Linguistics and the Consumer: 
The Practice of Theory

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CONTEXTUALIZATION

How refreshing it is, reading de Beaugrande (1997), to see linguistics socially framed—both with respect to its own disciplinary practice, and with respect to the political context of its applications, in education and beyond. A genuinely ecosocial perspective, which might serve to guide us well across the fraught frontiers of the new millennium. By way of responding, I’ll comment from an Australian perspective, in response to those parts of de Beaugrande’s paper that most struck a chord and where I think Australians have something distinctive to contribute on the basis of our experiences. Some sympathetic, and hopefully productive, repartee.

CONSUMING LINGUISTICS

Over the past 20 years I have been involved, as a functional linguist, with a range of language in education initiatives which grew out of my teaching in our MA Applied Linguistics program at the University of Sydney. The best known of these have focused on literacy teaching in primary, secondary, tertiary and adult ESL and workplace training sectors—based in various ways around our notion of genre. For reviews of this work see Hasan and Martin, 1989, Christie 1992, Martin 1993a, Cope and Kalantzis, 1993, Hasan and Williams, 1996, Rothery 1996, Martin in part a; Carter 1996, Grabe and Kaplan, 1996 and Hyon, 1996 contextualise aspects of this work from an international perspective.

Typically, throughout the development of this paradigm, I worked with educational linguists who had served as professional teachers and teacher educators for many years before pursuing post-graduate studies in linguistics. Until recently, in their MA at Sydney, these ‘teacher linguists’ were trained for two or three semes-
ters in functional linguistics of the Hallidayan variety, alongside five or six
semesters work in general linguistics, sociolinguistics, language development and
language curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation. Many went on to complete
Ph.D.’s which laid the foundation for an educational linguistics transdiscipline in
Australia. Our applications of linguistics grew, in other words, out of a dialogue
between functional linguists and educators—a dialogue which involved a recon-
textualisation of the practice of linguistics into some relevant educational
domains.

Initially, for me, this recontextualisation was inspired by Joan Rothery, who
was convinced that knowledge about language had a role to play in language
learning in schools. The questions were—what knowledge, what role? Joan was
especially interested in student writing and chose that as a site for intervention; we
spent a lot of time together analysing student texts in terms of functional grammar
(Halliday, 1994), discourse semantics (Martin, 1992) and register theory (Halli-
day, 1978; Halliday & Hasan, 1985). Our immediate stumbling block was
practicing teachers who had no knowledge about language to draw when consid-
ering their students’ writing. Traditional grammar had been dropped from school
curricula and teacher training programs; and the study of grammar in relation to
rhetoric had long since disappeared (Christie, 1990; Martin & Rothery, 1993).
The teachers who had heard of nouns, verbs and adjective probably couldn’t have
been counted on to recognise them in analysis; and they had been taught in any
case by Australia’s progressive teacher trainers that learning grammar did not
facilitate language learning—as countless studies had supposedly shown. Clearly,
to get off the ground, we needed something simple; and we needed something that
would really work.

To come up with something simple we had to revise the theory of context we
inherited from Halliday 1978. In his model, contextual description was organised
functionally into three components—field (institutional activity), tenor social
interaction) and mode (medium of communication). These components aligned
‘naturally’ with his functionally organised descriptions of language, as in Table 1
below.

We decided to ‘simplify’ this picture by abstracting the notion of the text’s
overall purpose from this array and setting it up as an underlying contextual vari-
able called genre—with genres defined, by around 1982, as staged, goal-oriented
social processes (e.g. Christie & Martin, 1997; Martin, 1985, 1992, 1997a, b, in
press a, b). Of course in a model of this kind, genres are realised through field,

| Table 1. Halliday’s Linguistic Metafunctions in Relation to his Model of Context |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **Language Metafunctions**       | **‘Type of Reality’** | **Contextual Variable** |
| INTERPERSONAL                    | social reality   | tenor            |
| IDEATIONAL (logical, experiential) | ‘natural’ reality | field            |
| TEXTUAL                          | semiotic reality | mode             |
mode and tenor variables, which are in turn realised through language, as in Figure 1 below. In Lemke's (e.g., 1995) terms, linguistic choices redound with field, mode and tenor (register), which in turn metaredound with genre. But the point of stratifying context, and letting genre run the show, was that we wouldn't have to say all this; we could suppress the grim complexities of register variation and language (including grammar), and concentrate on the more palatable notion of social purpose—as enacted through different kinds of texts (report, narrative, procedure, explanation, exposition, discussion, etc.), each with a distinctive kind of beginning, middle and end structure. For some of our colleagues this was heresy (cf. Hasan, 1995); but it appealed to us, on both theoretical and practical grounds, and proved consumable too.

The next step was to design pedagogy that could make this concept of genre work in classrooms, and it was here that we confronted the then hegemony of progressive education in Australia, especially its manifestations as 'process writing' and whole language' literacy programs. To our mind this pedagogy created far too passive a role for teachers, based on what de Beaugrande refers to as the irrationality of formalist models, in particular their complete mystification of language development. We, on the other hand, were impressed by the functional accounts of Halliday (1975, 1993a) and Painter (1984, 1986, 1989, 1991) which focussed on the guiding interactive role assumed by caregivers, and on the role that talk about language played in language learning (Painter, 1996); the connections between this conception of language learning and the Vygotskyan tradition, with

Our first teaching/learning cycle was constructed in 1988 by Mike Callaghan, Mary Macken and Joan Rothery in connection with the Disadvantage Schools Program's Language and Social Power project, which was developing a genre based literacy program for Sydney primary schools. This early model is presented in Figure 2 (from Callaghan & Knapp, 1989). It comprises three main phases—Modelling, Joint Construction and Independent Construction. Modelling involved introducing student to an example of the text type in focus, discussing the function of the genre, and examining its structure, including relevant language features. Joint construction involves preparing for work on another example of the genre.

Figure 2. An early DSP Teaching/Learning Cycle (Callaghan & Knapp, 1989, p. 10)
which will be jointly constructed by the teacher and students (with the teacher developing a text on the board, butcher’s paper or overhead in response to suggestions from students). Independent construction involves students preparing for another instantiation of the genre, which they will write on their own; it explicitly encourages creative exploitation of the genre and its possibilities. The arrows pointing to the centre of the model indicate that teaching can begin at any point, depending on the needs of the students—for example, some teachers found the Joint Construction stage unnecessary for some students, whereas for others, this stage needed to be worked through more than once before students were ready to write on their own. This model has been continually refined over the years by the educational linguists working directly as consultants with teachers, focussing in particular on how to introduce an institutional context for genre and how to develop critical social literacy (Murray & Zammit, 1992; Rothery & Stenglin, 1994; Anderson & Nyholm, 1996; Callow, 1996; Martin, in press, a); see also Christie et al., 1990a, b, 1992; Macken et al., 1989a, b; Derewianka, 1991; Martin & Rothery, 1991 (the latter two packages include video demonstrations for training purposes).

The success of literacy teaching based on this model was stunning—for both the teacher and the consultants involved. Primary school students from the lowest socio-economic backgrounds in Australia, up to 90% of them from non-English speaking background, were able to use this scaffolding to gain a purchase on a range of factual and narrative genres. Many moved from real difficulties with writing to confident control within a matter of weeks, and classes trialing the model soon had everyone writing competently in the focus genre. By 1997 this pedagogy, and the explicit understandings about genre on which it was based, formed the core of the literacy curriculum for primary schools in New South Wales (English K-6), Queensland 1 (English in Year 1-10), the Northern Territory (Getting Going with Genres) and Western Australia (First Steps)—with the progressive educators controlling curriculum in South Australia, Victoria and Tasmania continuing to hold out against the tide.

The time scale of this intervention is important to keep in mind—about 15 years from the genesis of the ideas in research projects at the University of Sydney to their adoption in state curricula. I would also stress that the engineers of this change were overwhelmingly educators with post-graduate training in linguistics; and the linguists involved had to learn some educational discourse in order to work alongside these engineers. It was the recontextualisation of the two fields, each by the other’s practice, which engendered the success of this action research.

