ungrammatical. In fact, although Huddleston does not refer to this part of Halliday’s discussion, his “not remotely” echoes Halliday’s “far from it”.

Halliday’s point is quite different from the one Huddleston argues against. It is that a mental clause is such that one participant can be interpreted as being endowed with consciousness. The grammar of mental processes makes this meaning. Huddleston’s alleged counter-examples in fact mislead us to focus on the grammar in terms as a meaning-making as well as a meaning-coding source. (It is crucial to keep in mind throughout this discussion that Halliday does not treat grammar as a conduit (cf. Reddy, 1979) -- as a set of forms whose sole function is to turn meaning to sound (see Thibault, 1987:614).)

Huddleston also cites Halliday’s example the fifth day saw them at the summit as a counter-example to the first criterion: “[Halliday] treats this as metaphorical, which is very plausible, it this does not entitle us to say that it violates any rules of grammar.” Again, who is Huddleston arguing against here? The implication seems to be Halliday but this is seriously misleading. One of the points of grammatical metaphor is precisely that it expands the “rules of grammar”; it creates new resources for meaning — it is a semogenic strategy. For instance, if there is no grammatical metaphor of modality, the tagged version of I think Henry said he’d come could be I think Henry said he’d come don’t I; but it is not. The tagged version is I think Henry of he’d come didn’t he; and it is precisely because grammatical metaphor has expanded the grammar at this point that the “rules” of tagging have not been violated. Similarly, it is precisely because of the metaphorical expansion of the grammar that we find circumstantial clauses (e.g., Nineteen eighty-seven saw the large producers and distributors playing it safer in ever before) with certain mental clauses of perception (but not all perceptive clauses and not with cognitive and affective ones). The motivation in this case is textual. It is partly related to the thematic structure of the clause. Mathesius (1975: 103) pointed out the thematic function of the subject in English is facilitated by frequent use of perceptive constructions (containing verbs like find, feel, perceive, etc.). It is also related to information structuring: the metaphor presents the phenomenon as one piece of (new) information (e.g. the large producers and distributors playing safer than ever before in the example above).

Halliday’s second criterion has to do with the range of possible types of phenomena in a mental clause: basically, they can be things as well as metathings (i.e. ideas and facts). In contrast, metathings cannot function as participants in material clauses; see the Table 8.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>phenomenon</th>
<th>meta-phenomenon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fact (embedded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>material</td>
<td>they climbed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>if it climbed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>was near</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: The distribution of phenomena and meta-phenomena

Huddleston claims that the fact that it had been shown to be a forgery ruined his argument shows that the restrictions on participants are not absolute. First, as noted in Part I, it is extremely unhelpful to argue from single-case apparent counter-examples without first indicating how they might fit into the overall picture. Second, note again here that what is ruined is a verbal construct -- the metaphorical, nominalized version of he argued -- not a material one. Third, curiously, Huddleston does not mention Halliday’s observation regarding the similar example the fact that the experiment had failed destroyed his life (IFG, p. 227):

Metaphenomena -- projections -- can be associated only with certain types of process, essentially saying, thinking, and liking, plus in certain circumstances being ... Complication arises because the names of metaphenomena, nouns such as belief and fact, can sometimes enter into material processes where the metaphenomena by themselves cannot. For example, although we cannot say it destroyed his life that the experiment had failed, we can say the knowledge that the experiment had failed destroyed his life -- not the idea as such, but the knowledge of it, was the destroyer. We might even say the fact that the experiment had failed destroyed his life, with fact standing not for a metaphenomenon but for a phenomenon, a 'state of affairs'. In other words the names of projections can function as participants in processes other than those of consciousness, because they can label events or states of affairs; and this is another aspect of the rather shaded area that lies on the borderline of expansion and projection.

Huddleston might at least have acknowledged that Halliday deals with this type of example and that it does not constitute a counter-example in Halliday’s interpretation, even if he doesn’t accept the account.

(iii) The third criterion has to do with the unmarked present tense selection. With mental clauses, it is the simple present (she likes the gift), but with material clauses, it is the present-in-present (they’re building a house). Regarding this criterion, Huddleston only writes: “Point (iii) is relevant to a discussion of the semantics of tense and aspect”. It is difficult to know what to do with this remark. Perhaps Huddleston means to suggest that the fact that it is relevant to a discussion of the semantics of tense and aspect makes it irrelevant to a discussion of transitivity. If that’s the case, Huddleston owes us a demonstration that tense and aspect are irrelevant to transitivity in spite of the substantial literature showing how they are related -- cf. for example, the findings of Hopper & Thompson (1980), work on split ergativity and aspectual categories, and so on.
A RESPONSE TO HUDDLESTON