Of course, we intended this intervention around the notion of genre simply as our way in—a first step towards mobilising knowledge about language as a tool for learning across the curriculum. It seemed to us that before moving on to grammar we had to get secondary school teachers interested in the role played by language in constructing the specialised knowledge of their disciplines. So the second phase of our Disadvantage Schools Program work focussed on genre in
relation to the uncommon sense of secondary school English, history, creative arts, geography and science—and some of the workplace discourses related to these subjects (science industry, media and administration); Rose et al., 1992; Rothery, 1994; Iedema et al., 1994; Iedema, 1995; Humphrey, 1996; Coffin, 1996; Christie & Martin, 1997. During this period of work (1990-1995) the independence of the Disadvantaged Schools Program as an alternative voice in curriculum development was being steadily eroded by the New South Wales Department of Education. This meant our materials were continually being surveilled and eventually controlled by the Department of Education curriculum developers and that we were never able to assemble the human resources we needed to make a significant impact across a range of secondary subject areas. Competing government agencies can make life very difficult indeed!

At the same time as the Disadvantaged School Program was losing its voice to the state Department of Education, the New South Wales Board of Studies was establishing theirs as a third player in language curricula development. They decided to adopt a functional model of language as the basis for their new primary school English syllabus (1994), involving work on genre along the lines we had developed it, and in addition introducing functional grammar in response to conservative government pressures for grammar to be reintroduced. Of course by grammar, the government meant traditional school grammar, not functional grammar; but they were persuaded by the board that functional grammar fitted better into the overall syllabus, and went along with it. This syllabus was prepared with absolutely minimal and last-minute involvement by educational linguists trained in functional grammar and experienced in introducing it to teachers. In service for the syllabus was prepared by the reluctant state Department of Education, not the Board—again, with next to no participation by educational linguists. The result was a complete fiasco. Teachers were directed to teach the new grammar without anything resembling an appropriate in-service and without suitable support materials. Understandably they were uncomfortable with the new terminology. The media attacked the new syllabus as incomprehensible to parents and teachers, and called for a return to basics (good old nouns, verbs and adjectives). The conservative government narrowly lost the next election. And the next government, with the continued support of the media, insisted that the syllabus be rewritten using conventional terminology. In the end, a syllabus framed around the notion of genre was salvaged, but with functional understandings of grammar severely backgrounded (behind a foreground of traditional word class terminology).

This shambles of competing interests and disinterests was a trying one for the educational linguists who could have made things happen, if they’d been given an opportunity. As it turned out, we were probably right in our assessment that a lot of groundwork had to be done before functional grammar could be introduced across the curriculum and thus into the community at large. Our near coup heartened and discouraged us. It was encouraging to see that educators we had not trained but who thought about how to take a step beyond genre moved over-
Table 2. Knowledge About Language—Towards Consensus on Resources for Language Learning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language System:</th>
<th>Realisations:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expression</strong> - resources concerned with the delivery and presentation of spoken and written texts, including their relation to images (tables, figures, maps, photos etc.)</td>
<td>Features of intonation &amp; rhythm; voice quality; accent; graphology-punctuation, font, formatting; verbiage/image relations (layout).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vocabulary</strong> - resources for naming content and expressing attitudes towards this content.</td>
<td>Everyday, specialised and technical lexis; evaluative lexis; intensification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time Management</strong> - resources dealing with temporal relations among events and in relation to the moment of speaking/writing.</td>
<td>Setting events in time; sequencing events (tense; temporal adverbs, phrases and conjunctions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interaction</strong> - resources for undertaking and reporting dialogue, including the engagement of the speaker/writer with their message.</td>
<td>Resources for dialogue; the nature of the producer's commitment to the message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Representation</strong> - resources for organising content into events and relationships.</td>
<td>Types of activity, the people and things they involve and contexts in which they occur. Lexical metaphor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information flow</strong> - resources for adjusting ways in which information unfolds at the beginning and end of grammatical units to suit the context.</td>
<td>How information is presented in clauses and sentences - first and last position (voice).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abstraction</strong> - resources for creating technical and abstract content and evaluation, above and beyond concrete vocabulary.</td>
<td>Turning actions, qualities, assessments, or logical connections into nouns or states of being (e.g. “assess” becomes “assessment;” “can” becomes “ability”)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Local Cohesion</strong> - resources for keeping track of participants, adjusting redundancy and linking events and arguments.</td>
<td>Cohesion between clauses (reference substitution &amp; ellipsis, conjunction); in relation to embedded, dependent, coordinated and independent clauses.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Global Organisation</strong> - resources for organising texts into stages according to their goals, including phases; previews and reviews.</td>
<td>The overall organisational properties of texts (e.g. generic stages/introducing and summarising).</td>
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whelmingly in the direction of a functional model of language; it was discouraging to see how naive we had been about the political context of this move, and the way in which populist politicians and the print and electronic media would line up against it.

Looking forward, it seems important at this stage to continue to work towards an international consensus on the kinds of knowledge about language that we feel are relevant to language learning, so that we have as broad and solid a base of support as possible to draw on during these crises. The New London Group 1996 has made some suggestions along these lines which I have elaborated on in Table 2.
These suggestions naturally reflect my own systemic functional perspective, but I've tried to couch them neutrally enough so that they could be taken up by educational linguists with complementary backgrounds.

In sum, our experience of getting people to consume linguistics shows that inclusive theory and practice involves a reciprocal recontextualisation of one theory's practice by another's—the dialogue among functional linguists and educators I described above. And the results of this dialogue have to themselves be recontextualised with respect to the practice of government (including politicians and bureaucrats) and the media, if meaningful social change is to be enacted.

Keep it simple; make it work.

**LANGUAGE IN EDUCATION (STATUS VS FUNCTION)**

Above I painted a rosy picture of dialogue across disciplines. But this dialogue was not a seamless one; often in fact it was a scene of engaging contestation. Some representative debates in which we were involved can be found in Reid, 1987; Giblett and O'Carroll, 1990; Freedman and Medway, 1994; Lee, 1996; Hasan and Williams 1996. One of the most prevailing of these had to do with intervention—with when and where, and to what degree and how, teachers should involve themselves in student learning. As noted above, when we entered the scene we had to deal with progressive educators who advocated a relatively passive role for teachers ('benevolent inertia' as Halliday has termed it). Initially, as a naive linguist, I had no idea where this was coming from—and without the patient tutoring of my education colleagues and Bernstein's oracular deconstructions of social class in relation to traditional and progressive pedagogy I would never have survived (Bernstein, 1975, 1990). By 1990 it seemed clear to me that what we had done was fill the empty lower right hand quadrant in Bernstein's four celled frame for pedagogies (which I have elaborated as Figure 3 below). As he outlines (1990, pp. 213-4):²

The vertical dimension would indicate the theory of instruction privileged relations internal to the individual, where the focus would be *intra-individual*, or...relations *between* social groups (inter-group). In the first case...the theory would be concerned to explain the conditions for changes within the individual, whereas in the second the theory would be concerned to explain the conditions for changes in the relation between social groups. The horizontal dimension would indicate whether the theory articulated a pedagogic practice emphasising a logic of acquisition or...a logic of transmission. In the case of a logic of acquisition the focus is upon the development of shared competencies in which the acquirer is active in regulating an *implicit* facilitating practice. In the case of a logic of transmission the emphasis is upon *explicit* effective ordering of the discourse to be acquired by the transmitter.
On my reading (Martin 1993, in press a), the teaching/learning cycle we had evolved (Figure 2 above) aligned us with traditional pedagogy as far as explicitness was concerned—since our work on genre was intended to make discourses as visible as possible for students; and it aligned us with critical pedagogic theories as far as social change was concerned—since we were concerned with redistributing power by making certain discourses available to social subjects that had not been given access to them before (Cope & Kalantzis, 1993). This meant we were regularly construed by progressive pedagogues as to reactionary, since we believed in explicit teaching (like traditionalists), and by traditionalists as too political, since we wanted to challenge power (like Freirians). It was a little unnerving to be construed by the left as right and by the right as left, often in the course of a single day!

The real issues, as far as I could determine, had to do with whether learning was enhanced by facilitation (implicit pedagogy) or guidance (explicit pedagogy); and whether teaching the genres of power was subversive of, or subservient to the power we wanted to change. Recall here that our work evolved in response to the our dealing with students from the most marginalised positions of Australian society (from working class, migrant, and Aboriginal backgrounds). Let’s pursue this in the context of Aboriginal education, where these issues are so highly charged. Simplifying grossly, should we teach powerful English genres to Aboriginal students, who may or may not still speak an Australian language as their native
tongue? If we do so, will this tend to devalue their already marginalised voice by placing value on mainstream discourse at the expense of their own?

These questions are explored in more detail in Gray, 1986, 1990; Martin 1988, 1990; Rose, in press; and Walton, 1996. My position has been that as agents of symbolic control we have no right not to make our genres available to anyone who wants them, since if Aboriginal people are to directly negotiate their future in Australia they will need to control these discourses. My impression over the years is that Aboriginal people would prefer to do this negotiating themselves, rather than have white ‘scribes’ do it for them. Beyond this I remain unconvinced that teaching someone powerful English genres necessarily threatens their identity. There is nothing to stop schools giving value to Aboriginal discourse, alongside the English curriculum, as happens in the ‘two-way’ education of some Northern Territory schools (Yunupingu, 1990)—if in fact Aboriginal communities decide they want their discourses cultivated by institutions such as schools (some do not, preferring English-only education for their children, even after 30 years of bilingual education; Rose in press). Learning one discourse need not efface another, as long as their functions are complementary, and useful (Martin, 1990).

Throughout these debates I have been puzzled by the fair weather Bakhtinianism of the critical theorists who embrace heteroglossia and dialogism, and celebrate social subjectivity as a carnivale of contesting discourses, while at the same time positioning the subjectivity of socially marginalised students as brittle and defenseless in the face of a few of the English genres used to administer citizens and run technology. On the contrary, our experience is that the more explicitly discourses are presented to such groups, and contextualised with respect to their social function, the more opportunity marginalised students have to take them or leave them as they choose, and if they take them, to take them up in ways that suit their interests, including renovations where required (Veel, 1991: Martin, in press, a).

What this debate is really about is how powerful discourses accrue power. Some of our critics talk as if powerful discourse are powerful because powerful people use them. In linguistics terms, these critics see powerful discourses as accents—as variations of dialect that have power because people see them as powerful. If this were true then the solution would appear to lie in changing people’s attitudes. All we have to do is get people to value marginalised discourses in the same way they value mainstream ones, and our problems will be over. We get regional accents accepted on the BBC and life has improved. From this perspective, the relationship between powerful discourse and language is arbitrary. Discourses come to have power the same way accents do—whimsically, through a series of historical accidents which end up positioning certain kinds of vowels as prestigious, and others as stigmatised.

I’m not suggesting that attitudes don’t need to change. But simply changing attitudes will not change who is running the show...because language is not arbitrarily related to powerful discourse; rather, it engenders this discourse (Berstein,
1996, Hasan, 1997). Language makes the power. And this is very hard to explain. Unless we talk about grammar. Let me try again.

At the end of his autobiography, one of the truly inspirational figures of this century, Nelson Mandela, offers a precis of his life. Generically, the text is an autobiographical recount, one of a range of history genres designed to reconstruct and interpret experience (Mandela, 1995, pp. 750-751). I've divided it into its generic phases below (Christie & Martin, 1997), and highlighted with small caps its construal of progression through time.

**Orientation**
I was not born with a hunger to be free. I WAS BORN free—free in every way that I could know. Free to run in the fields near my mother’s hut, free to swim in the clear stream that ran through my village, free to roast mealies under the stars and ride the broad backs of slow-moving bulls. As long as I obeyed my father and abided by the customs of my tribe, I was not troubled by the laws of man or God.

**Record of Events**
It was only when I began to learn that my boyhood freedom was an illusion, when I discovered as a young man that my freedom had already been taken from me, that I began to hunger for it. AT FIRST, AS A STUDENT, I wanted freedom only for myself, the transitory freedoms of being able to stay out at night, read what I pleased and go where I chose. LATER, AS A YOUNG MAN in Johannesburg, I yearned for the basic and honorable freedoms of achieving my potential, of earning my keep, of marrying and having a family—the freedom not to be obstructed in a lawful life.

BUT THEN I slowly saw that not only was I not free, but my brothers and sisters were not free. I saw that not only was I not free, but the freedom of everyone who looked like I did. That is WHEN I JOINED THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, and that is when the hunger for my own freedom became the greater hunger for the freedom of my people. It was this desire for the freedom of my people to live their lives with dignity and self-respect that animated my life, that transformed a frightened young man into a bold one, that drive a law-abiding attorney to become a criminal, that turned a family-loving husband into a man without a home, that forced a life-loving man to live like a monk. I am no more virtuous of self-sacrificing than the next man, but I found that I could not even enjoy the poor and limited freedoms I was allowed when I knew my people were not free. Freedom is indivisible; the chains on any one of my people were the chains on all of them, the chains on all of my people were the chains on me.

It was DURING THOSE LONG AND LONELY YEARS that my hunger for the freedom of my own people became a hunger for the freedom of all people, white and black. I knew as well as I knew anything that the oppressor must be liberated just as surely as the oppressed. A man who takes away another man’s freedom is a prisoner of hatred, he is locked behind the bars of prejudice and narrow-mindedness. I am not truly free if I am taking away someone else’s freedom, just as surely as I am not free when my freedom is taken from me. The oppressed and the oppressor alike are robbed of their humanity.

WHEN I WALKED OUT OF THE PRISON, that was my mission, to liberate the oppressed and the oppressor both. Some say that has not been achieved. But I know
that this is not the case. The truth is that we are not yet free: we have not taken the final step of our journey, but the first step on a longer and even more difficult road. For to be free is not merely to cast off one’s chains, but to live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of others. The true test of our devotion to freedom is just beginning.

Reorientation
I HAVE WALKED THAT LONG ROAD TO FREEDOM. I have tried not to falter: I have made missteps along the way. But I have discovered the secret that after climbing the great hill, one only finds that there are many more hills to climb. I have taken a moment here to rest, to steal a view of the glorious vista that surrounds me, to look back on the distance I have come. But I can only rest for a moment, for with freedom come responsibilities, and I dare not linger. FOR MY LONG WALK IS NOT YET ENDED.

As we know from reading this book, Mandela is a learned man—who trained and worked professionally as a lawyer before moving into political discourse. His life, as he interprets it, is about freedom. He opens this text with a description of his early life, using language which reflects oral culture into which he was born. By this I mean language in which the relationship between wordings and meaning is natural—people, places, things comes out as nouns, qualities comes out as adjectives, actions come out as verbs, assessments of ability come out as modal verbs and logical connections comes out as conjunctions (Halliday, 1985) This pattern is unpicked for the first few lines of his text below, drawing on categories from Halliday, 1994:

- participant as THING (noun)
  - I, fields, hut, stream, village, mealies, stars, bulls, father...

- Quality as Epithet (adjective)
  - free, clear, broad

- action as Process (verb)
  - was born, to run, to swim, to roast, rise, obeyed...

- Assessment of Finite (modal verb)
  - could

- logical connection as textual Theme (conjunction)
  - as long as

In language of this kind, the relation between working and meaning (between lexicogrammar and discourse semantics) is a direct one, as outlined in Figure 4. Meaning matches wording, and texts sounds natural, casual and easy to process as a result.
But this is not a pattern which runs through the text as Mandela’s life unfolds. As he moved from the carefree days of childhood into the uncommon sense world of school, then law, then politics, so the language he uses to construe these experiences changes accordingly. Mental processes are reworded as if they were things:

process as a Thing (instead of verb)
this desire
hatred

Qualities are reworked as nouns, as if they too were entities:

quality as a Thing (instead of adjective)
a hunger to be free
dignity
narrow-mindedness
humanity

So too for assessments of ability, probability and obligation—realised as nouns, not modal verbs:

assessment as a Thing (instead of modal verb)
achieving my potential
truth
responsibilities

And instead of clauses related logically to each other by conjunctions we find cause expressed inside the clause, as a relationship between abstract Agents (this desire for freedom) that affect (animated) other abstractions (my life) and change (transform) individuals (a frightened young man into a bold one).

Logical relation as Agency—inside the clause (instead of conjunction). It was this desire for the freedom of my people to live their lives with dignity and self-respect that animated my life, that transformed a frightened young man into a bold one, that drove a law-abiding attorney to become a criminal, that turned a family-loving husband into a man without a home, that forces a life-loving man to live like a monk.