(iv) The fourth criterion is based on the two directions in which a mental process can be realized, either on the model of *she likes the gift* or on the model of *the gift pleases her*. In contrast, material clauses are not bidirectional in this way. Huddleston claims: "Point (iv) has to do with the structure of the lexicon". Presumably, he assumes that this statement is enough to invalidate Halliday's criterion with respect to the grammar of transitivity. First, Huddleston needs to do more at this point than simply claim the facts have to do with the lexicon, not grammar. Second, what does Huddleston's position explain? Halliday's analysis does have explanatory value: if we have a notion of favourite clause types we can begin to see pressure on lexis and interpret the emergence of new lexical pairs such as *dig* and *send*. Third, Huddleston must surely be familiar with the way lexis and grammar modelled in systemic theory -- as one unified lexicogrammar (to which Halliday alludes on p. xiv). Given the systemic approach, grammatical facts and lexical facts are related through delicacy in lexicogrammar and Huddleston's objection carries no force whatsoever (systemic grammar makes general meanings and systemic lexis more specific ones, unlike the bricks [lexical items from the lexicon] and mortar [the rules of syntax] compositional model apparently assumed by Huddleston). Within a systemic functional model Huddleston's comment means the opposite of what he intends -- it means that the facts at stake are relevant, since lexis is delicate grammar (see Hasan (1987) on the continuity between lexis and grammar). Lexis and grammar are not separate systems. Rather they are different vantage points on the same system -- from the most general end or from the most delicate end. Consequently, generalizations about lexis (such as observations about pairs like *like-please*, *dig-send*, and *enjoy-delight*) are very often observations about grammar and grammatical details are very often lexical.

(v) Finally, Halliday notes that since material processes are 'doing' processes they can be probed and substituted by the verb *do: what did John do?* -- *he ran away; what John did was run away*. In contrast, mental processes cannot be probed and substituted in this way. Huddleston admits that point (v) would gain widest acceptance in establishing a traditional grammatical distinction, but he believes that it still would not constitute evidence for micro-functions. This brings us to our (2) -- labelling.

(2) Labelling

Although reluctant to recognize material and mental cryptotypes, Huddleston does agree that the distinction between attributive and identifying relational clauses is a grammatical one. So we will pursue the question of labelling initially with respect to these classes. The distinction can be illustrated with respect to the ambiguity in Halliday's (1967) example *I thought he was a friend of mine*, which is ambiguous between an attributive reading and and identifying one:

(i) attributive -- 'I thought he was a friend of mine [i.e. a member of that class] but he isn't anymore'

```
I thought be was a friend of mine
```

| Carrier | Process | Attribute |

Fig. 14: Attributive reading of *he was a friend of mine*
(ii) identifying - 'I thought he was a friend of mine but in fact it was someone else'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Token</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Fig. 15: Identifying reading of *he was a friend of mine*

Huddleston implies that we should reject the micro-functional labelling, replacing it simply with verb features. It is hard to see for purposes of text analysis how this would be an improvement over Halliday's notation. Moreover, it is hard to see how an analysis in terms of verb features could be perspicaciously deployed to bring out the difference in generality between Carrier and Attribute or the difference in abstraction between Token and Value. This would mean that in analyzing technical discourse the generalization that technical terms introduced in definitions are always Token would be obscured (see Martin, 1990). The grammatical arguments for recognizing micro-functions such as Token and Value will be taken up next, under point (3) below.

(3) The need for micro-functions

Huddleston suggests that even if we accept the grammatical distinction such as that between material and mental processes, "it still would not follow that it provided evidence for the grammatical functions Senser, Phenomenon, Actor and Goal, for it could simply be handled in terms of verb features". First, is the observation that the information can be recorded in terms of verb features an argument against recording it in terms of different sets of participant roles? There will always be notational variants and the existence of one is not an argument against another. Second, verb features won't do the job since the verb may be implicit, as happens for example in some relational clauses in English (*With Henry still a child, it's hard to travel*), almost all relational clauses in other languages (eg. Tagalog: *lako siya*, literally 's/he is a fool') and modalized clauses of motion in German (*Ich muss nach Hamburg*). The features have to be clause features, not verb features, if they are to be of any use in typologically focussed or descriptive linguistics.

Huddleston specifically attacks the relational clause micro-functions Token and Value proposed by Halliday for identifying clauses. The most common verb realizing the Process in this class is *be*, but it includes many other verbs as well: *equal, add up to, make, come out at, amount to, translate, define, signify, call, mean, spell, realise, symbolise, represent, stand for, refer to, imply, index, express, reflect, indicate, denote, suggest, betoken, smack of, evoke, play, act, act as, function as, exemplify*, instance and so on. Setting aside the verb *be* and the phrasal verbs listed, all of these verbs have active and passive forms. This is the grammatical basis of Halliday's distinction between Token and Value functions: the Token is Subject in the active. Consider:

(131) Mel played Mad Max
(132) Mad Max was played by Mel
(133) C-A-T spells cat
(134) Cat is spelled C-A-T
(135) The red represents blood
(136) Blood is represented by the red
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(137) His tone suggested betrayal
(138) Betrayal was suggested by his tone

With identifying phrasal verbs, the Value cannot be conflated with Subject as unmarked Theme. It is however possible with the verb be, though it has no passive morphology overtly signalling the conflation of Subject with Token or Value:

(139) Mel was Mad Max
(140) Mad Max was Mel
(141) C-A-T is cat
(142) Cat is C-A-T
(143) The red is blood
(144) Blood is the red
(145) His tone was betrayal
(146) Betrayal was his tone

Huddleston argues that it is not possible to demonstrate the syncretism between active and passive forms of be and that accordingly there is no evidence of Token/Value grammaticalisation. That there is a syncretism has in fact just been demonstrated; be can be used into just those environments which grammaticalise the Token/Value distinction through process. And in any case, when there are so many identifying verbs overtly grammaticalising the distinction, why should the syncretism between active and passive forms of be be taken as evidence against the Token/Value functions rather than as an exception to the rule (the verb be her all exhibits any number of peculiarities across languages (cf. Verhaar, 1971). It may be that Huddleston wishes to claim that verbs like play, spell, represent and suggest are not in relational. But this would be to deny the following proportionalities in which the verbs in question function first as identifying, then as action (material and behavioural) processes; and as position is surely untenable (witness for example the difference in tense):

(147) Mel plays Mad Max
(148) Mel is playing in the garden
(149) M-E-L spells Mel
(150) Mel is spelling his name now
(151) Mel represents goods looks
(152) Mel is representing Australia in Cannes
(153) Mel suggests vapidity
(154) Mel is suggesting a drink

More damaging for Huddleston's position is the fact that children over-generalize the active/passive opposition to the verb be when learning English. Note the following attested example:

(155) Well, the doctor won't be beed by anyone.

Secondly, identifying clauses with be are clearly ambiguous, and this ambiguity is nicely brought out by the Token and Value functions. Consider the two readings of Paul's the Head:

(156) What's Paul?
He 's the Head ('that's the role he plays')
Token Process Value
Which is Paul? He's the Head ('that's how you recognize him')

Note that the stylistic effect of examples such as Runyan's *What he did for a living was the best he could.* depends on just this ambiguity; the grammar frustrates the expectation of a Value → Token structure with a Token → Value one.

Finally, it is not possible to conjoin Token and Value roles (Huddleston himself makes use of this kind of test earlier in his review and so would have to accept it as relevant here):

\[
\begin{align*}
(158) & \quad \text{The fastest was the fittest one.} \\
& \quad \text{Token Process Value}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
(159) & \quad \text{The fastest was Ben.} \\
& \quad \text{Value Process Token}
\end{align*}
\]

But not:

\[
\begin{align*}
(160) & \quad \text{*The fastest was the fittest one and Ben.}
\end{align*}
\]

Huddleston goes on to object that Token Value structures should not be assigned to possessive (*Peter owns the piano*) and circumstantial (*Applause followed her act*) clauses on the grounds that these have stretched 'the concept of identification to a point where it is no longer intuitively grasppable' (p. 170). This is simply another case of Huddleston glossing the meaning of one of Halliday's grammatical labels in common sense terms and then using his gloss to argue against Halliday's analysis. This gambit need not detain us again here, except perhaps to note the way in which the term intuitive continues as symptomatic of the pathology of Huddleston's critique (i.e. if an idea is new and different then it must be bad).

After surveying and rejecting possible arguments in favour of ideational microfunctions as grammatical categories, Huddleston concludes (p. 169):

Overall, these functions are not characterized by distinctive properties that are at all comparable with those that define the Subject -- properties concerning verb agreement, case, position in declaratives and interrogatives. The difference in the nature of the distinctive properties cannot be explained by saying that the first four are ideational functions while the last is interpersonal: what has the contrast between clause as representation and clause as exchange to do with it? The explanation, I would argue, is that Subject is a grammatical function while the others are not.

First of all, the properties Huddleston mentions -- agreement, case, and position -- do not define the Subject, they realize it. Or rather, if we set up a definition of Subject in terms of the realizational characteristics by which we may recognize it if we parse a clause, this definition will be weak and uninteresting. It cannot, of course, explain anything about Subject; for instance why it should have these properties and not others: 'Subject' will just summarize them.

Moreover, although we should exercise much more caution in cross-linguistic generalizations than has often been done, a definition of the sort Huddleston envisages makes the task of comparing and contrasting different languages much harder if not impossible. In the typological setting, much of the debate about grammatical functions has focussed on the need to free them from language specific realizational properties. The weakness of Huddleston's notion of what constitutes a definition of a grammatical function is very important to keep in mind when we move to ideational functions since he seems to expect similar kinds of definitions for them.

Somewhat ironically, the kinds of criteria Huddleston insists on for defining grammatical functions do obtain for ideational and textual categories in many languages. In Tagalog for
example, verbs 'agree' with Theme; verbal affixes mark the case of the Theme, and different
process types use different affixes (see Martin, 1986). Note the different affixation used in the
following mental process of reaction clauses to make first the Sense and then the Phenomenon
Theme (note as well how the affixation differs from that deployed in the material processes
exemplified in Section 2.5 above; process type as well as micro-functions are grammaticalised in
Tagalog according to the kind of criteria Huddleston insists on when rejecting Halliday's English
cryptotypes):

1. na-takot ako sa subersibo
   fear I subversive
   Process Sense/ Phenomenon
   Theme
   'I was afraid of subversives'

2. ik-in-a-takot ko ang subersibo
   fear I subversive
   Process Sense/ Phenomenon/
   Theme
   'I was afraid of the subversives'

Huddleston's argument can thus be seen to place him in the position of having to argue that in
English interpersonal meanings are grammaticalised, whereas in Tagalog experiential and
textual meanings are. The result is that the line between grammar and semantics has to be
drawn at very different places in the two languages. This is certainly one way of bringing out
their differences, but unfortunately it obscures their similarities. Case grammar in both
languages is sensitive to process type; it is simply that English makes use of covert experiential
categories where Tagalog's coding is more overt. The disadvantage of basing stratification on
language specific criteria thus becomes obvious in typologically oriented work. Models such as
Halliday's which focus explicitly on crypogrammatical categories as well as more overtly
realised ones and which build different metafunctional components into the grammar itself
provide a much more productive basis for language comparison (see Martin 1983, 1988 for an
example of contrastive analysis based on cryptotypes rather than Standard Average European
categories and rules).