With language of this kind, the relationship between wording and meaning is indirect. Wording doesn’t match meaning—it’s in tension with it. To read the text you have to re-process wording as meaning, working out the symbolic relation between the two levels. If we say for example that this desire for the freedom of my people to live their lives with dignity and self respect animated my life, then literally we have a grammatical structure in which desire does something to life; but semantically, we have to unpick this into something like ‘I lived as I did because
I wanted my people to be able to respect themselves as they lived’ the grammar symbolises the meaning in question rather than directly coding it. Since the literal grammatical structure is a metaphor for the meaning, in a kind of figure/ground relationship, Halliday (e.g., 1994) refers to recoding as grammatical metaphor. And it’s the tension in the indirect mapping between the grammar and semantics which makes the meaning. The general drift of this indirect mapping in this kind of written English is towards the noun (Halliday, 1967, 1985; Halliday & Martin, 1993; Martin & Veel, 1998). An outline of the tension is offered in Figure 5.

What’s the payoff? How does this kind of language enable Mandela’s reading of the meaning of his life? Recalling Halliday’s metafunctions, introduced in Table 1 above, we can track the functionality of the pay-off along complementary trajectories of meaning—focusing on ‘freedom,’ which the text constructs as the pivotal concept in Mandela’s reading. Ideationally the pay-off is that ‘freedom’ is free to participate in various ways in different kinds of experience. It can be a quality which Mandela attributes to himself:

free as Attribute
I was not born with a hunger to be free.
I was born free...
When I knew my people were not free.
I am not truly free...just as surely as I am not free.

Then, once nominalised, it can be an entity which is itself classified and described:

freedom as abstract Carrier/Attribute
It was when I began to learn that my boyhood freedom was an illusion.
Freedom is indivisible,
...that my hunger for the freedom of my own people became a hunger for the freedom of all people, white and black.

It can be a commodity that can be acted on (taken away):

freedom as abstract Commodity (Goal)
when I discovered...that my freedom had already been taken from me.
...it was not just my freedom that was curtailed, but the freedom of...
A man who takes away another man's freedom is a prisoner of hatred...
If I am taking away some else's freedom
when my freedom is taken from me.
We have merely achieved the freedom to be free, the right no to be oppressed.

It can be an object of desire:

freedom as abstract Phenomenon
that I began to hunger for it (freedom).
At first, as a student, I wanted freedom...
Later..., I yearned for the basic and honourable freedoms of...
...That I could not even enjoy the poor and limited freedoms I was allowed

It can be an abstraction which is itself transformed:

freedom as abstract Token/Value
...that is when the hunger for my own freedom became the greater hunger for the freedom of my people.

It can be the agentive abstraction we saw above, which acts on people:

freedom as abstract Agent
It was this desire for the freedom of my people to live their lives with dignity and self-respect that animated my life, that transformed a frightened young man into a bold one, that drove a law-abiding attorney to become a criminal, that turned a family-loving husband into a man without a home, that forces a life-loving man to live like a monk.
It can be an abstract location Mandela sets as his goal:

freedom as abstract circumstance of Location
I have walked that long road to freedom.

It can be a companion as the journey continues.

Freedom as abstract circumstance of Accompaniment
But I can only rest for a moment, for with freedom come responsibilities…

Beyond this, the grammatical metaphors enable the extended lexical metaphor which organises the recount and functions as the title of Mandela’s book—the metaphor that life is a journey to freedom:

EXTENDED LEXICAL METAPHOR…When I walked out of prison…We have not taken the final step of our journey, but the first step on a longer and even more difficult road…I have walked that long road to freedom. I have tried not to falter; I have made missteps along the way. But I have discovered the secret that after climbing the great hill, one only finds that there are many more hills to climb. I have taken a moment here to rest, to steal a view of the glorious vista that surrounds me, to look back on the distance I have come. But I can only rest for a moment, for with freedom come responsibilities, and I dare not linger. for my long walk is not yet ended.

Interpersonally the pay-off is that when freedom is being taken away, Mandela does not have to accuse anyone of taking it. The grammatical Subject of the key clauses is freedom, not the government agents responsible:

when I discovered as a young man that my freedom had already been taken from me

I saw that it was not just my freedom that was curtailed, but the freedom of everyone who looked like I did…

Intriguingly, the only specific individual who is positioned as taking away someone’s freedom in the text is Mandela himself, hypothetically, in a conditional clause:

It was during those long and lonely years that my hunger for the freedom of my own people became a hunger for the freedom of all people, white and black. I knew as well as I knew anything that the oppressor must be liberated just as surely as the oppressed. A man who takes away another man’s freedom is a prisoner of hatred, he is locked behind the bars of prejudice and narrow-mindedness. I am not truly free if I am taking away someone else’s freedom, just as surely as I am not free when my freedom is taken from me. The oppressed end the oppressor alike are robbed of their humanity.
This means that the arguability of the clauses dealing with loss of freedom mostly has to do with whether or not freedom has been taken away (*My freedom was curtailed— Was it?— Yes, it was? — No, it wasn’t!*); the argument doesn’t rest on who was doing it (Halliday, 1994; Martin, 1992), except where Mandela himself is responsible (*I am taking away someone’s freedom.— No, you’re not.— Yes, I am.*). On the basis of modal responsibility of this kind, given the story of his life (told throughout without bitterness or recrimination), who could doubt Mandela is a very very gracious man?

Finally, the textual pay-off, as reflected in the distribution of information in the text. Following Halliday, 1994 (see also Martin, 1992) we’ll look at first position in the English clause (Theme) and last position (unmarked New). The overwhelming pattern in the text as far as freedom is concerned is for Mandela to position himself as Theme (early in the message), and freedom to be positioned as New (late in the message). Read semantically, in terms of information flow, this means that the text’s orientation to what is going on is Mandela (the angle on the field); and the news that is being constructed has to do with freedom (elaboration of the field):

Theme is to New as I (Mandela) is to freedom

I was not born with a hunger to be free.
I was born free...
That I began to hunger for it (freedom).
At first, as a student, I wanted freedom only for myself...
Later, as a young man in Johannesburg, I yearned for the... freedoms of...
That not only was I not free
that I could not even enjoy the poor and limited freedoms I was allowed
I am not truly free
if I am taking away someone else’s freedom,
just as surely as I am not free
we have merely achieved the freedom to be free...
I have walked that long road to freedom

Where freedom is Theme, then the grammar deals with what freedom becomes, as Mandela’s concept of freedom evolves through the text:

[when I began to learn] that my boyhood freedom was an illusion

That is when I joined the African National Congress, and that is when the hunger for my own freedom became the greater hunger for the freedom of my people.

Freedom is indivisible; the chains on any one of my people were the chains on all of them, the chains on all of my people were the chains on me.
And at the pivotal moments of Mandela’s life (joining the ANC; living outside the law), freedom is treated as a combination of Theme and New, through what Halliday refers to as Theme predication:

[But then I slowly saw that not only was I not free, but my brothers and sisters were not free.] I saw that it was not just my freedom that was curtailed, but the freedom of everyone who looked like I did. [That is when I joined the African National Congress . . .]

It was this desire for the freedom of my people to live their lives with dignity and self-respect that animated my life. that transformed a frightened young man into a bold one, that drove a law-abiding attorney to become a criminal, that turned a family-loving husband into a man without a home, that forces a life-loving man to live like a monk.

I could spend chapters on such a moving text of power and elegance, of humility and insight, of hope and determination... without grammatical metaphor it would never have been constructed along these lines; Mandela would have been limited to the resources he uses in his opening paragraph—and given what he needed to mean, that is not enough. So, is Mandela now a white man, who had been taken over by white discourses and sold his soul to the people who took away so much of his life? I don’t think so, and I challenge anyone who thinks so to publicly place their charge.

On the contrary, it strikes me that Mandela’s recount draws on features of the oral culture into which he was first initiated. Note how the text unfolds in cycles, returning again and again to the concept of freedom as its meaning in Mandela’s life evolves—from being free to act, to wanting freedom for himself, to wanting freedom for his own people, to wanting freedom for all people, towards the concept of the freedom to be free... drawn together in the final paragraph through the metaphor of the long road to freedom, which has no end. This is not just the linear time of the western historian (Coffin, 1996, 1997)... where something happens, then something follows and is followed by something else. Rather what we have is a spiral texture, enabled by the resources of grammatical metaphor, which invokes the rhythms of Mandela’s native discourses, and which uses these rhythms to scaffold his interpretation of his life. The western discourse fuses with another, to makes some new meaning that offers a future to his people, and perhaps to more of us as well.