Second, Huddleston claims that the difference between Subject and the ideational micro-
functions in terms of realisation cannot be explained by reference to the difference in
metafunction. What is the basis of this claim? It is precisely in the metafunctional difference
that the realisation difference lies (see Halliday, 1979). The properties Huddleston mentions
— verb agreement, case, position in declaratives and interrogatives — are in the service of the
interpersonal metafunction; they are in fact specific to the category of Subject and it seems
unhelpful to go on to wonder why they don't also characterize ideational microfunctions.30
Their interpersonal orientation is summarised below.

(i) Agreement in modern English is essentially prosodic: person and number features run across
the elements Mood and Moodtag. Prosody is the interpersonal mode of realization.

(ii) Case is related to Subject: a pronoun is nominative if it realizes Subject as part of Mood,
otherwise it is oblique (i.e., including non-Subject pronouns as well as pronouns as Subject
in non-finite clauses without the Mood element).

(iii) Position in declarative vs. interrogative clauses is again specific to Subject and it is a
direct reflex of mood selections: it is quite centrally interpersonal and ideational micro-
functions will predictably not be affected by interpersonal selections.

We will leave the ideational component of clause grammar here and turn to Huddleston's last
topic, grammaticalization and the verbal group.
4.2 The verbal group

Huddleston claims that "the verbal group provides a considerable number of examples where the grammatical analysis is based on semantic factors rather than grammatical ones, resulting in serious complication of the grammar". This claim seems to have little or no basis. As elsewhere in IFG, the interpretations have been developed to keep both grammar and semantics in focus. There is strong evidence from English as well as from other languages for Halliday's logical interdependency analysis of the verbal group. (Schachter, 1981, provides a detailed account of a dependency analysis, cast in terms of Daughter Dependency Grammar.)

Huddleston offers three examples of his claim: the auxiliary will, obligatory have, and examples from the hypotactic verbal group complex. With respect to the first two examples, a large part of the problem is that Huddleston only seems to accept the view from below — from morphology — and not the view from above — from the grammar of groups. Let's consider each type of example in turn.

(i) The auxiliary will. Huddleston claims that Halliday distinguishes future will from modal will on semantic grounds but that "there is no grammatical basis for this distinction". He might at least have acknowledged that linguists have presented grammatical arguments in favour of the distinction: see e.g. the important discussion in Wekker (1976). Even Palmer (1974), who rejects the future tense in English on morphological grounds, notes that future will differs from other types of will in important respects. We will mention only a few grammatical arguments in favour of the distinction.

(a) The analysis with future will takes into account the typological difference between modern English and languages such as Swedish and earlier forms of English, where the distribution of the simple present is significantly different from that of modern English.

(b) Future will and modal will have different distributions in different grammatical contexts. By and large, future will does not occur in dependent clauses providing logical or temporal conditioning. The restriction is not categorical (cf. for example, Close, 1979) but modal will is still quite unrestricted in contrast to future will.

(c) Modal will alternates with other strategies for expressing modality — for example I think and probably. Future will does not enter into a paradigm filled out by interpersonal metaphors; rather it contrasts with future-in-present (am/is/are going to) and (to some extent) the simple present, both of which it is related to paradigmatically in Halliday's analysis.

(d) Modal will and future will have different agnates, as can be seen in mood tags. For instance, modal will in she'll like fairy tales, does she? contrasts with the simple present in the tag (which means 'am I right in my assessment?'; see IFG p. 340), showing that she'll like = she likes represents the opposition between 'modal' and 'temporal'. In contrast, temporal will in it'll rain later on, will it? cannot be picked up by the simple present in the tag — the tag does it? is quite impossible — precisely because it is temporal so there can be no opposition 'modal : temporal' as in the first example.

(ii) Obligational have. The basic question here is again whether our interpretation is morphological (from below, in terms of the rank scale) or syntactic (from above). If we approach the modals from above, we can see paradigms such as can / could; is/am/are/was/were able to // be/being/being able to and can suddenly looks like have to.
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Finite in Predicator
(finite) (non-finite)

have to have to, having to, had to
has to
had to
can be able to, being able to, been able to
could is etc. able
to

(iii) Examples from the hypotactic verbal group complex. Huddleston focuses on two examples (a) be afraid to ... and (b) know how to ... . In some sense, the issues here are parallel to those relating to examples such as he left before the vote was taken: the question is which systemic relationship to foreground in the analysis. Huddleston prefers the alternative that contrasts with IFG, but he does not recognize, or at least he does not mention, the fact that the IFG brings out an alternative agnation.

(a) be afraid to. Huddleston objects to the analysis of be afraid to go. First, he observes that Halliday characterizes the verbal group as consisting of "a sequence of words of the primary class verb" so afraid is a problem. But Huddleston has himself already noted in the context of the before the vote was taken - before the debate examples that a functional grammar can relax the dependence of classes. Why doesn't he think this observation can apply to afraid in a verbal group complex? Second, he suggests that it isn't clear whether be afraid "is a verbal group when it has no non-finite dependent on it". That's very easy to clarify: it wouldn't be (it would be the Process + Attribute part of a relational clause structure).

The general issue is whether we want to give priority to the parallelism between fear to do and be afraid to do or the parallelism between be afraid to do and be afraid/ confident/ hungry. The former favours the IFG analysis, whereas the latter favours Huddleston's analysis. The important point is that the case is not clear-cut, although Huddleston seems to suggest that it is — his picture gives the impression of being more clear-cut since he doesn't mention the first parallelism. It is worth noting (Huddleston doesn't) that be afraid to do follows the normal pattern of ellipsis in the verbal group; for example:

(163) Why didn't you go?
   I was afraid to _ . (cf.: I wanted to _ )

As always, when there is a tension of this kind, the possibility of grammatical metaphor has to be considered: we might argue that be afraid is both like mental fear and like relational be tall as in Figure 16.