The metaphorical resources Mandela uses to make this meaning are the same resources used by the uncommon sense discourses of western culture to construct subject specific disciplinary knowledge. Here’s a small sample of their deployment in secondary school (nominalisations in bold face):

[from history] this most successful phase of the Long March owes a great deal to the diplomatic skills of Zhou Enlai and to the bravery of the rearguard.
Linguistics and the Consumer

[From English] Click is about a young girl who has run away from reality and its unhappiness and death that it confronted her with.

[From economics] An increase in consumer demand will result in high prices owing to a shortage in domestic supply.

[From science] Thus sound is a compression wave that can be heard;

As far as the ability to carry electricity is concerned, (b) we can place most substances into one of two groups.

[From geography] The effects of industrialisation and the need of more land due to the growth of population seriously affected wildlife and still is today already...

In sum, the bottom line is power and where it comes from. On my reading it comes from language—from language involving grammatical metaphor. This is the language we use to construct science, and the technology we use to control physical and biological resources on the planet; and this is the language we use to develop the humanities and social sciences, and the bureaucracy we use to manage people (Halliday & Martin, 1993; Martin, 1993B; Iedema, 1995). Having come this far, we can’t do without it; and no culture can withstand the impact of technology and bureaucracy without getting hold of some grammatically metaphorical discourse to negotiate with. We’re talking about power, not status.

Language makes power; power gets valued.

Linguistics in Society: Formalism and Functionalism

de Beaugrande suggests as far as linguistics is concerned, and the role it might play in more inclusive theory and practice, that there are reasons for both pessimism and optimism. In Australia this is certainly the case. The hegemonic discourses of linguistics in this country derive from the founding authority of R.M.W. Dixon of the Australian National University and are now enacted in various centres (e.g., the linguistics departments of the University of Melbourne, Latrobe University, the University of Sydney, the University of New England, and various linguistics programs elsewhere). In de Beaugrande terms (his Figure 5), the profile of these discourses is somewhat schizophrenic. On the one hand, the main mission of these linguists is to describe the Australian, Austronesian and Papuan Languages of the region (fieldwork linguistics); on the other hand there is the concern that this work be valued by American formalism by being seen as theoretically relevant (homework linguistics). This tension leads to a curious opposition between facts and theory—consider Dixon, 1973, p. xix, introducing his well-known grammar of Dyirbal:
The grammar is written at two distinct 'levels.' The 'facts' of the grammar...are described in Chapters 3, 4 and 6. Chapter 5 interprets some of these facts, setting up explanatory generalisations and describing the 'deep' grammar of Dyrrish...It has seemed desirable to (at least partially) separate facts from interpretations...

This naively positivist notion of unthcorited facts is deconstructed in some details in Matthiessen and Nesbitt 1996 and need not detain us here. More important is the kind of language description it promotes. The proliferation and rapid turn-over of theories in America (which is how formalists sustain a market for their own work) means that it is next to impossible for Australian linguists to stay in touch; by the time something gets to Australia and is taken up, it is often out of date. As Dixon 1972: xix continues: "As linguistic theory progresses (sic) Chapter 5 is rather likely to stand in need of revision; this is unlikely to be true for Chapters 3, 4 and 6."

This means that descriptions of language inspired by the ANU tradition lean towards the so-called facts—an account of phonology and morphology and a little syntax (often drawing on Dixon's SOA notation; Dixon, 1991, p. 11), based as far as possible on what a Whorf referred to as phenotypes—grammatical categories realised through overt morphological marking. Basically what we end up with is a belated manifestation of Bloomfieldian structuralism, although with rather less syntax than Bloomfield in fact offers his canonical Tagalog Texts with Grammatical Analysis (1917), and typically with few or any texts to back up the analysis (unlike Bloomfield).

In general then, in these mainstream Australian discourses, theory is viewed with suspicion; and this carries over to the attitude adopted towards Halliday's functionalism, which ranges along a scale from hostility at one end to malign tolerance at the other. This is coloured of course by the fact that two of Australia's most influential linguists, Dixon and Huddleston, did their Ph.D's with Halliday in London in the 1960s and subsequently moved radically away from functionalism in order to have their work valued by the hegemonic discourse of American formalism. As former students of Halliday their representation of Halliday's work are taken as authoritative, and their students rest assured that Hallidayan functionalism has nothing to offer as far as fieldwork linguistics is concerned (the malign tolerance position) and should be repressed elsewhere (hostility).

Perhaps I should clarify my own reading position here. My apprenticeship into the field (1968-1977) involved training in generative grammar (Bob Binnick, Jack Chambers), stratificational grammar (Al Gleason, Peter Reich), American structuralism (Al Gleason, Bill Samarin) and systemic functional linguistics (Michael Gregory, Michael Halliday). Since my main interest was in discourse analysis, as inspired by one of Gleason's students, Waldemar Gutwiniki, I have tended over the years to work within the general framework of Hallidayan theory, blended with Hartford stratificationalism where fruitful. For the first 10 years of my professional career, I worked in the department founded by Halliday at the University of Sydney. When he retired in 1988 the department was taken over by
linguists professing the ANU discourses outlined above, who have moved systematically since that time to bring the department back into line with American formalism. By 1995 I had to advise anyone interested in my work to enroll elsewhere, since changes in staffing and values meant that adequate training in functional linguistics was no longer available. The next year Grabe and Kaplan, two leading American applied linguists, published their state of the art textbook, *The Theory and Practice of Writing*, in Britain as part of Longman’s well-known Applied Linguistics and Language Study series. My name is cited more often than any other in its index; and the term genre is cited more than any other in its subject index. Such is life, in Academe.

My experience with this transformation confirm all of de Beaugrande’s observations about formalism in relation to exclusive theory and practice. There are many stories to tell. In 1996, for example, it fell to me to lead the 4th Year Honours Research Seminar, which is designed to support students with the thesis that will more or less decide their fate as far as postgraduate study in linguistics is concerned. The students were concerned with various formalist agendas, including optimality theory and binding. Their general ambition, as inspired by my colleagues in the Department, was to win a scholarship and go to America, where the theories they were working with come from. I think what surprised me most was the similarity between their contemporary agendas and the work I had pursued in my own generative linguistics training some 25 years earlier. Even more than before, formal syntax seemed to be about anaphoric relations inside the clause (a considerably reduced agenda); but this agenda is now pursued through a considerably elaborated descriptive apparatus, which might involve up to four tiers of analysis, with clauses parsed by class (category), by function (relation), by terms (vs non-terms) and by theta roles (case), plus linking rules, all aimed at dealing with the problematic that had been established and thoroughly worked over so many years before. I was also struck by the way in which I had ‘lost my institutions’—by which I mean lost my ability to make snap judgements about whether borderline English sentences were actually English or not. This is obviously something one has to be socialised into and stick with; I can still recall (during my halcyon days as a grammaticality adjudicator) that when Haj Ross came to town I would rank clauses confidently along a 7 point scale of grammaticality, usually siding with the majority when votes had to be taken because consensus could not be reached. Now I’m so out of it I can’t even tell when a sentence is grammatical or not, and sometimes think I can say things that formal theory tells me I should not! Seriously, though, I do sympathise with de Beaugrande’s concerns about the data used in homework linguistics and the need for the development of corpus oriented alternatives.

So much for the bad news. On the slightly brighter side, the steady erosion of government funding for universities in Australia means that it is becoming ever more important for linguistics departments to pay their way. As one of his first initiatives Halliday established an M.A. in Applied Linguistics at Sydney, the first
program of its kind in the southern hemisphere, and this program continues to attract large numbers of fee paying students from overseas. Basically these students want to consume linguistics they can use, which means that social, functional and practical applied perspectives have to be foregrounded. At present the department is developing new programs of this kind, including one focusing on English for Academic Purposes. And to run these programs it's going to have to appoint new staff with expertise in social discourse analysis—precisely the expertise that it had cleansed over the preceding decade. Economic factors, in other words, are beginning to dictate to universities what kinds of linguistics they should be teaching; and in this kind of economy de Beaugrande's functionalist theories are far more marketable than formal ones.