Different contexts may favour one or the other of these interpretations — contrast, for example: he was afraid (fearful) to go and he was tall but afraid. Ambivalences are of course part of the grammatical system and are not surprising once the multifunctional principle of grammatical structuring has been recognized: indeed, grammatical metaphors of the kind just suggested demonstrate the way in which these ambivalences can be interpreted as a fundamental resource for semogenesis.
Fig. 16: Alternative analyses of he was afraid

(b) know how to. Huddleston feels that if know how to do is allowed in verbal group complexes, we must also allow for know what to do, know who to turn to, and so on: "there is no reason to single out how from the class of interrogatives for special treatment". First, note that how does not exclude a specification of manner in the clause in which the verbal group complex occurs: he didn’t know how to type well; he didn’t know how to type with two hands. In this respect, it contrasts with e.g. who: he didn’t know who to ask Henry is impossible. With locatives, we can have examples such as he didn’t know where to go in London but note that where ... in London is appositive; where and London are related in one construction. So how is different from who, what, where, when, and so on; the latter have a participant or circumstantial role in the transitivity structure of the clause. The reason is very likely the shading of occurrence into manner of occurrence. We see this in other parts of the grammar. Compare for instance the interpretation of nominalizations: Larry’s speech was postponed (the act itself) and Larry’s speech was skillful (the performance of the act). Note also the relationship between manner and the possibility of certain classes of middle clauses: this ball throws quite easily.

Second, note that know how to do is part of a verbal group paradigm that includes can do; be able to do; learn to do, fail to do, and so on. In contrast, know who to turn to, know what to do, and so on are not part of similar paradigms.

III. Conclusion

In his review of Halliday’s IFG, Huddleston criticizes a number of general points and a number of more detailed analyses. We hope to have shown that all of Huddleston’s critical remarks can be answered. We have indicated some of the reasons why rank-based grammars are to be preferred over those based on IC-analysis and we have stated why the problems Huddleston associates with rank do not arise or where they do arise, do not arise because of rank (Section II:2). The basic issue has to do with the orientation of the grammatical theory: is it functional or formal? The basic motivation behind rank is functional, just as with other abstractions in systemic functional theory. We have shown why Huddleston’s attack on multifunctional structure (Section II:3) is misguided: for example Huddleston argues about Theme on the basis of lexical glosses and disregards discourse considerations. Further, he does not address the need to explain why English Subjects have the properties they have; he seems content to identify recognition criteria such as agreement with Finite. This relates to Huddleston’s discussion of ideational micro-functions and grammatical structure: in Section II:4, we suggested that we cannot simply take over the traditional conception of grammar based on overt categories such as case and ‘word order’ without raising the issue of covert categories, reactances and cryptotypes.
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Behind the various detailed criticisms are very fundamental issues. We cannot expect our conception of grammar to remain static. Traditional Western grammar started out with a conception based on words and their categories -- the most overt part of grammar in Greek and Latin (not surprisingly this development did not take place in Chinese linguistics). The territory of traditional grammar was expanded later, essentially by moving up the rank scale from word to clause (largely skipping group rank in the process): this was a more developed syntactic subtheory, e.g. in Modistic grammar. This is still quite a narrow theory of grammar. It lacks explanatory power; but to begin to explain grammar we also have to expand the territory yet again. And the new expansion is not based so much on rank (as the first expansion was) as on metafunction (and system). The new territorial expansion is oriented towards the metafunctional diversification of grammar and this is one fundamental concept needed to contextualize grammar in discourse (both monologic, where the textual metafunction comes into view, and dialogic, where the interpersonal metafunction can be seen clearly). This contextualization paves the way for new modes of explanation where the relationship between system and text is crucial and is partly reflected in a probabilistic construal of the system. Our conception of grammar is changing and this is reflected in IFG, since Halliday is one of the pioneers in the ongoing reinterpretation of grammar.

Yet Huddleston reviews IFG as if more traditional, narrower conceptions of grammar are simply to be taken for granted as we approach the 21st century. To accomplish this he has to disregard the explicit purposes of IFG -- the need to explain grammar, the need to interface grammar and discourse, and so on; for instance, he does not relate Halliday's interpretation of Theme to natural discourse nor that of Subject. How does this happen in Huddleston's review? First of all, he insulates IFG from developments within systemic linguistics after the late 1960s, approaching it only from an outdated point of view; at the same time he disregards developments outside systemic linguistics concerned with functional and discourse-oriented accounts and explanations. Second, Huddleston misrepresents IFG on a number of occasions by wrongly attributing analyses to Halliday, by omitting some of Halliday's comments on examples similar to those Huddleston cites as counter-examples, and by arguing from his own glosses of categories such as Theme. We can explore factors such as these that are specific to Huddleston's review; but we can also take a step back and examine the context in which this and other reviews appear.