In the short term, I expect that what will happen is that linguistics departments will stratify into a tenured rump of older descriptive/formalists supported financially by an untenured underclass of younger specialists in applied linguistics, social discourse analysis and functional linguistics—who are appointed to fixed-term contracts so that they can be fired and hired in response to money-making programs that respond quickly and directly to market needs. This is a volatile cocktail of exploitation and conflicting interests, which should resolve itself after a generation or so in reaction to the inevitable collapse of formalism. In the meantime, life will be less than pleasant, especially where the unclass of linguists includes concentrations of subjects from socially marginalised positions (i.e., from female, migrant, Aboriginal, gay and lesbian communities, and so on). Needless to say I have been appalled by developments in the department, but powerless to stop them in the face of a coalition of interest that profess an eclectic range of concerns with language but which ultimately, whenever it really matters, cringes in the direction of American formalism—which is where, after all, power in the discipline still resides.

Linguistics in the 20th century includes a fascinating cast of alter-egos: Mathesis and Saussure, Sapir and Bloomfield, Firth and Hjelmslev, Hymes and Labov, Halliday and Chomsky. In the first half of the century, the tyranny of distance meant that a genuine complementarity of distinctive discourses was maintained; in the second half, unfortunately, it is the dark side of the force that has prevailed—because it suited modernity to believe in the search for the one underlying truth; because it suits hegemony to elide language from the social, to lock it up as a set of forms and to throw the key away. Linguistics is perhaps unique among the humanities and social sciences in remaining relatively untouched by post-modernity, and the post-structuralist theory it entails. Elsewhere de Beaugrande (in press) has deconstructed the rhetoric Chomsky uses to dismiss alternative views in linguistics. Here's an example from a recent visit to Australia, directed not against his colleagues in linguistics (long since vanquished and laid to rest) but against critical theorists (who perhaps threaten his political discourse in ways that are hard to ignore):
Most of this stuff I can’t really comment on because I don’t understand a word of it. If I understand 2% I think I’m doing pretty well... Post Modernism is a big fad in intellectual life right now. It’s intriguing as an intellectual phenomenon. I don’t think there’s much in the way of intellectual substance to it. It offers people a device to be careerist, and go to conferences and get cushy jobs and write a lot of articles and be very very wealthy and live in big hotels, and keep totally disengaged from any human activity that matters, and meanwhile be more radical than thou.

Here we see the apotheosis of modernity in full cry—the outright dismissal of alternative views as lacking in substance; the seamless logic or irrationality (e.g., I can’t understand 98% of what you’re saying, so it must be rubbish). My own experience of working with the Australian critical theorists so gratuitously slandered by Chomsky on this visit leads no credence whatsoever to his views (e.g., Cranny-Francis, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995); what I find instead are thoughtful and politically committed intellectuals who have a great deal to contribute to linguists as far as learning to deconstruct texts and involve themselves in social change is concerned. Indeed, Australian functionalists have been among the leaders in the world in bridging from linguistics to relevant critical discourses (e.g., Kress & Hodge, 1988; Melrose, 1996; Thibault, 1992; Threadgold, 1997)—work which has opened up an important dialogue with the critical discourse analysis developing in Europe (Fairclough, 1992, 1995).

Unfortunately, there is no space to pursue the details of this negotiation here. What I cannot let pass however is the rhetorical closure Chomsky’s discourse ceaselessly constructs, and licenses for others and the self-serving confidence this closure engenders. Nothing has done more damage to the discipline since 1957 than closure of this kind. And in recent times it has licensed damage elsewhere—as with the recent sortie by the Gang-of-40 Massachusetts formalists into debates on literacy teaching in their state, where they lined up with reactionary forces against progressive teaching methods over the issue of phonics vs whole language, clearly without having thought through the political implications of their pronouncements of their truth. Similarly, in Australia, we regularly have to weather attacks on our functionally informed curricula and pedagogy from formalist language acquisition experts who argue that research has proved (sic) that teaching does not affect learning, since acquiring language is apparently just a matter of surrounding students with talk or print and waiting for their language acquisition device to swing into gear (à la Freedman, 1994). This is exactly what conservative governments concerned with cutting costs will want to hear—the ideal theorising for exclusive times.

I think we have had enough of this linguist by day, anarcho-syndicalist by night mentality. In Australia this split personality disorder reveals itself most clearly in the marginalised communities of Australia, South-east Asia and the Pacific where the linguists trained by the ANU and its satellites do fieldwork. Inevitably, these linguists become involved with the social and political aspira-
tions of these communities, and are strongly motivated to help where they can. But for the most part they cannot help professionally, as linguists, because their linguistics does not lend itself to either reasoning about or acting on social affairs (Martin, 1990; cf. Halliday, 1984). So when they act, they act as amateurs, who with all the best will in the world are not in a strong position to intervene effectively unless they re-train themselves to do something useful on the go. Alternatively, we might follow Halliday in construing linguistics from the start as an ideologically committed form of social action (e.g., 1985b, 1993b), and develop theory which allows us to act on the social as professional linguists by day and night—and be prepared as part of this to pay a professional and a personal price for our politics where necessary, as Halliday had to do in the first half of his career.

Perhaps we can look forward to a post-colonial linguistics in which the hegemony of American formalism is replaced with a plurality of functionalist discourses, restoring the complementarity of perspectives which characterised the half of the century (with different strokes for different folks and some measure of mutual respect all round). Personal computers and high-speed electronic communication now make it possible to form virtual communities that are not dependent on being together in a particular place for a particular time and this means that the institutional control exercised by formalists is not longer as potent a force as it has been. The advantage the future holds is that because of this technology complementary discourses can be better known to each other, and we can dialogue to make the new meanings that we need. Currently we only talk across the margins of disciplines—functionalists marginalised by linguistics talking with ethnmethodologists marginalised by sociology talking with feminist critical theorists marginalised by the literary canon talking with neo-Vygotskyan activity theorists marginalised by psychology... and so on. How much more exciting things might be if a set of complementary disciplinary centres could get involved, instead of building walls around exclusive theory and practice.

Get involved; get a life.

DEMOCRACY: TOWARDS INCLUSIVE THEORY AND PRACTICE

By way of responding to de Beaugrande’s concern with inclusive theory and practice and social justice, I’d like to draw on work by Bernstein (1996), who has been such an inspirational figure throughout the development of our educational linguistics projects in Australia (Christie, in press). More than any other figure he kept reorienting us to “...the grim obduracy of the social division of labour and of the narrow pathways to its positions of power and prestige” (Bernstein, 1975, p. 126) and to the significance of social class in relation to any discussion of democracy:
Despite clear indications of improvements in working class/race/gender educational chances, social class is a major regulator of the distribution of students to privileging discourses and institutions. If we are going to talk about democracy, culture and education, and if we are serious, then we have to consider the constraints and grip of class-regulated realities. Further we have to consider the interactions with underlying structural pressures arising out of the changing complexity of the division of labour. (Bernstein, 1996, p. 1)

Are we serious? We'd better be, since "biases in the form of content, access and opportunities of education have consequences not only for the economy; these biases can reach down to drain the very springs of affirmation, motivation and imagination. In this way such biases can become, and often are, and economic and cultural threat to democracy..." (Bernstein, 1996, p. 5). In Australia at present, access to education, to health care, to legal services, to employment and so on is being intensively stratified by a reactionary government intent on introducing the divisive policies that have failed so miserably overseas. In these excluding times, we need all the affirmation, motivation and imagination we can muster.

Bernstein proposes two conditions under democracy:

1. People must feel they have a stake in society...not only are people concerned to receive something but they are also concerned to give something.
2. People must have confidence that the political arrangements they create will realise this stake, or give grounds if they do not.

In order to achieve these conditions, Bernstein suggests we need to institutionalise three rights:

- The right to individual enhancement...has to do with experiencing boundaries as tension points between the past and possible futures...the right to the means of critical understanding and new possibilities...a condition for confidence
- The right to be included, socially, intellectually, culturally and personally...does not necessarily mean to be absorbed...may also require a right to be separate...a condition for communitas
- The right to participate...in procedures whereby order is constructed, maintained and changed...the condition for civic practice

Formulated as in Table 3, we can summarise as follows (Bernstein, 1996, p. 7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rights</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Levels</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>enhancement</td>
<td>confidence</td>
<td>individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inclusion</td>
<td>communitas</td>
<td>social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participation</td>
<td>civic discourse</td>
<td>political</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
It seems to me that this discussion provides a rich framework for positioning key issues in educational linguistics. With respect to enhancement, we have the issue of how the past is related to the future—how and when do we get critical? Is it better, for example, to withhold critique until students have mastered mainstream discourse, or should deconstruction begin from the very start? How do we encourage students to be creative with a genre, or to renovate it to suit some adjunct social purpose? The key point here lies in getting students to see that what has been meant is not all that can be meant—to move comfortably back and forth across the frontier of the past in relation to possible futures... as their texts unfold, as their life develops, as their culture evolves.