It has often been observed that there is nothing more dogmatic than liberalism (somewhat ironically since pluralism is what liberalism is being dogmatic about). At a time when linguistic theory is by and large determined by developments within American linguistics it is not surprising this dogmatic pluralism manifests itself in unproductive ways. Differences between languages for example are highly valued because of the light they shed on what cannot be said; and the intrinsic worth of each and every language and the right of their speakers to maintain them is staunchly defended. At the same time differences between theories are devalued, often to the point where the dismissal genre developed by Chomskyan linguists during the 1960s (see Postal 1964, 1968 or more recently Levinson 1983:289-294 on systemic approaches to conversational structure) needs to be wheeled out to deal with ideas that are new or different (or 'intuitively ungraspable' as Huddleston puts it). Huddleston's review falls into this genre (for further discussion, see Martin, 1991). This would not have happened were modern linguists as keen to learn from differences between theories as they are from differences between languages. To our mind, this state of affairs is disappointing. Next to nothing of what Halliday has offered to renovate grammatical theory is favorably contextualised in Huddleston's review; yet the grammar itself is a tour de force in functional linguistic theory. There is something disfunctional about the review genre when it operates in these terms. This dysfunctionality we have tried in part to redress in this reply. Unfortunately, for interpersonal reasons, the debate genre is probably not the best way to push meta-theoretical discussion to a higher plane. We will leave the last word to Foucault (for another useful commentary on the practice of 'scholarly' critique see Bernstein 1990:7-9):

Perhaps, someday, a long history will have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on discussion and an obstacle to the search for truth. Very schematically, it seems to me that we can recognize the presence in polemics of three
models: the religious model, the judiciary model, and the political model. As in heresiology, polemics sets itself the task of determining the intangible point of dogma, the fundamental and necessary principle that the adversary has neglected, ignored, or transgressed; and it denounces this negligence as a moral failing; at the root of the error, it finds passions, desire, interest, a whole series of weaknesses and inadmissible attachments that establish it as culpable. As in judiciary practice, polemics allows for no possibility of an equal discussion: it examines a case; it isn't dealing with an interlocutor, it is processing a suspect; it collects the proofs of his guilt, designates the infraction he has committed, and pronounces the verdict and sentences him. In any case, what we have here is not on the order of a shared investigation; the polemictist tells the truth in the form of his judgement and by virtue of the authority he has conferred on himself. But it is the political model that is the most powerful today. Polemics defines alliances, recruits partisans, unites interests or opinions, represents a party; it establishes the other as an enemy, an upholder of opposed interests, against which one must fight until the moment this enemy is defeated or either surrenders or disappears.

Of course, the reactivation, in polemics, of these political, judiciary, or religious practices is nothing more than theatre. One gesticulates: anathemas, excommunications, condemnations, battles, victories, and defeats are no more than ways of speaking, after all. And yet, in the order of discourse, they are also ways of acting, which are not without consequence. There are the sterilizing effects: Has anyone ever seen a new idea come out of a polemic? And how could it be otherwise, given that here the interlocutors are incited, not to advance, no to take more and more risks in what they say, but to fall back continually on the rights they claim, on their legitimacy, which they must defend, and on the affirmation of their innocence? There is something even more serious here: in this comedy, one mimics wars, battles, annihilations, or unconditional surrenders, putting forward as much of one's killer instinct as possible. But it is really dangerous to make anyone believe that he can gain access to truth by such paths, and thus to validate, even if in merely symbolic form, the real political practices that could be warranted by it. Let us imagine, for a moment, that a magic wand is waved and one of the two adversaries in a polemic is given the ability to exercise all the power he likes over the other. One doesn't even have to imagine it: one has only to look at what happened during the debates in the USSR over linguistics and genetics not long ago. Were these merely aberrant deviations from what was supposed to be the correct discussion? Not at all: they were the real consequences of a polemic attitude whose effects ordinarily remain suspended. [Foucault in Rabinow [ed.] 1984: 382-383]

Appendix

To provide material showing their normal thematic status and contribution to discourse, we give a hopefully exhaustive sample of negative Themes from a scan of roughly seventy pages of R.K. Narayan's Malgudi Days.

No other human being had seen the image yet. Soma shut himself in and bolted all the doors and windows and plied his chisel by the still flame of a mud lamp, even when there was a bright sun outside. (p. 64)
A RESPONSE TO HUDDLESTON

The result was he proposed to send Swami late to his class as a kind of challenge. He was also going to send a letter with Swami to the headmaster. No amount of protest from Swami was of any avail; Swami had to go to school. (p. 69)

Years and years ago he was reputed to have skinned the knuckles of a boy in First Standard and made him smear the blood on his face. No one had actually seen it. But year after year the story persisted among the boys (p. 70)

My friends and well--wishers poured in to congratulate me on my latest acquisition. No one knew precisely how much a road engine would fetch; all the same they felt that there was a lot of money in it. (p. 80)

I decided to encourage my wife to write to her father and arrange for her exit. Not a soul was going to know what my plans were. I was going to put off my creditors and disappear one fine night. (p. 83)

The Swamiji became indignant. 'I have done it in hundreds of places already and nobody questioned me about it. Nobody can stop me from doing what I like -- it's my master's order to demonstrate the power of the Yoga to the people of this country, and who can question me?' (p. 84)

He pulled it back. "None of that," he said to it and set it rigidly to contemplate the business of dying. Wife, children ... nothing seemed to matter. The only important thing now was total extinction. (p. 95)

A year later another tenant came, and then another, and then a third. No one remained more than a few months. And then the house required a reputation for being haunted. (p. 105)

In due course, he was safely lodged in my small house. His head and shoulders were in my front hall, and the rest of him stretched out into the street through the doorway. It was an obliging community there at Kabir Lane and nobody minded this obstruction. (p. 114)