As far as participation is concerned, we have the issue of to what extent students are involved in negotiating curriculum and pedagogy—a very sensitive issue in adult education, and a concern wherever marginalised groups are involved in institutionalised learning at whatever age. In our Australian work we have approached this issue by trying to figure out the nature of the administrative discourses required for negotiation (Iedema, 1995) and checking that comparable civic discourses are made available in school; I have not been involved in taking the more radical step of involving students (and their families) in the design of learning—a step some of our colleagues working in critical theory have often urged. Also at issue here is the question of to what extent we wish to prescribe the social subjectivity of students leaving our programs. Do we simply make available mainstream discourses and leave it to students to engender possible futures? Or do we press students in the direction of the critical stances we espouse—the post-patriarchal and/or post-colonial positioning upon which we feel a more just society depends? Again, we have been less prescriptive here than some colleagues would allow.

As for inclusion, there are major issues to be faced by educational linguists as they promote language as a tool for learning and critique in schools. On the one hand there is the problem of how and where to value non-mainstream discourses alongside discourses of power, always keeping in mind that institutionalised learning may not be the best site in which to value community discourses. On the other hand there is the technicality of the discipline, and the intellectual exclusion and affectual alienation it can cause. Let me follow up on this point in relation to teaching functional grammar, since the consumability of knowledge about language is one of the key issues de Beaugrande raises.

Take Halliday's description of the English nominal group for example. Put simply, Halliday suggests a function structure consisting of some combination of a Deictic, followed by a Numerative, followed by one or more Epithets, followed by one or more Classifiers, followed by a Thing, followed by one or more Qualifiers—exemplified as follows:

- those
- two
- young
- gum
- trees
- in the garden

Deictic Numerative Epithet Classifier Thing Qualifier
Table 4. Nominal Group Functions (Halliday 1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>grammatical function</th>
<th>question answered</th>
<th>typical word class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deictic</td>
<td>which one?</td>
<td>determiner (a, some, the, this, that...)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numerative</td>
<td>how many/much?</td>
<td>numeral (one, two, three..., first, second, third...), adjective (many, few, several)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epithet</td>
<td>what like?</td>
<td>adjective (big, round, red...)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classifier</td>
<td>what kind?</td>
<td>noun (stone, brick, steel...)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thing</td>
<td>what?</td>
<td>noun (wall, house, pan...)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualifier</td>
<td>long what like? [Often specifying which one]</td>
<td>prepositional phrase [in the garden] embedded clause [[that lived down one of my streets]]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An overview of this analysis is provided in Table 4, which includes a list of wh words as a guide to the meaning of the functions (relations) involved, and specification of the typical word classes (categories) realising functions. Of course the relation between function and class is not one to one: a given class can perform more than one function (e.g. noun as Classifier or Thing—gum trees), and a given function can be realised by more than one class (e.g. Epithet by adjective or verb-young trees vs. thriving trees). It's for this reason that Halliday uses function labels in addition to word class levels; if complementary label for what something does and what it is are not used, then the grammarian must find some other way of showing the difference in meaning between a frying fish (Epithet Thing) and a frying pan (Classifier Thing) for example. If we simplify the grammar, restricting our description to class label for words, then all we are doing is shifting complexity elsewhere—perhaps to our tree diagrams, perhaps to another level (lexis or semantics).

Halliday's class labels are relatively accessible to anyone with a background in traditional grammar, which focuses on word classes (the parts of speech). Note however that they are not very transparent semantically—unless you know what and adjective does you aren't likely to derive its function from the label. Halliday's function labels on the other hand are less familiar; and he uses a mix of Angle-Saxon (Thing), Latinate (Classifier, Numerative) and Greek derived (Deictic, Epithet) terms. Interestingly enough, my university students generally feel least comfortable with Things, since they expect a technical discipline like linguistics to have technical sounding terms, and in English this means deriving terms from Latin or Greek! As far as accessibility is concerned, they generally feel more comfortable with the Latin labels than the Greek ones.
Let’s set aside the issue of community techno-phobia when it comes to talking about language, and consider how this description might be adapted for use in infants and primary school (Rothery, 1989, Martin & Rothery, 1993). Because we are concerned with a grammar students can use, we have preferred to concentrate on function labels as opposed to class ones; this simplifies the description considerably (but gives the misleading impression to politicians and journalists that functional grammars don’t include the parts of speech). The next step is to get rid of the Greek, which teachers find intimidating, and so think their students will too (anyone with children interested in dinosaurs knows on the other hand that some kids thrive on technicality)—so Pointer in place of Deictic and Describer in place of Epithet. We’ve found students and teachers are comfortable with Classifier, but feel better if we replace the other Latinate labels—Number or Numerative and Long Describer (thus opposed to Short Describer) for Qualifier. This translation is outlined below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pointer</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Short Describer</th>
<th>Classifier</th>
<th>Thing</th>
<th>Long Describer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deictic</td>
<td>Numerative</td>
<td>Epithet</td>
<td>Classifier</td>
<td>Thing</td>
<td>Qualifier</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The result is a semantically transparent analysis that has proven very digestible for students, beginning in infants school (age 6/7). Of course, from a disciplinary perspective we’ve lost something in the translation—measure adjectives (e.g., many few, several) function as Numeratives (Number) but aren’t numbers; not all Pointers point (e.g., a, some); and so on. But the price seems a reasonable one to pay when first getting students and teachers off the ground. The costs of the relabelling can be taken up in time as students run into difficulties and begin to challenge the labels themselves. In the meantime the description gives students a tool for thinking about report writing and description in narrative, which they use to gain more control over these genres (Rothery 1989). Later on, these understandings of nominal group structure will prove critical when students are introduced to the functions of nominalisation in secondary school (the issue of grammatical metaphor introduced in relation to Mandela’s recount above).

Currently there is a broad spectrum of materials addressing different kinds of consumer needs as far as functional grammar is concerned. Roughly in order of complexity, from most introductory to most advances, these now include: Gerot & Wignell, 1994; Butt et al., 1995; Collerson, 1994; Knapp & Watkins, 1994; Thompson, 1996; Lock, 1996; Bloor & Bloor, 1995; Eggins 1994; Halliday 1994; Martin et al., 1997; Matthiessen, 1995. And I don’t believe the market is saturated by any means. We also need to keep in mind that making things simpler for educational purposes is not the only need. There are other kinds of consumers, such as computational linguistics, who require a good deal more technicality, explicitness and detail than Halliday, 1994 or even Matthiessen, 1995 provide (Matthiessen & Bateman, 1991). Beyond this, there are points at which a descrip-
Table 5. Realisations for Primary and Secondary Tense Selections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>primary tense</th>
<th>secondary tense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>future</td>
<td>will</td>
<td>be going to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>present</td>
<td>-s form</td>
<td>be -ing form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>past</td>
<td>-ed form</td>
<td>have -en form</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...tion, however apt, runs counter to familiar ways of thinking about and representing grammar. English tense is a case in point, and aspects of Halliday's notation appear to worry de Beaugrande, who suspects him of offering a palliative for formalists.

As a next to final step I’ll explore this just a little. Halliday (1994) argues that the English tense system consists of three terms, past, present and future; and he suggests that the system is a recursive one—meaning that tense can be chosen more than once, with up to five tenses possible (e.g. had been going to have been taking). The first time round tense is realised in the past by the -ed form of the verb (took), in the present by the -s form of the verb (take or takes depending on person and number), and in the future by will followed by the infinitive form of the verb (will take). After the first selection, however, tense is realised differently - past by have followed by the -en form of the verb, present by be followed by the -ing form of the verb, future by be going to followed by the infinitive of the verb. These realisations are summarised in Table 5.