There was a blind fellow yelling his life out at the entrance to the fair and nobody seemed to care. People seemed to have lost all sense of sympathy these days. (p. 119)

Why could it not go on forever, endlessly, till the universe itself cooled off and perished, when by any standard he could be proved to have led a life of pure effort? No one was hurt by his activity and money-making, and not many people could be said to have died of taking his stuff; ... (p. 125)

He said authoritatively, 'Leave way, please." But no one cared. (p. 125)

He held the box upside down and shook it violently till he felt deaf with the clanging of coins. But not one came out of it. (p. 130)

The blacksmith had made a good job of it -- the slit was exactly the thickness of a coin, which could go one way through it. No power on earth could shake a coin out of it again. (p. 130)

Someone told him, "She has only fainted. Nothing has happened to her. Don't make a fuss." They carried her out and laid her in the passage. (p. 135)
Footnotes

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1 Both Halliday (1976) and Halliday & Martin (1981), to which Huddleston refers, are collections of earlier work.


3 It has, of course, always been part of systemic linguistics, as it was in Firthian linguistics -- cf. the report on the project including Huddleston and others on scientific English directed by Halliday in the 1960s -- Huddleston et al (1968). Similarly, Prague School linguists pioneered the area of FSP.

4 Threadgold, Grosz, Kress, and Halliday (1986); Birch & O'Toole (1987); Thibault (in press); Hasan (1985); Martin (1985); Painter & Martin (1986); Hasan & Martin (1988); Christie (in press a, b).

5 The influence seems to have stopped, however, around the end of the 1960s, which is when Huddleston stopped contributing directly to the development of systemic theory.

6 It should also be noted that Halliday raises the problem of labels on p. xxxiii of the Introduction to IFG.

7 Naturally, as we move down the grammatical rank scale, there is a concomitant generalization, for instance across different participant types with respect to nominal groups: groups are contextualized by the clauses they occur in and do not have to signal all the distinctions made at clause rank.

8 Following Firth, Halliday has always operated with a notion of prototypicality in his conception of grammatical categories -- as is clear from his discussion of clines and probabilistic systems in Halliday (1961). The importance of the notion of prototypicality has also come into focus more recently in functional work outside the systemic tradition. In spite of this and in spite of the fact the Huddleston (1984) uses the notion of prototypicality, Huddleston gives the impression of expecting categorial categories from IFG, as is illustrated by his appeal to counter-examples such as *there's a fallacy in your argument* to call into question the general category of Theme.

9 Since Huddleston criticizes Halliday for this significant omission, one might expect an illuminating discussion in his own Grammar of English, but all Huddleston (1984: 370) has to say on the subject is embodied in one short paragraph where he notes "the phrase containing the *wh* word may have a function within a declarative content clause or a non-finite clause embedded inside the interrogative clause itself". He then gives three examples and indicates what their structures are. This gives no indication as to how these types of example are to be explained.
10 The term *agnation* was introduced by Gleason (1965) to refer to grammatical relationships between items (agnate items) without involving the metaphor of mutation (e.g., transformational relations in Chomskyan grammars of that period). It is closely related to Saussure's *valeur* and Derrida's *difference*. The concept of agnation is fundamental to 'deep' grammar in systemics (see Halliday, 1966). System networks, used by systemists to capture paradigmatic relationships in language, show how relations between agnate items are related to each other.

11 Examples such as *what did you ask me if I had done ___?* may be acceptable but pretty well restricted to echoes; so the more likely form would be *what was it you asked me if I'd done ___?*

12 There is also a substantial body of work on the tagmemic equivalent of rank.

13 'Formal' is used here in opposition to 'functional'. It is important to note that this sense of *formal* is different from formalized: both formal and functional grammars can be more or less explicitly formalized. Functional grammars can be formalized just as formal ones can (see e.g. Tuten & Ritchie, 1987, for a formalization of systemic functional grammar). Since functional grammars expand the territory of grammar (e.g. by taking a broader range of functions into consideration, by emphasizing dynamic grammar, and by relating grammar to discourse), they present formalization with challenges that do not arise with formal grammars but that does not mean that they cannot be formalized, given the appropriate resources.

14 The interesting exception is the adverbial group, which will be discussed below in the context of Huddleston’s remarks concerning it.

15 Huddleston seems to suggest that the total accountability requirement is purely a property of Halliday’s theory. In one sense, this is right, of course: the theory is always an intermediate stage between our interpretation and the data under scrutiny. However, Huddleston does not appear to consider the possibility that total accountability could be a fundamental property of integrated systems in general (language or systems of other kinds). If we explore this aspect of total accountability, we can begin to ask what aspects of systems it can account for: it reflects the inter-connectionity of systems such as language.

16 As we will see, the particular subtype of expansion is highly relevant to the question of where the line is drawn between rankshifting and hypotaxis: Huddleston does not address this.

17 Unlike LFG where functions are introduced as ‘glosses’ on c-structures, syntagms are derived from function structures through realization statements. As in the theory in general, functional considerations drive formal ones.

18 Huddleston only shows the bracketing of Halliday’s multivariate constituency analysis of the example in his (10), but not of the univariate interdependency analysis taken here from p. 170 of IFG.

19 Compare and contrast with N-bar interpretation, which is taking some steps towards recognizing univariate patterning but without really getting rid of maximal bracketing.

20 In formal grammars, ‘adverbials’ are assigned different positions in the IC analysis, giving us sentence adverbials (those immediately dominated by S [or S-bar]) and VP adverbials (those immediately dominated by VP). However, this distinction is often a metafunctional one (interpersonal adjuncts vs. ideational ones); cf. the last paragraph of Section 2.2 above.

21 The situation would be the same with constituency. That is, if Huddleston were right in his objection, there would not be a solution currently.
22 Dik (1980) allows for coordination of functions as well as of the ‘fillers’ of functions. Along similar lines, one could obviously explore the possibility of conjoining Residues, giving Huddleston’s example the analysis Mood “(Residue & Residue). Huddleston does not raise this possibility. In general, Halliday’s approach to ‘ellipsis’ is a functional one. We have already reviewed the function of residue ellipsis in dialogue above. Mood ellipsis in paratactic clause complexes (i.e., branching ellipsis) can also be interpreted functionally as a signal that the clause complex is to be treated as a single move from the point of view of exchange structure (as in *Mary arrived on time but ___ left early*). In other words, it is not accidental that it is the Mood element or some part of it that is ellided. Residue ellipsis, on the other hand, allows for the clause complex to make more than one move (as in *Mary arrived on time but did you ___?*).

23 The only possible exception is of the type ‘side of house’, where ‘side’ can arguably be interpreted as a Facet in the structure of a nominal group (cf. IFG, pp. 173-5) rather than as a preposition.

24 Essentially Miniranges are potential Subjects in middle clauses, e.g. *this blackboard has never been written on*, but not in effective ones, e.g. *this blackboard has never been written that example on*. Cf. Tagalog *p-in-ag-sulat-an niya ng tatlo-ng likham ang mesa* ‘the table was written three letters on’. (The Tagalog example, although generally restricted to embedded constructions, is fine, whereas the English example is unlikely.)

25 In fact, he may not object to negative themes in general: his objection is just cast in terms of the example *nothing will satisfy you*.

26 Except, of course, if the negative feature isn’t a feature of the clause as a whole but is rather local to the thematic element.

27 And Halliday does not imply that it is. He writes (IFG, p. 40): *‘Sometimes in English the Theme is announced explicitly, by means of some expression like as for ..., with regard to ..., about ... Usually it is only nominal Themes that are introduced by a locution of this kind.’*

28 Huddleston seems to focus on participant functions rather than on circumstances. Maybe that’s because circumstantial functions such as Locative and Means are more transparently grammatical: they are marked explicitly by different sets of prepositions and their relative sequencing is partly determined by reference to circumstantial subtype.

29 For a detailed discussion of the functionally composite nature of realizational devices such as case marking and word order, see Givón (1984).

30 Huddleston seems to have singled out easily identifiable, overt categories. Whorf’s (1956) work on reactances, covert categories, and cryptotypes is crucial in this context.
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References


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FURTHER REMARKS ON HALLIDAY'S FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR: 
A REPLY TO MATTHIESEN & MARTIN

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1. Introduction

I am grateful to the editors for giving me the opportunity to reply to Matthiessen & Martin's paper (this volume) responding to my 1988a review article on Michael Halliday's Introduction to Functional Grammar (1985), henceforth *IFG*. The patronising and overtly hostile tone of their paper makes this a distasteful task, but it contains so many misrepresentations of what I said,¹ and their claim (S111) 'to have shown that all [my] critical remarks can be answered' is so far from true, that it should not be allowed to go unchallenged. It should also be borne in mind that although Matthiessen & Martin purport to be presenting the Systemic-Functional point of view on various issues, what they say is in certain cases, as we shall see, in conflict with what Halliday himself says in *IFG*.

I shall turn straightway to the substantive issues raised in my review, discussing them under the headings of rank, theme, subject and grammaticalization.

2. Rank

2.1 A terminological preliminary

From the early scale-and-category days (cf. Halliday 1961) a distinctive feature of Halliday's theory of grammar has been that it incorporates a scale of rank which imposes significant constraints on the kinds of constituent structure analyses assigned to sentences. In *IFG* (§2.2) Halliday characterizes the distinction between rank-based and other constituency models by saying that they involve respectively 'minimal bracketing' and 'maximal bracketing'. The name he uses for the non-rank approach is 'immediate constituent (IC) analysis', and Matthiessen & Martin follow this terminology in a way which seems to me somewhat tendentious. In the strict sense of the term, 'immediate constituent' can be applied in any approach which assigns a hierarchical constituent structure to sentences, and indeed Halliday himself uses it in this way of his own rank-based approach in his paper 'Types of Structure', henceforth *TS* (1981a:29,34): the ICs of some item are simply the constituents at the immediately next layer down in the hierarchy. (I shall follow this convenient terminology in a number of places below.) In order for IC analysis to be properly contrasted with 'ranked constituent analysis', therefore, it must be given some more specific interpretation. Matthiessen & Martin (§2.3) gloss IC analysis as 'the approach developed within neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics'. Although neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics was undoubtedly a major influence on generative grammar, it would not be valid to suggest that the constituent structures assigned in, for example, Chomskyan grammar, are arrived at by methodological procedures like those put forward in the classic neo-Bloomfieldian paper on the topic, Wells 1947. To avoid subscribing to any such implication, I will draw the contrast simply in terms of 'rank grammars' and 'non-rank grammars'. This brings out the point that Halliday's theory of constituent structure is distinct from others by virtue of certain special features involving the concept of rank: the issue is whether this concept is well-motivated and helpful.

²PL 5: 75-129