Now clearly this is a complicated account; but it is also a very elegant one as far as a very complex region of English grammar is concerned. It is further complicated by the fact that the realisation of the secondary tenses is discontinuous—so that in a verbal group like were whaling, were signals primary past (it’s one of the -ed forms of the verb be) and in addition it is part of the realisation of secondary present (be followed by the -ing form of whaling). The structure is outlined in Figure 6, which in addition takes note of the mirror image patterning of tenses in the verbal group in relation to temporal circumstances in the clause (for were whaling for several months a year by 1500).

'present in past'

[primary past] [secondary present] 'ongoing' 'back then'

-ed form be -ing form
were whaling for several months a year by 1500

Figure 6. English Time—Tense in Relation to Time Adverbials
Grammar doesn’t get much more complicated than this (for details and argumentation against competing formalist accounts see Matthiessen, 1996). As de Beaugrande points out, Halliday does use some Greek notation to represent tense structure; $\alpha$ for primary tense, $\beta \gamma \delta \varepsilon$...for secondary, $\gamma$ for past, $\beta^0$ for present and $^+$ for future. So the tenses in *were whaling* can be represented as $\alpha - \beta^0$. Beyond this Halliday suggests that the tenses can be named in English, beginning with the last choice made; in these, presumably more accessible terms, the tense of *were whaling* is present in past. And this does seem to be an appropriate characterisation of its meaning—namely that something happened in the past with respect to the moment of speaking (*by 1500*), but that if we take for a moment the perspective of that activity in the past then it was an activity that was ongoing (*for several months a year*). Thus *were whaling* contrasts with *whaled* (past), *had whaled* (past in past) and *were going to whale* (future in past).

Complexity admitted, it seems to me that the value of this kind of analysis is worthwhile as soon as one tries to apply it to discourse. Here’s a short passage from the modelling stage of our teaching/learning cycle (Figure 2 above); the teacher is reviewing the first expositions written as individuals by the class (Martin, in press, a).

What some people did the other day was they all had these wonderful ideas in their introduction or thesis and I was all ready to read about them and I got to the end and they hadn’t talked about all these things they had told me they were going to tell me.

The finite verbal groups are tensed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verb</th>
<th>Tense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>did</td>
<td>past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>had</td>
<td>past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>was</td>
<td>past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>got</td>
<td>past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hadn’t talked</td>
<td>past in past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>had told</td>
<td>past in past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>were going to tell</td>
<td>future in past</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first four choices are for past, placing the events recounted as preceding the moment of speaking—as happening *the other day*. The text unfolds through time up to where the teacher says *I got to the end*; at this point she wants to retrace her steps and talk about events that happened previously. So she chooses past in past (*hadn’t talked, had told*) to place the talking and telling before her reading. Then she refers to something that the students said they were going to do between the time when they said they’d do it and the time when she was going to read it—so she selects future in past, *were going to tell*, to fit the event in. If the final clause hadn’t been located in time by the projecting clause *they had told me*, matters might have been more complicated still:
What some people did the other day was they all had these wonderful ideas in their introduction or thesis and I was all ready to read about them and I got to the end and they hadn’t talked about all these things they *had been going to tell me.*

Without the projecting clause to position *were going to tell,* it now takes three tense selections to appropriately place the events in relation to each other: future (*be going to*) in past (*have -en*) in past (*-ed*):

\[
\text{had been going to tell me} \quad \text{‘future in past in past’}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{-ed} & \text{have... -en} & \text{be going to} & \text{tell} \\
\alpha^- & \beta^- & \gamma^+ & \delta \text{ event} \\
\text{past} & \text{past} & \text{future} \\
\end{array}
\]

Glossing crudely, the primary past selection means ‘before now’; the secondary past means ‘before before now’; the tertiary future means ‘after before before now.’ I think the glosses make it clear how efficient the tense system is, as opposed to temporal lexis. The interdependency of these temporal meanings, with successive selections taking preceding selections as their point of reference, is outlined in Figure 7 below.

Now, this is hard to consume—some might even say extravagant (or perhaps Byzantine if we feel shy about reflecting the richness of language in our grammars). But it is certainly not without interest, and it takes us far beyond traditional concerns with subject/verb agreement we hear about from politicians and the media. Significantly, it allows us to read the temporal development of the text in a way that the morphology based two-term tense system (past/present) of formalism does not—since such a description has no concept of ‘future in the past.’ Halliday’s analysis displays tense as a semantic resource for placing up events in

![Figure 7. The Temporal Meaning of *had been going to tell*](image)
temporal relation to each other, which native speakers take for granted—BUT which speakers of English as a second language have to learn. There is certainly a market for this description in ESL contexts, where the potential for at least three rounds of tense has to be enabled, at least as far as listening is concerned. We don’t yet have the materials to teach these meanings. But we do have many of the descriptions we need (with power to burn)—to facilitate inclusion, socially, intellectually, culturally and personally.

Be extravagant; get real.

ORIENTATION

In its most recent editorial attack on functional grammar, the Sydney Morning Herald, one of Australia’s leading broadsheet newspapers, referred to my education linguistics colleagues and I as “ideological linguistic warriors.” This was intended to dismiss our efforts as too self-serving and political—as driven by ideology and so dispensable, suspicious and unsound. I found this a little annoying on the day, since the editorial was celebrating the purging of functional grammar from the NSW English syllabus. But over time I have to confess to feeling a little inspired by the label... I reckon ideological linguistic warriors is what more of us need to become as we try to “put into inclusive practices the inclusive theories whereby the social order is legitimated, and bring democracy out of our institutional policy documents, election speeches, and newspaper editorials, and into our ordinary lives” (de Beaugrande, 1997, p. xx)—making trouble—as Jay Lemke calls it (e.g., Lemke, 1995).

To make trouble we have to put our theories on the line and renovate them or replace them until they do what we want them to do. I’ve attempted here to give some sense of how Australian functionalists have tried to do this, and there are certainly affine initiatives elsewhere—for example Britain’s all too dangerous LINC project (Carter, 1990, 1996) and work on critical language awareness (Fairclough, 1992); and Kutz’s exciting suggestions for renovating linguistics teaching in America (Kutz 1997). The thing that’s foremost in my mind at present is that we have to do more than persuade our colleagues in linguistics and education; we have to learn to manage the media, bureaucrats and politicians as well. Otherwise the arguments we win in theory, we may lose in practice. Given all of the resources we have wasted on socially irresponsible linguistics over the last 40 years, our track record can only improve. It’s time.

Just do it.

NOTES

1. In Queensland, functional linguistics in fact informs the English syllabus from Years 1 through 10; in addition the national curriculum of the Adult Migrant English Service has been based on functional principles since the early 90’s (Feez & Joyce, 1996; Hyon, 1996).
2. He adds: "It is a matter of interest that this top right-hand quadrant is regarded as conservative but has often produces very innovative and radical acquirers. The bottom right-hand quadrant shows a radical realisation of an apparently conservative pedagogic practice... each theory will carry its own conditions of contestation, 'resistance', subversion." (Bernstein, 1990, p. 73)

3. S is intransitive subject, A transitive subject and O transitive object.

4. In the early 1990s, at the University of Melbourne, the applied linguists in fact left linguistics to start a program of their own; within a couple of years, the University decided that the theoretical linguists were not viable as a group on their own and forced the groups to rejoin, appointing an ANU trained formalist as Professor to take charge.

5. In general mainstream Australian linguists do not like to be called formalists; I prefer however to judge people on the basis of what they do rather than what they say, and am using de Beaugrande’s categories accordingly.


7. Recently the Australian Linguistics Society has sponsored a project designed to reach out to schools by designing a senior secondary schools linguistics course, to be taught as an option, presumably by English teachers (inspired by a similar development in Britain). This centripetal exercise, in other words, involves formal linguists reproducing themselves in schools and contrasts sharply with initiatives by Australian functionalists to promote language as a tool for learning across the curriculum. Needless to say, as an early step in their intervention, the formalists have moved to discredit functional initiatives (cavalierly dismissed by Victorians as the “mistakes of other states”), using a range of misrepresentations—such as the nonsense that systemic grammar is only useful for English, that it is not concerned with historical change and so on. In Britain, on the other hand, where functionalism is not perceived as a threat (since Halliday emigrated), formalists and functionalists worked together (thanks to Ron Carter’s leadership; Carter, 1990, 1996).

8. The grammatical terms we have inherited were of course much more semantically transparent when introduced by Greek grammarians for Greeks or Latin grammarians for Latin—*nomen* from the Latin *nomen*, meaning ‘name’ for example.

REFERENCES


